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ABSTRACT 
The published papers and accompanying essay which make 
up this doctoral thesis examine economic aspects of the 
competitive process in mature product industrial markets 
and draw implications for competition policy. The 
analysis of price competition relates patterns of price 
leadership and discount competition to features of market 
structure (using the UK petrol market as a case study) 
and examines the influence of large buyers on price 
determination. Policies towards buying power and price 
discrimination in several countries are compared and 
appraised. The analysis of long-run adjustment and 
competitive equilibrium focuses on the diversification 
process,analysing the industry structure determinants 
of the inter-industry pattern of diversification within 
a risk/return framework. The same risk/return optimis-
ation provides the basis for an examination of the role 
of risk differentials in determining inter-firm and 
inter-industry differences in return on capital. Some 
implications are drawn for the interpretation by 
competition authorities of the returns earned by dominant 
firms. 
5 
PART ONE 
ASPECTS OF PRICING BEHAVIOURAND LONG-RUN 
CDr1PETITIVE ADJUSTMENT IN INDUSTRIAL 
MARKETS WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR 
. . - , 
COMPETITION POLICY: AN INTEGRATIVE 
ESSAY 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
ATTACHED PAPERS BY R.M. GRANT , 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ATTACHED PAPERS BY R.M. GRANT 
Since this submission for a research degree principally comprises 
a selection of my published papers, this brief thesis serves only as an 
introduction to the attached papers. The purpose of the 
introductory essa)' is threefold: 
( i ) 
( i i ) 
( iii) 
to explicitly identify the contribution of my 
papers to research in economics; 
to explain the relationships and complementarities 
between the individual papers submitted; 
to provide a fuller survey of prior research to 
which the papers contributed, together, where appropriate, 
wi,tl1 an outl ine of the Hndings of parallel and subsequent 
research studies; 
In comparison with most doctoral theses in economics, the 
principal characteristic of the papers which make up my 
submission is that they cover a broadly-defined sector of study. 
This reflects the fact that the papers arise from a number of 
separate but overlapping research projects and interests over 
a period of a decade rather than from a single, continuous 
programme of full-time research. Yet despite the apparent 
diversity of the titles of my papers, they are linked and, to 
a substantial degree, unified by a number of factors. 
The dominant theme of all the papers is the analysis of competitive 
behaviour. The division of the papers into two groups corresponds to 
the distinction between price competition (essentially short-run 
competitive behaviour) and competitive adjustment through 
] 
inter-industry resource allocation (essentially long-run competitive 
behaviour). In both areas the basic approach has been to examine 
the relationships between market structure and the competitive 
behaviour of firms, primarily in the markets for manufactured goods. 
This focus represents a central area of interest in the field of 
study that has become known as "industrial economics" or the "economics 
of industrial organisation". In seeking to explain competitive 
behaviour with reference to market structure and then to draw 
implications for economic welfare and public policy, the papers 
utilise traditional price theory and in particular the methodological 
framework of "structure-conduct-performance" analysis,which continues 
to be the dominant paradigm in industrial economics. Care has been 
devoted to avoiding any over-naive or mechanistic application of the 
structure-conduct-performance approach. For example, the work on 
industrial diversification recognises the two-way interaction of 
structure and conduct, while the adoption of a case study approach to 
examine oligopoly pricing behaviour permits the careful evaluation of 
the usefulness Of a " s tructure-conduct" analysis in explaining and 
predicting competitive behaviour at a very detailed level. 
The papers are related not only by subject matter and methodology, 
but also because they involve the application and influence of a 
th~ 
small number of key ideas. For instance, in several oflpapers 
attention is given to the importance of the structure and behaviour 
of the buying industry in influencing competitive behaviour in 
industrial markets. A further theme is the importance of risk 
in the study of industrial economics, in particular, the usefulness 
of risk concepts developed in financial economics. 
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A final unifying factor is that all the papers reflect a 
common motivation in that they deal with subjects which 
have regarded as interesting aspects of economic behaviour 
and many of which were important from a public policy 
viewpoint. Many of these interests arose 
directly from my work as an economist with the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission where I recognised a number of 
features of competitive behaviour by firms that had not been 
sufficiently appreciated by academic economists or adequately 
addressed by the standard mic'roeconomic literature'. These i.ncluded the 
prevalence of price leadership across much of manufacturing 
industry; the impact of buying power in intermediate 
markets; the complex composition of "market pricell in terms 
of list price, discounts, rebates, credit terms and so forth 
and the differential behaviour of list and non-list components 
of price; the importance of diversification as a source of 
entry and a mechanism for resource allocation; and the 
apparent failure,even of competitively structured industries, 
to adjust to competitive equilibrium earning IInormaltl profit. 
The absence of satisfactory analysis of these features of market 
behaviour and performance has been less a weakness of 
conventional microeconomic analysis,as a failure to recognise 
and examine these pheonomena.Hence before moving towards the 
development of new theoretic approaches or retreating to 
ad hoc institutionalism and description, a first priority 
was to apply conventional microeconomic theory to the analysis 
of these problems in the form of Marshall ian neoclassical 
9 
analysis together with the further insights and tools provided 
by "structure-conduct-performance" approach to industrial 
economics(associated in particular with work of J.S. Bain, 
1956). The attached papers all reflect the desire to use 
standard tools of economic analysis to explain,as simply and directly 
as possible, important and interesting aspects of industrial market 
behaviour. 
In terms of the specific additions to the stock of economic 
knowledge, I consider that the papers which make up this 
doctoral submission have made the following contributions: 
1. The analysis of pricing behaviour in oligopoly. 
The analysis of price competition in the UK wholesale 
market for petrol (Grant 1982) has both descriptive 
and theoretical value. As an account of pricing 
behaviour in an oligopolistic industry supplying a 
homogeneous product,it clearly reveals several features 
which appear to be typical of such industries. 
First, a pattern of pricing based upon published 
list prices and various off-list discounts and rebates 
with a dichotomisation of collusive and competitive 
tendencies between list prices and discounts. Second, 
notable changes in the pattern and the extent of 
competitive behaviour over time in response to changes 
in market structure and a tendency towards instability 
of oligopolistic price equilibrium. At the 
theoretical level, the paper takes some modest steps 
towards bridging the gulf between the complexity of 
observed oligopoly price behaviour and the abstraction 
10 
of formal models of oligopoly price 
determination. To do this the paper synthesises a 
number of the hypotheses which have been proposed 
in the industrial organisation literature concerning 
the relationships between market structure and pricing behaviour, 
and shows how this informal theory of oligopoly achieves consider-
able success in explaining and predicting the general features of 
pricing behav~our in the UK petrol market and changes over time in 
the intensity of competition and level of price. 
2. Buying power and policies towards price discrimination. 
The conventional textbook classification of markets 
focuses upon the structure of the supply side, notably 
upon seller concentration. Yet most of the markets 
for producer goods are characterised by bilateral 
oligopoly and probably the most important structural 
change in the wholesale markets for consumer products 
has been the growth of concentration, and hence buying 
power, in the retail sector. This has had far-reaching 
consequencies for price determination, marketing and the overall 
competitive strategies pursued by the manufacturers of consumer 
goods. 
The analysis of price discrimination (Grant 1979; 
English version: Grant 1980), focuses upon the role of 
large buyers in influencing prices and argues that the 
traditional approach to the analysis of oligopsony, 
as a mirror image of oligopoly, does not accord 
either with the nature of buying power or with observation. 
1 1 
The analysis developed in the paper examines oligopsony 
within the framework of oligopoly theory and shows 
that buying power rests not upon collusive tendencies 
among concentrated buyers, but on the ability of large 
buyers to counteract the market power of 01 igopol ists 
and provoke competition between them. 
The growth in concentration in the retail sectors of 
most industralised countries since the beginning of the 
1960s and the growing buying power of the large retail 
chains has been one of the most pressing and difficult 
problems facing the competition authorities in these 
countries. In response to the difficulties of applying 
established monopoly legislation to the problems of 
buying power, several countries have introduced new 
measures against buying power and price discrimination. 
In "Recent developments in the control of price 
discrimination in countries outside North America" 
(Grant 1981b), the experiences of France, West 
Germany, Ireland and Australia with new price discrimination 
measures are compared. Some remarkable similarities 
are apparent in'the objectives and implementation problems 
in the four countries which parallel the much-discussed 
experience of the United States with the Robinson-Patman 
Act. On the basis of my findings, some general conclusions 
are drawn regarding the use of competition Jaw to deal with 
the problems of price discrimination add buying power. 
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3. Industrial diversification. 
While the level of industry price and output in the 
short run results chiefly from the extent of price 
competition between the firms in the industry, over 
the long term, it is the movement of resources between 
industries that is fundamental to the establishment 
of competitive equilibrium. Conventional analysis has 
implicitly assumed that the adjustment towards long run 
equilibrium occurs through the entry of new firms and 
exit (through liquidation) of established firms. 
In practice,an important mechanism for inter-industry 
resource adjustment is diversification by established 
firms. My two papers on industrial diversification 
attempt to analyse the structural factors which influence 
the extent and the direction of diversification. 
The first (Grant 1974) argues that the analysis of 
diversification behaviour does not require complex 
managerial theories of the firm but can be approached 
using the conventional motivational assumption that 
firms seek to maximise shareholder wealth through 
maximising expected return and minimising risk. 
In the second paper (Grant 1977) the analysis is further 
developed and is used to generate and test predictions 
concerning the inter-industry pattern of diversification 
by UK manufacturing firms between 1963 and 1968. An 
innovatory feature of these papers is the application of 
the Sharpe/Lintner concept of "systematic risk" to the 
analysis of structure-conduct relationships in industrial 
economics. Past research in industrial organisation 
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has given insufficient attention to the role of risk and 
has tended to look at specific sources of risk and 
subjective attitudes towards risk. The advantage of 
the Sharpe-Lintner approach is that it provides an 
overall measure of risk for the firm. which is empirically 
measurable and is soundly based upon optimising behaviour by 
investors and equilibrium in the securities markets. 
4. Risk and long run competitive equilibrium. 
The growth of industrial diversification and the 
ability of diversification by large firms to breach 
conventional barriers to entry raises issues for the 
establishment of long run competitive equil ibrium across 
industries. At the simplest level, long run competitive 
equilibrium involves the establishment of the "normal" 
rate of profit across industry. "The relationship 
between risk and rate of return on capital in UK industry" 
(Grant 198ta) argues that the competitive rate of return on 
capital depends upon the degree of industry risk, where 
the appropriate risk measure is the systematic risk of firms' 
equity return adjusted for the degree of leverage. 
This measure of risk gives a remarkably good explanation 
of differences in rates of return between firms in 
competitively structured industries. The implication is 
that a failure to take account of risk has been a major 
weakness of the many studies which have sought to relate 
industry profitability to market structure. 
14 
...... 
A practical application of this empirically measured 
relationship between risk and the competitive rate of 
return is in the identification of monopoly profit. 
Grant (1978) examines some of the difficulties which 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission has encountered 
in interpreting the rates of profit earned by dominant 
firms. It is suggested that in preference to comparing 
the return on capital of the monopoly enterprise with 
the average for industry, a more sophisticated approach 
would be to compare the company's return on capital with 
the risk-adjusted competitive rate of profit. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PRICING BEHAVIOUR IN OLIGOPOLY INDUSTRIES 
The primary motivation underlying my study of pricing in the UK 
market for petrol (Grant 1982) was di:.satisfaction over the lack 
of integration between the theory of 01 ~[opoly and the empirical 
study of pricing behaviour in the markets for manufactured 
products. The absence of an integrated and general theory of 
oligopoly capable of explaining and predicting pricing behaviour 
across the range of concentrated industries represents one of the 
major failures of economic science. Part of the problem may be a 
misdirection of effort: as Needham has noted, "traditional analy-
sis of 01 igopoly models in economics, has with few exceptions, 
dealt with models selected for their mathematical tracta~ility 
than with their empirical relevance" (Needham 1978, p.63). A 
symptom of this failure of 01 igopoly theory to address the 
principal features of pricing behaviour in industrial markets 
is the separation in industrial economics textbooks of pricing 
theory from the discussion of empirical aspects of pricing 
behaviour (see ,for example,Scherer 1980, chapters 5-12; Hay and 
Morris 1979, chapters 4-7; Needham 1978, chapter 3; Koch 1980, 
chapters 12 and 13). In examining the pricing of petrol (an 
industry selected for the richness and variety of its pricing 
behaviour in recent year~, my paper (Grant 1982) attempts to explain 
the complexities and variability of pricing behaviour using an 
informal framework of hypothesised structure-conduct relationships. 
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Although lacking in theoretical elegance and in the ability to 
generate a determinate equilibrium with predictable levels of pricing 
and profits, the approach encounters some success in analysing 
observed patterns of price behaviour. Apart from any analytical 
contribution at the descriptive level the study succeeds in identi-
fying certain features of pricing behaviour which, apart from any 
intrinsic interest. would appear to be more generally characteristic 
01 igopol istic competition. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background to my study of 
petrol pricing behaviour by relating the study to the theory of 
01 igopoly and to other empirical research into pricing in imperfectly 
competitive markets. A review of the theoretical literature 
identifies two principal strands in the analysis of oligopoly. First. 
the more formal approaches to oligopoly theory which rests upon profit 
maximising price-output decisions given specific assumptions concern-
ing the nature of 01 igopol istic interdependence (section 2.l).Second, 
are the various 01 igopoly theories which start from the presumption 
that oligopol ists behave collusively in seeking to maximise industry 
profits (section 2.2). Drawing upon both these areas of theory. section 
2.3 examines the relationship between market structure and oligopoly 
pricing with the conventional "structure-conduct-performance" approach. 
The findings of my petrol market study (Grant 1982) are summarised 
and compared to earlier work on competition in the supply of petrol 
both in the UK . , and the US (section 2.+). In section 2.5, 
the conclusions reached in relation to petrol are examined in relation to 
empirical research On pricing in other 01 igopoly industries. In 
addition to surveying other publ ished work. this section draws 
heavily upon evidence on pricing behaviour described in reports by 
18 
the Monopol ies and Mergers Commission. 
2.1. Formal approaches to 01 igopoly price 
The essential weakness of oligopoly theory identified in the petrol 
study was that: "no single theory is powerful enough to explain the 
wide range of pricing behaviour observed both across different 
industries and in the same industry over time" (Grant 1982, p.272). 
The restrictiveness of oligopoly theory in relation to the range of 
predictions of individual theories have their origins in over-specificity 
of behavioural assumptions and the narrow range of market structure 
variables which the theories incorporate. 
The central problem of oligopoly is that, unlike perfect competition or 
pure monopoly, each firm's demand and marginal revenue schedules are not 
immediately determinate because they are dependent upon rivals' reactions 
to price or quantity changes by the initiating firm. In achieving a 
solution to this indeterminac. y, two main approaches have dominated the 
literature. The first is to make specific assumptions about firm's 
expectations of how rivals react to changes in price or output 
(liconjectural variations") and then to derive a price-output equilibrium 
on the basis of optimising decisions by individual firms. The second, 
which will be examined in the following section, is to assume collusive 
behaviour by firms and to identify the factors which determine the extent 
to which the industry price will approach the pure monopoly level. 
The principal feature of most of the more formal approaches to oligopoly 
has been to achieve a determinate price-output equilibrium by 
introducing assumptions concerning conjectural variations. The basic 
19 
model here is that of Cournot (1963), a quantity adjustment model 
distinguished by each firm's assumption that changes in his own output 
leaves his rivals' outputs unaffected. Extending the analysis from 
duopoly to oligopoly causes equilibrium price and output to approach the 
perfectly competitive level as the number of firms increases. Where firms' 
market shares differ,due to cost differences between firms, then the price-
cost margin in equilibrium is HIE, ~here H is the Herffndahl index of 
1 
concentration and E is the price elasticity of market demand. This 
condition represents a simplification of the Cowling-Watetson result 
(see below) 
The basic Cournot model has been extended in several directions to 
produce a whole class of oligopoly theories. For example, more 
complex conjectural variations terms have been introduced through 
embodying adaptive expectations (Friedman 1968; Cyert and DeGroot 1973) 
While the motivation for such extensions appears to have been the desire 
for more realistic conjectural variations terms, the result has been the 
~nergen~e of a body of literature on the stability properties of equilibrium 
in Cournot type models (see, for example, Theocharis 1960~ Hahn 1962~ 
Quandt:1967; and Okuguchi 1970). A further dt'lelorw(11; has been to identify 
price rather than output as the appropriate decision variable and may be 
solved either for product homogeneity (the Bertrand model) or 
differentiated products{Scherer 1980, pp 150-152). Stackelberg's duopoly 
model (Stackelberg 1952) extends the Cournot model by introducing 
alternative conjectural variation terms: either Cournot-type "follower" 
behaviour, or "leadership" behaviour where the firm maximises profit on 
the assumption that the other behaves as a follower (for a summary see 
Cohen and Cyert 1965,pp 236-239). 
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Even the kinked demand curve model (Sweezy 1939; Hall and Hitch 1951), 
which is a theory of price stability rather than price equilibrium,is 
distinguished by its assumptions regarding conjectural variations. 
For price increases. each firm assumes that rivals l prices remain constant 
(dpj/dPi = O),for price decreases, it is assumed that rivals match the price 
change (dp./dp. = 1). The consequence is that each firm perceives a 
J I 
kinked demand schedule with the result that each firmls price is 
unresponsive to changes in cost and demand. 
The principal characteristics of these formal approaches are,flrst, their 
focus upon optimising decisions by the individual firm and, second, the 
specific assumptions which are made concerning conjectural variations. 
It is differences in these assumptions about conjectural variations whlch 
are the primary source of the different predictions of the different 
theories. Several attempts have been made at general ising these Cournot-
type models to embody a wider variety of assumptions about interdependtnce 
while preserving some predictive content. 1fhe most successful of these 
is by CowHng and Waterson (1976).2 
Maximising firm ils profit function subject to an industry demand function 
gives a first order condition~ 
d1J I _ p + x. 2E. dX de = dX. - I dX. - 0 dX • dX. I I I 
Where p is price, X. is firm i IS output, X is industry I 
output and e is cost. 
Multiplying by Xi and summing over N firms gives: 
2 
EpX. +r Xi 2E. ~ X2 
I 2'. dX • dX. • X I 
pX 
-1; 2L X dX.· i 
I 
= 0 
i . e. industry price-cost margin - Herfindahl index of concentration .A = price elesticity of demand 
Where A - E~ X 2 / E X.2 dX. i I 
I 
The analysis offers predictions as to the determinants of the level 
of price in an industry which are independent of the nature of Inter-firm 
interactions. The conjectural variations term A could take values 
corresponding to a variety of assumptions. Under the r,ournot assumption 
A would equal 1, while at the other end of the range, full collusion would 
1 imply ~equalled N where an firms are of equal size,orir where firms 
3 have differing market shares. In their empirical results, Cowling and 
Waterson obtain a regression coefficient whkhimplies that assellerconcentration 
increases,the value of the conjectural variations terms falls - i.e. 
collusion tends to fall. In examining this problen,Dickson' (1982) shows 
that this counter-intUitive result arises from an inappropriate specification 
of the conjectural variations term as an index of collusion. "To avoid such 
problems", notes Dickson (ibid p.40) , •• a collusion measure. should foc.us 
more directly on the retaliatory assumptions that firms extend to one 
another. 1I Hence Dickson proposed an index of collusion with a constant 
range, the maximum value of which does not automatically increase as 
seller concentration falls. 
The Cowl ing and Waterson model is important in that it shows that price 
and output in oligopoly are not exc~~sively a function of assumed 
conjectural variations and that concentration and demand elasticity 
are related in a systematic manner to price-cost margin, independent of 
the conjectural variations terms. The problem still remains, however, 
that the conjectural variations term enters the model as an exogenous 
variable. The central question which these theories do not answer Is what 
factors determine the way in which oligopolists interact? 
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2.2 Oligopoly coordination: collusion and price leadership. 
Dissatisfaction with the Implausibility of Cournot-type behaviour has 
encouraged the development of theories of oligopoly based upon the assumption 
that firms will seek to Increase joint profits by eschewing Independent 
pricing behaviour in favour of coordination. 
The tendency towards collusion can be incorporated 
within a formal profit maximising oligopoly model by assuming a ~olluslve 
conjectural variations term,'the result 'being a constant-market share 
demand curve for each firm and a pure monopoly solution. However such 
an approac~ fails to examine the mechanism'of·such behaviour Ignoring the 
problem~ 6f achieving"and maintaining collusive equilibrium. One of the 
major contributions of the more behavioural collusive approaches to oligopoly 
has been the identification of conditions conducive to oligopolistic 
coordination and the determinants of the resulting price level. 
The incentive for collusive behaviour among competitors 
has long been recognised in the analysis of markets. 
It was clearly identified by Adam Smith in his 
renowned statement that: "People of the same trade 
seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
publiC or in some contrivance to raise prices". 
(Smith 1910, p 117). The principle was extended by 
Chamberlain (1933) whose small group model of 
monopolistic pricing behaviour postulated that even In 
the absence of formal collusion, where the number of 
sellers .in an industry is small, recognition by firms 
of the interdependence of their price-output decisions 
would result in the attainment of a monopoly price. 
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But while there is incentive for firms to Increase 
industry profits by avoiding competitive pricing 
behaviour, It is generally recognised that collusion, 
either expl icit or taclt,is unlikely to result In the 
attainment of the pure monopoly price. The reason is 
that once a price has been established above the 
competitive level, it is in each firm's Interest to 
increase its output,by making small price reductions. 
This propensity towards price cutting (normally secret 
and selective) is the fundamental source of instability 
in collusive arrangements and the principal reason for 
the breakdown of cartels. 
An alternative approach to the analysis of oligopoly Is to 
postulate an equilibrium between the confllctlng·foree~·towards industry 
collusio~ and independent price cutting at the fir~ level. Such an 
equilibrium lies at the heart of Stigle~'s theory of oligopoly (Stigler 1964) 
which assumes that each s~ppller selectively offers secret 
price reductions to the extent that his resulting 
acquisition of market share is just compatible with 
the random movement of buyers between sellers, and hence 
his price reductions remain undetected by competitors. 
The greater are the random shifts in market share between 
suppliers, the greater is the ability of firms to 
secretly cut price. It can therefore be shown that 
the extent of price cutting, and thus the level of 
industry price, depends (positively) upon the number of 
suppliers, the fewness and size of buyers, the greater 
the frequency of entry and exit of buyers to ~nd from 
the market and the greater the differentiation of 
products by suppliers. 
Apart from detailed criticisms of the fomulation of 
Stigler's model by McKinnon (1966), in relation to 
our quest for a general theory of oligopoly price, the 
chief weakness of the Stigler model is the restricted 
circumstances to which it applies. In particular, 
the notion that suppliers will engage in price cutting 
only up to the point where they are likely to be "found 
out" implies a formal collusive arrangement. Under 
informal collusion as envisaged by Chamberlain, such 
clear limits to independent price cutting are unlikely to 
be perceived. 
The tendency for oligopolists to indulge in independent 
price cutting is only one reason why the monopoly price 
level may not be attained. Even if coordination between 
competitors is perfect, the theory of limit pricing 
predicts that the level of industry price will be 
determined by the level of barriers to entry to the 
industry, the price elasticity of market demand and 
entrants' expectations of established firms' reaction to 
its entry. By assigning Cournot-type expectations to 
the entrant(that established firms will hold their output 
constant in the event of entry), Sylos-Labini (1962) and 
Modig\.iani (19S8) derive a limit price, the level of which 
depends upon the extent of scale economies and the 
elasticity of market demand. 
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The numerous extensions t0J,.Bain-Sylos-Labini-Modiglianl 
analysis of limit pricing has done little to clarify and 
generalise the theory. While further underlining the 
importance of entry barriers for the development of 
industry structure and the competitive behaviour of firms, 
the role of entry barriers in determining the level of 
oligopoly and monopoly price has become more complex and 
confused. Some of the most useful extensions of limit 
price theory have been to recognise that entry depends 
not only upon whether industry price exceeds the limit 
price, but also on the amount by which thead:ual price 
exceeds the limit price. Thus Kamien and Schwartz (1971) 
make the probability of entry dependent upon the degree 
to which the I imit price is exceeded while Gaskins (1971) 
makes the rate of entry a function of the degree to which 
the limit price is exceeded (see Scherer 1980, pp 236-239 
for a summary of the principal features of Gaskins' 
analysis). 
More contentious has been the plausibility of the 
"Sylos Postulate" concerning the reaction of rivals to 
entry. Maintenance of pre-entry levels of output once 
entry has occurred is to forego profit by forcing down 
the level of industry price and Wenders (1971a) has 
argued that the formation of a new collusive agreement 
which includes ~e new entrant would be more rational. 
On a wider front, the whole theory of limit pricing has 
been undermined by questioning the need for limiti~g 
price in order to deter entry. 
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Entry is dete~~d by creating unfavourable expectations 
as to the post-entry behaviour of established firms 
towards entrants. While the maintenance of a pre-entry 
limit price is one means of deterring entry, a less costly 
alternative might be the threat of~sgressive post-entry price 
competition. Such threats will be more credible when 
backed by the maintenance of excess capacity in reserve 
(see, for example, Wenders. 1971b; and Spence 1977). 
A final complication is that the level of barriers to 
entry (and consequently the level of limit price) depends 
upon both the identity of the entrant and the method of 
entry. While the literature distinguishes between small 
and large scale entry, in the case of entry th(oL~h 
diversification by established firms,the level of barriers 
to entry are dependent upon the resources of the 
diversifying firm. The capacity for established firms to 
breach or circumvent conventional barriers to entry is 
enhanced further by their ability to take over an 
existing firm and to build upon a "toe-hold~acquisitiDn 
by internal investment. 4 
What emerges from this survey of limit pricing models is 
very similar to the conclusions which were drawn from the 
survey of the formal models of oligopoly which assumed 
independent pricing by firms: determinate equilibria can 
be predicted but only in highly simplified circumstances. Like the 
Cournot-type oligopoly models, I imit pricing theories deal with 
only a small number of market structure variables and incorporate 
inplausibly naive assumptions about firmst expectations. 
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The introduction of greater complexity and greater 
realism cause a loss in determinancy with the result 
that we are left with only rather imprecise qualitative 
predictions regarding the influence of structural 
variables on price. Thus, just as with seller concentration 
where it is possible to predict a positive relationship with the 
level of oligopoly price but difficult to specify the precise 
~ 
form of the relationship,~with barriers to entry it is 
similarly likely that a positive relationship to oligopoly 
price exists, but difficult to support any particular theory 
of a determinant level of price. 
Theories of limit pricing presume collusive behaviour among 
oligopolists, hence the only issue is finding the optimal 
price level for the industry as a whole. However the limit 
pricing theories, in common with the Chamberlain and Stigler 
theories, are not explicit as to how oligopolists coordinate 
their pricing decisions. Clearly, the success with which firms 
achieve collusion is a critical determinant of the level 
of industry price - particularly where cartel agreements are 
illegal. Hence,a further important contribution to the 
theory of collusive oligopoly is analysis of the process 
by which the firms in an industry achieve coordination 
of their pricing behaviour. Unlike most oligopoly theory, such 
analysis has. been firmly grounded in empirical studies of 
oligopoly pricing, particularly in certain US antitrust actions, 
notably tobacco (U.S.v American Tobacco Company 1946), steel 
(U.S. v United States Steel Cbrporation et aI, 1920and 
harvesting machinery (U.S. v International Harvester Co., 1927). 
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The principal observation of these studies - the tendency for 
suppl iers' prices to move in parallel usually with one firm acting 
as leader - has formed the basis for the theory of price 
leadership. The basic schema was proposed by Markham (1951} who 
identified three major forms of price leadership which have subseq-
uently become known as dominant firm, collusive and barometric 
price leadership. The most fully jeveloped of these models is 
dominant firm price leadership where the dominant firms sets 
his profit maximising price and output in the knowledge 
that smaller firms will act as price takers. As Markham 
recognised, however, such behaviour is merely a consequence 
of a near-monopoly market structure and, as a theory of 
oligopoly, the model lacks general interest. 5 
More interesting for students ·of oligopoly are collusive 
and barometric price leadership. Collusive price leadership 
(referred to by Markham, 1951, as "price leadership in 
lieu of an overt agreement"}describes the practice where 
coordination of prices in a concentrated oligopoly is achieved 
through one firm being recognised as a price leader. In the 
knowledge that other firms will follow initiatives, 
the price leader bears the responsibility of setting an 
industry price which is attractive to all firms in the 
oligopoly. Unlike dominant and collusive price leadership, 
barometric price leadership carries no connotations of 
uncompetitive pricing behaviour. In a industry supplying 
an homogeneous product, suppliers will be constrained by 
competitive forces to charging the same price. In this 
situation there may be some apprehension on the part of firms 
in being the initiator of price changes in response to changing 
market conditions and one or more firms may become recognised 
as price leaders simply because of their rapid identification of, 
and response to,changing circumstances in the market. As Stigler 
has noted: the barometric firm "commands adherence of rivals 
to his price only because, and to the extent that, his price 
reflects market conditions with tolerable promptness". 
6 (Stigler 1947, p 446). 
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Ono (1982) has criticised the traditional classification of 
price leadership as being based upon both market structure 
and behaviour, but without clarifying how the structure or 
behaviour is determined and without establishing any general 
model of price leadership. On the basis of a simple 
optimising model, Ono establishes whether firms will find it 
profitable to behave as price leaders or price followers. 
Ono then goes on to establish three basic types of price 
leadership: 
(i) Voluntary price leadership. where one firm has a clear 
cost advantage over his rivals. This corresponds to 
the standard dominant price leadership model, with 
the exception that the price leader doesn't necessarily 
possess the greatest market share. 
(ii) Deceived price leadership exists where followers are 
unwi 11 ing to reduce price despi te a fall in ma·rginal 
costs in order to ensure that the price leader 
maintains his leadership role. The leader is 
"deceived" into price leadership since it would be 
more profitable for him to adopt a follower role 
(Ii i) Forced price leadership occurs where price competition 
leads to all firms adopting follower roles with 
a consequent adjustment of price towards the 
competitive level, at which point it becomes 
profitable for every firm to adopt a leadership 
position. 
While Ono provides a more satisfactory derivation of leadership 
behaviour, the model does not provide an entirely convincing 
analysis of the collusive price leadership type which is the 
most interesting and prevalent of the various forms of price 
leadership behaviour. The problem appears to rise from the 
clear distinction which is made between leadership and follower 
behaviour which does not deal adequately with the 
notion of tacit collusion in 01 igopoly. 
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2.3. 
The approaches to oligopoly price determination which 
assume coordinated behaviour among firms lack the elegance 
of the more formal models which proceed from specific 
assumptions about conjectural variations. However, the 
collusive approaches have the advantage of plausibility 
in the basic behavioural assumptions and, furtherm0re, they 
lack the restrictiveness of the more formal approaches 
being more flexible in the range of pricing behaviour 
predicted. At the same time, none of the theories proposed 
is adequate from an empirical point of view. As has already 
been noted, the principal feature of oligopoly industries 
is the variety of pricing behaviour observed ranging from 
well-organised collusion resulting in a monopoly price 
level, to destructive price warfare. Indeed, individual 
industries display a wide range of behaviour often over 
fairly short periods of time. None of the theories of 
oligopoly discussed so far is capable of generating a range 
of behaviournl outcomes extending from the fully collusive 
to the highly competitive, and offering unique predictions 
based upon the structural conditions of the particular 
market. Certainly some theories do relate both to competitive 
and collusive outcomes. For example, Bishop (1960) develops 
~oligopoly theory where three possible reaction. schedules· 
are identified: a collusive equilibrium where joint profits 
are maximised, a warfare reaction and a limited warfare 
reaction. The central problem of the analysis is that the 
pricing outcome depends upon the behavioural stance adopted 
by each firm and is not determined within the model. 
Oligopoly pricing and market structure. 
In relation to our requirements for an oligopoly theory which 
is powerful enough to encompass the whole range of oligopoly 
pricing behaviour and make specific predictions based upon 
predetermined structural variables, the existing theories 
suffer from two principal short comings. First, all the 
theories consider only a limited range of structural variables. 
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For example, the Cournot-type models show only how the level 
of equilibrium price varies with seller concentration, while 
the limit price theories focus upon the height of,barriers to 
entry. Second, in all the models the range of predictions is 
constrained by the assumptions made concerning the nature of 
oligopolistic interdepence. For example, the Cournot-type 
models make highly specific assumptions about conjectural 
variations, while the collusive approaches presume particular 
types of business coordination. 
Different theories vary considerably in their restrictiveness 
- for instance,Stigler's theory of oligopoly (Stigler 1964) 
achieves a considerable degree of generality both in 
incorporating elements of competitive and collusive behaviour, 
and in relating the level of industry price to a number of 
elements of market structure. To extend our analysis even 
more widely necessitates an abandonment of determinate theories 
of oligopoly price in favour of a looser, more generalised 
approach towards the factors influencing the nature and extent 
of competitive behaviour which utilises the "structure-
condu~t-performancell paradigm based upon the work of Bain 
(1959) and Mason (1939). 
One of the earliest attempts at relating the degree of 
competition in industry to a detailed examination of the 
structural conditions of the industry was Clark's theory of 
workable competition (1940). Although the focus of Clark's 
interest was performance - the conditions under which 
socially-desirable competitive performance of industries could 
be attained - his primary concentration was on the range of 
imperfectly competitive industries. Here he considered how 
combinations of structural conditions (seller concentration, 
product differentiation, geographical distribution of firms, 
cost conditions and method of price setting) affected the 
nature and intensity of price competition. 
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Clark's analysis of market conditions conducive to 
competitive behaviour was extended in relation to oligopoly 
market structures by Bain (1950). Four patterns of competitive 
behaviour in oligopoly were identified:-
(i) Effective collusion on price and/or output quotas, 
or its equivalent through tacit collusion or 
mutually recognised interdependence - tendency 
towards monopoly price and output. 
(ii) Imperfect collusion with internal discussion, 
secret price shading, or its equivalent through 
mutually recognised interdependence - price lower 
than monopoly level, selling costs may exceed 
monopoly level. 
( iii) Conventional kinked demand pattern, resulting from 
a certain pattern of sellers' conjectures about 
their rivals' reactions - price below monopoly level. 
(iv) Chaotic competition or active price rivalry arising 
from unrecognised interdependence or inconsistent 
conjectures by rivals - prices below "normal" profit 
level, at least temporarily. 
Bain argued that market structure could effect both the choice 
of behaviour patterns and the specific results of each 
behaviour pattern in relation to the level of price and profit. 
The structural features identified by Bain were: 
(i) The level of barriers to entrx -the existence of 
subs tant i a I entry barr i ers faci 1 i tates colI us i on 
and determines the level of collusive price in relation 
to the monopoly level. Furthermore,protection from 
entry permits the achievement of a rationalised size 
distribution of firms such that all firms are producing 
at an efficient scale of operation. 
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(ii) Level of seller concentration - moderate concentration 
is likely to result in quasi--competitive behaviour 
(types (ii) and (iii) above) with the 
( iii) 
appearance of chaotic competition - very high 
concentration tends to produce type (i) collusion. 
"This hypothesis essentially rests on the premise and 
argument that given the incentive to joint profit 
maximisation, the impediments to express or. tacit 
agreement increase, while the restraint of recognised 
interdependence on independent price cutting should 
decrease {with ordinary frictions and imperfections)as 
concentration decreases, and at such a rate that a 
shift in competitive pattern results over a certain 
concentration zone within oligopoly (Bain 1950,p 43). 
The number and size distribution of buyers - high buyer 
concentration puts pressure on sellers which makes 
effective collusion among them more difficult - hence 
tending towards lower prices and profits, and possibly 
towards "destructively" low prices. 
(iv) Product differentiation - selling costs tend to be higher 
where products can be effectively differentiated, the 
principal effect of differentation on price is likely 
to be in raising entry barriers; it is difficult to 
identify the effect of product differentiation on 
price competition - it may dampen the tendency 
towards severe price competition and enhance the prospect 
for collusion on price. 
This informal approach to oligopoly price behaviour which relates 
the structure of industry to the nature of firm Interaction 
and the level of industry price has been further elaborated in 
the leading industrial organisation textbooks. The general 
approach has been to outline the structural features of industry 
which are likely to lead either to competitive or collusive 
behaviour: in Scherer's terminology "conditions facilitating 
oligopolistic coordinations" and "conditions limiting 
oligopolistic coordination" (Scherer 1980) or,following 
J.M.Blair,"centripetal" and "centifugal" tendencies (Blair 1972). 
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The hypotheses relating market structure to pricing behaviour 
are not deduced from optimising behaviour by individual firms 
reconciled in a determinant equilibrium, but are based upon some 
simplea priori postulates regarding the attractiveness and 
feasibility of collusive behaviour together with generalisations 
drawn from observed pricing behaviour in a number of industries. 
My own contribution (Grant 1982) to this informal approach to 
oligopoly pricing is in summarising and integrating a number of 
the hypotheses which have been proposed regarding the 
relationship of market structure to oligopoly price behaviour. 
The basic framework is to identify the level of industry price 
(in relation to the competitive and monopoly levels) with the 
extent to which firms can successfully coordinate their pricing 
behaviour. This is shown to depend upon: 
the profit incentive for collusive behaviour, 
the recognition of interdependence by firms, 
the ability to achieve coordination of pricing decisions, 
the successful maintenance of price above the competitive 
level. 
The next stage is to relate these behavioural factors to elements 
of market structure. The approach is entirely qualitative: 
it only indicates the factors which are likely to influence 
price and the direction of that influence. Thus, although the 
analysis identifies the variables which determine the price 
level of and, in most cases, the sign of the first order partial 
differentials, it is not possible to specify the form of the 
functional relationship so as to show the quantitative impact 
of each independent variable or the way in which the 
independent variables interact. 
Indeed, one of the specific features of my approach is that an 
equilibrium price, certainly a stable one, does not exist. 
Industry price is unlikely to be either unique or stable. 
The outcome is a balance of conflicting c~petitive and collusive 
factors, but not an equilibrium with stable properties. 
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In contrast with other theories of oligopoly, this approach 
emphasises the mechanism by which prices are set. Thus, 
published list prices facilitate the coordination of prices 
between suppliers, hence their behaviour tends to reflect the 
forces of coordination and industry discipline. Simultaneously, 
competitive pressures are manifest through a range of 
discounts, rebates and other allowances. The selective and 
semi-secret nature of discounts means that price discrimination 
between buyers Is a general feature of oligopoly industries and, 
even where parallelism of list prices is near-perfect, suppliers' 
net prices may diverge significantly from one another. 
A further prediction is that the balance of competitive and 
collusive forces is unlikely to be stable - once competitive 
initiatives are taken, then retaliation is likely resulting in 
a cumulative departure from the collusive price level. The speed 
of retaliation will depend largely upon the cross-elasticity 
of demand between competing suppliers' products (the greater the 
substitutability, the more rapid is retaliation). A further factor 
is industry demand relative to industry capacity - the greater the 
extent of excess capacity, the more willing are firms to follow a 
competitive initiative. Hence periodic price wars are likely to 
be a feature of oligopoly industries supplying standardised 
products which face a highly cyclical demand. 
The sole purpose of this market structure - oligopoly conduct 
approach to pri C'ing was to provide an analytic framework capable 
of a richer and more general explanation of observed oligopoly 
price behaviour than that provided by the more precise and 
rigorous theories of oligopoly. My research on pricing 
behaviour in the UK wholesale market for petrol provided a good 
test of the usefulness of this analysis. 
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2.4. Pricing behaviour in the supply of petrol 
The UK wholesale market for petrol provides a particularly demanding 
empirical test for any theory of oligopoly pricing. Over the period 
1970 to 1980 the industry displayed a remarklably· varied pattern of 
pricing behaviour during which the stable orderly pricing which had 
existed for several decades gave way to more flexible pricing inrer~ersed 
with temporary price wars. In view of the changability and, at times, 
instability of industry prices,the results of the study are moderately 
encouraging both in identifying characteristic features of oligopoly 
pricing and in supporting the predicted relationships between market 
structure and competitive behaviour (Grant 198~,pp 289-291). 
With regard to the general pattern of price behaviour, a clear 
distinction between coordination of list prices and competition in 
discounts, which I have argued is a general feature of those oligopoly 
industries where list prices are quoted, is clearly displayed 
(Ibid p 281). Also the tendency in industries supplying relatively 
-' 
undifferentiated products for competitive initiatives to produce 
instability in industry prices through a cumulative process of 
competitive retaliation is apparent (lQlQ,PP 288-289). 
power 
As regards the explanatory/of the structural variables, this was shown 
both qua I itatively and quantitatively, facilitated by a separation of 
short from long-term influences. Over the longer term, seller concent-
ration appeared to be the major factor influencing the ability of the 
industry to coordinate its pricing behaviour and changes in seller 
concentration were instrumental in distinguishing the earlier "collusive' period 
from the later "competitive" period. Over the short term,competitive 
behaviour was indicated primarily by the level of discounts offered. 
The extent of discount competition was showntob&dependent primarily 
on cost conditions and the case of entry, both factors being reflected 
in the level of Rotterdam spot prices for petrol relative to the UK 
scheduled wholesale price. 
The limitations of the analysis, both in relying exclusively upon market 
structure to explain and predict 
predict quantitatively the level 
conclusions (~, pp 289-291). 
pricing behaviour, and the failure to 
of price are discussed in the article's 
In spite of these qualifications, the 
paper adds substantially .to previous work on competitive behaviour in the 
UK petrol market. 
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Academic interest in the petrol market has been stimulated by the 
attention which the industry has received from government authorities. 
The industry has been subject to two Monopolies Commission investigations 
(Monopolies Commission 1965; Monopolies and Mergers Commission 1979) 
as well as an inquiry by the Department of Prices and Consumer 
Protection (1976) and several reports by the Price Commission. The 
earlier Monopolies Commission report was concerned primarily with the 
competitive effects of vertical arrangements in the industry: 
exclusive supply contracts with retailers, forward integration into 
retailing ,tie- in sales and the recommendation of retail prices by 
the petrol suppliers. The academic debate which followed the 
publication of the report was provoked by differences of opinion 
within the Commission as to the effects on competition and efficiency 
of the Ilsoh.ls system" of distribution. Tibor BC1"nalS note of dissent 
to the report (Monopolies Comnission 1965, pp 171-181) was a determined 
attac~ upon the inefficiencies and anti-competitive effects which 
he associated with the distribution practicies of the major oil 
companies. The debate which followed in the pages of Economica 
(Townsend 1965; Barna 1966) and the Antitrust Bulletin (Pass and 
Hawkins 1972; Dixon 1973) concentrated upon the impact of exclusive 
deal ing on distribution costs, capital investment in upstream 
activities and price competition at wholesale and retail levels. 
However, as with the main report, relatively little attention was 
given to the description or analysis of price competition in the 
industry. 
More detailed consideration of competitive behaviour in the UK petrol 
market was provided by Shaw (1974) and Lowe (1976). Shaw identified 
a well-coordinated pattern of price leadership among the major 
suppliers of petrol at the beginning of the 1960s, while in the course 
of the decade price parallelism became less co hi esive and the primary 
focus of price competition switched to the retail level following 
the abandonment of recommended retail prices. Shaw concluded that 
pricing by the majors did not constitute limit pricing, as Witnessed 
by the entry which took place both by small, cut-price wholesalers 
and integrated majors not previously represented in Britain. Rather 
the level of prices was designed to control the rate of entry and the 
growth of market share of the new entrants. 
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Lowe's article is of interest since it documents and analyses features ~ 
and changes in the structure of the petrol market in the period up 
to the oil crisis of 1974. Even during this period of comparative 
stability, some important changes in market structure are noted: 
the entry of new suppliers, the growth of market share by the cut-
price independent wholesalers, an acceleration in forward integration 
into retailing, and the increasing failure of the majors to 
successfully differentiate their products by advertising and promotion. 
It is notable too that Lowe identified the Rotterdam price of spot 
petrol as a major influence on the pricing behaviour of the small 
independent wholesalers. What is striking however, is that despite 
these changes in market structure, price competition was remarkably 
subdued throughout the period and it was not until the major shocks 
of the post-1973 period that oligopolistic coordination was seriously 
shaken. 
The reports by the Department of Prices and Consumer Protection (1976) 
and the Monopolies and Mergers. Commission (1979) Were stimulated by 
the sudden change in the competitive environment of the petrol suppliers 
after 1974 and concern {voiced primarily by retailers} that the pricing 
behaviour of the majors might be both predatory and discriminatory 
(directed in particular agains.t small wholesalers and independent 
retailers). The reports documented some of the principal features of 
wholesale price competition over the period and the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission report went as far as to relate changes in 
pricing behaviour to the evolution of the competitive structure of the 
industry and changes in the balance of supply and demand (Monopolies 
and Mergers Commissionl979b,chapter 3). 
The outbreak of price competition after 1974 was unprecedented in the 
history of the British petrol supply industry. However, such a pattern 
of temporary, local ised price wars interspersed with periods of 
comparative stabi I ity are an establ ished feature of competition in the 
US petrol market. For this reason a brief review of US· studies on 
competition in petrol supply is useful. As in the UK, academic study 
of the US petroleum industry was s~!~ulated by the active interest of 
the antitrust authorities in the structure and practices of the Industry. 
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Following the break-up of StandardQil in 1911,the industry was 
under constant scrutiny from Congress, the Justice Department and 
the Federal Trade Commission. After the Second World War the 
industry was subject to a nu~mber of Congressional inquiries (U S 
House of Representatives 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957; U.S. Senate 1952, 
1953, 1956). The result was a number of detailed studies of 
competition in the supply of petroleum products, and petrol in 
particular, covering the period 1940-1958. 
The purpose here is not to provide a detailed survey of the literature 
on price competition in the United States petrol supply industry, but 
to briefly examine the principal findings of some of the key U S 
studies to compare them with my own for the UK, and to determine to 
what extent the hypotheses which I advanced concerning the relationship 
between market structure and pricing behaviour are supported by the 
U S evidence. 
De Chanzeau and Kahn (1959) provided one of the most thorough 
investigations into structure and competition in the U S petroleum 
industry. What is apparent from their study. which makes the U S 
petrol supply industry interesting for purposes of comparison with 
the UK, wasthat its organisation, in terms of the main groups of 
participants and their relationships,was similar to that of the U K. 
Integrated oil companiesaccomtedfor the majority of the product 
flow from refining to retailing, and almost half of retail outlets 
were wholesaler-owned at the end of the 1950s. A number of independent 
wholesalers operated including distributors of the ~ended petrol of 
the integrated majors and the independent marketers which purchased 
from refineries and terminals and suppli'edunder their own brand or under 
no brand at all. Independent wholesalers purchasedeither on long term 
contracts or on a spot basis. The principal differences between the 
US and UK markets\>ere,first, the US is geographically se'gmented 
which meant that market structure varied between regions and suppliers 
to one region \>ere potential entrants to adjacent regions, second, 
independent wholesalers werelonger established and occup!ed larger 
shareof the market than in the UK, third, a number of non-integrated 
refiners axistedwhich provided comparatively secure sources of supply 
for the independent wholesalers and ensur~active spot markets for petrol 
in the principal refining areas. 
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The pattern of pricing behaviour described by De Chazeau and Kahn 
( D & K), over the period from the late 1920s to the end of the 1950s 
showed many similarities to that observed in the UK during 1970-80. 
Announced prices to retailers, the tank-wagon price, provided the 
focal point for price leadership among the integrated majors. The 
role of leadership was traditionally exercised by the Standard Oil 
companies which continued to dominate their respective territories 
after Standard Oil's dissolution. in 1911. The .pattern of pr,icing bore 
many res~mblences to that predicted oy the dominant tirm price 
leadership model: t he Standard companies maintained en industry price 
level which was largely followed by the smaller companies and which 
was accompanied by a steady loss of market share by Standard (!..Ql.s1., 
pp. 403-406). 
Further evidence on price leadership during this period is provided in 
the Brookings study of big business pricing (KaplaJn et Cll 1958) and by 
Sain (1945). On the Eastern seaboard Esso was a consistent price leader, 
its price being determined primarily on a cost-plus basis by cost of 
crude plus transportation cost, less the sales realisation from fuel 
oi 1 and other fractions (Kaplan et al. 1958, pp!:i0-85 ). Gulf on the 
other hand, despite its size, exercised very little pricing initiative 
and invariably followed Standard's lead (ibid. ,p 206 ). On the 
Western seaboard. Sain noted that price leadership was the principal 
means of averting instability and was inevitable in view of the level of 
concentration: "price leadership by Standard was recognised in fact and 
was followed consistently with only minor defections by the other 
majors~ (Bain 1945, p. 291). 
While the same forces for coordination of prices between the major petrol 
supplie~exis~ in the US as in the UK, the achievement of coordination 
was rendered more difficult in the US by the more competitive structure 
of the industry. as indicated by the importance of independent refiners 
and wholesalers and the importance of spot markets for petrol. 0'& K placed 
consid~ra~eemphasis on the role of the spot market as a competitive 
influence upon petrol prices, this parallellecthe role of the Rotterdam 
market on UK pricing during the period 1975-80 (Grant 198~ pp 283-289). 
The "significant and controversial question" identified by 0 & K 
(1959, pp 393-394). was "whether and to what extent (the spot markets) 
assure competitive pricing throughout the industry". 
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The answer they gavewa:; that, despite the small proportion of petrol 
sales through spot markets, spot petrol markets exerted a powerful 
influence on the level and structure of wholesale prices: "the short 
t'3il has wagged the huge dog" (Ibid,p. 398). The spot price 
"signifies to, all marketers the price at which their competition can 
purchase': thus spot priceswEI"e "sensitive barometers of industry wide 
conditions of supply and demand, and the basis to which all prices 
must conform (l.!2J.g, p. 394). 
o & K identifioo ~e strategy of the majors over the period as a quest 
for stability in a potentially turbulent ma~ket, the essential 
ingredient of such stabilitywas an avoidence of price competition 
through price leadership backed by forward integration to limit the 
potential for instability. "Forward integration therefore plays some 
part in making price leadership effective. The concern of the Integrated 
refiner to shun price wars and to insulate his operations as far as 
possible from the competition of disorderly independents who have no 
good alternative to price cutting" involved the establishment of 
differentiation through brand advertising and the provision of services 
at retail filling stations (ibid,PP 446-447). 
But even the absence of independent wholesalers, 0 & K identified 
competitive tendencies amongst the integrated majors. In the main this 
was reflected not in direct price competition but in the offer of service 
station leases at nominal rents,the provision of equipment at subsidised 
rates and the willingness to fuel local retail price wars through 
selective price reductions. This tendency for retail price competition 
to feed back into wholesale price competition through appeals by retailers 
for support and "interventions by majors to induce retailers to meet 
lower competitive offers" reflected "irresist\ble competitive 
pressures on themselves" whichwere themselves partly a product of 
forward integration (ibi~ p 453). 
Indeed, noted 0 & K, it was the fact that vertical integration was not 
perfectly balanced that creat~d supply and demand imbalances which led 
to the outbreak of price competition. Because additions to refining 
capacity were large and lumpy leading to temporary excess capacity, and 
because changes in product demand led to temporary surpluses and 
shortages in the supply of individual refined products, surplus supplies 
appearedonthe market depressing spot prices. 
lower spot prices were tranlated into increased wholesale competition 
largely through independent wholesalers, at the same time excess 
supplies of petrol encouraged incursions into one another's 
marketing areas. (Ibid,pp 458-459). 
Again the mechanism for wholesale price warswas similar to that 
which occurred in the UK during 1975-78:- surplus petrol at low 
spot prices enabled price competition by independent wholesalers, 
excess supplies db the European refineries of integrated majors 
induced some of the European-based majors to increase their 
supplies to the UK market at lower prices, while increased 
competition at the retail level encouraged defensive measures by the 
established majors to support their retailers. As 0 & K noted, 
"what appears clear in most cases is that the major refiners do not 
start price wars, although their oil may power it and 'ill: the end they, are 
dra-.n into the fray to meet competition'.' (lbid,p.468). 
By examining the petroleum industry as a whole, 0 & Kwereable to show 
the influence of upstream activities and markets upon the wholesale 
petrol market. In particular, the influence of crude oil supplies and 
prices and the role of the independent refiners, influences which were 
considered exogenous in my own study. However, because the study dealt 
with the petroleum industry at a national level, the analysis of 
competition in the supply of petrol can only be treated in general 
terms. To examine in detail pricing behaviour and its relationship to 
market structure it is necessary to focus upon regional or local 
product markets. For this reason the studies by learned and Ellsworth 
(1959) and Cassady and Jones (1951) are of particular value. 
learned and Ellsworth's study of "Gasol ine Pricing in Ohio" represents 
by far the most detailed account of petrol pricing at wholesale and 
retail levels available in the literature. The principal feature of 
market structure in Ohio during the post war period was the predominant 
position of Standard Oil Ohio (Sohio) with about 31 per cent of gallonage 
retail sales and with 28 per cent of retail outlets. The largest six 
suppliers to the Ohio market accounted for about 74 per cent of total 
sales, while in addition to the 14 integrated majors there were a number 
of small refiners and independent wholesalers which together accounted for 
2.4 per cent of sales. 
The most prominent feature of price behaviour over the period 1948-
1955 was the orderline$of prices and the restrained nature of price 
competition. In this,price hehaviour correspcnded to that of the 
UK market prior to 1975, rather than to the mo~e turbulent behaviour 
of 1975-1980. Tank wagon pr ices were subject to near-perfect 
parallelism: uniform prices were charged by the major suppliers, 
all price changes were initiated by Sohio and competitors followed 
these initiatives, either on the same day or within five days. 
Yet,despite evidence of other commentators of Sohio's sister companies' 
dominant price leadership (see, for example, McLean and Hagu,e 1954, 
pp 210-222 for a discussion of Standard of Indiana's. "price 
umbrella" pol icy), Learned and Ellsworth are emp~tic that Sohio's 
leadership was of a barometric type. The evidence for the barometric, 
as opposed to dominant or collusive, nature of Sohio's leadership 
was chiefly Sohio's stated policy of selling prices which reflected 
all market factors and Sohio's obvious efficiency in doing so.7 
Following the abandonment of state-wide tank wagon pricing by Sohio, 
regional differentials in posted tank wagon prices emerged. Regional 
price differentials were a function both of differences in distribution 
costs and differential degrees of competition. In general it was in 
the cities and larger urban areas where retail and wholesale competition 
tended to depress prices. 
The pattern of price competition was famil iar (see Grant, 1982, pp 283-
285): liThe price movers in downward price adjustment were a small 
number of aggressive dealers, often supplied by jobbers, private brand 
distributors or suppliers of unbranded gasoline, always located in,or 
very close tO,an urban market where potential sales were high. Some of 
these retailers,by cutting prices deeply,attracted so much gallOnage 
that competing dealers felt obliged to follow suit. When such price 
cutting became widespread, suppliers cut their tank wagon price, 
realizing that any other course would result in such low margins for 
some dealers that their very existence would be threatened." 
(Learned and Ellsworth 1959, p 52). 
Where this pattern of price competition deviat~ from the typical UK 
pattern after 1974~s in the response of the majors. On identifying 
emerging retail price competition and pressure on wholesale prices, 
Sohio was normally the first of the majors to post a lower tank wagon 
price for the local ity whi Ie introducing a smaller price reduction in 
a "buffer zone" peripheral to the centre ~ pri ce competi tion 
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(lQlg,p 52 and pp 67-68) . What is apparent, therefore, is that 
despite the competitive pressures which emerged on a local and 
temporary basis, Sohio was able to maintain a leadership role in 
responding to and containing the competitive pressures in an orderly 
manner, and then leading the market back to "normal" pricing once 
the source of the disturbance had abated. In comparison even with 
the competitive urban areas of Ohio, (Akron and Toledo),the structure 
of petrol distribution in the los Angeles area in the post-war period 
was substantially more competitively structured. The six largest 
majors accounted for only about 49 per cent of total retail outlets 
and a total of around 150 petrol brands were represented, including 
those of a number of independent wholesalers and retailers 
(Cassady and Jones 1951, pp 44-54). The emergence of a price 
war in the los Angeles area between 1949 and 1950 is carefully 
documented by Cassady and Jones and it is interesting to compare 
the sources and development of competition and the reactions of the 
majors with those in the UK between 1975 and 1976. 
Between the end of the Second World War and February 1949 price 
cutting was practised by a number of independent wholesalers and 
their dealers, but the price differentials below the majors' brands 
were fairly stable. Between February and June 1949 a number of 
Shell and Tide Water retailers began to meet the lower prices of the 
independents, which was followed by a rapid spreading of discounting 
among the retails of major brands • 
. 
The price cutting intensified towards the end of 1949 and beginning 
of 1950 to the point were virtually all retailers were selling at cutpr' ICes. 
While price cutting by retailers was a major factor in initiating the 
price competition, the development of a full-scale price war 
necessitated competitive discounting at the wholesale level. 
It was notable that in the course of the price war no movement in the 
major 5' tank wagon price occurred and the wholesale price cutting took the 
form of fixed rebates to dealers in critical areas or discretionary 
rebates conditional upon the dealer lowering his retail price to a 
particular level. 
The results of these U S studies confirm a number of features of 
pricing behaviour observed in my own study - notably the tendency of 
wholesale list prices to follow a pattern of price leadership 
(a I though different i nterpretat ions have been offered as to whether 
the leadershipw.asdominant, collusive or barometric in nature), the 
localised and temporary nature of wholesale price competition and 
its promotion through selective rebates, the importance of retail 
price competition and excess petrol supplies at refinery level as sources 
of wholesale price competition (with independent wholesalers and their 
dealers occupying a key role in linking the two), and the effect of 
vertical integration by the majors both in insulating the major 
companies from competitive forces and in providing a mechanism for 
transmitting price competition from retail to the wholesale level. 
At the same time, the U S studies are largely descriptive and their 
explanations of competitive behaviour refer primarily to the specific economics 
of the oi 1 industry rather than to more general theories. By fai ling 
to provide a theoretical framework within which petrol pricing can be 
examined it is difficult on the basis of those studies to predict the 
nature of pricing behaviour in different local ities or time periods. 
The principal virtue of my own study is that it outlines hypotheses 
concerning the relationship of market structure to pricing behaviour, 
and uses these hypotheses to relate changes in pricing behaviour over 
time to changes in structural variables. The U S studies have not 
provided any general hypotheses of why pricing behaviour changed over 
time or sought to explain variations in price practices and levels 
between different geo graphical regions. In the lighffthe evidence 
for the UK., further interpretation of some of the earlier U.S. 
studies is possible. For example, the differences in petrol pricing· 
behaviour between Ohio and Los Angeles would appear to be partly a 
result of differences in seller concentration and, in particular, the 
presence of a natural and traditional market leader in Ohio. 
2.5. Evidence on oligopoly pricing behaviour in other industries 
The results of my research (Grant 1982), together with the findings of 
other studies surveyed in the previous section, identify some interesting 
features of pricing behaviour in the supply of petrol. 
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Certain characteristic patterns of pricing behaviour are apparent with 
regard to leadership and competition, and clear relationships emerge 
between market structure and competitive behaviour. To the extent 
that these findings are valid only for the petrol supply industry, they 
are of limited value. However, the objective of case study inquiry is 
to generate, through the careful and detailed study of particular economic 
sectors and units, results which can be applied more generally. Whether 
the observations made and hypotheses developed in the context of the 
petrol industry are capable of more general applicability can only be 
judged by a comparison with the findings for other industries. 
Relating the research findings for the petrol industry with the body of 
previous empirical research into oligopoly pricing behaviour is no easy 
task. In common with other areas of scientific endeavour the expectation 
which underlies economic research is that an increasing stock of empirical 
knowledge will enable more precise discrimination between the effectiveness 
of competing theories,and that the application of existing theories to 
new data will enable the adaptation of theory towards greater generality. 
In the case of oligopoly pricing behaviour such a process of development 
has been hindered by the absence of a generally agreed body of theoretical 
knowl edge (see sect ion 2.1 above) and by the fra gmentary and heterogeneous 
nature of the empirical literature. Indeed,onlya comparatively small 
part of the literature deals with the process of price competition in 
concentrated industries. The two principal areas of empirical work.l'~ate been 
concerned, first, with the relationship of market structure to the level 
of industry price and, second, the determinants of price setting by 
individual firms. 
The "structure-performance" studies have focused upon the influence of 
seller concentration, product differentilationand barriers to entry on the 
level of price as indicated by the profit/sales ratio and the rate of 
return on capital. 
These studies have been characterised by a weakness of the underlying 
theory of the influence of market structure on price, wide discrepancies 
between empirical variables employed and the theoretical variables which 
they represent, and a remarkable inconsistency of findings. To some extent 
it is dissatisfaction with the results of the "structure-performance" 
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studies which provides a justification for detailed case study analysis 
of pricing behaviour. For example, to take just one relationship, that 
between seller concentration and price, the diversity of empirical 
findings together with a lack of clear theoretical ~uidance suggest 
the need for more detailed study of the process by which structural 
variables influence industry performance, i.e. research into the 
conduct link between structure and performance. This represents one 
of the primary purposes of my petrol study.8 
The second area of empirical investigation, price setting by firms, 
has developed the early work by Hall and Hitch and has been particu-
larly concerned with testing the cost-plus pricing hypothesis - the 
view that business firms set their prices in relation to their per-
ceived average cost~ paying little or no attention to market ~emand 
or the state of competition. Important studies of the pricing 
practices of individual firms include: in the UK,Hague (1971), in 
the U S, Kaplan et al (1958), and in DenmarkJFog (1960). Industry-
wide econometric investigations into the movement"" of industrial 
prices in the UK include Rushdy and Lund (1967), Coutts et al 
(1978) and Sawyer (Cq~o) and have been stimulated by the debate in 
the United States over the "administered pricing hypothesis" - the 
view that in oligopoly industries firms use their market power to 
ensure a stabi lity of the price level, to avoid downward adjustment 
of prices, and to raise prices principally in response to general 
. 10 increases In costs. 
The principal deficiency of these studie~ from the point of view 
of this survey, is that the~ ~ocus on the impact of cost changes in 
firmsl prices has resulted in very little attention being devoted 
to the competitive interaction of firms within an industry which is 
the essence of oligopoly pricing behaviour. Both Kaplan et al 
a nd Hague report the ex i s tence of lifo II ower ll behav i our by some firms 
insetting their prices, but the focus of theirstudi~upon individual 
firms precluded the investigation of pricing behaviour at the industry 
1 eve I. 
48 
Adherence to rigid cost-plus pricing procedures by firms represents 
a denial not only of market forces, but also of the interdependence 
which is generally regarded as the characteristic feature of oligo-
poly industries. However, once the tendency for cost mark-ups 
to vary is accepted and the role of discounts and allowances off list 
price is acknowledged, then cost-plus pricing can be viewed as a 
useful procedure in setting prices in the face of uncertainty over 
demand conditions.Moreover, it has been argued that common adherence 
to traditional "rul e of thumb" approaches to price setting facilitates 
oligopoly coordination (particularly when suppliers are subject to 
common cost conditions) and the maintenance of a fixed relationship 
between price and average cost is consistent with limit pricing (see 
Scherer 1980, pp184-190~ Sylos-Labini 1979). 
That part of the empirical literature which deals in a systematic 
and analytical way with the competitive interaction of firms' pricing 
decisio~at the industry level and the resulting patterns of industry 
pricing behaviour is limited. Probably the most extensive and 
detai led British study of price competition at industry level was that 
undertaken by Dennis Swann and his colleagues at Loughborough University 
(Swann et al 1973). The principal findings of the study and the 
implications for competition policy are summarised in Swann ~ (1974). 
The purpose of the study was to identify the impact of restrictive 
practices legislation on competitive behaviour in previously cartellsed 
industries~ in doing s~ the study provides a detailed account of pricing 
behaviour in a number of manufacturing industries. To the extent 
that all the industries surveyed were subject to some form of price 
fixing agreement, then they do not represent an unbiased sample. At 
the same time, the patterns of pricing behaviour which they reveal 
are instructive and tend to support the findings of other studies of 
pricing behaviour, in particular those concerning the UK petrol 
market. 
The principal finding of the Loughborough study was that the aban-
donment of price fixing agreements increased price competition -
substantially so in the case of wire ropes, sanitaryware, drainpipes 
and cables - hence suggesting that tacit collusion is unlikely to be 
as effective as formal collusion in preventing price competition 
(Swann 1974,~150). Where price competition was successfully avoided, 
then the primary reason was the substitution of an information 
agreement for the price fixing agreement (these were particularly 
effective in tyres, electric light bulbs and transformers) (Swann 
1974, p~161-163). 
In several industries collusion was replaced by price leadership. 
Thus~ in electric cables BICC led price changes, in wire ropes - British 
Ropes, in steel pipes - Hepworth Iron Co., and In metal windows -
Crita" -Hope. In all cases the price leader was the dominant firm in 
the industry. In no case \'CIS price leadership entirely effective in 
eliminating price competition~ in electric cables 1 for instance,price 
competition was notably severe (Swann 1974, ppI64-172). The strength 
of the price leadership depended considerably on the position and 
behaviour of the price leader. In wire ropes, British Ropes ability 
to induce obedience in its competitors' list prices and 
discounts was due to its market share and its willingness to either 
retaliate against or acquire competitors which took competitive 
initiatives. 
An even more comprehensive study of pricing behaviour across a 
number of industries was that undertaken by Bjarke Fog in Denmark 
(Fog 1960). Again price leadership was observed to be a general featureof 
thepattern~ price movements, although only in one case did Fog 
identify "perfect" price leadership where the price changes announced 
by one firm were followed immediately and identically by competitors. 
In some other industries followers maintained a constant price 
differential below the price of the leader, while in others followers 
would undercut the leader by a variable amount. In some industries 
only a vague pattern of price leadership was discern,able - the 
leader changed identity and price initiatives were not always followed. 
In general the price leader was the largest firm in the industry, 
although exceptions were observed. Price leadership did not necessa-
rily result in high prices. Very often the price leader had the 
lowest variable costs with the result that the profits for followers 
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were very low. One reason ,for this suggested by Fog was that the 
'" leader may have an interest~a low price level both to prevent 
price cutting by small firmsand to limit the market share of the 
smaller firms (a prediction of the dominant firm leadership model). A 
further feature of pricing policy by large firms when faced with 
price-cutting by small competitors was for the major fir~ to maintain 
their list prices while retaining sales through the introduction of 
a cut-price brand, or the offer of special discounts to larger 
customers. However, the use of secret discounts was regarded by 
leading suppliers as dangerous because of the rapidity with which 
rumours of discounts spread, thus encouraging all customers to demand 
discounts "and, thereby, the bottom will fallout of the entire 
pricing system" (Fog 1960, p146). 
More detailed evidence on pricing behaviour in highly concentrated 
British industries is provided in reports by the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (MMC). Between 1976 and 1979 a number of reports 
were published on concentrated oligopoly industries: 
Frozen Foodstuffs (Nov.1976) (3 suppliers) 
Cat and Dog Foods (July 1977) (2 major suppl iers) 
Flour and Bread (July 1977) (3 major suppl iers) 
Ceramic Sanitaryware (Aug 1978) (4 major suppliers) 
Insulated Electric Wires & Cables (March 1979) (6 major suppliers) 
Ice Cream and Water Ices (Aug. 1979) (2 major suppliers) 
Electricity Supply Meters (Aug 1979) (4 major suppliers) 
The industries fall into two groups: frozen foods, cat and dog foods, 
flour and bread, and ice cream and water ices are all processed foods 
sold principally through grocers' outlets; the others are industrial 
products. All the products display some measure of parallel price 
movements .. The objective of the following comparison is to relate 
the similarities and differences between the price patterns in the 
different industries to the structural characteristics of the industry, 
and to compare the observations in these industries with the findings 
for the petrol market. For purposes of comparison five aspects of pricing 
behaviour are examined: the extent of price uniformity, the existence of 
a leader, competition in discounts, mechanisms for coordination and the 
level of price. 
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(i) The degree of price uniformity 
The extent to which the leading suppliers in each industry charged 
uniform prices over the study periods (normally between 5 and 7 years) 
varied from industry to industry. 
In the two principal categories of electric wires and cables,general 
wiring cable,and winding wires and strips (MMC 1979a pp65-71, 80-82) 
and in standard bread (MMC 1977a, pp67-68),prices were identical 
over the whole period~ For the major types of electricity meter, 
(MMC 1979d , p.68), bakers' flour (MMC 1977a, pp58-59),~imi~r types 
of frozen food (MMC 1976, p-06), competing brands of cat and dog 
food (MMC 1977b, pp7~-81) and for most ice cream and water ice products 
(MMC 1979, ppI90-194), the list prices of the major suppliers were 
identical for most of the periods' studied. Discrepancies in the prices 
of competing products were most noticeable during the period 1975-76 
when rapid inflation together with the operation of price controls by 
the Price Commission made the maintenance of parallel prices more 
d i ff i cu It. 
In the case of ceramic sanitaryware products, slight differences in 
the prices of the four major suppliers existed over the whole period. 
These price differences seldom exceeded 4 per cent, (MMC 1978,pp78-82). 
(ii) The existence of a price leader 
In all the industries price changes took place at similar times 
although the time lags and the degree of price leadership varied from 
industry to industry. 
Bread was unique in that equal price changes almost always occurred 
on the same date, hence no price leader was evident, although ABF was 
recognised as the least-cost producer or "back-marker" which could 
not be ignored by RHM or Spillers (MMC 1977a, p.63). 
In three industries there was a clearly recognised price leader:-
Blee in electrical wires and cables, Birds Eye in frozen foods and 
Pedigree Petfoods (a subsidiary of Mars Ltd) in cat and dog food. 
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In all three cases the price leader was the largest supplier and in 
frozen foods and cat and dog foods the largest supplier was also 
the least-cost manufacturer (due partly to economies of scale). 
In the remaining industries a consistent price leader did not 
exist. In electricity supply mrters, GEC Measurements was responsible 
for most price initiatives, particularly during the late 1970s, 
however during the earlier 1960s the lead in price increase switched 
between the suppliers (MMC 1979d, p.68). In flour, RHM was responsible 
for most price initiatives between 1960 and 1963 when there were only 
two major milling companies. Following the entry of PBF into milling, 
price leadership was less disc iplined: while RHM and Spillers tended 
to change price simultaneously, ABF failed to coordinate its price 
changes with the other two (MMC 1977a pp53-59, 92-94). Similarly, in 
ceramic sanitaryware the absence of a consistent price leader was 
also noted (MMC1978, p.66). In ice cream and waterices leadership 
switched between the two major suppliers. Between 1973 and early 1975 
Wallis initiated most price changes, while between mid 1975 and 1978 
Lyons Maid led most price increases, (MMC 1979c, ppI90-194). 
(iii) competition in discounts and allowances 
In all of the seven industries the parallelism of prices existed only 
in list prices, and on discounts, rebates and other allowances signi-
ficant competitive behaviour occurred, particularly in the terms offered 
to large customers. Only in ice cream and water ices were the scales 
of discount and rebate and ultimate net prices largely identical 
between the two companies. (MMC 1979c, ppl02-103). The extent of 
competition in discounts and rebates varied considerably between the 
remaining industries. In cat and dog goods there was a notable'lack 
of competition in discounts off list prices, indeed Pedigree Petigoods 
gave no other discounts other than its published qu~ntity discounts. 
In electricity supply meters, manufacturers offer~ standard rebate 
terms which had the effect of parallel list prices being translated 
into parallel actual prices. Between 1974 and 1976 some selective 
price concessions were introduced, while after 1976 competition in 
concessionary prices increased substantially, largely reflecting a 
change in purchasing practices by the electricity boards 
(MMC 1979d, pp27-29). 
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In electrical wires and tables there was a similarity between the 
types and the rates of discount and rebate offered by the competing 
suppliers although the Monopolies Commission found that this did 
of 
not preclude competition in any sectortthe market. Thus between 
late 1971 and 1973,higher rates of discount by a smaller supplier 
led to a price war in general wiring cable. (MMC 1979a, pI16). 
In sanitaryware~price competition occurred primarily through the 
offer of confidential rebates to builders' merchants. These rebates 
were based upon the customer's annual purchases. Rebates were first 
introduced around 1963 and the levels of rebate rose considerably 
in the following years. 
Two industries where competition in discounts and rebates was particu-
larly intense were frozen foods and bread. In both cases the compe-
tition was limited to larger retailers (notably the major supermarket 
groups). In frozen foods,the competitive situation was relatively 
stable, with the major supermarket groups purchasing at net prices 
which were substantially lower than those of small retailers. Thus 
small grocers I shops received no discount off wholesale price by 
Birds Eye, while the 20 largest retail customers received discounts 
which averaged over 10 per cent (MMC 1976,p31). In bread,on the other 
hand,price competition has been unstable with periodic price wars 
breaking out between the major baking companies, in which discounts to 
the major supermarkets have risen to levels at which the bakeries have 
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sold at net prices far below average costs. 
(iv) Mechanisms for coordination 
One of the Interesting features of oligopoly price behaviour which 
all the empirical studies have failed to shed much light on, is the 
mechanism by which coordination of prices is attained. While 
Chamberlain (1933) claimed that the mere recognitl6n of inter-
dependence is sufficient for the achievement of a monopoly price 
level, Fellner in his introduction to the revised edition of 
"Competition Among the Few" (1965) has p~inted to the importance of 
uncertainty in hampering bargaining among competing oligopolists. 
54 
Swann et al (1973) noted the extent to which the abandoment of price 
fixing agreements was followed by the institution of agreements or 
informal arrangements between companies to exchange information on 
actual or proposed price changes. In some industries (e.g. transfomers, 
and wire ropes) these arrangements were effective means of preventing 
competition, in others (e.g. glass containers) they were not. 
In the period covered by the selected Monopolies Commission 
investigations, information agreements were illegal. However, it was 
apparent that flows of information either directly or indirectly 
between competitors was the principal mechanism by which similarity 
list prices was achieved. In electricity supply meters there was a 
formal, but apparently legal agreement, to exchange price lists 
between competitors through the trade association. In ceramic 
sanitary ware there was notable price parallelism.again without a 
clearly defined price leader, coordination being facilitated 
by companies announcing their price increases well in advance of their 
implementation. Here it would appear that past cartel agreements 
and the geographic concentration of the industry facilitate understandings 
and communications that "have sometimes touched on incr~ases in costs 
and intentions regarding prices" (MMC 1978,p66). In ice cream too, 
substantial price parallelism was achieved without clear and consistent 
price leadership. It would appear that the existence of a 
dominant duopoly,each with secured market shares through the system 
of distribution agreements with retailers and with issued recommended 
price lists,obviated the necessity for leadership in price increases. 
In the industries with a well-defined price leader, changes in prices 
were announced through published price lists, though only in electric 
cables did it appear that the leader's price lists were actually 
distributed direct to competitors. 
(v) The level of prices 
To evaluate the practice of price leadership from the viewpoint of the 
public interest It is necessary to consider the effect of price 
leadership upon the level of industry prices. Theoretical considera-
tions would suggest the best indicator of market power tO'be the degree 
to which prices are raised above marginal cost (the price-cost 
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margin or Lerner index) since this would indicate the exercise of 
market power both in the short run and the long run. However, 
because of the difficulties of measuring marginal cost, rates of 
profit are the only practical measure of monopolistic pricing. The 
underlying principle here is that,ln the long-run,competition will 
force the rate of return on capital to the "normal" level. In the 
absence of intra-marginal rents due to inter-firm efficiency 
differences, a long-run rate of return above the normal level implies 
monopolistic pricing. A more detailed consideration: of the problems 
of and methodology for inferring market power foll~,in Chapter 4, 
for the present let us adopt the approach traditionally employed by 
the MMC of comparing return on capital with industry averages. 
Table 2. I shows the results for seven industries where price parallelism 
has been observed by the MMC. 
The most striking feature of Table 2.\ is, with the sole exception 
of cat and dog foods, the low level of profitability in the industries 
subject to parallel pricing. However, in the light of numerous studies 
into cartel behaviour and performance, the finding that apparently 
uncompetitive behaviour does not lead to above average profitability j~ 
the US (AscH and Seneca 1976) and Denmark (Fog 1960 ) shows that the 
of 
profitability of colluding firms tends to be below thattnon-colluding 
firms. The interpretation of these low rates of profit is crucial to 
any appraisal of the role and influence of parallel pricing practices. 
Three explanations of the figures in Table 2.2 present themselves: 
parallel pricing is effective in raising industry prices above their 
competitive level, but this is not readily observable through industry 
profit rates, second, parallel pricing is ineffective in avoiding 
price competition; third, parallel pricing is potentially effective, 
but firms choose not to utilise their potential market power. 
Effective price leadership might give rise to only average rates of 
industry profit in industries where competitive pricing might be 
expected to result in particularly low profitability. Thus in industries 
supplying undifferentiated products suffering stagnant or declining 
demand where substantial barriers to exit operate, then one would 
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Table 2.1 Rates of return on capital in industries subject to parallel pricing 
INDUSTRY COMPANIES PERIOD RETURN ON* WEIGHTED AV.RETURN FOR 
CAPITAL AV. MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY 
Frozen Birds Eye 1971-74 18.0 
Foods Findus II 7.3 12.2 15.6 
Ross II 5.8 
Cat and Pedigree Petfoods 1972-76 44.0 36.6 16.2 
Dog Foods Spi llers II 19.2 
Insulated BICC 1971-76 16 
Electric Wires AEI II 23 
Cab 1 es Delta II 21 17.7 16 or 
Pi rel1 i General II 13 
... 
Ice Cream & Wa 11 s 1972-77 20.9 17.7 16.2 \.later Ices Glacier II 13.2 
II 
.... 
E. 1 ec t ric i ty Ferrant i 1972-77 4.7 
Supply Meters GEC II 34.5 17.8 16.2 
Landis & Gyr II 8.0 
Sangamo-Weston II 24.0 
.... 
~lour and ABF 1971-75 14.8 
Bread RHM II 15.3 13.0 15.4 
Spillers II 7.4 
..... 
teramic Armi tage Shanks 1971-76 16.9 
~anitaryware Twyfords II 17.4 16.6 16 
Doulton II 6.9 
Idea 1 Standard II 23.4 
..... 
*Historic cost basis, before tax but after interest payments. 
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expect rates of return on capital that fell below both the all-
industry average and the long-run "normal" level. Some of the 
industries considered, notably insulated wires and cables, electri-
city supply meters, flour and bread and ceramic sanitaryware, combine 
low growth of demand with low product differentiation. However these 
factors would not account for the low profitabil ity of frozen foods 
and ice cream. 
A further factor which might obscure the effectiveness of parallel 
pricing in raising industry profit rates is inefficiency which lack 
of competition might permit. Such a possibility was emphasised 
by the Monopolies Commission in its Report on Parallel Pricing 
(1973,pp26-28). Evidence of cartel performance shows that absence 
of price competition results in the survival of inefficiently 
small firms and the encouragement of inefficiency in otherwise 
efficient firms (X-inefficiency). Thus Swann et al (1974) observed 
that abandoment of price fixing agreements and the emergence of price 
competition was frequently accompanied by considerable structural 
adjustment involving the elimination of inefficient plants and firms 
from the industry. Some support for the inefficiency hypothesis is 
provided by the wide inter-firm variability in profit rates observed 
in table 2.1 (for instance in electricity supply meters and ceramic 
sani taryware). 
The second group of explanations for the co-existence of price 
parallelism with low profitability is that parallel pricing does not 
involve any significant restriction of competitive behaviour. Thus 
any tendency for parallelism in list prices to produce monopoly 
profit may be counteracted by competition in discounts and other 
allowances, the net result being net prices which correspond to 
broadly competitive levels. Such tendencies have been observed in 
petrol, bread, frozen foods, sanitaryware and cables. 
A further possibility is that parallel pricing itself is not collusive 
in nature. Where no substantial differentiation exists between 
different suppl iers· products price parallelism is Inevitable and 
where one supplier possesses some cost advantage over his competitors 
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then it is likely that other suppliers would be reluctant to initiate 
price changes. Thus price leadership arises not through collusion 
or the exercise of dominance by one firm, but by the desire of firms 
to adopt followership roles. This phenomeno~is indicated by Ross 
Foods' statement of its pricing policy for frozen foods: 
"Ross Foods sets its prices generally at the same level 
as those set by Birds Eye. Since Ross Foods only 
advertises and promotes its products on a very limited ~cale, 
it cannot hope to win space in retailers' cabinets and charge 
prices above those charged by Birds Eye. On the other hand 
it cannot afford to undercut Birds Eye's prices to any signi-
ficant extent •••• In the economic conditions prevailing ••• Ross 
Foods had every incentive to move its prices up to the level of 
Birds Eye's prices whenever it had the opportunity to do so. 
(MMC 1976 p.2). 
In these circumstances the mportant issue is the extent to which the 
emergence of follower behaviour encourages the price leader to set 
prices above the competitive level. This brings to our final set of 
considerations: whether low profitability may be the result of firms 
deliberately not seeking to use oligopolistic coordination to earn 
monopoly profit. In industries where entry barriers are low, limit 
pricing by firms might result in collusive oligopoly prices being 
set at levels cJose to the competitive level. Of the industries listed in 
'n . ..----. 
table 2.1, only~frozen foods and bread would entry appear to be easy. 
But similar considerations which lead firms to set limit prices in 
the face of potential entry might also induce firms to keep industry 
prices low in the face of potential competition between existing 
industry participants. The costs of price competition lie not only 
in low profits but also in the uncertainty with regard to prices, 
profits, market shares and sales which independent pricing behaviour 
gives rise to. A price leaderJ s attempt to elevate industry prices 
far above the competitive level might threaten the cohesiveness of 
price parallelism. Similar behaviour has been observed in Fog's 
study of cartels where fear of a breakdown in the cartel resulted in 
cartel prices remaining static over a long period in the face of rising 
costs (Fog 1960). 
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2.6 Concluding comment 
In surveying the literature on oligopoly pricing, the principal 
impressions gained are of the gulf between theory and evidence 
and the sheer diversity of the approaches and the findings both of 
the theoretical and the empirical studies. One of the main objectives 
of my study of petrol pricing was to forge a closer linkage between 
theory and evidence by studying changing pricing behaviour over time 
in a single industry. The confirmation of many of the predictions 
of my structure-conduct model was encouraging,even if the model 
represented only a loose theoretical framework which synthesised 
a number of prior approaches, as opposed to an integrated model 
.... 
rigorously derived from basic behavi9ral axioms. 
The features of pricing behaviour which were identified in the 
UK petrol market - notably price par~llelism, discount competition 
and the tendency for instability - correspond" not only to the pricing 
behaviour observed in other studies of the market both in the UK and 
the US, but also to that of other manufacturing industries whose 
structure and products are very different from those of the petrol 
supply industry. A superficial survey of pricing patterns observed 
in aome other industries, including evidence from a number of 
Monopolies Commission reports, suggests that many of the elements 
of market structure identified as relevant to petrol price behaviour 
are also important influences in other industries. 
The picture is far from clear however. It is difficult to determine 
the extent to which the patterns of price leadership observed represent 
collusive behaviour or are simply forms of price competition that are the 
inevitable consequence of these types of market structure. The 
interpretation of the different levels of profitability across separate 
industries is also problematic. But despite these various qualifications and 
.Lu:l.c.e,rtaii'nties, one of the main conclusions arising from this survey is the 
potential value of case ~tudy' investigation of pricing behaviour. The 
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results of 
several decades of cross-sectional structure-performance studies 
of the determinants of the levels of}S1~~J~Yand profits have 
been disappointing in that no clear and consistent story has 
emerged as to the key structural determinants of the industry 
price level. Hence, the most obvious direction for further 
study is into the detai led investigation of the pricing process 
and inter:firm interactions at the level of individual industries. 
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1. 
FOOTNOTES 
Where firms are of equal size, price-cost margin under Cournot 
assumptions is - 1 ,where N is the number of firms and E is 
NE 
the price elasticity of demand (see Cowling and Waterson 
1976, p 268). 
2. The Cowling and Waterson analysis is reproduced in simplified 
form in Hay and Morris (1979, pp.143-l44 and Sawyer (1981, 
pp. 19-20). 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Full 
each 
i.e. 
collusion would imply that where firm sizes are equal, 
firm j would make equivalent changes in output to firm i, 
dX. dX ~ = 1, therefore dX = N. 
dX i i 
The role of diversification in the inter-industry allocation of 
resources is discussed more fully in Chapter 4. 
In the analysis of near-monopoly positwn~however,some very 
interesting applications of the dominant leadership model have 
been undertaken, see for example,Yamawaki (1982) 
Distinguishing collusive from barometric price leadership is 
very difficult in practice even though the nature and results 
of the two on quite different. Scherer (1980, pp 178-184) 
identifies price leadership in petrol and steel as 
barometric, while the Monopolies Commission Report on Parallel 
Pricing (1973,pp 12-13) outlines certain characteristics of 
barometric price leadership. 
This discussion further underlines the difficulties of 
applying Markham's classification of price leadership types. 
See Yamey (1972) for a survey of the pre-1970 literature. 
Among recent UK studies see Cowling and Waterson (1976), Hart 
and Morgan (1977), Hitiris (1978) and Nickell and Metcalf 
(1978) • 
Different views have been expressed as to the appropriate 
measure of cost: full costs, variable costs, standard cost, 
buying-in-cost. 
The hypothesis was proposed by Gardiner Mec-,ns (1935), the 
principal contributions to the debate being Stigler and 
Kindah1 (1970, 1973:; Means (1972); Weston et a1 (1974, and 
Weiss (1977). 
See chapter 3 for further discussions of preferential terms 
to large suppliers and section 3.3 for an analysis of levels 
of discount reported in MMC reports. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BUYING POWER, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
The two papers on buying power and price discrimination (Grant 19791, 
Grant 1981b) were motivated by the discrepancy between the 
importance of these related phenomena as a problem for competition 
policy and the inadequate economic analysis of their causes and 
effects. This chapter enlarges upon the material in my two papers, 
first, by surveying earl ier literature on the economics of 
buyer market power, second, by supplementing the analysis of buying 
power with an empirical test, and, finally, by updating the papers 
principally through reviews of recent reports by OECD and the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981). 
3.1. Buying power in economic theory 
The survey in Chapter 2 of pricing behaviour in 01 igopoly industries 
included a number of ins~ances where buyers exerted an important 
influence on the level of price and the nature of competitive 
behaviour by sellers. In the UK petrol)market buyers (retail 
filling stations) were small and unconcentrated in comparison 
with sellers, but despite the general absence of buying power, the 
emergence of a small number of larger retailers (such as ASDA and 
Heron) was a significant factor in the growth of discount competition 
during the mid-1970s. In other industries, such as bread, frozen 
foods, cables and electricity supply meters, the size and concentration 
of major customers, either supermarket chains or public authorities, 
exercised a major influence on pricing behaviour. 
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In view of the extent of buyer concentration In the markets for most 
manufactured products and the observed impact of large buyers on 
prices, it is remarkable that economic theory has largely ignored 
the structure of buyers and its influence on market equilibrium. 
The basic market models of price theory are defined largely in terms 
of the seller side of the competition, the usual assumption being 
that buyers are unconcentrated. Such an assumption is valid in the 
case of final markets where supply is to households, however in 
intermediate markets and supply to public authorities, buyer concen-
tration, though lower on average than seller concentration, is 
frequently moderate or substantial. 2 
Theoretical approaches to the impact of buyers on price have focussed 
upon the single buyer case, monopsony, where the treatment has been 
precisely analagous to monopoly analysis. The two basic models of 
perfectly competitive supply - monopsony demand, and bilateral 
monopoly are standard textbook material. The analysis can be extended 
by assuming that the monopsonist is a reseller and in the resale 
market he is either a perfect competitor or a monopolist (see Scherer 
1980, pp299-306). 
The analysis of markets with concentrated buyers (oligopsony) has 
followed a similar pattern - 01 igopsony has been regarded as the mirror 
image of oligopoly. In oligopoly, as has been argued in the previous 
chapter, the relationship of concentration to market power stems 
essentially through the recognition of interdependence and the ability 
to coordinate pricing behaviour. A similar propensity seems plausible 
on the buyer side of the market and such a hypothesis has been proposed 
by Lustgarten (1975). It is my contention, however, that the "collusive 
oligopsony" approach to the market power of buyers Is .unsatlsfactory in 
relation to the markets for most manufactured goods in that It fails 
to take account of the relatively low buyer concentration ratios facing 
most industries and the fact that,for. most manufactured goods, list prices 
tend to be set by suppl iers. The ease of collusion Is further limited 
by the tendency for buyers of most intermediate products to be 
drawn from a number of industries. Certainly in auction markets 
where prices are set by competitive bidding, collusive behaviour 
among concentrated buyers is 1 ikely and is commonly observed 
(see Grant 1980,p,4 and footnote 4). For the great majority of 
manufactured goods, however, the implausibil ity of the collusive 
01 igopsony thesis is demonstrated by the observation that the 
principal manifestation of buying power is in individually nego-
tiated discounts and allowances rather than a uniform buying 
. 3 p rice. 
Fortunately the analysis of concentration among buyers has not 
been I imited to hypotheses of collusive oligopsony. Galbraith's 
concept of "countervailing power" (Galbraith 1980) was aimed 
primarily at explaining the structural trend towards bilateral 
concentration, the underlying idea being that competition at the 
horizontal level was no longer the principal constraint upon the 
exercise of economic power~ vertical countervailing economic power 
on the opposite side of the market was more influential. The 
tendency for concentration on one side of a market to beget concen-
tration on the other, impl ies that the predominant market structure 
in advanced capital ist societies will be bilateral oligopoly. 
Galbraith devotes I ittle attention to the mechanics of countervailIng 
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power and provides no general model of price determination in such 
markets. What is notable, however, is that his concept of counter-
vail ing power is different from conventional monopsony market power. 
In the monopsony model, the buyer is able to push market price 
below the perfectly competitive level. However in Galbraith's 
analysis, concentrated buyers only countervail the market power of 
sellers: "The opportunity to exercise such (buying) power exists 
only when the suppl iers are enjoying something that can be taken 
away: i.e., when they are enjoying the fruits of market power from 
which they can be separated." (Galbraith 1980,p.118). The power 
of the buyer in such cases rests upon his ability to infl ict loss 
of sales volume on the supplier by taking his business elsewhere. 
The notion of buying power as countervailing power is supported by 
what is probably the most thorough empirical study in buying 
behaviour by a major firm Adelman's study of A&P (Adelman 1959). 
Based upon his own research and data submitted as evidence in the 
anti-trust case against A&P, Adelman provided a detailed 
examination of the terms on which A&P purchased from its suppliers 
of processed foods (Adelman 1959. chapters 10 and 11 and appendix 4). 
The findings are not only that A&P exercised little or no market 
power (in terms of being able to influence market price over the 
medium to long term), but that in many instances the effect of the 
Robinson-Patman Act was to cause suppliers to discriminate against 
A&P. Where A&P was able to purchase at lower net prices than other 
retail buyers (taking into account differences in the cost of supply), 
this was the result of one of two factors. First, where variations 
in quoted prices emerged either between sellers or over time, then 
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A&P had greater incentive, because of fixed information and negotiation 
costs, to seek these out and greater abil ity (through its warehousing 
space) to take advantage of them. Second, when faced with the market 
power of 01 igopoly suppliers, A&P could secure discriminatory price 
reductions through its size of purchasing. Rut against competitive 
small suppliers A&P was not able to secure any discriminatory 
concessions. Also when faced with sellers of the most highly 
differentiated products, then favourable discounts and allowances 
were similarly unforthcoming (Adelman 1959, p.220). 
Statistical studies of the effect of buying power on prices have 
taken the form of cross-sectional studies where buyer concentration 
ratios have been one of the market structure variables upon which 
industry price-cost margins have been regressed. To giVe two 
examples of the profit equations fitted to US census data: 
Lusgarten (1975) 
PCM=a + bl K/O + b2 CR4 + b3 BCR + b4 AFP + b5 RFS + b6 DSP 
McGuckin and Chen (1976) 
PCM= a +b, K/O + b2 CR4 +b 3 BCR +b 7 G +b 8 0 
where PCM is price-cost margin in sell ing industry 
K/O is capital-output rat io in selling industry 
CR4 is 4 firm concentration ratio in selling industry 
BCR is buyer concentration rat i 0 ac ro s s buy i ng industries 
AFP is average annual purchases per firm in buying industries 
RFS is ratio of firm size in buying industries to firm size 
in sell ing industry 
DSP measures dispension of buyers across different industries 
G is rate of growth of sell ing industry 
o is a dummy variable for consumer or producer industry. 
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In both studies the capital/output coefficient (b 1) was positive and 
significant as was the seller concentration coefficient (b 2). while 
the coefficient of the buyer concentration variable (b3) was 
negative and significant.4 Lustgarten further found that the average 
volume of purchases by each buyer. relative size of buyer and lack of 
dispersion of buyers across industries all tended to depress price-
cost margins in the supplying industries. 
Both the studies found evidence that the impact of buyer concentration 
does not act independently of seller concentration t but operates in 
conjunction in the manner suggested by Galbraith and Adelman. Thus 
McGuchin and Chen noted that the omission of buyer characteristics 
understated. the effects of seller concentration on profits (McGuchin 
and Chen 1976, p.131) while Lustgarten found that the negative impact 
of buyer concentration on profit was strongly significant in high 
seller concentration industries, but negative in low concentration 
industries (Lustgarten 1975 p.129). 
The foregoing analyses have only considered concentration among 
the buying industries as relevant to the bargaining power which can 
be exerted against firms in the supplying industry. But concentration 
amongst buyers 31so·Jmplies concentration and market power in supply 
by the buying firms. One of the limitations of partial equilibrium 
approaches of the Lustgarten type is that the impact of successive 
market power upon the primary industry is ignored. 
The extent to which buying power in aniAtermediate market implies 
monopoly power in the secondary market is of crucial importance in 
appraising the effects of retail buying power on prices to the consumer 
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and Adelman devoted considerable attention to the issue of how far 
the fruits of A&P's buying power were passed on in lower retail 
prices (Adelman 1959 pp360-379). However. buying power is not the 
only method by which concentration in the consuming industry affects 
prices and profits in the supplying industry. Where firms in the 
buying industry possess market power in the market which they supply, 
this will influence their demand for inputs and, consequently, the 
revenues and profits to the suppliers of those inputs. 
Based upon an extension of Cournot's analysis of price determination 
in an intermediate market. Waterson (1980) shows that price-cost 
margin in an intermediate product industry is positively related to 
the Herfindahl index of seller concentration in the consuming 
industry and negatively related to the price elasticity of demand 
facing the consuming industry. The effect therefore is the opposite 
of that predicted by the buying power hypothesis. 
In his empirical test, Waterson includes both effects: the successive 
market power effect,where concentration in the buying industry 
increases the profitabIlity of the industry supplying the intermediate 
good. and the buying power effect,where concentration in the buying 
industry decreases the profitability of the supplying industry. The 
signs of the two buying industry concentration variables are of 
opposite signs as predicted. but the larger relative size and greater 
statistical significance of the former concentration variable indicates 
the greater quantitative importance of this effect. 
The notion of vertical cooperation as opposed to confl ict between 
supplying and customer industries is also developed by Porter in 
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an analysis of manufacturer-retailer Interaction (Porter 1974). 
The basis of retailer power, argues Porter, Is in the contribution 
of the retailer to the differentiation of the manufacturer's 
product through information, advice, and after-sales service. 
In this respect consumer goods fall into two categories: 
convenience goods where product differentiation is almost entirely 
the responsibil ity of the manufacturer and the retailer offers 
virtually no services other than retail distribution, and non-
convenience goods where the retailer (normally small and specialist) 
plays a vital role in promoting and differentiating manufacturers' 
products. The importance of the distinction between convenience 
and non-convenience goods was demonstrated by running standard 
structure-performance regression analysis of consumer industry profit 
rates. For the convenience goods industries the standard market 
structure variables (seller concentration, advertising/sales ratios, 
growth and minimum efficient scale) performed well. However, in 
the non-convenience sector the results were poor, due,argued 
PorteG to an exclusion of retailer variables. Including average 
retail firm size (a proxy for retailer power) improved the R2 
and the significance of the other structural variables. 
This result and the theory upon which it is based has some 
pecul iar features. Porter argued that the retailer's influence 
on product differentiation, and hence his power, is indicated by 
smallness of size (Porter 1974,p.434). This reasoning confl icts 
with most notions of buying power, is lacking in intuitive appeal 
and runs counter to most casual observation. 
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3.2. The contribution of the Grant papers to the debate over 
buying power 
My own contribution to this rather confused and conflicting 
discussion is an attempt to clarify the nature of buying power in 
industrial markets and to examine its influence on price within a 
simple framework of oligopoly analysis. Grant (1980) argues that 
the principal impact of large buyers on price is to counteract 
the market power of sellers, indicates the mechanism of such 
countervailing power, and identifies the conditions conducive to 
the exercise of purchasing power. 
The analysis of buying power is greatly simplified by examining the 
influence of buyers within the framework of conventional approaches 
to 01 igopoly pricing. Thus the impact of large buyers on price can 
be viewed primarily in terms of the behaviour of sellers. In my 
paper, I argue that the tendency of 01 igopoly suppl iers to offer 
preferential prices to large buyers arises, first, from the lower 
barriers to entry which exist in relation to supplying large as 
opposed to small buyers and, second, from the willingness of 
oligopolists to undercut collusive prices in order to obtain the 
business of the large buyer (ibid,pp4-8). 
These two mechanisms for the influence of large buyers are related 
to different structural variables. 
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The price differential between large and small firms arising 
from limit price behaviour by oligopoly suppliers in the face of 
differential barriers to entry between large and small buyers 
depends upon 
(i) the extent of economies of scale in marketing and distribution 
which will be related to the size of indivisible (i.e. fixed) 
cost elements in these functions; 
(Ii) the proportion of industry sales which are to buyers whose 
size of purchases exceeds the minimum efficient plant size 
level of output in the supplying industry; 
(i i i) the difference in the pri ce elasticity of demand of large 
and small buyers, which depends primarily upon the extent to 
which the goods or services supplied by the larger firms in 
the buying industry are less differentiated than those of 
s rna 11 e r fir ms ; 
(iv) the level of seller concentration in the supplying 
industry which will be positively related to the ability of 
the supplying industry to adopt collusive limit pricing. 
The abil ity of large buyers to encourage the brea kdown of collusion 
. ---
in the supplying industry depends upon the fragility of oligopolistic 
coordination between sellers. This will be inversely related to the 
level of seller concentration in the supplying industry (i.e. as 
very high levels of concentration are approached,coordination between 
sellers is 1 ikely to hold even against large buyers) and positively 
related to the extent of excess capacity in the supplying industry 
(which is dependent principally upon the growth of demand). 
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Thus, the predictions yielded by my analysis as to the determinants 
of price differentials between large and small buyers and the 
overall impact of buyers on average market price are complex. 
Not only are there confl icting predictions as to the effect of 
seller concentration, but no simple structural measure of buyers' 
potential influence on price is suggested. 
The problem which arises from my analysis is, therefore, how can 
the hypotheses concerning the relationship between market structure 
variables and price be tested? Even in Lustgarten's comparatively 
simple model, his concept of buying power being conferred by buyer 
concentration failed to translate into any easily estimable empirical 
measure: buyer concentration could only be inferred from seller 
concentration ratios related to supplying industries through input-
output coefficients. Thus)Lustgarten measured buyer concentration 
in industry i as the average of four-firm concentration ratios in 
consuming industries weighted by the ratio of the sales of industry 
i to consuming industry J (X .. ) to total industry i sales (S.) 
I J I 
Thus BeR. = 
I 
n 
~ 
J=l 
Guth. Schwartz and Whitcomb (1976) criticised this measure as over-
stating the extent of buyer concentration and proposed a measure of 
buyer concentration whic~. they claimed, is analagous to the 
calculation of standard seller concentration ratios. The approach 
is to rank the consuming industries by the average purchases of the four 
I a rges t firms: X ..• CR4
J
., then to calculate the buyer concentration 
I J 
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ratio facing industry 
aCR. 
1 = 
(aCR.) 
1 
n 
L 
i=l 
x •• CR4J IJ 
S. 
1 
where n is the number of buying industries to be included. 
My analysis (Grant 1980) points to a somewhat different approach to 
measuring the 1 ikely impact of buyers upon price. The notion of 
buyer concentration proposed by Lustgarten and Guth et al appears 
to be based upon the bel ief that buying power operates in a 
similar way to sell ing power - presumably through some form of 
collusive behaviour on the part of buyers. My own analysis 
provides no simple structural measure of buying power. To the 
extent that the influence of buyers on price arises because of 
lower entry barriers in the supply to large purchasers, the extent 
of preferential prices depends upon the extent and nature of scale 
economies in supplying large as opposed to small buyers (through the 
standard Sylos-Labini/Modigliani analysis) and the threat of entry 
by large buyers which will depend upon whether purchases(each of the 
large buyers exceeds minimum efficient plant size (MEPS) in the 
supplying industry. The overall effect of buyers on industry limit 
price therefore would seem to be indicated by the proportion of the 
supplying industry's sales which are to buyers whose level of purchases 
exceed the MEPS in the supplying industry. 
The second effect of buyers is through their ability to encourage 
the breakdown of oligopolistic coordination. Here again it is the 
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size of purchases by individual buyers together with a wide size 
dispersion of buyers' purchases which would be conducive to the 
breakdown of price uniformity, rather than buyer concentration per se. 
The breakdown of price coordination depends not Just upon the 
willingness of oligopoly suppliers to offer price concessions to 
larger buyers, but also on the bargaining power exercised by large 
buyers to force preferential terms from their suppliers. Bargaining 
power is a difficult concept to define or measure but essential1it 
is related to the relative costs which each party can impose upon 
the other as a result of a refusal to deal. The relative bargaining 
power of the buyer vis-a-vis a particular supplier depends, inter alia, 
upon the size of his purchases compared with the size of his supplier's 
sales, the number of alternative suppliers available to the buyer, 
the number of alternative buyers available to the seller, the extent 
of product differentiation in supplying and buying industries, 
the relative adjustment costs for both buyer and seller in refusing 
to deal and establ ishing the same volume of trade with alternative 
suppliers and customers, and the relative proportions of each firms' 
business whic h trade with the particular buyer or seller represents. 
It is interesting that this notion of the basis of economic 
bargaining power bears similarities with the concept of economic 
dependence which is incorporated in the anti-discrimination section 
of the German Act against Restraints on Competition (See Grant 
1981b, pp.615 - 618). 
3.3. Some empirical evidence on retail buying power in the UK 
Although my analysis of buyer power represents a more cogent account 
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of the operations of large buyers in industrial markets than that 
provided by Lustgarten or Porter, the task of demonstrating the 
is 
empirical val idity of my analysisl..formidable. Because my analysis 
relates primarily to the degree of price discrimination in favour 
of large buyers rather than to the level of industry price and 
because the size of these differentials)s ~ closely guarded 
commercial secret. , there is a disttnct absence of empirical data. 
However the reports of the MMC and the Price Commission provide a 
wealth of information on terms of supply of individual companies 
and industries, and, in the case of the report on "Discounts to 
Retai lers" (MMC 1981), more comprehens ive evidence on buying price 
differentials between retailers. This information can be used both 
to illustrate and test some of the hypotheses which have been 
formulated. 
As regards the different views concerning the operation and the 
structural determinants of buying power, the evidence is inconsistent 
with the collusive 01 igopsony approach and tends to point to my own 
view of large buyers influencing their buying prices,partly through 
optimal price discrimination by monopolistic suppliers,and partly 
through the breakdown of 01 igopolistic coordination. The collusive 
01 igopsony thesis is discredited by two types of evidence, first, 
that the influence of large buyers largely takes the form of 
individually negotiated discounts and special prices and, second, 
that buyer concentration ratios tend to be substantially lower than 
seller concentration ratios. This is particularly the case in 
wholesale markets where the manufacturers of consumer goods deal with 
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retailers. Of eleven consumer products studied in the MMC 
discount report, for six products the three firm concentration 
ratios exceed 70 per cent, while for only five products did the 
three-firm buyer concentration ratios exceed 10 per cent (MMC 
1981, p.30). 
Individual reports by the MMC provide a number of illustrations of 
the two mechanisms through which large buyers achieve discriminatory 
preferences. In near monopoly industries, price concessions to large 
buyers can usually be explained in terms of I imit pricing behaviour. 
In metal containers, Metal Box's special terms to major canners 
such as Heinz and Pedigree Petfoods reflected these buyers' potential 
either to backward integrate or to encourage the entry of a new can 
maker (Monopol ies Commission 1970). The london Rubber Company's 
special prices to the Family Planning Association and the Ministry 
of Defence for contraceptive sheaths and Rank Xerox's "group pricing 
scheme" for plain paper copiers recognised the attraction of large 
purchasers as a point of entry into the UK market (Monopolies 
Commission 1973; MMC 1976). 
In more moderately concentrated industries price concessions to large 
buyers have been more closely associated wIth the ability of large 
buyers to defeat 01 igopolistic coordination of prices. An extreme 
case was the "discount war" between the three major bread suppliers 
during the mid-1970s (MMC 1977a, pp.62-67). Similar but less intense 
competition is recorded in insulated cables (MMC 1979a pp.72-76, 
115-117). Such competition in preferential terms to large buyers is 
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particularly strong where products are relatively homogeneous and 
excess capacity is present. As the MMC report on retail discounts 
obse rves: liThe gene ra II y s ta tic volume of s a I es of many food 
products in recent years has led to keen competition for market 
share. In the effort to secure or expand the volume of sales, 
competition between manufacturers for the business of the large 
multiples ••• has been intended to intensify, and business with them 
may sometimes be accepted at a price which makes less than a full 
contribution to the manufacturer's fixed costS.11 (MMC 1981, p.31). 
In industries where seller concentration is very high and excess 
capacity less apparent, then suppliers tend to be more successful 
in holding their list prices in the face of large buyers. Thus 
in cat and dog foods (MMC 1977 b ,pp.15-16) and in cigarettes 
(Price Commission 1978a,ppI3-17; Hadjiraptis 1981, pp.87-I03) 
discounts to large distributors were largely cost Justified. 
Drawing upon data on special discounts and allowances contained in 
a number of MMC and Price Commission reports, a statistical test 
of the determinants of preferential terms to large buyers is 
possible. As the MMC discounts report notes, the measurement of 
the extent of price discrimination in favour of large buyers is 
extremely difficult. In particular, lito discover what is the highest ... 
and lowest price at which a supplier sells a particular product and 
to express one in terms of the other" will tell us little, parti-
cularly if we are unable to "ascertain the extent to which price 
differences are attributable to cost differences". (MMC 1981. 
pp.15-16 ). The measure of preferential terms to large buyers 
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employed by the Commission is expenditure on specially negotiated 
discounts, rebates, promotions and services expressed as a 
percentage of sales revenue. The justification is that manufac-
turers' publ ished terms normally incorporate discount scales 
which take at least some account of cost savings in marketing and 
distribution. Discrimination in favour of large buyers occurs 
primarily through specially negotiated terms. 
Table 3.1 shows the value of specially negotiated terms which include 
special prices or discounts and retrospective rebates or overriders 
on as consistent a basis as possible. Section 3.2 above identifies 
a number of factors which are likely to determine the degree of 
discrimination in favour of large buyers. Of these, three are 
likely to be especially important. These are capacity utilisation, 
seller concentration In the supplying industry, and proportion of 
sales to large buyers. 
Capacity util isation data is not readily available, but it might be 
expected to be related to growth in manufacturers' output over the 
medium term. Seller concentration was measured by the Herfindahl 
index. Not only do theoretical models of 01 igopoly pricing point to 
the appropriateness of the Herfindahl index (e.g. Cowling and 
Waterson 1976; Stigler 1964), but the index has the advantage of 
clearly distinguishing between industries dominated by one or two 
suppl iers and 01 igopol ies with four or five leading firms. Such 
industries may have very similar four or five firm concentration 
ratios, though the consequences for price and discount behaviour 
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Table 3.1. Special discounts al1_d_Jndustry~structure variable_s: observations for 17 products 
PRODUCT SPECIAL DISCOUNTS GROWTH RATE OF HERFINDAHL PROPORTION OF SALES 
AS % OF SALES UK MANUFACTURERS' INDEX OF SELLER THROUGH MULTIPLE SOURCE 
SALES CONCENTRATION RETAILERS 
Biscuits 5.7 0.2 0.27 0.70 MMC 1981 
Refrigerators 3.5 7.7 0.18 0.69 II •• 
Cigarettes 0.2 -3.2 0.51 0.21 II II 
Cake 2.5 -0.6 o. 13 0.60 II II 
Canned beer 3.9 -1.5 o. II 0.72 II II 
Bread 6. I 0.0 o. 13 0.45 MMC 1977a 
Frozen foods 3.4 4.8 0.18 0.79 MMC 1976 
t Cat and dog foods 0.34 3.9 0.44 0.60 MMC 1977b Ice cream 3.7 3.0 0.2 I 0.30 MMC 1979c 
Vacuum ware 0.0 0.5 0.53 0.40 Price Commission 1979a 
Gas cookers 13.6 -2.5 0.24 0.97 MMC 1980a 
Gas fires 15.6 -2.0 0.15 0.90 II II 
Water heaters 7.4 4.2 0.43 0.75 II II 
Tampons 1.6 3.7 0.55 0.40 MMC 1980b 
Portable electric tools 0.9 5. I 0.89 0.63 Price Commission 1979b 
I Floor and furniture polish 2,6 0.2 . 0.34 0.50 Price Commission 1979c 
. Cigarette papers 0.2 2.8 0.96 0.30 Price Commission 1978b 
! 
--
of the different size distributions of firms are likely to be very 
different. As a measure of the impact of large buyers, the 
proportion of retail sales through national mUltiples was used. 
This measure was not entirely satisfactory due to failure to take 
account of the different sizes and therefore bargaining strength 
of large and small multiple groups, but it was broadly consistent 
with the concept of buying power discussed on pp 75-7(0 
above and it was the only measure where reasonably consistent 
data could be obtained. 
In view of the small number of observations (17) and the disparate 
nature of the products included, the results were surprisingly 
good. Linear multiple regression gave the following result: 
82 
Independent 
va riabl e 
Sales growth 
Regression 
coefficient 
-0.4570 
Seller concentration -4.138 
Retail concentration II .18 
* 
significant at 10% level 
...... 
""'''' 
significant at 5% level 
*** 
significant at 1% level 
R2 
= 0.3999 
Correlation matrix 
T-statistics 
** 
-1.906 
-1.722* 
84*** 7.0 
sales growth seller concent. retai I concent. 
sales growth 
sell e r concent. 
retail concent. 
-0.3474 
0.09367 -0.6434 
All the coefficients are of the predicted sign with both sales 
growth and retail concentration clearly significant, while seller 
concentration is almost significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Ideally seller concentration should have entered the regression 
in a non-linear form in accordance with the inverted U shape 
relationship between discounts and concentration predicted by 
theory. However, since all the observations related to concentrated 
industries it seems reasonable to postulate a negative relationship 
for the range of concentration being considered. 
Clearly, both the measurement of the variables and the small number 
of observationsmean that only limited weight can be placed on these 
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results. At the same time it is encouraging that the sparse evIdence 
which is available on this important but neglected area of pricing 
behaviour can be explained by reference to simple hypotheses of 
01 igopoly behaviour. 
3.4. Implications for competition policy 
The principal result of my analysis (Grant 1980) supported by the 
empirical evidence in section 3.3 is that influence of large buyers 
on price is manifest principally in price differentials between 
large and small buyers. This phenomenum is not a consequence of 
monopsony (or collusive oligopsony) but is associated more with 
market power on the supply side. Hence it would appear that the 
appropriate policy response should be towards the exercise of market 
power by powerful sellers against small buyers, rather than towards 
the pressure by large buyers for competitive prices. 
The problem here, as clearly illustrated by the empirical evidence 
in section 3.3. is that price discrimination between large and small 
buyers is most closely associated with moderately concentrated 
01 igopoly industries, rather than with highly concentrated industries 
where price competition is more obviously absent. Hence conventional 
competition policies towards market dominating firms are either 
inapplicable or inappropriate in dealing with the price distortions 
arising from this assymetric oligopolistic competition. And yet, 
the problem is a real one in relation to welfare. Price discrimination, 
whether it is the conventional monopol istic exploitation-type or the 
result of assymetric oligopolistic competition in the face of 
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different sized buyers, is likely to encourage resource misallocation 
and increased seller concentration in the buying industry, apart from 
any considerations of equity. 
Such concerns have been focused primarily upon the distributive 
sector where the emergence of large scale national chain stores in 
the retailing of a high proportion of consumer products and the 
decl ining role of independent retailers and the wholesaling sector 
has been strongly influenced by the preferential terms of supply 
which large retailers have been able to obtain. The response by the 
industrialised countries to the problem of discriminatory terms of 
supply between retailers and rapid structural change in the distri-
butive sector h~~been influenced more by consideration of equity 
and the desire to protect traditional retailers than by thorough 
analysis of the welfare impact of these conditions. In several 
countries antitrust legislation was extended to specifically outlaw 
certain forms of discrimination in terms of supply. Enactment of 
anti-price discrimination measures have occurred in two waves. 
In the United States and Canada, the early advent of the chain store 
movement is retail ing combined with the severity of the Great 
Depression resulted in the introduction of price discrimination laws 
during the mid-1930s. In Western Europe and Australia, the more recent 
(and in many ways more rapid) structural revolution in the retail 
sector has produced a similar rash of legislation. 
Because the welfare effects are confl icting, necessitating careful 
quantitative measurement to determine the net effect of discriminatory 
pricing. no clear conclusion is reached in the paper as to the 
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desirability of price discrimination controls as a means of 
preventing and I imiting price differentials in favour of large buyers. 
The most that can be achieved by a general discussion is to outline 
the principal issues (Grant 1980,pp.IO-18). First is the effect of 
buyer - induced price discrimination on the level of price both in 
the supplying industry and to the final consumer. While the breakdown 
of oligopolistic competition might be expected to lower average supply 
prices, there is the possibility that discriminatory limit pricing 
could raise average prices, and, more seriously, deter new entry. 
Second, discriminatory prices to the buying Industry will distort the 
al location of resources between firms within the industry and promote 
the growth of concentration. There is clear evidence that favourable 
prices to large buyers has promoted the exit of smal I firm~and growth 
of large firms particularly in retailing. However, most of the 
available evidence on prices (see Grant 1980,p.14; also Adelman 1959) 
suggests that the growth of size and buying power of large retailers 
has had the effect of lowering retail prices to consumers, even if 
only a part of the buying price advantage of the retail chains is 
passed on to the consumer. Indeed, the effect of price discrimination 
in raising retail seller concentration may be offset by the encourage-
ment to independent retail pricing behaviour which differential buying 
prices induces. 
3.5. A survey and appraisal of recent price discrimination measures 
The existence of a market imperfection with adverse welfare consequences 
is an insufficient basis for the introduction of public pol icy measures. 
It is also necessary to carefully evaluate the consequences of the 
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policy, for no government intervention represents a simple correction 
of market imperfections; in many cases the imperfections of 
government pol icy are more damaging than the market imperfections 
which are the target of the intervention. The history of the Robinson-
Patman Act is one of the classic examples of this phenomenum. Over 
four decades of criticism and calls for reform and repeal culminated 
in 1977 in a US Department of Justice report which identified the 
legislation as anti-competitive in intent, spirit and effect 
(US Dept. of Justice 1977). Yet during the early 1970s a number of 
countries introduced measures which were aimed at the same problem, 
discriminatory prices to large (particularly retail) buyers, and 
which resembled, to a greater or lesser extent, Robinson-Patman. 
Little had been written on the new approaches to discrimination, the 
only significant study was that of Ann Everton (1976) which concen-
trated upon the main features of legislation in a narrow range of 
countries and said little about the enforcement or the impact of the 
measures. My survey of the experiences of Germany, Ireland, France 
and Australia with recently enacted price discrimination laws 
(Grant 1981b)was to find out whether their experiences had paralleled 
those of the United States, and in particular to determine: 
whether price discrimination legislation can be 
effective in preventing or controlling discriminatory 
policy; 
whether the anti-competitive consequences of the 
legislation are worse than the initial problem; and 
whether anti-discrimination laws are the appropriate 
pol icy towards the basic problem. 
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All of the countries surveyed experienced severe problems of enforce-
ment. Where the scope of the laws w'as na rrow (such as in 
GermanYS and Australia) no widespread impact on pricing practices 
were disc.ern.ible, while more general prohibitions had succeeded 
either in partial compliance (France) or outright flouting of the 
law (Ireland). For the most part, the ineffectiveness of the 
legislations arose from uncertainties as to the content and coverage 
of the provisions against discrimination. These uncertainties have 
been increased by confusion and indecision among the various 
competition authorities as to their interpretation and enforcement 
of the law. Only in Australia, and to a lesser extent France, has 
a concerted and consistent attempt at clarifying and explaining the 
anti-discrimination law been undertaken by the competition authority 
(Grant 198Ib,Pp603-60S). 
Evidence on the effects of the measures is sparse. In general 
the extent of any anti-competitive effect in terms of suppressing 
price competition depended upon the scope of the legislation in 
each country and its interpretation. But even where, as in 
Austral ia, the law is aimed only at price discrimination which 
involves a substantial impairment of competition, the effect may 
still be to encourage oligopoly coordination and the raising of net 
prices (Grant 1981~pp601-602). 
The overall results of the measures are disappointing. In all 
countries the price discrimination laws have given rise to consi-
derable uncertainty and controversy and in none has a substantial 
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degree of compl iance been achieved. The anti-competitive effects 
of the general prohibitions of price discrimination suggest a 
preference for more selective approaches aimed at discriminatory 
prices which are seriously anti-competitive in its effects (e.g 
Australia). If this is the case, however, then more conventional 
approaches to competition policy which concentrate upon the sources 
of price discrimination in the market power of suppliers and buyers 
rather than upon the manifestation of the problem may suffice 
(Grant 1981b,pp626-628). 
3.6. The OECD Report on Buying Power 
Subsequent to the publication of my own papers (Grant 1979 and 198Ib), 
the OECD released a major report by its Committee of Experts on 
Restrictive Business Practices on "Buying Power. The Exercise of 
Market Power by Dominant Buyers" (OECD 1981). The scope of the 
report is somewhat wider than my papers:- in addition to an 
extensive discussion of the nature of buying power and its effects, 
the report surveyed policies towards buying power and price discrimi-
nation across most of the OECD member countries. 
The report gathered together a considerable amount of information 
on the extent and the growth of buyer concentration in the OECD 
countries (largely from secondary sources), although there was a 
marked lack of any comprehensive statistical data which could allow 
detailed comparisons to be made either over time or across countries 
(OECD 1981,ppI7-22 ). The main evidence related to the growth of 
concentration in the distributive trades which had occurred through 
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the creation of national retail chains, mergers between smaller 
chain retailers and the emergence of voluntary associations of 
small independent retailers. The report also noted the propensity 
for large retailers to integrate backwards into wholesale and 
manufacturing operations, thus supporting my view (Grant 1980,pS) 
that 01 igopolists perceive large buyers as potential entrants. 
The report found that the pattern of development of concentration 
at the buyers' level gave some support to the theory of countervailing 
power (OECD 1981,p88). , 
As to the effects of buying power on competition and economic welfare, 
the conclusions of the OECD Committee of Experts were largely 
consistent with my own (Grant 1980, pplO-18). In particula; the 
report emphasised the procompetitive effects of buyi.ng power on 
oligopol istic supplying industries through reducing the levels of 
prices and barriers to entry (OECD 1981 pp33-40). With regard to 
dynamic efficiency, however, a possible danger that was foreseen 
was that suppliers' profits might be depressed to a level which 
was detrimental to investment and innovation in manufacturing 
industries (ibid,p.90). 
Two issues particularly concerned the Committee. First whether , 
discriminatory prices to large buyers would increase concentration 
in buying industries. second, whether price concessions obtained 
by powerful retailers would be passed on to consumers. Clearly 
the two issues are closely 1 inked. On the first, the report noted 
that buying power was only one factor in the trend towards 
increasing concentration in buying industries and particularly in 
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retail ing. Scale economies in retail distribution and more 
aggressively competitive behaviour were very important factors 
causing the exit of small firms. As regards the ultimate effect 
on consumer prices, while risks were acknowledged, there was no 
empirical evid~nce that increasing concentration in buying industries 
was leading to higher consumer prices (ibid,p.90). 
The OECD report paid little attention to the possibility that 
discriminatory terms of business might give rise to serious 
inefficiencies in the distributive sector. The primary argument of 
OECD was that preferential prices to big buyers would tend to promote 
concentration in the retail sector, but so long as price competition 
between retailers was active1then the consequences were unlikely to 
be serious. This appears to be based upon the presumption of scale 
economies in retail ing. However, there is a clear danger that 
preferential buying terms to large retailers may enable inefficient 
iarge retailers to displace efficient small retailers and for 
inefficiencies to emerge among larger retailers in the form of 
excessive investment or X-inefficiency. Moreover the response of 
manufacturers to the increasing size and influence of leading retailers 
has frequently been a defensive strategy based on increased product 
differentiation principally through higher advertising. Such a 
strategy may represent socially inefficient market investment. 
The bulk of the OECD report comprised a survey of policy measures 
used to control the abuse of buying power in the different OECD 
countries. The report found few cases of the enforcement of 
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competition law provisions against buying power. The principle 
reasons being the difficulties in estimating costs of supply to 
individual customers and the fact that on the basis of standard 
market share criteria, few buyers occupied dominant positions 
(ibid, pp.91-9 2) 
-
The apparent scarcity of buyers OCCUP)lrIg positions of market 
dominance in contrast to the abundant evidence of the power of large 
buyers to obtain favourable price concessions, calls for a detailed 
examination of the nature and sources of buying power in relation to 
conventional concepts of market power and monopsony power. Such a 
discussion is largely absent from the OECD report. Buying power is 
defined as: lithe situation which exists when a firm or group of firms, 
either because it has a dominant position as a purchaser of a product 
or service or because it has strategic or leverage advantages as a 
result of its size or other characteristics, is able to obtain from 
a supplier more favourable terms than those available to other buyers. 
The degree of a firm's buying power is closely dependent on the 
magnitude of the extra costs or other disadvantages whTch it can 
occasion to its suppl iers by ceasing to buy from them and, conversely, 
on the extra costs and other disadvantages which it can itself incur 
in consequence of the change of supplier." (ibid,p.IO). 
But the report goes on to acknowledge that buying power is not an 
Independent phenomenum but can only effectively be exercised against 
suppliers with market power, what is called for, therefore, is a much 
more rigorous analysis of buying power and some explicit conclusions 
as to whether it constitutes market power. My own views on the subject 
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have been clearly stated (Grant 1980): the ability of large buyers 
to obtain discriminatory prices and discounts is most commonly a 
result of the market power of the suppliers, not of the buyers, hence 
the application of competition law to such buyers is ~nappropriate. 
Yet the DECO report suggests that the problems involved in the 
application of the dominant firm provisions of competition law to 
buyers could be resolved by redefining the conditions for market 
dominance by buyers, "For example by defining specialised methods 
of distribution to constitute markets" or the existence of buying 
which might be indicated '~hen the latter regularly obtains special 
benefits in addition to rebates or other considerations customary 
in the trade". (~.p. 5). 
The report identified legal provisions to control discrimination 
as the most important measures directed towards the abuse of buying 
power in DECO member countries. The same problems of price 
discrimination control as were identified in Grant (1981b) were 
discussed in the report, most importantly the problems of enforecement 
and the anti-competitive effects of such measures. These problems 
are particularly serious in the countries which have adopted the most 
stringent prohibitions (France and the United States). The report 
cautioned against a strict ban on price discrimination. liThe anti-
competitive effects of a rigid prohibition of discriminatory prices, 
added to the costs and problems of administration, would seem to 
outweigh the claimed benefits of such a pol icy" (ibid t p.9S). The 
recommendation was that measures to deal with buying power through 
controll ing price discrimination should be "based upon the principle 
of avoiding systematic discrimination of a permanent character in 
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favour of certain groups of buyers which distort market forces in 
the long run." (ibid,p.94). How such a principle should be put 
into practice was not fully explained. However, the report noted 
that any price differences based upon cost differentials or 
offered to meet a competitor's price should be allowed. Also, 
where specific practices were likely to constitute an abuse of 
buying power - e.g. pressure on suppl iers not to supply competing 
buyers, excessive delays in payments, certain types of promotional 
allowances and starting up bonuses - these could be prohibited or 
subject to stricter control (ibid,p.96). 
In summary, the findings of the report about the effectiveness of 
price discrimination measures against powerful buyers largely 
supported the conclusions reached in my own survey (Grant 198Ib). 
In its analysis and recommendations, however, the main characteris-
tic of the report was its inability or reluctance to utilise the 
evidence obtained from seventeen member countries to identify the 
sources and effects of buying power and to establish clear guidelines 
for public policy, The failure to reach clear conclusions stemmed in 
part from the lackofa sufficiently clear conception of what buying 
power is, and in particular how it relates to the underlying notions 
or market power and bargaining power. 
3.7. The MMC report on discounts to retailers 
The inconclusiveness of the OECD report was probably inevitable in 
view of the impressionistic and fragmentary evidence which the 
Committee had at its disposal. In contrast, the principal virtue 
of the Monopol ies Commission report on retail discounts (MMC 1981) 
was that it was based on a much greater mass of empirical data on 
terms of supply to the distributive trades amassed over the three 
and a half years of the enquiry. Although the Commission could 
not achieve a statistical survey of the extent of price discrlmina-
6 tion between retail buyers. sufficient evidence was available for 
some clear conclusions as to the overall effects of discriminatory 
terms of supply on the publ ic interest and for recommendations 
concerning public policy (~. chapter 9). 
Discrimination in price and other terms of supply in favour of large 
retailers was found to be prevalent in the supply of manufactured 
products (both food and non-food) and was found to be Ilgreatest when 
much of the market for the product in question is in the hands of a 
fairly small number of suppliers and some of their customers have 
significantly more bargaining power than others" and "it also tends 
to fluctuate ••• according to the balance between demand and supply 
or product i on capac i ty .11 (~,p.65) . These findings conform 
to the analysis of buying power in Grant (1980) and are consistent 
with the statistical analysis above. 
As regards the effects of discriminatory concessions to large 
retailers upon economic welfare. the report is far more positive 
and unequivocal than my own a priori analysis suggested. The report 
largely confirms the findings of other studies (e.g. US Department 
of Justice 1978) on the pro-competitive effect of buying power and 
discriminatory discounts on the supplying industry. In the processed 
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food industry in particular, the effect of growing retail concentra-
tion has been to contribute substantially to lower profitability 
(MMC 1981 pp36-37). What is interesting however is that the 
increased competition and reduced profitability has had no observable 
impact in reducing product variety, depressing capital investment 
and discouraging innovation. Indeed the observations of the 
Commission were that increased competition has had a stimulatory 
effect on all of these (ibid,pp37-37). 
Some of the most interesting and rigorous analysis undertaken by the 
Commission concerned the relationship between the buying and selling 
prices of retailers. The issue here was whether the discriminatory 
concessions received by large retail organisations are passed on to 
the consumer through retailer competition or whether they simply 
serve to augment the profitability of an oligopolistic retail trade. 
Statistical analysis for 10 products showed that between 31 and 90 
per cent of variability in retail selling prices was attributable 
to variations in buying prices. Regressing selling prices on buying 
prices for each of the 10 products and running separate regressions 
for multiples and independents gave the following results: 
Table 3.2. Regressions of retail sel ling prices on buying prices 
Multiples Independellls 
Sqllare of Square of 
correlation correlatioll 
Product Slope coefjicicII' Slope coe/ficie,,' 
Baked beans 0·95 0'62 0'81 0'31 
Canned beer 1'34 0'50 0'71 0'26 
Toothpaste 0'92 0'56 0'83 0'40 
Paper 
handkerchiefs 1-18 0'33 1'01 0'60 
Refri$erators 1-18 0'91 1'91 0'30 
Biscuits 0'78 0'59 HJ 0'72 
Paint 1-17 0'76 1'08 0'93 
Bread 0'63 0·24 0'38 0'80 
Cigarettes 0'74 0'50 0'54 1>-42 
Chocolate 
confectionery J.3J 0'90 1'13 0'91 
Source: MMC 1981, p.147 
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For 8 out ot 10 products the slope coefficient of the least squares 
regressions was greater for multiples than for independents, showing 
that the multiples had a greater tendency to lower their gross retail 
margin with a lower buying-in priCe. Overall the evidence strongly 
supported the view that discounts to multiple retailers tend to be 
passed on to the customer (~,ppI46-148). 
Consideration was given by the Commission as to whether discrimination 
in favour of large retailers was likely to induce inefficiency in 
the retail sector either bY encouraging retailers to grow beyond 
their most efficient size or by allowing large retailers to operate 
inefficiently. The report argued that price discrimination has been 
only one of the forces that has reshaped the retail trade in recent 
years and its role has been to sustain and accelerate the growth of 
successful retailers rather than to initiate change (ibid p.49). 
The Commission found 1 ittle reason to fear that discrimination might 
operate to protect inefficiency among large retailers. Not only 
have lithe large multiple retailers who have emerged so strongly in 
recent years successfully exploited new techniques in retailing and 
represent an efficient response to changing market conditions", but 
the continuing vigour of competition among the multiples was seen as 
a powerful constraint upon inefficiency. While the domination of the 
retail trade by a small number of major retailers remained a 
possibility, continuing competition from independents and the 
opportunities for new entry limiteJ such a risk (ibid, pp67-68). 
In considering actions which might be taken to regulate discriminatory 
terms between retailers, the Commission considered both the 
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existing legislative measures (the Fair Trading Act and Competition Act) 
and new legislation. drawing on the experiences of overseas 
countries. The Commission rejected any comprehensive scheme of 
regulation (along the lines of the Robinson-Patman Act or France's 
Loi Royer) primarily on the basis of unenforceability, but also 
because such a measure would impair price competition. The 
desirability of selective investigation into discriminatory terms 
by a particular company or within a particular trade o~ industry 
was endorsed by the Commission because of the risk to the public 
interest arising from distortion of competition at the customer 
level or from the use of discriminatory terms in a predatory way 
or as a barrier to entry. For the short term, at least, the 
Commission considered that existing powers under the Fair Trading 
Act and the Competition Act were sufficient for the investigation 
of specific instances of discrimination and to provide for 
remedies (~,pp69-72). 
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FOOTNOTES 
Subsequent references to this paper are to the Engl ish version 
(Grant 1980). 
Buyer concentration statistics are not collected by public 
authorities or on any systematic basis. Estimates have been 
made for US industries using seller concentration data and 
input-,output matrices (Gutrr et al 1977). Fragmentary evidence 
on buyer concentration in wholesale markets in the UK is 
provided by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission report (1981). 
This raises the issue of whether in fact buying power does 
constitute market power. If the power of buyers over price is 
limited to bilateral transactions, then individual buyers are 
not exerting a significant influence over market price. 
However to the extent that bargaining power for concessionary 
prices by a large buyer increases the difficulty of oligopoly 
coordination and may trigger more general price competition 
across the market, then such an exercise of buying power can 
have a more general impact on market price. 
Similar results were also found by Brooks (1973) at a higher 
level of industry aggregation. 
A more detailed account of German price discrimination than 
offered in Grant (1981) is available in Gerber (1982). 
Primarily because of the complexity of terms of supply which 
were found to extend from discounts and rebates to conditions 
of delivery, credit terms and the provision of various services, 
and the difficulty of distinguishing price discrimination from 
cost Justified price differentials (MMC 1981, Chapter 4). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DIVERSIFICATION AND LONG-RUN COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM 
In focusing upon pricing behaviour, the analysis so far has 
concentrated upon competition in the short term (conventionally 
defined as the period during which productive capacity is fixed). 
As has been noted however in the previous two chapters, even 
short run pricing behaviour is likely to be influenced by 
established firms'recognition of the potential for new competition 
through the entry of new firms. Since the early work by Bain, the 
industrial economics 1 iterature on price determination has seen an 
increase in the emphasis placed upon the role of potential 
competition, as measured by barriers to entry, and comparatively 
less emphasis on the extent of actual competition, as indicated 
by seller concentration ratios. Indeed, the recent treatise by 
Baumo 1, P,am:ar. and Wi 11 i g (1982) dispenses wi th the concept of 
perfect competition in favour of a theory of "contestable markets" 
based upon the notion of costless entry and exit. 
The analysis of barriers to entry in the Bain/sylo!Labini/Modigliani 
literature has presupposed de novo entry. In practice, most 
entry on any substantial scale into already established industries 
has been primarily through diversification by establ ished firms. 1 
Recognition of the role of diversification as a primary mechanism 
for entry has important consequences for the nature and level of 
barriers to entry and consequently for the pricing behaviour by 
monopoly and oligopoly enterprises. 
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While the threat and the anticipation of entry represent important 
influences on competitive behaviour in the J~hol-t- run, diversifica-
tion is also the primary long-run medium for competitive behaviour. 
If we accept that most products have finite life spans and the 
Chandler (1962) thesis of the tendency for firms to develop from 
single product into multi-product firms, then over the longer 
term competitive behaviour is concerned less with competitive Inter-, 
actions in individual markets as with the allocation of 
resources between the firm's current range of 
activities and decisions over entry into new industries. 
Economists have traditionally viewed the reallocation of resources 
between industries as being undertaken by factor markets 2 with 
long run equilibrium being achieved where the rate of return on 
capital is equalised across industry at the "normal" rate. 3 
The important role played by diversification in the inter-
industry allocation of resources has far-reaching consequences 
for the process of adjustment towards.and the achievement of, 
long-run equilibrium. The ability of established firms to breach 
conventional barriers to entry (and exit) is not only likely to 
constrain pricing decisions by established firm5but also facilitates 
the inter-industry allocation of resources, thus accelerating 
adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. Secondly, to the extent 
that managers' diversification decisions are subject to different 
objectives than those of the owners of capital and respond to 
different industry variables, then the equilibirum positions 
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establ ished under the two mechanisms for resource allocation will 
differ. For these reasons understanding of the process and deter-
minants of diversification is fundamental to the analysis of 
competitive behaviour and the process of adjustment of the market 
economy. 
4.1. Theories of the determinants of diversification 
Economic analysis of diversification by firms has been inhibited 
both by the economist's analytical fiction of the single product 
firm and by scarcity of empirical data. Recognition of the 
importance of diversification as a source of company growth and 
a feature of modern industrial structure is associated In Britain 
with EAG Robinson (1958) and Edith Penrose (1959) and in the 
United States with Corwin Edwards (1955) and Alfred Chandler 
(1962). During the early 1970s a strong growth of interest in 
the empirical analysis of industrial diversification in the UK 
occurred. stimulated by the pioneering studies of Gcrt in the US 
(1962) and Ame'J in Britain (1964). Using Census of Production 
data which was available for 1958, 1963 and 196~ (though not on 
a comparable basis for all three years) studies of diversification 
in the UK focussed upon two main areas: the impact of diversifi-
cation on firm growth and seller concentration and the determinants 
of corporate diversification. The former area, associated in 
particular with work of Berry (1975) in the United States, was the 
subject of limited work by Hassid (1977) and a much larger scale 
investigation by Utton (1979) which used a special compilation 
of Census data prepared by the Business Statistics Office. 
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The latter area was explored in parallel studies by Gorecki (1975a), 
Hassid (1975) and myself (~rant 1977), which were undertaken entirely 
independently and provide an interesting comparative study of how 
different investigators, addressing similar questions to identical 
data,employ different methodclogies and emerge with differences in 
results and the interpretatio~of those results. 
The principal findings 0' my own work on the subject are contained 
in Grant (1977). This represents an extension of earlier work 
(Grant 1974) which took the form of a commentary on a behavioural 
analysis of diversification by Sutton (1973). The article confirms 
at the industry level the trend towards diversification which, at 
the enterprise level,was identified by Channon (1973) and explains 
this general trend in terms, first, of the fall in relative costs 
of inter-industry resource al location within the firms as opposed 
to through the market (see Coase 1937) and, second, of the 
informational advantages possessed by established firms as compared 
with new firms in the exploitation of new investment opportunities 
(see Alchian and De~setz 1972). 
The determinants of the inter-industry patterns of diversification 
are inferred from a theory which assumes that the objective of the 
firm is to maximise shareholder wealth. Hence diversification 
depends upon the expected return and systematic risk (that part of 
the variance of return which is correlated with fluctuations in 
overall returns) in outside industries as compared with the firm's 
primary industry (Grant 1977, pp.86-88). The identification of 
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risk and expected return as the goals of diversification is 
scarcely novel. The principal contribution of this analysis is 
in specifying a measure of risk which is securely grounded in modern 
financial theory and which avoids two major problems inherent 
in the more generalised analysis of diversification in the face of 
risk (e.g. Fisher 1961; Smith and Schreiner 1969) : first, that 
diversification directed towards minimising the variance of the 
firm's overall return is difficult to reconcile with portfol io 
diversification by individual investors, second, that the amount of 
diversification by individual firms depends upon the extent of risk 
aversion by each firm's management. 
Relating the expected profitability of diversification to structural 
variables at the firm and industry level presents greater difficulties. 
Probably the most satisfactory approach is through the "specific 
asset 'l concept used by Gorecki (1975a) and derived from Cave~ theory 
of multinational enterprise (Caves 1971). Where the firm possesses 
specific assets which can be exploited in more than one industry, 
it might be expected that imperfections in the markets for the 
services yielded by these assets, would encourage the firm to exploit 
these assets directly through diversification. The imperfections 
identified by Gorecki include 
the absence of a market because of the difficulty of 
enforcing exclusion, 
non-transferabil ity of the asset, 
high transactions costs. 
externalities arising from the specific asset which compl icate 
the conclusion of a contract between buyer and seller. 
(Gorecki 1975a, p.132). 
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But despite the differences in the theoretical basis from which 
different authors have approached the analysis of diversification; 
what is striking is that all have outlined similar predictions 
concerning the structural determinants of diversification. For 
example, Sutton adopting a behavioural theory of satisficing and 
limited search (Sutton 1973), Hassid's examination of the 
productivity and adaptability of diversifying firms (Hassid 
1975, ppl4 and 32), Gorecki IS specific asset concept 
(Gorecki 1975a, pp.137-139) and my own discussion of the abil ity 
of diversifying firms to breach conventional barriers to entry 
(Grant 1977, p.89),all point to research and advertising intensities 
as likely influences on the extent of diversification. 
4.2. Measurement of diversification 
One of the principal problems which has beset empirical work in 
the UK on business diversification has been the unsatisfactory 
measures of diversification which are available using Census of 
Production data. The severest limitation is that data is only 
available for industry groups and not for individual enterprises. 
Hence the detailed enterprise level studies undertaken in the US 
by Gort,using specially authorised access to Census data for 
individual enterprises, and by Berry, using Fortune's Plant and 
Product Directory,has not been possible in the UK. Using 
diversification measures which are averages for individual industries 
implicitly assumes the homogeneity of firms within each industry and 
enables only industry-level variables to be employed as determinants 
of diversification behaviour. The problems of industry level data 
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are compounded by different industry basis of UK diversification 
statistics between the periods 1958-63 and 1963-68 and by the large 
number of industries for which diversification data were not 
disclosed due to the over-rigorous application of confidentiality 
requ i rements . 
The statistical measures of diversification employed by different 
writers have varied according to the choice of static or dynamic 
definitions of diversification and whether numbers of industries 
or amount of output or employment have been used as the basis for 
measurement. Gorecki, Hassid and ,more recently, Utton (1979) 
have followed Arney in using static measures of diversification:-
the numbers of industries in which a firm produces and the ratio 
of its output or employment in "secondary" industries to that in 
its "primary" industry. Such measures of diversification,1 have 
argued (Grant 1977,p.84), relate to diversity rather than 
diversification: diversification refers to the growth in the 
• f f" t'" 5 diversity 0 a Irm s ac IVltles. Furthermore, to the extent 
that a firm's degree of diversity depends upon decisions made by 
the firm throughout the whole of its history, it appears inappro-
priate to relate empirically the degree of diversity to current 
values of industry variables. 
More awkward is the choice between the number of industries entered 
or the increase in the ratio of secondary to primary output 
(or employment) as the measure of diversification. 
The cOrrelation between the two measures tends to be low and some 
authors have adopted composite measures of diversification. 
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The three leading candidates for a cOmposite measure. of 
enterprise diversification are: 
Be r ry {197 5 ) 
Ash (1965) 
Utton (1979) 
n 
L p.2 (i.e. a Herfindahl-type index) 
i=t I 
n 
2 L. (i Pi) - 1 
i=l 
(where the i industries are ranked 
in descending order according to 
the proportions of the firms 
output or employment). 
Where Pi is the proportion of the firm's output or employment in 
industry i (i = 1,2, 3, ..... n) 
Of these the Utton index would appear to possess the most desirable 
characteristics. The index conveniently takes a value of n for a 
firm whose activities are distributed equally between n different 
industries. Also the index is more sensitive than the Berry-
Herfindahl index to changes in the number of industries in which a 
firm operates which do not involve large scale reallocation of output 
(Utton 1979, pp.15-17). 
However, though useful indicators of changes in the degree of 
diversity over time, the composite indices are not entirely appro-
priate for empirical work into the determinants of diversification. 
For this purpose it would appear desirable to work with separate 
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diversification measures for the number of industries in which the 
firm operates and the ratio of secondary to primary output. The 
reason is that decisions in relation to these two types of 
diversification involve separate considerations and are likely 
to be influenced by different industry structure variables. 
Thus,diversification which involves an increase in the number of 
industries in which a firm operates is Influenced by the level 
of entry barriers, the competitive reactions from established 
firms and the risks inherent in investment in a new activity. 
Diversification which involves an increase in the relative 
importance of secondary activities does not necessarily involve 
new entry and is 1 ikely to be influenced primarily by the relative 
gro~h and profit rates between different industries and the scope 
for resourc.e reallocation within the firm. My own approach was to 
use different measures of diversification for examining different 
questions. Thus, for examining the determinants of the inter-
industry direction of diversification,the increase in the number 
of industries in which the firm operated was used; while for 
examining the efficiency of diversification as a means of resource 
allocation, changes in the ratio of secondary to primary output 
was used (Grant 1977, p.90). 
Apart from differences in time periods and levels of aggregation, 
a major difference in the measures of diversification employed by 
Gorecki and Hassid on the one hand and myself on the other, 
relates to my measurement of diversification between pairs of 
industries and into destination industries, my approach being to 
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analyse diversification from each industry into each J industry (i~J). 
This latter approach possessed two advantages: first, it greatly 
increased the number of observations available. While Hassid 
using the same data was limited to 17 observations for each SIC Order, 
thus excluding the possibility of multiple regression analysis of the 
determinants of diversification, use of the full diversification 
matrix increased the number of observations to 192. Second, the 
analysis of diversification between pairs of industries enabled 
not only the simultaneous testing of the influence of the structure 
of both "source" and "receiving" industries, but also enabled the 
introduction of variables representing complementarities between 
the two industries in terms of technological and marketing similarities. 
4.3. The determinants of the pattern of diversification in UK 
manufacturing industry 
In comparing the results of the different studies (see Table 4.1.), 
the first comparison to be made is between the explanatory value of 
the estimating equations as indicated by the R2 values. The Gorecki 
studies show remarkably high R2s in view of the aggregated nature 
of the data, the absence of firm level variables and the lack of 
any strong theoretical model upon which to base the empirical tests. 
The Hassid study too gives rise to some surprisingly high R2 
. . h th t t . It' I . 6 conSidering t at e es s are main y separa e simp e regresSions. 
In contrast,the explanatory power of my own estimating equations was 
substantially lower, which was surprising in view of the more 
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Table 4.1. A compari~on of empirical studies of the determinants of diversification in the UK 
manufacturing'industry 1958-68 
AUTHOR I DIVERSIFICATION MEASURE 
Gorecki (1975a) I non-primary employment 
total employment 
diversified firms 
a II fi rms 
Goreck i (1975b) I ~ nee of outs i de firms 
present in the industry 
total no. of outside firms 
present in the industry 
Hassid (1974) non-primary net output 
Grant (1977) 
total net output 
outside firms' net 
~ output in industry 
industry net output 
no. of firms in industry i 
~ with operations in industry ~ 
DATE 
1963 
SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES (pos.-positive impact; 
neg.-negative impact) 
advertising (neg.); R&D (pos.)-particularly 
in producer goods industries. 
R2 
0.37 
1963 I as above; plus concentration ratio (pos.). 0.43 
1958 
- 63 
1963, 
1968 
1963 
- 68 
1963 
- 68 
growth of sales (pos.) 
R&D (pos.); concentration ratio (pos.). 
profitability (neg.); profitability (pos.); 
variance of profits (neg.); advertising 
(neg.); advertising (pos.); 
0.47 
simple 
regress ion 
only 
" 
II 
R&D in source industry (pos.); similarity in 
R&D intensity in source and destination industriesl 0.18 
(pos.); profitability of source industry (pos.); 
systematic risk of source industry (pos.); 
rate of growth of destination industry (pos.). 
theoretically satisfactory measure of diversification and the 
inclusion of more independent variables (particularly risk). In 
comparison with the Gorecki study (1975a; 1975b), the low R2s 
are probably partially accounted for by the more aggregated data 
(17 SIC orders compared to 51 industry groups). 
In terms of the factors which were found to influence the amount 
and direction of diversification, there exists substantial 
consistency between the results of the different studies. This 
is both pleasing and surprising in view of the different diversi-
fication measures and study periods, and the generally low levels 
of statistical significance which characterise cross-sectional 
studies in the economics of industrial organisation. Furthermore, 
most of the findings support those of Amey (1963). 
The principal findings which were common to more than one study were: 
(a) diversification from an industry was positively related to 
research intensity (all studies strong and significant), and to 
seller concentration (weak and sometimes insignificant, and 
negatively related to advertising intensity (comparatively 
small influence, frequently insignificant). Conversely, 
growth of sales and the rate of profit were generally 
insignificant with varying signs; 
(b) diversification into an industry was positively related to 
the growth of sales in the receiving industry. 
4.4. Diversification and the efficiency of resource allocation 
Most of the discussion of the impact of diversification upon economic 
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performance has been concerned with the competitive effects of 
diversification, particularly of conglomerate merger. 7 Cer~ainly, 
any effects of diversification upon competition in individual 
markets has implications for the efficiency of resource allocation. 
However, the more direct impact of diversification upon performance 
concerns the efficiency of diversification as a mechanism for 
resource allocation. In so far as diversification is a means of 
allocating resources between industries which lies outside the 
market mechanism, our primary concern is with the efficiency of 
the "visible hand" in comparison with the "invisible hand". 
Two criteria may be postulated for determining the efficiency of 
inter-industry resource allocation 
(a) the extent to which resources are reallocated from low 
productivity to high productivity use, and 
(b) the speed of such reallocation. 
The evidence here is that the overall performance of the UK 
industrial sector with regard to the inter-industry allocation of 
resources is remarkably poor. Util ising statistics on the 
adjustment of the industrial structures of the Western European 
countries collected by the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (1981), I have shown that not only has the UK manufacturing 
sector experienced a comparative lack of change in the Industrial 
composition of output and employment since 1968, but that changes 
in the pattern of the UK's industrial specialism have involved 
resource reallocation towards industries which, on a European basis, 
are declining. These industries include textiles, clothing, rubber 
goods, footwear, tobacco products, leather goods and printing 
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(Grant 1983). Part of the proulem would appear to be the lack of 
mobility in the labour market both geographically and occupationally 
together with a generally low level of labour skills. An 
indication of labour market immobility is shown by the exceptionally 
low level of structural change in the industrial composition of 
8 
employment between 1968 and 1972 (see Grant 1983, table 10.). 
The extent to which diversification reallocates resources from 
declining to expanding industries is difficult to assess from the 
empirical studies surveyed. My own study showed that diversifying 
entry was positively related to industry growth and also that the 
shifts in output between industries i and J were positively (though 
insignificantly) related to the difference in the rate of growth 
between industries i and J (Grant 1977, p.93). The comparative 
efficiency of diversification as a means of resource allocation was 
also supported by Gorecki's finding that entry by diversifying 
enterprises was more strongly related to the rate of growth of the 
entered industry than was entry by specialist industries (Gorecki 
1975 b, p.144). 
The second influence of diversification on the efficiency of resource 
allocation is through the effect of diversification upon the level 
of competition in industry. Here the a priori arguments are 
conflicting: diversification may be regarded as stimulating competition 
through the ability of diversifying firms to breakdown barriers to 
entry into concentrated industries and upset established patterns of 
coordinated pricing behaviour. On the other hand. increasing 
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aggregate concentration associated with diversification by large 
firms has been declared potentially anti-competitive.as-a result of 
potential for predatory competition through cross-subsidisation, 
"re(.ipro'ity" and "mutua 1 forbearance" (see Scherer 1980,pp335-348, 
and Utton 1979, pp57-76). 
Most of the evidence on the direction and nature of diversification 
tends to be consistent with the competitive nature of large firm 
diversification and gives little support to any monopolistic 
effects. Thus Gorecki (1975b) found no evidence of diversifying 
firms being deterred byscale economy nr product differentiation 
barriers, while Utton (1979 pp92-93) found that the largest firms 
"were not deterred from entering industries because of the existing 
structure". Utton also found no tendency for diversifying entry 
by large firms to lead to any substantial increase in seller 
concentration in the entered industry. 
4.5. ~dJustment to long-run equil ibrium: preliminary remarks 
As has been discussed above, allocation of capital between industries 
is through two mechanisms: allocation of finance between firms by 
the capital market and allocation within the firm through diversifi-
cation. Capital market allocation occurs both through the 
expansion and contraction of established firms in response to the 
growth and decline of market demand, and through the entry and exit 
of firms. The relative importance of these two processes of capital 
market allocation depends upon a number of factors, in particular the 
shape of the long run average cost curve. In ind~stries where 
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average costs are approximately constant over a broad 
range of firm slzes.then industry adjustment will occur principally 
through changes in firm sizes. Where a well-defined optimal firm 
size exists, then adjustment will involve changes in the population 
of fi rms. 
Long-run equil ibrium occurs where factor proportions and overall 
industrial capacity are optimally adjusted to the level of demand 
and state of technology, and is indicated by profit rates acr03S 
all industries being equated to the "normal" level. However, both 
the time path towards the long run and the final equilibrium point 
reached is dependent upon the adjustment mechanism. First, the 
length of time in reaching equil ibrium depends upon the barriers to 
capital mobil ity and, second, different adjustment mechanisms Involve 
different decision makers whose objectives may differ resulting in 
different equilibrium positions being attained. 
It has been suggested by Grant (1977,pp93-94) and Gorecki (1975b,pI40) 
that resource allocation by diversification may be less subject to 
mobil ity barriers than resource allocation through the market 
mechanism. In examining barriers to inter-industry allocation by 
the capital market it is important to distinguish between reallocation 
arising from the expansion and contraction of established firms and 
that arising from the entry of new firms and exit (through 
liquidation and bankruptcy) of existing firms. MObility barriers 
are 1 ikely to occur primarily in relation to the latter. Whether 
we are considering diversification in terms of the reallocation of 
resources between existing product divisions of the firm or the 
diversifying expansion into new industries, barriers to resource 
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reallocation might be expected to be lower than the corresponding 
market processes. In the case of reallocation of capital between 
product divisions within the same firm, immobilities arising from 
the costs of using the capital market and the delays inherent in 
decision making by financial i .. ,st·~tu.tions are avoided. In the case 
of diversifying entry into new industries most barriers to entry are 
1 ikely to be less effective than against new firms and, similarly, 
barriers to exit in withdrawing from industries may be lower. 
Differences in the objectives guiding capital investment decisions 
may arise as between the capital market and corporate diversification 
as a result of company management pursuing objectives which diverge 
from the wealth maximisation goal of investors. The 1 iterature on 
managerial motivation is vast and no attempt will be made to survey 
it here. Suffice to say that, even if management objectives are in 
conflict with maximisation of owners' wealth, freedom to pursue such 
goals is constrained by competition in product and capital markets 
and the operation of the market for corporate control. Evidence on 
the operation of these constraints Is far from clear-cut.9 In 
relation to the objectives guiding diversification, a major sour~e 
of evidence concerns the performance of US conglomerate firms. 
Studies have found either inferior performance of conglomerate firms 
in relation either to non-conglomerates or equity portfolios 
(Reid 1968, Mason and Goudzwaard 1975) or that no significant 
performance difference would be detected (Weston and Mansinghka 1971, 
Haugen and Langetieg 1975). 
In the absence of any discrepancies between the objectives of 
Investors and company management (that is, assuming either that 
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managements operate in their shareholders' interests or that the 
constraints on the pursuit of managerial objectives are binding) 
and if we assume that in the long run barriers to entry are 
ineffective, then under static conditions adjustment to a long-run 
equilibrium in the economy can be predicted. In the Introductory 
textbooks such an equilibrium is Identified with the·'·'normal" rate 
of profit - that which is Just sufficient to remunerate and maintain 
capital. However once risk is introduced then,as long as investors 
are not indifferent to risk, long-run equilibrium requires differences 
in the rate of return on capital across industries corresponding to 
differential degrees of risk. 
4.6. The relationshi between risk and rate of return in 
ong-run equi I rium 
This relationship between risk and rate of return on capital in long 
run equil ibrium is the subject of an empirical study reported in 
Grant (198Ia). While the determinants of industry rates of profits 
(or price-cost margins) hav(: been a central theme of empirical research 
in industrial economics for over two decades, such work has tended 
to focus upon a short-run theoretical framework where seller cOncentra-
tion has been assumed to playa leading role. Despite the widespread 
presumption,supported by considerable empirical evidence,of risk 
aversion by investors and managers, comparatively little evidence 
exists as to the relationship across industries between return on 
capital and risk. 
Most approaches to the analysis of risk-return relationship are 
based either upon the presumption rrhmate risk aversion by human 
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beings or on a Friedman - Savage util ity function where risk 
aversion is a consequence of the diminishing marginal utility of 
income. Adopting the latter approach. Fisher and Hall (1969) 
postulate a utility function for the firm where 
U = U (P + W) 
-9.!L- > 0 
d(P+W) 
where P is profit and W is net worth 
Fisher and Hall then show that where return is a random variable. 
utility may be related to the first three moments of the probability 
distribution of returns: thus utility varies positively with expected 
value of the return. negatively with variance of the return1s 
probabil ity distribution. and positively with the degree of positive 
skew of the return's probability distribution. Since in long rUn 
equil ibrium the utility from investments in different industries 
would tend to equality. it would be expected that 
differences in return on capital between industries would depend upon 
risk premia as determined by the standard deviation and skewness of 
10 
the probability distributionsof returns for the different industries. 
Regressing rate of return on net worth of firms over 1950 to 1964 
on the standard deviation and skewness of the return. the coefficients 
of the indepedent variables were found to be significant and to have 
the correct signs. However the explanatory power waS low (R2 = 0.4936). 
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One of the assumptions of this analysis is that the probability 
distributions of return facing each firm and industry are determined 
exogenously. This assumption of exogenous risk is questioned by 
Caves and Varney (1971) who argue that the relationship between risk 
and return which Fisher and Hall observe may be due less to the 
adjustment towards equilibrium rates of return in the face of 
independently determined risk, as a consequence of oligopoly price 
b~haviour in concentrated industries. Thus,differences in inter-
industry rates of return are likely to reflect differences in market 
power. Hence the tendency for high rates of return on capital to be 
be 
associated with high risk may~because both are a consequence of 
collusive pricing behaviour in concentrated industries. The elevation 
of the level of prices and profits in concentrated industries also 
increases the inter-temporal variability of profits because of the 
likel ihood of a breakdown in oligopolistic coordination (these 
tendencies have been discussed in chapter 2). 
In their response to Caves and Vamey, Fisher and Hall attempt to take 
account of this point, and they broaden their analysis by including 
a number of structural and performance variables in their analysis, 
including firm size, price-earnings ratio, growth of sales, market 
size and concentration ratio. Of the additional variables only 
market size and growth are significant, however the R2 increasesto 
0.785 (Fisher and Hall 1971). 
The simple addition of further variables does not, however, appear to 
be an adequate response to the problem. What is needed is a more 
careful analysis of the separate determinants of risk and rate of 
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return which can then provide the basis for a properly formulated 
structural model and more valid econometric testing. 
Even if risk is treated as exogenously determined, a further problem 
is that ex ante risk (the standard deviation of the anticipated 
probability distribution of future returns) does not necessarily 
correspond to ex post risk (the standard deviation of observed 
returns}. Indeed ex post risk may be measured in two ways - either 
the standard deviation of returns over time, or the standard deviation 
of firms' returns within an industry during the same time period. 
Fisher and Hall's main analysis uses time series measures of risk, 
while in a similar study Conrad and Plotkin (1968) utilise the cross-
sectional risk measure. The problem of this latter measure is that 
the variance may reflect stable inter-firm differences in efficiency 
or the heterogeneity of the industry's output rather than random 
factors. The problem of using ex post data to measure ex ante 
risk is one which has bedevilled most work in this field, particularly 
empirical tests of the capital asset pricing model. 
Further analysis of the influence of market structure upon the 
degree of risk is provided· by Winn (1977) and SuI I ivan (1978). 
Winn's results give strong support to the Caves and Varney thesis by 
showing that the standard deviation of firm's return on capital is 
positively and significantly related to seller concentration ratios. 
However, Sullivan using a different theoretical framework and a 
different data set provides seemingly contradictory results. The 
objective of his analysis is to relate the cost of capital of the 
firm to its market power. Since cost of capital depends, under 
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tompetitive capital markets, upon the degree of risk which lenders 
perceive, the study was essentially attempting to relate risk to 
market power. Using a capital asset pricing model approach to the 
determination and measurement of the perceived risk of a firm's 
equity, the study regressed equity risk (both adjusted for the 
degree of debt/equity leverage and unadjusted) on seller concentration 
ratio and firm size. Both seller concentration and firm size were 
found to be significantly negatively related to risk. 
One explanation for the different findings between Winn and SuI 1 ivan 
lies in the measures of risk used. Sullivan's risk measure was 
based upon the capital asset pricing model and assumed the holding 
of diversified portfolios by investors. Hence, investors are 
concerned,not with the total variance of the returns from a firm,but 
only with that part of the variance in return that is correlated with 
overall market fluctuations, i.e. the systematic risk. On the basis 
of the Caves and Yamey thesis, i t could be argued that the instability 
of oligopoly coordination represents a random and hence a diversifiable 
risk that does not influence systematic risk. A further complication 
concerns the direction of causation. The presumption so far has been 
that seller concentration and its consequences for pricing behaviour 
influence the degree of risk. However causation may flow in the 
opposite direction: as Yale Brozen has suggested (Brazen 1974), high 
concentration may be response to high levels of exogenous risk. 
My own study (Grant 1981) follows the Fisher and Hall approach in 
attempting to identify the effect of risk upon rate of return on 
capital at the firm and the industry level. In order to focus upon 
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rate of return on capital at the firm and the industry level. In 
order to focus upon the effects of risk and to exclude the impact of 
market power on return on capital, only competitively structured 
industries were included - thus industries with high concentration 
or barriers to entry were excluded along with industries where 
products we re high 1 Y d i ffe rent i ated. Wi th i n the "compet it i veil 
industries, very large firms and certain highly specialised firms 
were excluded because of the risk of market power in particular market 
segments. The exclusion of potentially uncompetitive industries 
offered further advantages. First, the endogenous risk identified 
by Caves and Vamey which arose frum the fragility of oligopolistic 
coordination was el iminated Second, the assumpt ion of fi rms pursuing 
shareholder interests is more valid in competitive product markets 
where the pursuit of managerial objectives is likely to be severely 
constrained. 
The measure of risk employed is similar to Sullivan's (1978): the 
risk to the firm is the risk perceived by investors in the 
firm's securities and, in relation to equity, this is the systematic 
risk coefficient identified by the capital asset pricing model. 
Certain refinements of the risk concept are made in my paper -
notably corporate debt is not considered homogeneous and risk free. 
However, as far as the firm as a whole is concerned, the risk measure 
is basically systematic risk on equity adjusted to remove the equity 
risk which arises,not from the risk inherent in the firm's earnings, 
but from gearing through the debt/equity ratio. Within the limita-
tions of the data used, the results of the study were highly satis-
factory. For the period 1971-75, risk explained over 71 per cent of 
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differences in the rate of return on capital earned by firms in 
competitively-structured UK industries. 
4.7. Applications to the identification of monopoly profit 
and the regulation of prices and profits 
One of the most potentially useful applications of research into 
competitive rates of profit is to the work of government agencies 
in evaluating the price and profit performance of market dominating 
firms and in regulating prices and profits. Both in the UK and 
the US considerable experience has been gained in the evaluation 
and regulation of prices and profits with surprisingly little 
guidance being offered by economic theory or empirical research. 
Some significant differences exist between the direction of UK 
and US work in this field. In the UK, the major pol icy interest 
has been the identification by competition authorities of the 
exploitation of market power as indicated by monopoly rates of 
profit. Regulation of profits and prices has sometimes been the 
result of monopoly policy and, more generally, has been associated 
with the price control functions of the National Board for Prices 
and Incomes (1964-70), the Price Commission (1972-79) and the Review 
Board for Government Contracts. In the US the determination of "fair" 
rates of return has been associated primarily with the work of 
commissions responsible for the regulation of public util ities and 
other natural monopolies. 
My discussion here of the measurement of competitive rates of profit 
is chiefly within the British context and relates to the object of 
identifying monopoly rates of profit. Such a restriction enables 
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me to avoid the additional theoretical and practical issues involved 
in the regulation of prices and profits, such as the "Averch - Johnson 
effect" (Averch and Johnson 1964). 
The approach of the Monopolies Commission to the problem of identify-
ing the exercise of market power by dominant enterprises has been 
to use a variety of 'relativities including comparison of the investi-
gated firmls prices with those of competitors, comparison of price 
increases with movements in costs and movements in wholesale and 
retail price indices, comparisons of profitability (in relation to 
sales and capital employed) with that of other firms in the same 
industry or sector and in the industrial sector as a whole. Among 
these various comparisons, the one which has been used most frequently, 
and to which the Commission has attached most weight,is the rate of 
return on capital employed for the investigated firm in relation to 
the rate for manufacturing industry as a whole. 
The problems of inferring monopolistic pricing from such a comparison 
of rates of return on capital are many and great. As a result the 
Commmission has always exercised extreme caution in the interpretation 
of these comparisons and has not used them in the mechanistic manner 
impl ied by Rowley (1969) and Bello (1977)." In my commentary upon 
Bello IS article (Grant 1978), the cautions expressed by the 
Commission are emphasised and the methods used by the Commission to 
minimise the problems of comparing returns on capital are outlined. 
Most attention has been devoted to the accounting problems which 
arise in the comparison of rates of return on capital, in particular 
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the unsatisfactory standard approaches to the valuation of capital 
and depreciation (particularly during periods of high inflation), 
differences in accounting conventions between firms and problems 
over the calculation of protit and capital employed for a single 
activity of a multi-product firm. Such problems, though complex, 
are in principle surmountable with sufficient investment in the 
collection and refinement of data. More intractable are the 
problems associated with the interpretation of comparative rates, 
of return on capital. In particular, does the average return on 
capital for all industry correspond to the competitive rate of 
profit and is monopoly pricing likely to be indicated by a rate of 
return on capital which exceeds the average? 
The rate of return on capital~averaged across industrY,diverges 
from the long run competitive rate of return for two principal 
reasons. First, the presence of market power in many industries 
tends to raise the average above the competitive rate. Second, the 
absence of long--run equi Ii brium in the industrial sector means that 
the average rate of return is dependent upon the position of the 
economy on the business cycle. For example, during the recession of 
the mid-1970s it was clear that real rates of return in UK manufacturing 
were considerab~ below the long-run competitive rate of return 
(see Flemming et al 1976). 
The rate of return earned by a particular firm in relation to the 
average for industry depends not only upon the extent to which the 
firm exploits monopoly power, but also upon the relative efficiency 
of the firm and the degree of risk to which it is subject. Even in 
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the absence of these other factors, there is the possibility that 
monopoly profitability may become capitalised in the firm's assets 
through goodwill and the valuation of premises and natural resource 
12-
reserves. 
In order to suggest improved methods for the identification of 
monopoly pricing,it is necessary to examine with some care what is 
meant by the competitive rate of return and how it is determined in 
a simple economic model. Assuming a perfectly competitive capital 
market in a riskless world where firms face an infinitely elastic 
supply of capital at the prevailing market rate of interest, then each 
firm invests to where the marginal rate of return equals the rate of 
interest. However the rate of return on the firm's assets as a whole 
may exceed the cost of borrowing - such a situation implying that 
the price the firm was receiving fo~ its output exceeded average cost. 
Assuming no efficiency differences between firms, then new entry 
would reduce market price to average cost and long run equilibrium 
would be establ ished where the rate of return on capital equalled 
the rate of ~I'terest. 
If firms are subject to differential degrees of risk, then the cost 
of borrowing for the firms will differ in proportion to the degree 
of risk. If risk is exogeneous to the firm and is dependent solely 
upon the industry to which the firm belongs, then in long-run 
competitive equilibrium rates of return on capital are equated to 
cost of capital which varies in proportion to risk. 13 
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Hence as an indicator of the competitive rate of returns on capital for 
an industry or firm, cost of capital provides a much more 
statisfactory guide than the average return on capital in industry. 
Not only does cost of capital take account of risk differences 
between firms and industries, it also indicates long run equilibrium 
return. 
The principal problem in the use of cost of capital is that the cost 
of equity finance - the rate at which the stock market capital ises 
the expected return on a company's shares - is not directly observable. 
The capital assetpricing model predicts that Investors' required 
rate of return on a firm's equity is a linear function of the undiversi-
fiable risk associated with that return. This risk is conventionally 
measured by the beta coefficient of the return on equity. 
As the Grant (198Ia)paper shows, the overall cost of capital to a firm 
and, hence, the firm's competitive rate of return, can be directly 
related to the beta coefficient of the firm's equity and the debt/ 
equity ratio. On the basis of the relationship identified it is 
possible to ascertan whether firms are earning risk in relation to 
thei r "adjusted risk" coefficient (Grant 1981a, p.207). 
The principal merit of this approach is that it enables specific, 
quantitative account to be taken of risk in assessing the rate of 
return earned by a dominant enterprise. At the same time it provides 
no solution to the other problems associated with the interpretation 
of a firm's return on capital, notably the influence of efficiency 
and the absence of long-run equilibrium. Also the use of beta 
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coefficients as measures of risk give rise to additional problems 
such as the impossibility of measuring the ex-ante beta of the 
capital asset pricing model, the problems of instability of beta 
over time, and the possibility of inefficiency in security markets. 
These issues have been thoroughly debated in the finance 
I • 14-I te rature. 
In the light of these various problems it is clear that stock 
market based measures of risk cannot be relied upon exclusively as 
the basis of the measurement of the "risk premia" to be assigned 
to monopolists' return on capital. Furthermore, because a monopoly 
enterprise may be privately owned or a subsidiary of a larger 
corporation and because the firm'sactivities may be spread between 
several markets, stock market risk coefficients maybe either 
unavailable or inapplicable. 15 The recommendation which arises 
therefore is, first, that a firm's cost of capital is, in principle, 
a more satisfactory indicator of competitive rate of return than the 
average fo r industry as a whole and, second, that equity beta coefficients 
(suitably adjusted for leverage) should be employed as an additional 
instrument in evaluating the return earned by a monopoly enterprise. 
Already considerable experience has been gained in the application 
of these concepts to the determination of fair rates of return. 
The theoretical and practical issues have been thoroughly explored 
in regulatory commission hearings in the United States and 
I
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FOOTNOTES 
Diversifying entry may take several forms: the acquisition of an 
existing firms (with or without the addition of new capacity), 
the establishment of new subsidiary or division by the 
diversifying firms, or a new company involving a Joint venture 
by two or more diversifying firms. 
Economists' preoccupation with the market mechanism and market 
equilibrium has largely precluded them from analysing resource 
allocation within the firm, which has been the preserve primarily 
of organisational and management thinkers. The complementary 
and competing roles of firms and markets in resource allocation 
was examined by Coase( 1937), while the more recent reintroduction 
of management science and organisation theory into microeonomics 
has been principally associated with the work of Oliver Williamson 
(1964, 1970, 1975). 
Though conventionally defined in terms of capital market 
equilibrium, long run equilibrium also implies equilibrium across 
other factor markets too - e.g. net advantages for labour I::eing 
equalised across industries for each category of labour. 
In addition to the studies mentioned more limited empirical 
.investigations were undertaken by Sutton (1973) and Kelly (1974). 
Equivalently the term "special isation" refers to a reduction in 
the degree of diversity •. 
For example, simple regressions 2of diversification on some of the technology variables gave R of more than 0.5. 
Emphasis on the relationship of diversification to competition 
reflects the general preoccupation of industrial economics with 
issues of market power. This emphasis seems misplaced in the 
current economic predicament of the mature industrial countries. 
Since 1974 the principal features of the manufacturing sectors 
of Britain and the other Western European economies have been 
strong import competition, excess capacity and low levels of 
profitability. In these circumstances the problem of monoroly 
is secondary to issues of low productivity growth and low rates 
of investment in plant and innovation. 
Further evidence on the inadequacies of structural adjustment in 
UK manufacturing industry and the role of industrial policy is 
contained in the other two papers which make up the appendix to 
this submission. Peacock et al (1980, chapters 5 and 6) point to 
the inefficient maintanence of capacity in the UK shipbuilding 
industry and to the unbalanced development of the UK computer 
industry. My survey of appraisal techniques points to an 
over-emphasis in the conduct of British industrial policy on 
the short-term impact effects of subsidies (particularly in 
relation to employment) (Grant 1982b). 
Evidence on take-overs in the UK shows that while acquired 
companies have a lower rate of profitability than acquiring 
companies, the probability of low profitability companies being 
acquired is low (particularly if they are larger), see Singh 
(1975) and Kuehn (1975). 
l)O 
10. A necessary condition for such an equilibrium which Fisher 
and Hall do not make explicit is that all firms possess 
identical utility functions. 
11: The extent of this caution is indicated by the fact that out 
of nearly 50 monopoly reports up to 1980 only eight concluded 
that profits had been excessive (George and Joll 1981 
pp203-204 ). 
12. To avoid some of these problems it has been suggested that 
the measurement of dominant firms' profitability should look 
at the ex ante return on new investment rather than the ex yost 
return on firms' existing stock of assets (see Turvey 1971 • 
13. The assumption here is that fi rms operate in a Modig\ ian I -
Miller wOTld where risk and cost of capital are independent of 
debt/equity ratios, and also where risk is independent of 
market conduct variables. 
14. For an introduction see Jensen (1972). 
15 •. 
16· .. 
For a way round the problem see Gordon and Halpern (1974), 
.. _ .... , 
For a debate on the use of beta coefficients in setting public 
utility rates of return see Myers (1972a, 1972b) and Breen 
and Lerner (1972). An interesting Australian example concerned 
Shell's case to the Prices Justification Tribunal in 1979. 
(see Prices Justification Tribunal Reports, CCH Australia Ltd, 
1979, pp 18,690-18,697) 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As I have attempted to show in the foregoing chapters, the published 
papers which make up the core of this thesis represent significant 
steps in the analysis of the competitive process and the determinants 
of competitive behaviour. One of the principal merits of the work 
has been its orientation towards real world problems and phenomena 
which have been subject to either neglect or misinterpretation in 
the industrial economics literature. As a result, one consequence 
of my work has been its applicability to policy issues, notably 
in the field of competition policy. Thus, in the interpretation 
of price leadership patterns, the analysis of buying power and 
price discrimination, the investigation of diversification 
(particularly by merger), and the appraisal of rates of return 
earned by dominant firms, the attached papers make some useful con-
tributions. 
In common with most empirically-based research in economics, the 
work raises more questions than it answers. Indeed, the principal 
realization which I have drawn from this survey of my own and allied 
publications has been the limited scope of most of the analysis 
undertaken and the deficiencies of much of the empirical work. 
The main purpose of this concluding chapter, therefore, is to 
identify the potential for further development of the findings and 
directions of thought contained in my papers. 
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A central topic of my research 6oncbrns"the determinants of oligopoly 
pricing behavior. My principal contribution here was showing how in 
the petrol market . changes in pricing behaviour over time were 
a consequence of changes in market structure variables. Apart 
from the scope for improvements in the empirical analysis of petrol 
pricing behaviour through the addition of further structural variables 
to the estimating equations, there would appear to be considerable 
opportunities for longitudinal studies of pricing behaviour in other 
product markets - particularly those where both price and profit data 
are available. Such work could provide the basis for a refinem~nt of the 
crude set of structure-conduct hypotheses that form the "theory of 
01 igopoly" in my petrol paper (Grant 1982 ). 
An important element in the analysis of industrial pricing behaviour 
which is capable of further development is the role of buyers in 
affecting 01 igopoly pricing. The principal contribution of Grant 
(1980) is to suggest a more realistic basis for the analysis of 
buying power than the collusive oligopsony approach that has provided the 
grounding for most empirical work on buyer concentration. Section 3.3 
of chapter 3 provides some rudimentary empirical testing of my 
buying power model. Clearly more extensive empirical testing is 
called for, preferably ina form which is capable of comparing the 
predictive powers of alternative analyses of the impact of buyer market 
structure. 
As regards publ ic policy towards buying power and its principal 
manifestation, price discrimination between large and small buyers, 
the survey of recent legislation in overseas countries (Grant 1981b) 
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clearly illuminates the principal difficulties which have been 
encountered. Yet the existence of concentration on the buyer side 
of markets remains a pressing current problem for competition 
policy in the developed countries. While official reports both in 
Britain (MMC 1981) and the US (US Department of Justice 1977) point 
to the favourable impact of buying power on price competition in 
oligopolistic markets, the tendency for unrestricted buying power 
to encourage increased concentration of the retailing sector is an 
issue which calls for more thorough research into the welfare con-
sequences of this trend. 
The work on adjustment towards long-run equilibrium across 
industries discussed in chapter 4 combines several related threads 
and suggests further work in a number of directions. The investi-
gation of diverSification (Grant 1974, 1977) identifies a number 
of industry structure variables which influence the extent and the 
direction of diversification, but the principal limitation of this 
and parallel studies of diversification has been the use of industry 
level data. The importance of diversification as an element of 
corporate strategy and as a source of firm growth, and the divergent 
diversification patterns displayed by firms within the same industry, 
all suggest the need for empirical study of diversification behaviour 
at company level. Since most large-scale diversification occurs 
through acquisition, then one approach to the absence of diversification 
data at firm level would be to examine conglomerate mergers by 
industrial firms. Such an analysis would enable both Industry and 
company level variables to be included. 
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The obvious direction for development of the work on risk-return 
relations in competitive equilibrium Is a more general analysis of 
industry profit rates. The principal contribution of Grant (198Ia) 
was the recognition of systematic risk as an important factor in 
determining industry profit rate - a factor that had been almost 
wholly neglected in UK research into the market structure deter-
minants of profitability. In the light of chapters 3 and 4 of this 
thesis, a more comprehensive analysis of inter-industry 
differences in profitability could be ondertaken Incorporating, 
together with risk, the more typical market structure variables 
(e.g. capacity utilisation~ entry barriers, seller and buyer 
concentration) • 
At a more general level the analysis of diversification gave rise 
to a consideration of the overall mechanism for resource allocation 
and the adjustment of industry structure (chapter 4, sections 
4.4 and 4.5). An important feature of change in the structure 
of the manufacturing sector industry in Britain has been failure 
to achieve as rapid a rate of adjustment of output and employment 
between industries as other Western European economies. Moreover, 
UK.. hos bl!(f\ ~~n"-S 
the change in the pattern ofLindustrial specialisation "~industries 
which, on a European basis, are declining. The reasons for the 
apparent structural rigidity of British industry and the failure to 
shift resources into the growth industries of the 1970s are an aspect 
of industrial performance which warrants further research. 1 
A feature common to the whole area of research covered by my papers 
has been the importance of risk and the attitudes of firms towards 
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risk and uncertainty. This emerged most specifically in relation 
to diversification and inter-industry differences in return on 
capital, but was also a relevant factor in oligopoly price 
behaviour. Inclusion of risk and uncertainty into models of 
economic organisation and corporate behaviour has followed several 
directions. My own application of modern finance theory to 
diversification and long-run competitive equilibrium has been 
considerably extended into theories of the market behaviour of firms, 
one of the most general examples being that of Subrahmanyam and 
Thomadakis (1980). A second area has been the theory of economic 
organisation in the face of uncertainty arising from imperfect 
information (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Williamson 1975). This 
approach has been most fully developed in relation to vertical 
integration (e.g. Perry 1~82). Considerable scope remains for a more 
general integration of the role of risk and uncertainty within the 
theory of the firm. 
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FOOTNOTE 
1. My own progress in this direction is indicated 
by the papers which make up the Appendix to 
this submission, and which concern aspects of 
structural adju~tment in UK manufacturing 
industry and the i~pact of government industrial 
policies. 
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FOR PETROL 1970 - 80: A "STRUCTURE - CONDUCT" 
ANALYSIS 
R. M. GRANT-
INTRODUCTION 
THE objective of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of pricing 
in the markets for manufactured goods through a detailed examination of 
pricing behaviour in the UK wholesale market for petrol between 1970 and 
1980. 
The UK petrol market is particularly suitable as a case study in pricing 
behaviour because of the availability of information and the changes in pricing 
behaviour observed over the period. During the 1970s changes in market 
structure and supply conditions combined to force a breakdown in the long. 
established coordination of the major suppliers' wholesale prices, giving way to 
periods of intense price competition. 
Earlier studies of competition in the industry have concentrated upon the 
pricing practices of the major suppliers [I71 and on changes in market 
structure [61. This paper extends and develops the examination of pricing 
behaviour, first, by concentrating upon a period characterised by 
unprecedently traumatic changes in market conditions and pricing behaviour 
and, second, by incorporating more comprehensive information on pricing 
drawn from industry sources and from reports by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission [91. Department of Prices and Consumer Protection [3] and Price 
Commission [1 II. [12l. [I3J. [14]. The approach followed is to examine petrol 
pricing behaviour as an application of a simple "industrial organisation" model 
of oligopoly pricing. In the light of a structure· conduct analysis of pricing 
(section I). the principal structural features of the UK petrol market likely to 
influence pricing behaviour are identified (section II). Predictions are made 
concerning the nature of pricing behaviour in the industry and the changes in 
pricing behaviour which might be induced by structural change, (section III) 
and these predictions are tested out by an examination of pricing behaviour 
over the period (section IV). 
I. A STRUCTURE· CONDUCT APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF OLIGOPOLY PRICE 
The variety and predictive weakness of theories of oligopoly pricing are well· 
known: 
01 am gt'ateful to G. Gemmill. G. D. Vaughan and the anonymous referee for hdpful comments. 
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"It has been held that competition between two sellers will result in a 
monopoly price, a competitive price, a detenninate price intennediate 
between them, a perpetually oscillating price, and no price at all because 
the problem is impossible."[l, p.SO] 
Jbis range of predictions corresponds closely to the range of pricing 
behaviour which is observed in manufacturing industry. The essential weakness 
is that no single theory is powerful enough to explain the wide range of pricing 
behaviour observed both across different industries and in the same industry 
over time. 
In response to the inadequacies of oligopoly theory, industrial economists 
have taken refuge in a less fonnal approach to the analysis of oligopoly pricing 
based upon plausible assumptions concerning corporate motivation and 
behaviour and the observation of patterns of pricing behaviour in a number of 
industries. The approach is infonnal in the sense that it does not seek to 
develop a detenninate theory of the level of oligopoly price (as in the Cournot 
model for example), but concentrates upon the factors which influence the 
extent of collusion and competition and detennine both the pattern of pricing 
behaviour and the level of industry price. Drawing upon the theories of 
oligopoly coordination [1, chap. 3l. oligopoly collusion [18], price leadership 
[7] and limit pricing [20], and modern textbook expositions such as Scherer 
[16}, the relationships between market structure and pricing conduct shown in 
Figure I may be hypothesised. 
The extent to which price in an oligopoly exceeds the long run competitive 
level (i.e. the price·cost margin) depends upon the success of finns in 
coordinating their pricing decisions. Such coordination will depend upon the 
following factors: 
1) The incentives for collusive behaviour. The incentive for avoiding price 
competition is the potential for monopoly profit which depends upon: the 
price elasticity of market demand (the lower is elasticity, the greater the 
increase in price resulting from output limitations); the level of entry 
barn'ers to the industry (the higher the barriers the greater the 
opportunity for earning monopoly profits in the long run); and the 
similarity of costs and technology between firms (the absence of any 
significant cost or technological advantage between finns will promote 
unanimity over the desirability of collusive pricing). 
2) The recognition of interdependence by firms. The extent to which the 
benefits of coordinated pricing are recognised by firms will depend upon 
their perception of the interdependence of their price-output decision 
which is dependent upon seller concentration and the cross-elasticity of 
demand between the outputs of the oligopolistics. The cross-elasticity of 
demand between firm depends (mainly) upon the degree of product 
differentiation. 
3) A bility to achieve coordination of pricing decisions. The achievement of 
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LEVEL OF PRICE depends upon EXTENT OF OLIGOPOLY PRICE 
COORDINATION which depends upon:-
INCENTIVE FOR 
COLLUSION 
RECOGNITION 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
EASE OF 
COORDINATION 
STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS 
Elasticity of market demand 
Barriers to entry 
Similarity of costs and technology 
Product differentiation 
Seller concentration 
Competition law 
Industry history 
Method of pricing 
SUCCESSFUL MAINTE- _ Buyer concentration 
NANCE OF COLLUSIVE ____ Ratio of price to short run 
PRICE marginal cost. 
Supplementary predictions 
(1) Competitive pricing behaviour occurs predominantly in discounts and 
other allowances rather than in list prices. 
(2) Oligopoly prices tend to be unstable particularly where products are 
undifferentiated. 
FIGURE 1 
Market Slructure and Oligopoly Pricing Behaviour. 
Summary of Predictions. 
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successfuJly coordinated pricing decisions in an industry is essentially a 
problem of communication. Ease of communication depends upon 
the number of firms in the industry (the number of communication 
links between N firms is (N·})! which rises more than proportionately 
with increases in N) and their size distribution (the presence of a 
single large firm may ·encourage smaJler firms to adopt a "follower" 
role); 
the history of past cooperation and communication in the industry; 
the method of pricing (where firms price by means of announced 
price lists. coordination of pricing decisions is easier than where 
prices are negotiated individually with customers or where tenders 
are submitted for individual orders). 
4) The successful maintenance of price above the competitive level. 
Assuming that the firms in an industry achieve effective coordination. the 
ability to raise and maintain prices above the competitive level depends 
upon their success in defending monopolistic price levels against 
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competitive Initiatives from without and within. Protection from 
newcomers to the industry is afforded by entry bam·ers. Whether or not 
firms adopt limit-pricing behaviour. price in a collusive oligopoly cannot 
in the long run exceed the perfectly competitive price by more than the 
level of entry barriers to the industry. The incentive to competition from 
within arises from the incentive for each firm to undercut the oligopoly 
price and expand its profits. which. when pursued by all firms results in 
lower profits for all. Observation and analysis suggest that two factors are 
of particular importance in encouraging oligopolists to undercut industry 
price: first. the presence of large buyers in the market which will induce 
the offer of special discounts (for an analysis see [ISI. [41) and. 
second. a fall in the level of short run marginal costs relative to average 
cost and industry price (typically caused by the emergence of excess 
capacity). 
Two further implications of the foregoing analysis may be drawn. First. 
because of the desire of oligopolists to adjust prices to the different conditions 
operating in different sectors of the market and to avoid competitive price cutting 
where possible. price competition in oligopoly will typically take the form of 
discounts and allowances. Second. the balance of forces for coordination and 
competition in oligopoly is unlikely to result in a stable equilibrium. The 
tendency towards retaliation against the competitive initiative of any supplier 
leads to a process of cumulative price cutting which may degenerate into a 
price war. Since both the incentive to gain sales by reducing price and the 
propensity to retaliate are dependent upon the cross elasticity of demand 
(between the products of different suppliers). it is likely that the oligopoly price 
will be more unstable if the product is relatively homogeneous. 
II. MARKET STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN UK PETROL 
WHOLESALING 
On the basis of the foregoing hypotheses. we proceed by examining the 
structural features of the UK wholesale market for petrol which are likely to 
influence pricing behaviour. 
1) Seller concentration. Market shares over the period by numbers of outlets 
supplied are given in Table I and by gallonage supplied in Table II. 
Although moderately high in 1970. seller concentration declined 
substantially between 1970 and 1979: the five·firm concentration ratio 
declined on a gallonage basis from Sl.9 per cent to 72.3 per cent and on a 
retail outlets basis from Sl per cent to 69 per cent. The Herfindahl index 
of concentration (on a gallonage basis) registered a steeper decline -
from 0.232 in 1970 to 0.135 in 1979. The most important factors in the 
decline in seller concentration were the dissolution of the joint marketing 
company Shell-Mex and BP at the beginning of 1976 and the growth in 
the market shares of the "new majors" (integrated oil companies which 
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entered the UK market during the 1960s). The fall in seller concentration 
was associated with a reduction in the disparities between the market 
shares of the majors. Between 1970 and 1976 the number of suppliers 
with market shares exceeding 4 per cent increased from 4 to 7. This 
implies that problems of avoiding price competition are likely to have 
increased over the period, particularly when account is taken of the 
desire of most of the new majors to expand their market shares. 
2) Demand conditions (elasticity of market demand and product 
differentiation). Because the cost of petrol constitutes only about 20% of 
total motoring costs (Petroleum Review, March 1980, p.53) and bec.ause 
of the absence of substitutes, its price elasticity of demand tends to be 
low. For example, between the beginning of 1974 and the end of 1975 the 
TABLE I 
WHOLESALE SUPPLIERS' SHARES OF THE UK RETAIL MARKET FOR PETROL (BY % OF TOTAL RETAIL 
OUTLETS AT EACH YEAR END 
1979 1978 1977 1976 197' 1974 197J 1972 1971 1970 
Esso 20.1 21.0 21.4 22.0 21.8 22.0 2~.0 22.5 22.0 22.5 
Shell 16.9 19.2 21.9 22.9 40.8 40.2 ~S.5 gS.5 40.5 41.9 
BP 19.4 18.0 18.0 17.4 
Texaco 8.0 7.6 7.6 7.7 S.O 8.9 9.1 8.7 8.8 8.9 
Mobil 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.g 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.2 4.0 
Petrofina g.8 g.8 g.6 5.7 g.8 g.6 g.8 ~.8 5.7 5.6 
Burmah ~.2 g.1 5.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.9 g.O 
Total 3.0 ~.O 3.1 5.1 5.0 :U 2.4 2.g 2.2 2.2 
Atlantic Richfield U 1.4 U 1.1 
Elf 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 
V.I.P. 1.7 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.0 
Conoco g.1 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.4 
l.e.1. 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 I.g 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 
Ultramar 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.4 
Mureo 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.6 
Amoco 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Gulf 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 l.l 0.9 0.8 0.7 
McMullans 1.0 1.01 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Chevron O.S O.S 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Globe 0.7 O.S 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.4 U 1.1 
Pace 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 
Nafta 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 O.S 0.7 0.7 
Sheaf o.~ 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Roberts 0.5 0.5 O.g 0.2 0.2 
Thames 0.1 0.4 0.5 OJ! 0.2 
Mansfield o.g 0.5 0.2 0.4 O.~ 0.5 0.2 
Thrust 0.6 0.4 0.5 O.g 0.5 0.5 O.g O.g 0.2 0.1 
Rix 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 O.g O.~ 0.5 
Trident 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Avia 0.6 0.4 
Total no. of retail 26.5 
outlets (.000'5) 
28.g 29.4 gO.5 g1.4 g2.7 gg.O g4.5 g5.9 g7.1 
Source: Institute of Petroleum 
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TABLE II 
WHOLESALERS· SHARES OF THE UK RETAIL MARKET FOR PETROL (BY GALLONAGE) 
Company Market Share (%) 
1964 1970 1974 197J 1976 1977 19791980' 
SHELL·MEX AND BP LIMITED 45.0 59.6 58.1 55.0 
Munster Sims & Company Limited 
SHELL UK LIMITED 19.5 19.5 2U 22.6 
ESSO PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED 27.4 25.4 21.2 19.2 18.7 19.5 19.5 19.6 
Agip Limited 0.2 
BP OIL LIMITED 14.7 14.6 15.1 15.1 
TEXACO LIMITED 8.0 9.5 9.4 9.1 9.2 8.2 8.2 
Regent Oil Company Limited 11.1 
MOBIL OIL COMPANY LIMITED 5.9 7.1 6.8 6.6 7.0 7.1 8.4 7.1 
Bowen Petroleum Limited 0.1 
CONOCO LIMITED 5.8 S.1 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.9 5.4 
Jet Petroleum Limited 5.5 
TOTAL OIL GREAT BRITAIN LIMITED 1.1 5.1 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.6 2.4 2.8 
Gainsborough Petroleum Company Limited 0.2 
Aero Petroleum Company Limited 0.2 
ELF OIL GREAT BRITAIN LIMITED 2.8 2.9 2.4 2.8 
Isherwoods Petrol Company Limited 0.8 
VIP Petroleum Limited 2.1 1.9 2.5 
PETROFINA UK LTD 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.2 
BURMAH OIL TRADING LIMITED 2.6 2.S 2.9 S.I 2.6 2.5 1.6 
Lobitos Oil fields Limited 
Curfew Petroleum Limited 0.8 
Major & Company Limit.ed 
IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES LTD 0.9 J.7 2.6 2.7 2.5 5.1 2.7 
GULF OIL (GREAT BRITAIN) LIMITED 0.2 1.0 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 
AMOCO (UK) LIMITED 1.2 U 1.8 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.5 
CHEVRON OIL (UK) LIMITED 0.7 1.0 l.l 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.7 
MURCO PETROLEUM LIMITED 0.5 1.7 U U U 1.1 1.0 1.0 
OTHERS 0.5 2.4 2.7 4.5 4.4 5.9 S.5 S.4 
-- ---- -- -- -- -- --
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 
Notes 
I. Figures for 1964·77 are from the Monopolies and Mergen Commission (1979), figures for 
·1979 and 1980 are based on samples and I an' from the Motorists' Diary Panel. 
2. Companies whose names are shown in lower case type were taken over during the period. 
Source: Monopolies and Mergers Commission (9). 
• To 4 October. 
retail price of petrol rose by about 75% yet consumption in 1975 was only 
0.6% lower than in 1974. Such a low short run price elasticity 
discourages price reductions as a means of increasing industry sales and 
makes collusive pricing behaviour attractive. At the brand level, 
however, motorist's demand is likely to be much more price elastic due to 
the physical homogeneity of supplier's petrol. The perceived 
homogeneity has increased since the beginning of our period due largely 
to the star grading of petrol by octane level (introduced in 1968).1 
I The reduction of advertising expenditure on petrol from £5.2m in 1968 to £l.4m in 1971 also 
indicates the recognition by the majors of the futility of attempting to differentiate petrol. 
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If the retailers were free to purchase from any wholesaler. it would be 
expected that retailers' demand from individual wholesalers would 
be highly price elastic. However. the price elasticity of the demand 
facing each wholesaler is reduced by forward integration by 
wholesalers both by ownership of retail outlets and by exclusive 
supply contracts with retailers ("solus agreements"). Thus. at any 
point of time few retailers are able to change their suppliers: in 
addition to the 8 per cent of retailers (in 1977) without solus 
agreements [81. an average of about 1 per cent of retailers will 
terminate their solus agreements in anyone month. 
3) Entry barriers. Forward integration by the majors also constitutes the 
main source of entry barriers to petrol wholesaling. A significant trend 
during the period was the increasing ownership of retail outlets by petrol 
wholesalers. By 1979 72.2 per cent of retail sales were through 
wholesaler-owned outlets which meant that the great majority of the 
market was permanently foreclosed from new entrants. Vertical 
integration by the majors also restricts the availability of petrol supplies 
to new entrants - because virtually all UK refining capacity is owned by 
the majors. it is difficult for the new entrant to obtain secure supplies of 
petrol. 
During the 1960s entry to the UK market had taken place on a 
substantial scale. The entrants were primarily integrated oil companies 
which already had refining capacity and were able to establish retail 
distribution either through the acquisition of independent wholesaling 
companies (Table II shows the major acquisitions of independent 
wholesalers since 1964) or the purchase of independent retailers. By 1970 
however almost all of the potential entrants from the ranks of the 
international oil companies had entered the UK market and wholesale 
entrants during the 19705 were (with the exception of Elf) small. non· 
refining petrol distributors_ Some were specialist petrol wholesalers. other 
diversified into petrol wholesaling from the distribution of other 
petroleum products. Such small scale entry was facilitated by the 
contraction in the numbers of retail outlets during the 1970s. The 
increasing unwillingness of the majors to supply low-volume retailers of 
doubtful long term viability meant that there were always a number of 
small. often poorly-located. retail sites available to the independent 
wholesaler. The ability of independent wholesalers to enter and prosper 
depended critically on the availability of petrol supplies at a reasonable 
price. The independent wholesalers obtained their petrol from two 
sources: long-term contracts with UK majors and spot purchases on the 
Rotterdam market. In the case of the former. purchase arrangements 
offered security of supply but. because the price tended to be related to 
the majors' scheduled wholesale price. gave little scope for price cutting. 
In the case of the Rotterdam market. during periods of surplus supply it 
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was possible for the independent wholesaler to earn substantial profits from 
distributing low· priced spot purchases to the UK market, while in periods 
of shortage such operations were quickly curtailed. Thus, during the 
periods 1972·74 and 1978·79 when Rotterdam prices were high and 
supplies short many independent wholesalers went out of business or 
withdrew from the market. During the period of low prices and plentiful 
supply between late 1974 and 1977 there was a substantial increase in the 
numbers and market share of the independents. 
One entrant to the UK market which deserves special mention is ICI 
which operated in the UK petrol market as a small wholesaler despite 
being one of the largest UK manufacturing companies. ICI began 
supplying branded petrol in 1965 and during the period 1970·75 
quadrupled its market share by expanding its marketing area from the 
North East of England to the North, the Midlands and Scotland. 
Similarity of costs and technology. Although the problem of allocating 
joint· product costs means that it is extremely difficult to identify the cost 
of production of petrol. the similarity between the majors of production 
and distribution methods and crude oil costs means that no company is 
likely to perceive an absolute cost advantage over the others. Indeed, the 
tightening of the OPEC cartel during the early 1970s would have tended 
to reduce the variability of crude oil costs between companies. The only 
companies with a substantially different cost structure were the 
independent wholesalers whose costs depended primarily on the 
Rotterdam price for bulk petrol. 
Industry history. The main feature of the development of the world 
petroleum industry relevant to competitive behaviour in the UK petrol 
market is the long period of co·existence of the major multinational oil 
companies in a variety of different activities, product markets and 
countries. Cooperation between the companies had taken the form of 
joint exploration and exploitation of crude oil, joint ownership of 
refineries and product exchange arrangements aimed at minimising the 
costs of distributing refined products. This background is conducive to 
the development of understanding between the majors and is likely to 
discourage aggressively competitive initiatives in any market for fear of 
retaliation in some other market. The lack of price competition in the 
industry was noted by the Monopolies Commission in its first report [8, 
p.1391 and was emphasised by Professor Barna in his note of dissent 
[ibid, pp.I71·81). 
Buyer concentration. Apart from the major oil companies, which are by 
far the largest retailers of petrol 2 , petrol retailing has otherwise always 
I Most supplier. owned retail outlets are operated by tenants and licensees. During the 19705 
however. an increasing number of these company·owned outlets became directly operated by their 
suppliers often through a subsidiary company - e.g. Dart Oil Co. Ltd (Esso). City Petroleum Co. 
Ltd (Shell). Stations Supreme Ltd. (Texaco). 
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been an especially unconcentrated area of retail trade. with a high 
proportion of small. single-outlet businesses_ During the 1970s the 
structure of petrol retailing was altered by the emergence of a number of 
particularly large petrol retailers. Some of these were specialist service 
station chains such as Heron. Alan Pond and Telegraph Garages. others 
were entrants into petrol retailing from the grocery trade - most notably 
ASDA (Associated Dairies). and on a smaller scale Carrefour. Fine Fare 
and Sainsbury. Although none of these companies achieved more than a 
very small share of the national petrol market. the volume and growth of 
their sales and their efficiency in retailing made them particularly 
attractive customers for the majors. and. as a result. conferred upon the 
retailers a substantial measure of bargaining power. particularly in times 
of plentiful supply of petrol. 
7) The ratio of average to marginal cost. The importance of excess capacity 
resulting in low levels of short run marginal cost in encouraging the 
breakdown of oligopolistic collusion is well documented in many capital 
intensive industries. 3 In the case of petrol. however. the problem of joint 
costs means that there is no simple way of estimating marginal supply 
cost. An alternative approach is to take the Rotterdam spot price as the 
short run marginal opportunity cost of ex-refinery petrol. Although the 
UK majors have tended to minimise the importance of Rotterdam (a 
"marginal" market where published prices are "unrepresentative") it is 
effectively the only alternative market for refined petrol used by the UK 
majors. and it is notable that Esso uses the Rotterdam price as its internal 
transfer price for ex-refinery petrol when assessing the profitability of 
new retail business [12. p.261. When the Rotterdam price for petrol is low 
relative to average cost (and to the UK wholesale price) the recognition of 
the low marginal opportunity cost of petrol is likely to increase the 
incentive to each supplier to increase sales and profits by undercutting 
the industry price level. 
8) Pricing method. The wholesale prices of the majors are announced on 
the basis of a "scheduled" price to retail buyers. The published prices 
allow for differentials between geographical zones and for surcharges for 
part-load deliveries. While zonal differentials in principle reflect 
differences in delivery costs. in practice the national suppliers of petrol 
have almost identical zonal boundaries. irrespective of the location of 
each company's distribution points. and zonal price differentials have 
remained unchanged since 1952. Retailer-owned outlets are generally 
given a rebate ("solus rebate") which is negotiated as part of the exclusive 
supply agreement with the wholesaler. Any other discounts are generally 
also offered on a selective basis and are temporary. Terms of supply 
relate not only to price but include credit arrangements. low interest 
loans and the provision of maintenance services by suppliers. As has been 
1 See for example the study by Swann el al [19]. 
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noted above, published list prices facilitate coordination of prices 
between suppliers. Such coordination is far more difficult in individually 
negotiated rebates and discounts and, as has been observed in other 
industries, 4 it would be expected that these would be the principal media 
for price competition in the industry. 
III. PREDICTIONS FOR PETROL PRICING 
The implications of this analysis of industry structure for pricing behaviour in 
the UK wholesale market for petrol are as follows: 
(i) The combination of low price elasticity of market demand, a high degree 
of brand substitutability, similarity of costs between suppliers and a 
background of past cooperation would have encouraged coordinated 
pricing behaviour, particularly in the early part of the period when seller 
concentration was high. 
(ii) Structural changes are likely to have increased the difficulties of 
coordinated pricing and increased the incentives for greater price 
competition. The principal long term change was the fall in seller 
concentration arising from the dissolution of Shell-Mex and BP and the 
gains in market shares by the new majors. The dismembering of Shell-
Mex and BP also had the effect of depriving the industry of a natural 
price leader. The emergence and growth of a number of large retailing 
groups would have tended to accentuate the impact of falling seller 
concentration on price coordination - though it should be noted that 
buyer concentration in the petrol market is still much lower than in most 
sections of retail trade. 
(iii) Over the shorter term, the principal factors promoting more competitive 
pricing are likely to have been new entry, the ability of small independent 
wholesalers to undercut the scheduled prices of the majors, and the 
inducement to individual majors to depart from scheduled prices when 
short run marginal costs are relatively low. All three of these competitive 
factors are strongly influenced by a single variable - the level of the 
Rotterdam bulk petrol price in relation to the UK wholesale price. Hence 
our analysis suggests an influential role for the Rotterdam market as a 
source of competitive initiatives in the UK wholesale market. Moreover, 
because of the high degree of brand substitutability, price cutting, even 
when initiated by quite small suppliers, can have a quite dramatic effect 
on the stability of the industry price level. This was demonstrated in the 
previous decade by the retaliatory price cuts by the majors in response to 
the cut-price strategy of Jet [17]. 
• See for inslance reporl5 by the Monopolies and Mergen Commissin on Ceramic Sanitaryware 
(1978). Insulated Electric Wires and Cables (1979). Frozen Foodsluffs (1976). Ice Cream and 
Waler Ices (1979). 
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TABLE III 
INNER ZONE SCHEDULED WHOLESALE PRICES FOR 4 STAR MOTOR SPIRIT 
DATE SHELL ESSO TEXACO MOBIL DATE SHELL ESSO TEXACO MOBIL 
16.1.70 6/0 6/0 6/0 6/0 27.10.77 14.6~ 
51.7.70 6/0~ 6/0~ 6/0~ 6/0~ 1.12.77 14.14 
6.11.70 6/1~ 6/1~ 6/1~ 6/1~ 8.2.79 14.97 
21.2.70 51.7~ 12.2.79 1~.2\ 
22.2.71 51.75 51.75 51.75 16.2.79 15.08 IU7 15.08 
28.4.72 52.15 6.4.79 1~.82 16.08 15.82 
29.4.72 52.15 9.4.79 15.75 
I.~. 72 52.15 52.1~ 26.5.79 18.58 18.42 
9.9.72 52.65 12.6.79 18.45 
11.9.72 52.65 52.65 52.65 18.6.79 18.45 
29.4.75 55.65 55.65 55.65 2.7.79 19.60 
15.5.75 55.65 5.7.79 19.81 
4.10.75 54.65 54.65 54.65 54.6~ 4.7.79 20.08 
IU2.75 57.55 57.55 57.55 57.55 5.7.79 20.41 
12.2.74 45.25 45.50 45.25 45.27 29.11.79 20.20 
18.12.74 52.20 52.15 52.20 52.~0 28.12.79 20.50 
2.12.75 55.00 29.12.79 20.50 
U2.75 55.00 55.02 1.1.80 20.41 
~.12.75 55.00 17.1.80 21.08 21.20 21.20 
·9.4.76 15.74 15.745 15.74 15.75 18.1.80 21.07 
29.10.76 14.51 19.2.80 21.8~ 21.64 
50.10.76 14.65 20.2.80 2\.84 2\.85 
5.11.76 14.52 26.5.80· 25.75 25.54 25.74 25.75 
6.11.76 14.~1 17.UO 24.5~ 
21.1276 14.74 2U.80 24.29 
1.1.77 14.76 25.5.80 24.15 
10.1.77 \4.75 24.5.80 25.92 
·29.5.77 15.61 14.85 15.86 15.84 5.6.80 24.66 
26.4.77 16.08 7.6.80 24.61 24.65 24.66 
27.4.77 16.08 5.7.80 24.28 24.25 
29.4.77 16.08 16.08 9.7.80 24.28 
8.7.77 15.49 15.8.80 25.90 
·8.8.77 14.59 14.95 14.98 14.98 
!\jOlt'S 1970 prien in .hilling. and old p<'net p<" gallon: 1971·75 prieto p<'r gallon: 1976·80 
pric~ in pr'nct' fWT lIut'. 
2 ASlrrisks show chang" in txcisr lax. 
3. Priers mcludr duty, r:uludt" VAT 
SourCf' Pt'trolf'um Tim". 
(iv) In common with other oligopoly industries. it is likely that the forces for 
coordinated and competitive pricing would be dichotomised between list 
prices and the various discounts and allowances - list (scheduled) prices 
typically showing a pattern of price leadership and discounts and rebates. 
because of their flexibility and confidentially. providing the focal point 
for competitive activity. 
In the following section we examine the behaviour. first. of scheduled prices 
and. second. discounts and rebates. 
IV. PRICING BEHAVIOUR 1970·80 
(a) Scheduled prices 
Previous studies of petrol prices have regarded the scheduled prices of the 
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majors as following a pattern of conscious parallelism. Shaw [I7) identified 
collusive price leadership led by Shell-Mex and BP. and occasionally by Esso. 
where the level of prices was set. not so as to exclude new entry. but to limit the 
market share of the newer entrants. 
Table III shows changes in scheduled prices by four major suppliers between 
1970 and 1980. The period is divisible into two. Between 1970 and the end of 
1973 there was a continuation of the parallel pricing which had characterised 
the previous decade: the majors charged identical prices and changed price by 
the same amounts. Six price changes occurred simultaneously. two were led by 
Shell-Mex and BP and one by Mobil. In the period from February 1974 to 
December 1980 no price changes took place simultaneously. only once were the 
majors' prices identical. and no price leader was evident (although Shell still 
initiated price changes more frequently than any other supplier). To begin 
with differences in scheduled prices were very small - they did not exceed 1 % 
until 1977. Between 1977 and 1980 price differences widened. The trend 
towards greater competition in scheduled prices is also indicated by the price 
reductions which occurred between July and December 1977 and in July 1980. 
Most studies of administered pricing identify changes in variable costs as the 
chief cause of price changes [2) [5). In the supply of petrol the principal cost 
item is crude oil. To test the proposition that changes in the scheduled 
wholesale price of petrol are determined by changes in costs rather than by 
demand or competition. percentage changes in the before-tax UK scheduled 
wholesale price (Wi) were regressed on percentage changes in the Sterling price 
of Saudi Arabian marker crude (Ci) during the previous five week period. The 
result was as follows: 
Wi = 6.286 + 0.3554 Ci 
(t = 4.016) 
(R2 = 0.4230) 
The regression coefficient was highly significant and a value of less than 
unity was to be expected in view of the other costs of producing petrol. The low 
value of the R2 may partly reflect the variable lag between changes in crude oil 
prices and changes in scheduled price which resulted from the government 
price controls which were in operation for much of the period. 
To test the influence on scheduled prices of changes in demand. percentage 
changes in the Rotterdam barge price for premium petrol (in £ Sterling) during 
the four weeks prior to wholesale price changes were added to the regression 
equation. The justification for using changes in the Rotterdam price as an 
indicator of changes in demand is that. in such a competitive market. price is 
determined by supply and demand. Short-term price changes are likely to be 
largely demand determined since. as a joint product. the short-run price 
elasticity of supply of petrol tends to be low. 
The estimated coefficient of the Rotterdam price variable was close to lero 
and quite insignificant and the R2 of the regression equation increased only 
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marginally. However a study of the residuals from the first regression did 
provide some weak evidence of more competitive influences on pricing 
behaviour during the latter part of the period. A predominance of negative 
residuals after 1974 suggested that after this date the oil companies became less 
willing or able to pass on increases in the price of crude through increases in the 
price of petrol. 
(b) Rebates and discounts and the price wars of 1975-78 and 1980 
While scheduled prices clearly show a breakdown of price coordination during 
the period, the primary media for price competition were discounts and 
rebates. During the early part of the period when scheduled prices where 
characterised by well· orchestrated parallelism, competition in rebates to gain 
solus agreements with independent retailers was active. However, the most 
notable feature in the development of price competition during the period was 
the introduction and growth of temporary discounts during period 1975· 78. 
The vigour of competition in discounts (and other allowances) was such that 
the period has been described as a "price war" and it warrants detailed study. 
During the latter part of 1974, the shortage of petroleum products which 
had followed the Arab·Israeli War of 1973 quickly turned into surplus as 
supplies of crude oil at greatly increased prices were resumed to an industrial 
world moving steadily into recession. Although higher prices and lower levels of 
real disposable income caused only a small decline in the demand for petrol, 
recession in the petrochemical industry resulted in an excess supply of naphtha 
which was increasingly converted to petrol (3, p.3). Between March and 
December 1974 the Rotterdam petrol price (in Sterling) fell by about 40% 
encouraging new entrants into the UK wholesale market and enabling 
established small wholesalers to expand sales by undercutting the majors. The 
rise in the market shares of the non· refining wholesalers in 1974 and 1975 can 
be seen from Tables I and II and more clearly from Figure 2 . .! 
The smaller wholesalers were not the sole source of price cutting. Higher 
rebates paid by the majors to some large retailers combined with their low· 
margin high·volume retail pricing policy increased price competition at the 
retail level. A key influence was ASDA, a supermarket chain which received a 
very favourable rebate from Mobil. In September 1975 ASDA's retail petrol 
price was 62p at a time when the majors' scheduled wholesale price was 65.25p. 
, Two special faclOrs d~rve mention in increasing the competition offered by the smaller 
wholesalers to the majors. First, the opportunity for smaller wholesalers to undercut the majors' 
prices were increased in Ikcember 1974 ~y the agreeme,nt of the major oil companies to the request 
of the British government to load the major part of the Increased cost of crude oil on to the price of 
petrol. Second, was the particularly large margin by which ICI undercut the prices of the majors 
for a short period. Between 1970 and 1974 ICI had steadily expanded its petrol sales by 
maintaining a price differential of about 5 per cent below the scheduled prices of the majors. 
However between 18 December 1974 and 10 January ICl's wholesale price was 9.2~p (18%) below 
the scheduled prices of the majors, and for the remainder of 1975 the differential was 5p (9.6%). 
Table II shows the substantial increase in ICl's market share between 1974 and 1975. 
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A notable feature of the price competition was its concentration in urban 
and suburban areas of the Midlands and the North of England. These areas 
coincided with the distribution areas of a number of cut· price wholesalers 
(including ICI) and the locations of a number of low·margin retailers (notably 
ASDA). 
The response of the majors to falling market shares and the threat to the 
continued existence of many of their solus retailers was to reduce prices 
selectively and differentially through the offer of temporary discounts to 
retailers suffering the severest competitive pressures. In December 1974 Conoco 
led the way by introducing discounts to some of its retailers. In February several 
other new majors introduced temporary discounts. they were followed by Mobil 
in March. by Texaco in May and. finally. by Shell·Mex and BP and Esso in 
September. 
The form of the discount schemes and their limited coverage indicates that 
they were intended. not as a competitive initiative. but as a means of defending 
market share and protecting the viability of each supplier's retail outlets. In 
most cases the amount of discount was calculated to enable the retailer to meet 
local price competition. but not to undercut it. Moreover. the established 
majors made several attempts to withdraw temporary discounts during the 
course of the price war: on 31 Octobe 1975 Shell-Mex and BP. Esso and Texaco 
withdrew their support measures but the failure of the new majors to follow led 
Esso to re-introduce discounts. At the end of May 1976. Shell al"nounced its 
withdrawal of discounts and was again followed by the leading majors. in the 
summer however Shell led a re-introduction of discounts. 
The inability of the leading majors to contain and eliminate price 
competition is further indicated by the expansion in the geographical coverage 
of temporary discount schemes. While initially the schemes were limited to the 
marketing areas of certain cut-price wholesalers and retailers. there was a 
constant tendency for the areas of price competition to grow. and during 1977 
selective discounts were extended throughout much of the South of England. 
The culmination of this widening of the area of price competition was the 
reduction in scheduled wholesale price by Shell in July 1977. The continued 
momentum of price competition between the majors is further indicated by the 
persistent growth of discounts and other price support measured during the 
first half of 1978. when no external factors promoting such price competition 
can be identified. 
A combination of factors brought about an abrupt end to the price war. A 
shortage of petrol in the summer of 1978 caused by industrial action by tanker 
drivers was followed by a rapid escalation in the spot prices for crude oil and 
petroleum products caused by the Iranian revolution (see Figure 3). On 
November 2 1978 Mobil announced its intention of eliminating temporary. 
discounts to retailers on November 6. Shell followed by initially withdrawing 
discounts from 1.300 of its 1.600 subsidised retailers in the first instance. On 
November 10 Petrofina withdrew temporary support and on November 13 Esso 
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announced its withdrawal of discounts - which at the time were being paid to 
about 20% of its retailers. ' 
The shortage of crude oil intensified during the early months of 1978 and 
between March and August all the majors rationed supplies of petrol to their 
retail outlets. 7 One of the principal results of the petrol shortage was 
substantially reduced price competition at the retail level. Retail prices became 
more uniform and retail margins rose to their highest levels of the decade. 
Scheduled prices were increased four times between February and early July 
1979. 
The termination of price competition proved to be only temporary however. 
Market conditions during late 1979 and early 1980 resembled those of late 1974 
when. against a background of falling Rotterdam spot prices for petrol. UK 
scheduled wholesale prices were increased (see Figure !I). Competitive pressure 
was further increased by the desire of many wholesalers to increase their share 
of the UK market: Shell. BP and Esso desired higher gallonage sales through 
their large. company-owned sites. while Conoco. Esso. Total and Amoco 
wished to expand their market bases in anticipation of increased production 
capacity arising from investments in refineries and catalytic crackers. 
While the 1975·78 price war was precipitated primarily by the competitive 
tactics of smaller wholesalers with the majors introducing discounts largely as a 
defensive measure. the outbreak of discounting in 1980 appears to have been 
initiated by the majors. No substantial price cutting by smaller wholesalers is 
apparent during early 1980. and there is no evidence of their gaining any 
significant increase in market share during these months (see Figure 2). 
Competitive initiatives were first taken at the retail level. In an effort to 
bring down the high levels of retail margin which had arisen during the period 
of petrol shortage. Shell and Esso used their control over retail prices at their 
owned retail outlets to absorb some of the increase in the wholesale price 
between December 1979 and March 1980. • Temporary discounts to retailers in 
competitive areas were first introduced by Shell at the end of March 1980 and 
in July 1980 Shell and Esso led with a reduction in scheduled prices. In August 
Esso introduced a 0.33 pence per litre discount to all retailers which was 
followed by the other majors. In September an additional temporary discount 
was offered by Esso. but only to retailers in the competitive areas. A week later 
Conoco followed. Conoco then increased its temporary discount from 0.4 to 0.7 
per litre (Sept. 22). In October Shell introduced its "terminal area price 
support scheme" - discounts varied between each distribution area from 0.44 
• See Finallcial Times. II November 1978 (p.3) and 14 November 1978 (p.7). 
, Rationing took the form of an allocation to each retail .. r which was a fixed proportion of his 
purchases in the same period during the previous yt-ar. In June 1978 these allocations ranged from 
95% for Shell and BP. to 90% for E.so. down to 75% for Burmah. 
• Only a small minority of wholt-salt'r - owned retail outll'ts are directly opl'rated by thl' 
wholl'salers. However. in addition to Sf'uing rNail prices at these sites. the wholesal .. rs Can also 
dfectively control retail prices at sitt's which were I .. t on licence agre .. m .. nts (as opposed to tenancy 
agreements) to ind"pl'ndent operators [9. chap.2\. 
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to 1.20p per litre. while within each area the same discount was received by all 
retailers. This renewed bout of price competition proved to be short lived 
however. Under pressure from poor profitability on downstream activities. the 
majors were anxious to take advantage of any upward trend in Rotterdam 
petrol prices. When BP announced on 8 December its withdrawal of temporary 
discounts. it was quickly followed by the other majors. 9 
While the fall in seller concentration in petrol wholesaling provided the 
background to this aggressive competition in discounts which characterised most 
of the latter half of the decade. the strongest force behind the introductions and 
withdrawals of discounts appears to have been the level of the Rotterdam spot 
petrol price in relation to the UK scheduled wholesale price. The relationship 
of the differential between UK and Rotterdam petrol prices to the 
introductions and withdrawals of temporary discounts is illustrated by Figure 
3. Such a relationship fits in well with the earlier predictions that the level of 
the Rotterdam price in relation to the UK scheduled wholesale price would be a 
primary determinant of entry by smaller wholesalers. independent price 
cutting by established small wholesalers. and the incentive for the major 
wholesalers to undercut the "collusive" industry price. 
To test more precisely the relationship between discounting and Rotterdam 
prices. the average level of wholesale discount in the UK was regressed on the 
differential between the UK and the Rotterdam price on a four weekly basis 
over the period 1971 to 1980. The two variables were calculated as follows: 
Xi Shell scheduled inner zone 4* price per gallon in month i net of all 
taxes minus Rotterdam spot barge price for premium petrol per 
gallon (converted to Sterling) 
Yi average discount in month i was calculated as the Shell scheduled 
inner zone price for 4·star minus the average net wholesale 4-star 
price for the UK. The average net wholesale price was zone price for 
4* minus the average net wholesale 4* price for the UK. The average 
net wholesale price was calculated by subtracting from the average 
UK retail price (source: Motorist's Diary Panel) estimates of average 
retail gross margins (sources: Price Commission, 1976, Financial 
Times. estimates supplied by retailers and wholesalers). 
The data were subject to numerous shortcomings. 
(z) reported Rotterdam prices are sometimes unreliable as a guide to average 
transaction prices [15, pp.7 and 101 
(ii) the figures for average retail prices are based on a representative sample 
of motorists and are subject to sampling error, 
(iii) the estimates for retailers' gross margins were compiled from a number of 
sources all of which were subject to error, 
(iv) the estimates of average discount (including solus rebate) on scheduled 
price are understated by the extent to which net wholesale prices are 
increased by zonal differential and part-load premia. 
, ~ Financial Times 9 December 1980, p.8. 
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Although the estimates of average discounts are subject to several sources of 
error. an independent check of the figures against the indices for scheduled 
prices and net wholesale prices for Shell. Esso and BP published by the Price 
Commission [121 [13], [141 for the period 1977 - 79 confirmed their validity. 
The regression yielded the following result: 
Yj = 1.083 + 0.1512 Xj.2 
(t = 6.409) 
(R2 = 0.4146) 
Although the coefficient of independent variable is highly significant when 
lagged two months. less than half of the variability in the level of discount is 
explained. Two inadequacies of the regression analysis may be partly to blame: 
the first being errors in variables. the second being the omission of structural 
variables (such as changes in buyer and seller concentration) which might be 
expected to influence discounting behaviour over the longer term. The most 
likely explanation however is the lack of a stable relationship between 
discounting behaviour and industrial structure. Certainly the pattern of 
residuals did not suggest that the inclusion of seller concentration or any other 
single variable in the regression equation would substantially assist the 
explanation of discounting behaviour. 
It has been noted that the influence of Rotterdam prices on competitive 
behaviour is through three sources: new entry. under-cutting by established 
small wholesalers. and the cohesiveness of the majors' pricing policies. Over the 
period the relative importance of the first two factors and the last factor 
changed. The introduction by the majors of temporary discounts and their 
expansion in 1975 and 1976 can be seen as the reluctant response of the majors 
to loss of market share to small wholesalers. However, the growth of 
discounting during 1977 and early 1978 and the reintroduction of discounts in 
1980 seems to reflect the forces of competition between the majors rather than 
competition from outside. Thus, during 1977 and 1978 the growth in the 
average level of discounts was principally due to the extension of temporary 
discounts to areas where cut-price small wholesalers were not a significant 
force. Similarly the re-emergence of the discount war in 1980 did not appear to 
be accompanied by any substantial surge in the market share of cheap brands 
(see Figure 2). 
A further factor promoting an unstable relationship between discounting 
and the Rotterd.tm price is the cumulative nature of the price competition once 
oligopolistic price coordination had been lost. The growth of average discounts 
in the face of rising Rotterdam prices in 1978 demonstrated the self-
perpetuating effect of oligopolistic price competition. 
v. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper has been to apply an informal "structure-conduct" 
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approach to the theory of oligopoly pricing to predict and explain pricing 
behaviour in the UK petrol market during the period 1970·80. While there are 
a number of features of this industry which are atypical - notably the joint 
production of petroleum products and the high degree of vertical integration in 
the industry - the main finding of the paper is that the structural features of 
the industry and the market which were hypothesised as influencing pricing 
behaviour go a substantial way in explaining the pricing behaviour observed in 
the wholesaling of petrol. 
Low market and high brand price elasticity of demand, a past history of 
cooperative arrangements between suppliers, high seller concentration, and 
the similar costs and technology of the majors combined to produce close 
parallelism of schedule prices during the early part of the period. During the 
later part of the period the fall in seller concentration resulted in a breakdown 
in price parallelism, but still movements in scheduled prices were closely 
related to changes in costs. 
The principal medium for price competition was in discounts and other 
allowances, as has been observed in other oligopolistic industries. This reflects 
the flexibility of discounts in meeting market circumstances on a localised 
basis and the lower risk ofretaliatory across-the-board price cuts than would be 
likely from more obvious reductions in scheduled prices. The behaviour of the 
majors in offering temporary discounts was found to be related to new entry, to 
competitive price cutting by small wholesalers and to the margin between 
scheduled prices and the marginal costs of the majors. All these factors were 
reflected in the differential between UK scheduled prices and the Rotterdam 
spot price. A statistical analysis showed the latter differential to be highly 
significant in determining the level of discounts. 
But in spite of the success of the informal theory of oligopoly in predicting 
and explaining most of the principal features of pricing behaviour over the 
period, in terms of offering precise predictions as to the level of prices and 
timing of competitive initiatives the theory was of limited value. Both our 
approach to oligopoly pricing and our observations of the petrol market suggest 
that pricing behaviour is influenced by a large number of structural variables 
(past behaviour in the industry may be regarded as a "structural" variable). 
Moreover, the possibility of modelling the relationships is reduced by changes 
over time in the relationships and their relative importances. This instability in 
the relationship between structural variables and pricing behaviour reflects, 
first, the instability of collusive price equilibrium in a homogeneous product 
oligopoly and, secondly, changes in market strategies of the companies. 
Between 1976 and 1977 Shell and Esso appeared to give up their roles as 
stabilising forces in the petrol market and adopted more competitive 
approaches to maintaining and expanding their market shares - price 
leadership changed from a collusive to a barometric kind. While these changes 
in market strategy can be related to structural factors - such as falling seller 
concentration and excess capacity - the resulting complexity of the structure· 
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conduct relationship makes accurate modelling extremely difficult. 
There is a further limitation of the study which must also be recognised. Our 
theory of competitive behaviour in oligopoly relates both to the pattern of 
pricing behaviour (in terms of independent pricing initiatives by firms) and the 
level of industry prices in relation to the competitive and monopoly levels. The 
level of price is measured by the excess of price over average cost (including 
normal profit adjusted for risk) and is normally expressed as a percentage of 
sales revenue or capital employed. However. our analysis of pricing behaviour 
in the petrol market has been concerned only with the pattern of pricing 
behaviour and has been unable to consider the level of prices in relation to the 
competitive level except in terms of the relationship of scheduled prices to the 
Rotterdam price. The problem here is that the usual indicator of the level of 
price over cost. profit. is not available for petrol wholesaling because of the 
virtual impossibility of allocating joint costs in any economically meaningful 
way. 
Even in view of these deficiencies of the study and the imprecision of the 
analysis. the results of the study offer some cause for optimism. Despite the 
complexity of oligopoly pricing behaviour. relatively simple approaches to its 
analysis based upon straightforward profit objectives are capable of yielding 
useful predictions and cogent explanations. Moreover. the approach does 
succeed in reconciling aspects of pricing behaviour which have often been 
regarded as conflicting: competition. collusion. cost-plus pricing and the 
influence of demand. 
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PAPER 2 
DISCRIMINAZIONE DEL PREZZO 
AL DETT AGLIO E POLITICA COMMERCIALE 
di Robert M. Grant'" 
1. Legislazione sulla concorrenza e discriminazione del prezzo 
La discriminazione del prezzo e stata tradizionalmente considerata, 
tanto dagli economisti quanta dalla legislazione sulla concorrenza, co-
me un aspetto del comportamento monopolistico. L'analisi economic a 
del monopolio discriminato dimostra come la discriminazione del prez-
zo aumentera i profitti del monopolista al di sopra di quello che po-
trebbe essere guadagnato con una politica di prezzo uniforme; I'effetto 
della discriminazione del prezzo suI prod otto del monopolista e invece 
am biguo (I). In base aile leggi sulla concorrenza vigenti nella maggior 
parte dei paesi europei, i singoli casi di discriminazione del prezzo che 
comportano l'utiIizzazione 0 l'estensione del potere di mercato da par-
te di una impresa dorninante possono essere affrontati con riferimento 
alia legislaz6ne anti-monopolistica. 11 Fair Trading Act del Regno Uni-
to, la legge del 1957 contro Ie restrizioni della concorrenza della Re-
pubblica Federale Tedesca e l'articolo 86 del Trattato di Rorna consen-
to no aile autorita competenti di proibire la discrirninazione del prezzo 
quando venga praticata da una impresa dominante il mercato (2). 
E' stata di recente riscontrata una crescita di interesse verso la discri-
minazione del prezzo che non e apparentemente legata allo sfruttamen-
to monopolistico, rna e il risultato della capacita dei grandi acquirenti 
di negoziare con i propri fornitori prezzi pill favorevoli di quanto non 
-Traduzione di Alberto Lolli. 
\. Per una discussione sugli elfelli sui benessere della discriminazione monopolistica del 
prezzo si veda M. Howe. Policies towards Market Power and Price Discrimination in George e 
Joll (1975). 
2. Un caso interessante di applicazione dell'articolo 86 riguardo alia discriminazione del 
prezzo e il caso United Brands (Common Market Law Report, 1978). 
Commercio. n. J. 1979. 
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possano fare quelli piccoli. L'attenzione generale si e concentrata sulla 
capacita dei grandi dettaglianti e distributori di ottenere prezzi favore-
voli; questi sconti e riduzioni sono stati considerati, per 10 meno dai 
piccoli dettaglianti, come elemento che avrebbe condotto ad una con-
correnza sleale nel settore al dettaglio. In molti paesi europei e stata 
introdotta una legislazione volta ad abolire Ie differenze di prezzo non 
derivanti da differenze nei costi di rifornimento, 0 comunque quelle 
che producano effetti negativi sulla concorrenza. In Irlanda sono state 
create norme specifiche in senD al Restrictive Practices Act per impedi-
re la discriminazione del prezzo nel settore dei generi di drogheria 
(1973), deJla benzina (1961, 1972 e 1975), e di certi altri prodotti. In 
Francia la "Loi Royer" del 1973 ha introdotto severe penal ita contro 
la discriminazione del prezzo. In Australia la Legge Federale dal 29 
giugno 1977 ha completato la Legge sui Cartelli per consentire al Tri-
bunale competente di proibire I'offerta di condizioni differenziali ai 
dettaglianti in assenza di una giustificazione rilevante. Tutti questi 
provvedimenti presentano delle strette somiglianze con il Robinson -
Patman Act approvato nel 1935 negli Stati Uniti. 
Sia in Europa che nell' America del Nord, la legislazione volta a 
proibire una discriminazione del prezzo sleale e contraria ad un corret-
to comportamento concorrenziale ha fatto seguito a periodi di rapido 
mutamento strutturale nel commercio al dettaglio, che avevano com-
portato aumenti nella concentrazione dei venditori e la sostituzione dei 
piccoli punti di vendita con unita molto pili grandi. Gli anni trenta 
hanno visto I'introduzione dei supermercati nell'America del Nord e la 
rapida espansione delle catene di negozi, sviluppi che si sarebbero veri-
ficati in Europa durante gli anni cinquanta e sessanta, e che continua-
no ancor oggi. In entrambi i continenti la legislazione e stata sostenuta 
con decisione dai piccoli dettaglianti e, parebbe, i provvedimenti adot-
tati si sono occupati pili della protezione degli interessi di questa cate-
goria che del perseguimento di una pili attiva concorrenza 0 di migliori 
performance. 
Secondo l'opinione della maggior parte degli osservatori competenti, 
l'aver proibito la discriminazione del prezzo nell'Arperica del Nord ha 
avuto effetti restrittivi sulla concorrenza piuttosto che favorirla. Nella 
sua analisi del funzionamento del Robinson-Patman Act, it Ministero 
della Giustizia degli Stati Uniti e giunto alla condusione che tale Legge 
"incoraggia i prezzi aiti, aumenta Ie difficoita di entrata nel mercato e 
l'inefficienza neJla distribuzione deJle merci; essa ha favorito I'adozione 
di politiche iIIegali di prezzo fra produttori concorrenti" (Ministero 
deJla Giustizia degli Stati Uniti, 1977, p. 260). 
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Poiche la legislazione volta a proibire la discriminazione del prezzo e 
stata motivata in primo luogo da fattori politici, una precisa analisi 
delle cause, delle circostanze di applicazione e degli effetti del1a discri-
minazione del prezzo a favore degli acquirenti dotati di potere contrat-
tuale e stata in gran misura assente dal dibattito politico. 
Questo articolo analizza brevemente Ie cause dei prezzi preferenziali 
a favore dei grandi acquirenti, e procede esaminando Ie implicazioni suI 
benessere di questa tipo di discriminazione del prezzo. Sotto questo 
aspetto, vengono tratte alcune conclusioni sulla desiderabilita di una 
legislazione che vieti la discriminazione del prezzo. 
2. Analisi economica dell' influenza degli acquirenti suI prezzo 
L'analisi del1a struttura e del comportamento dcgli acquirenti ha 
ricevuto poca attenzione nella letteratura economica. La struttura degli 
acquirenti viene generalmente ipotizzata dai mercati come perfettamen-
te concorrenziale, una supposizione che e ragionevole soItanto nel caso 
in cui un'impresa venda direttamente aile famiglie. I tentativi di elabo-
rare considerazioni circa la struttura dcgli acquirenti sono stati condot-
ti in termini di modelli di semplice monopsonio 0 di oligopsonio, 
equivalenti ai modelli elementari di monopolio e di oligopolio. II mo-
nopsonista puro useni it proprio pot ere suI prezzo di mercato per 
acquistare una quantita pill piccola ad un prezzo pill basso di quello 
praticato in presenza di un settore acquirente perfcttamente concorren-
ziale. 
Solo di recente e stata prestata attenzione alia influenza degli acqui-
renti concentrati suI prezzo. Indagini condotte da Brooks (1974) e da 
Lustgarten (1975) (3) mostrano che l'inclusione degli indici di concen-
trazione degli acquirenti nelle equazioni di regressione che mettono in 
relazione la profittabilita del settore con la struttura del mercato mi-
gliora it valore esplicativo delle equazioni, e che la concentrazione degli 
acquirenti ha di per se stessa un effetto ncgativo sulla profittabilita del 
settore venditore. Le spiegazioni di questa capacita degli acquirenti di 
abbassare it prezzo di una merce al di sotto di quello pagato in presen-
za di un settore d'acquisto concorrenziale, si basano sulla supposizione 
che gli acquirenti concentrati, cosi come i venditori concentrati, coor-
dinano it proprio comportamento d'acquisto allo scopo di esercitare un 
3.1 risullati di Lustgal1en sono stati contraddclli da quelli di Guth l'f al. (1976). che ha so. 
10 una misura diversa dcgli acquirenti ed un numero molto pili piccolo di osservazioni. 
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potere monopsonistico sui prezzo, "L'oIigopsonio, analogamente all'oIi-
gopolio, renderebbe gli acquirenti consapevoli dcll'impatto potenziale 
delle proprie offerte d'acquisto sulle offerte degli altri acquirenti. Ci si 
potrebbe aspettare che questa interdipendenza produca collusione fra 
g1i acquirenti" (Lustgarten 1975, p, 126), 
La tesi dell"'oligopsonio collusivo" non e pero plausibile per due 
motivi: 
a, dal momento che i prezzi relativi alia maggior parte dei prodotti 
industriali vengono stabiliti dai venditori, la capacita degli acquirenti 
di riconoscere la propria interdipendenza e limitata (4) e soltanto 
nei mercati in cui gli acquirenti sono impegnati in offerte in concor-
renza, la lora interdipendenza sara riconoscibile e la loro coord ina-
zione sara fattibile (5); 
b, nella maggior parte dei mercati iI Iivello di concentrazione dcgli 
acquirenti e basso, inferiore al corrispondente livello di concentrazio-
ne dei venditori; la concentrazione degli acquirenti e esigua in quasi 
tutte Ie branche del commercio al dettaglio nei paesi europei (6), 
Inoltre, la tesi dell'oligopsonio collusivo afferrna che il potere del-
l'acquirente avni come conseguenza per il prodotto, un prezzo di mer· 
cat~ pill basso rna il fattore principale che distingue l'influenza degli 
acquirenti sui prezzo e che Ie concessioni di prezzo vengono ottenute 
dai singoli acquirenti. 
E' percio necessario, per esaminare Ie differenze di prezzo fra gIi 
acquirenti, analizzare I'influenza del singolo acquirente sui prezzo dei 
propri acquisti e iI comportamento dei fornitori nella politica di prezzo 
verso i singoli clienti. "II potere dell'acquirente" - la capacita dei 
4. Baner e Yamey (1952) hanno dimoslralo che i prezzi di mercalo delle noei in Nigeria 
superavano raramenle il prezzo minima umeiale dei produllori nelle zone in cui operavano 
sollanlo due sociela d'aequislo, mentrc in quelle zone dove la quanlila degli acquirenli era 
piu grande, i premi al di soprd del prezzo minima erano comuni. Un'indagine di Mead 
(1966) sui prezzi d'asla per I'abele Douglas ha dimoslralo, che il rapporlo Ira prezzi d'asla e 
prezzi dei prodUllori e direllamenlC proporzionale alia quanlila degli acquirenli. Le indagini 
di Mac Avoy (1962) e di Mead (1967) sui prezzi delle concessioni per 10 Srrullamenlo del pe-
lrolio e del gas nalurale, han no dimoslralo che i prezzi diminuiscono in modo significalivo 
quando la quanlila dei partecipanti ad un'asla divenla molto piccolo. 
5. Una indagine di AIkin e Skinner (1975) sui melodi di dClerminazione del prezzo usali 
da 220 sociela nel Regno Unilo, ha dimoslralo che il 55 per eenlO operava con lislini prezzi 
pubblicali, il47 pereenlO aveva Iislini prezziinlerni, il53 percenlO negoziava i prezzi indivi-
dualmenle con i elienli; e il 43 per eenlo slabiliva i prezzi con offerle formali. 
6. Per 53 sellori negli Slali Unili Gulh 1'/01 (1977) hannodimoslralo che sollanlo in 61a 
eoncenlrazione degli acquirenti ha superalo la coneenlrazione dei vendilori. 
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grandi acquirenti di ottenere concessioni di prezzo dai fornitori - non 
si basa quindi sui convenzionale potere di mercato, rna sui potere di 
contrattazione verso i singoli venditori. 
Si sostiene frequentemente che la fonte del maggior potere contrat-
tuale degli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni vada ricercata nei costi che 
essi possono risparmiare ad un fornitore ritirando una parte sostanziale 
del suo giro d'affari. Cosi, se i1 fornitore opera al Hvello ottimale della 
capacita produttiva 0 ad un livello inferiore, la minaccia di perdere un 
grande volume di vendita pub essere sufficiente ad indurlo a negoziare 
un prezzo che copra i costi marginali rna non i costi medi. Questa 
analisi, perb, non spiega rna assume soltanto la discriminazione da par-
te del fornitore fra acquirenti grandi e piccoli. Per un fornitore minac-
ciato da perdite di clientela e di fronte ad eccesso di capacita, potreb-
be essere vantaggioso offrire ad ogni c1iente, grande o· piccolo, un 
prezzo che copra i costi marginali. II problema rilevante e per quale 
ragione i fornitori siano disposti a trattare come cIienti marginaIi i 
grandi acquirenti, rna non quelli piccoli. 
E' comunque possibile fare a menD della nozione di potere d'acqui-
sto, e spiegare la discriminazione del prezzo fra acquirenti grandi e 
piccoli in termini di comportamento dei venditori nel determinare iI 
prezzo. La discriminazione del prezzo richiede che i venditori possegga-
no una qualche misura di potere di mercato - allo stesso tempo gli 
acquirenti di grandi dimensioni possono ottenere delle concessioni di 
prezzo anche se non possiedono potere di mercato - percio la discri-
minazione del prezzo fra gli acquirenti puo essere considerata come un 
aspetto di comportamento oligopolistico. Si suggerisce in questa sede 
che i prezzi differenziali fra gJi acquirenti di grandi e piccole dimensio-
ni riflettano due fattori: primo, Ie differenze nel livello delle barriere 
all'entrata nel rifornimento dei grandi e piccoli acquirenti; secondo, la 
maggior difficolta di mantenere una coordinazione oligopolistica di 
prezzo in presenza dei grandi acquirenti. 
3. II livello delle barriere all'entrata nel rifornimento degli acquirenti di 
grandi e piccole dimensioni 
Si suppone che gli oligopolisti industriali si comportino tipicamente 
in modo collusivo e che mirino ad un 'Limit Pricing' facendo pagare iI 
prezzo pill alto che consenta loro di esc1udere i nuovi concorrenti dal 
mercato. Se Ie barriere all'entrata nel settore variano in altezza secondo 
Ie dimensioni del c1iente che I'impresa che tenta di entrare rifornisce, 
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aHora la politica del Limit Pricing implica che Ie imprese affermate 
discriminino fra Ie diverse dimensioni dei c1ienti. E' possibile sostcncre 
numerose argomentazioni per spicgare come mai Ie barriere all'entrata 
saranno pill basse per Ie imprese che tentano di entrare cercando di 
rifornire acquirenti grandi, piuttosto che per queUe che cercano di 
rifornire acquirenti piccoli. 
3.1. Minori costi unitari di vendita e distribuzione nel rifornimento dei 
c1ienti di grandi dimensioni 
costi di marketing e di distribuzione diminuiscono rapidamente 
con l'aumento delle vendite ad un singolo cliente quando i livelli di 
vendita sono alti, mentre il decremento e pili moderato per bassi livelli 
di vendita. Cosi Ie imprese che entrano nel mercato, che possono ini-
zialmente aspettarsi soItanto una piccola quota degli acquisti di ogni 
c1iente, si troveranno di fronte ad un svantaggio di costo maggiore nei 
confronti dei produttori affcrmati nel rifornimento dci piccoli acqui-
renti piuttosto che di quelli grandi. 11 risultato e che i produttori 
affermati possono guadagnare un pill alto margine sulle venditc ai pic-
coli acquirenti chc non a quelli di grandi dimcnsioni. 
3.2. Una maggiore elasticita della domanda da parte dei grandi acqui-
renti piuttosto che di quelli piccoli 
La tendenza per cui differenze nei costi di vendita e di distribuzione 
portano ad un pill alto Limit Price nel rifornimento dei piccoli acqui-
renti rispetto a quelIi grandi, sara accentuata qualora la domanda pro-
veniente dagli acquirenti pill piccoli sia menD elastica di quella dei 
grandi acquirenti. Nel commercio al dettaglio, per esempio, la sopravvi-
venza dei piccoli dettagIianti e stata dovuta in parte alia loro capacita 
di differenziare i propri servizi - per es. per mezzo di orari d'apertura 
flessibiIi, dello stoccaggio di beni particolari, della disponibilita a rifor-
nire in loco piccole comunita. A causa di questa differenziazione e 
della tendenza a servirsi dei piccoli dettagIianti per acquisti di basso 
val ore, I'elasticita della domanda relativa al piccolo dettagIiante e pro-
babilmente pill bassa di quella relativa al dcttagliante di grandi dimen-
sioni. Oi conseguenza, la domanda dei piccoli dettaglianti nei confronti 
del produttore sara menD elastica di quella dei grandi dettaglianti. 
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3.3. La capacita delle grandi imprese operanti nel settore distributivo 
di gestire il marketing dei ben; di consumo 
Nei settori dei beni di consumo una piu importante barriera all'en-
trata e data dalla condizione di svantaggio in cui si trova una marca 
sconosciuta in mercati dominati da prodotti differenziati gia affermati. 
Per favorire il successo del proprio prodotto suI mercato, it nuovo 
venuto deve 0 spendere fondi sproporzionatamente elevati in pubblicita 
o promozione, oppure offrire il proprio prodotto ad un prezzo sconta-
to in modo sostanziale. E' comunque possibile, per il grande distributo-
re all'ingrosso 0 al dettaglio, abbattere Ie barriere all'entrata derivanti 
dalla differenziazione del prodotto attuata dai produttori affermati of-
frendo i prodotti dei nuovi entrati sotto il proprio marchio commercia-
Ie. L'aumento della concentrazione in molte branche del commercio al 
dettaglio che ha incoraggiato I'introduzione di marche private dei det-
taglianti, ha comportato un trasferimento della funzione di marketing 
dal produttore al distributore, e ha co\pito proprio a\ cuore il potere di 
mercato dei fornitori oligopolistici di beni di consumo di marca. . 
3.4. L ';ncoraggiamento aU'entrata proveniente dagli acquirent; d; gran-
di dimensioni 
Anche se Ie irnprese che entrano non risentono di alcuno svantaggio 
di maggior cos to nel competere con i produttori affermati, un'impresa 
che cerchi di entrare in un mercato e guadagnare quota di mercato a 
spese dei concorrenti deve considerare il proprio investimento come 
un'avventura rischiosa. Questo e partico\armente vero nei settori oligo-
polistici dove Ie reazioni concorrenziali delle imprese affermate verso 
un nuovo fomitore sono incerte. GH acquirenti di grandi dimensioni 
possono esercitare un ruolo importante nella riduzione del rischio assi-
curando alia potenziale impresa che entra un certo Hvello di attivita. 
Esempio rilevante e stato )'incoraggiamento dato dalla Pet-Foods Ltd. 
alIa Reads Ltd. affinche entrasse nel mercato delle lattine metalliche 
open-top del Regno Unito in concorrenza con la Metal Box (Monopo-
lies Commission, 1970, pp. 88-141). 
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3.5. Le opportunita di integrazione a monte che si offrono agli acqui-
renti di grandi dimension; 
Le barriere all'entrata sono inefficaci nel proteggere Ie vendite dagli 
acquirenti di grandi dirnensioni a causa della capacita di questi uItimi 
di integrarsi a monte nel settore di rifornirnento. II mercato delle latti-
ne metalliche fornisce un esempio interessante. Le favorevoli condizio-
ni offerte dalla Metal Box ai propri principali c1ienti del Regno Unito 
ne riflettevano la capacita di produrre gli input loro necessari (Mono-
polies Commission, 1970, prg. 247 e 248). La propensione dei grandi 
trasformatori di generi alirnentari ad integrarsi a monte nella produzio-
ne delle lattine e stata dirnostrata negli Stati Uniti tra il 1950 e 1960, 
quando molti trasformatori di alimentari cominciarono a produrre 1atti-
ne in proprio in risposta alia cessazione delle condizioni d'acquisto lora 
favorevoli che sembravano violare iI Robinson-Patman Act (Adams, 
1967, p. 314). La capacita dei produttori di veicoli di esercitare. un 
forte potere contrattuale verso i fornitori di componenti monopolistici 
ed oligopolistici, si basa fondamentalmente sulla provata possibilitA per 
i produttori dei veicoli di fabbricare da se i componenti loro necessari; 
iI potere di mercato dei fornitori di componenti viene cost in effetti 
esercitato solamente nel commercio dei pezzi di ricambio. II risultato e 
un differenziale notevole tra i prezzi che vengono fatti pagare ai pro-
duttori dei veicoli e il prezzo all'ingrosso standard addebitato aile au-
tofficine ed ai distributori di componenti (7). 
7. Esempi di difTerenziale di prezzo per alcuni componenti per veicoli. 
Prezzo Prezzo Prezzo per I pro-
al dettaglio all'/ngroJSo duttorl del veicolo 
meno di 2 1/2p 
Candele champion 2Sp 14·18p 160p (equipag· 
aiamen to inlzia1e) 
Frizione cia 6" 60Sp approx.4SOp 320p (1OItituzione) 
Fonte: Monopolies Commission, 1963, Monopolies Commission, 1968. 
Comunque deve essere nolato che un altro motivo di difTerenziali di prelZO e I'importante 
complementarieta tra il mercato degli equipaggiamenti iniziali ed il mercato di pelzi di rio 
cambio: cosi un prezzo puo essere diverso anche per 10 stesso acquirente a seconda che si 
tratti del componente I'equipaggiamento iniziale 0 di un ricambio. 
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4. La difficoIta di man tenere prezzi collusivi di fronte ad acquirenti di 
grandi dimensioni 
La tendenza dei settori oligopolistici ad accordare prezzi preferenzia-
Ii ai grandi acquirenti risultera non soltanto dal comportamento del 
settore volto a massimizzare it profitto, rna anche dalle difficolta di 
coordinare i prezzi nei confronti degli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni, 
e quindi di mantenere i prezzi sopra i loro livelli concorrenziali (8). 
La difficolta di ottenere una coordinazione di prezzo oligopolistica 
di fronte a grandi acquirenti deriva principalmente dall'eterogeneita 
delle transazioni con simili operatori. Nel caso in cui it prodotto di un 
settore sia sostanzialmente uniforme e i metodi di marketing e di di-
stribuzione siano uguali, aHora i costi di rifornire diversi clienti saranno 
simili, ed un unico prezzo di listino, pur con aggiustamenti riguardo 
alia localizzazione del cliente ed alia dimensione del1a sua ordinazione, 
potra essere offerto a tutti i clienti. Una tale sempIicita nel determina-
re it prezzo facilita di molto it parallelismo di prezzo fra gli oligopoli-
sti. Le transazioni tenderanno ad essere omogcnee tra piccoli acquiren-
ti, poich!! il modesto volume degli acquisti di ogni compratore rende 
costose Ie singole variazioni nel prodotto, nell'imballaggio 0 nel metoda 
di consegna. I grandi produttori d'altra parte possono aver bisogno di 
componenti di misura non standard e molte catene di dettaglianti pos-
sono richiedere ai propri fornitori accordi speciali circa il trasporto 
della merce e Ie consegne (vedi Blois, 1972). 
Questa maggiore eterogcneita delle transazioni con i grandi acquiren-
ti significa che Ie variazioni nei costi e di conseguenza nei prezzi offerti 
ai grandi acquirenti tendono ad essere negoziate individualmente. II 
parallelismo del prezzo, 0 in verita qualsiasi forma di coordinamento 
del prezzo tra i fornitori oligopolistici, e estremamente difficile quando 
i prezzi vengono negoziati individualmente con i clienti, poiche un 
coordinamento efficace richiede che i singoli fornitori conducano Ie 
proprie trattative contemporaneamente e che essi siano in comunicazio-
ne fra di loro per assicurare la coerenza delle condizioni. 
8. La teo ria di Stigler sull"oligopolio (1962) si occupa di questo problema, e dimostra, che 
gli oligopolisti collusivi otTrivano sconti di prezzi segreti fino allimite dove i lora guadagni 
nella quota di mercalO rendano la loro politica di sconto evidente agli altri fornitori. L'anali-
si di Stigler atTenna che gli sconti di prelZO segreti saranno otTerti agli acquirenti grandi 
piultosto che ai piccoli. Comunque la teoria e applicabile esclusivamente nei confronti di 
quellioligopolisti legati da un accordo di detenninazione del prezzo che comporti un'azione 
disciplinare da parte del sellore se vengono scoperti scanellamenti di singole imprese. 
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5. Le differenze di costi fra i fornitori 
II mantenimento di qualsiasi parallelismo di prezzo fra oligopolisti 
richiede in qualche misura un accordo circa iI livello di prezzo ottimale 
per il settore. Un accordo richiede somiglianza nelle condizioni di co-
sto tra i fornitori. Comunque, anche se i diversi fornitori hanno dei 
costi simili, e probabile che Ie singole imprese, quando negoziano con-
dizioni speciali con i clienti di grandi dimensioni, percepiscano in mo-
do piuttosto diverso i costi comportati dal rifornire i singoli c1ienti, 
che dipendono dalle convenzioni seguite dalle imprese nell'imputazione 
dei costi generali, e dalle loro stime circa Ie relazioni costo-valore. 
Cosi, mentre i fornitori sono in grado di accordarsi suI prezzo standard 
dei propri prodotti in base a qualche forma di cost-plus-pricing, un tale 
accordo e meno probabile nelle singole determinazioni del prezzo per 
gli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni. 
La tendenza al divampare della concorrenza fra i fornitori che tenta-
no di commerciare con grandi clienti, sara incoraggiata dal comporta-
mento degli acquirenti che cercano di ottenere delle quotazioni di 
prezzo dai fornitori e che si mantengono informati per quanto riguarda 
Ie condizioni di costo ed i faUori concorrenziali dei singoli fornitori. 
Una tale informazione ha un costo fisso, e la sua acquisizione pub 
essere non economica per i piccoli acquirenti. Questa abilita di trovare 
affari e stata una irnportante spiegazione della capacita di "A and P" 
di approvvigionarsi a cosH pill bassi di quanto non facessero i suoi 
concorrenti, e ha costituito uno dei maggiori risparmi di costo nel suo 
passaggio dall'acquisto decentrato all'acquisto centralizzato (Adelman, 
1953, p. 440). E' chiaro che questa capacita del grande acquirente di 
scovare gli affari ed avvantaggiarsi di ogni occasione di bassi prezzi che 
si presenta sui mercato, non ha niente a che fare con il potere d'ac-
quisto, ma soltanto con la capacita di sfruttare delle imperfezioni del 
mercato. 
6. La misura degli sconti concessi agli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni 
II livello degli sconti, delle riduzioni e delle altre concessioni di 
prezzo eccedenti i risparmi nei costi di rifornimento viene probabil-
mente influenzato inter alia da: 
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a. if live//o di concentrazione del settore fornitore 
La capacita dei grandi acquirenti di ottenere un prezzo prefercnziale 
dipende dal fatto che prezzi praticati verso i piccoli acquirenti siano al 
di sopra del Iivello concorrenziale, cos{ che sia disponibile un qualche 
margine per la trattativa. La possibilitA che si verifichi un notevole 
differenziale di prezzo fra acquirenti grandi e piccoli tendera ad au-
men tare quando il prezzo del prodotto ere see al di sopra il suo livello 
concorrenziale in seguito ad un aumento della concentrazione. Nello 
stcsso tempo, l'aumento della concentrazione tendeni ad accrescere la 
capacita di collusione dei fornitori oligopolistici, non soltanto nei con-
fronti di piccoli acquirenti rna, ad alti livelli di concentrazione, anche 
nei confronti di que IIi grandi. Potremmo quindi supporre che il diffe-
renziale di prezzo tra acquirenti grandi e piccoli varii in modo inversa-
mente proporzionale alia concentrazione dei venditori. A bassi livelli di 
concentrazione, gli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni non sono in grado 
di ottenere alcun vantaggio in quanto i prczzi sono comunque ai loro 
livelli concorrenziali (cos( catene di negozi non godono di grandi van-
taggi nei confronti dei negozi indipendenti ncll'acquisto di prodotti 
freschi, fomiti in condizioni concorrenziali come la frutta, la verdura t' 
la carne). I livelli di concentrazione moIto aIti, i differenziali di prezzo, 
si riducono di nuovo a causa della collusione oligopolistica e del potere 
monopolistico, che diventano efficaci nei confronti di tutti gli acqui-
renti. Nel Regno Unito e negli Stati Uniti, gli sconti concessi ai detta-
glianti di grandi dimensioni sono particolarmente alti nei settori oligo-
polistici della trasformazione alimentare: il latte, il gelato ed i prodotti 
per la cucina negli Stati Uniti (cfr. Ftc 1966) ed il pane, gli alimentari 
surgelati ed il gelato nel Regno Unito (Monopolies Commission 1976 a, 
1976). Comunque in alcuni settori particolarmente concentrati del 
Regno Unito quali la fabbricazione di intonaci e di mattoni (100 per 
cento monopoli) e di alimenti per animali, detersivi per la casa e cola-
zioni a base di cereali (duopoli aJtamcnte differenziati), non esistevano 
concessioni di prezzo ai grandi clienti (Monopolies Commission 1968, 
1970, 1977). 
b. /'eccesso di capacita nel settore fornitore 
La tendenza versO una guerra concorrenziale fra oligopolisti che ten-
tano a clienti di grandi dimensioni sara influenzata dal grado di eccesso 
di capacita nel settore. Qualora i costi variabiIi siano al di sotto dei 
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costi medi totali - e la differenza pub essere considcrevolc nei settori 
con alti costi fissi -. I fornitori possono essere ancora disposti ad 
ottenere lavoro addizionale 0 a mantenere i grandi c1icnti esistenti 
anehe a prezzi ehe coprono sol tanto i costi variabili di fornitura. Nell' 
industria britannica del pane, )'uscita dal mercato di Spillers ncl 1978, 
che ebbe I'efetto di ridurre )'eccesso di capacitil come pure iI numcro 
dei maggiori fornitori da 3 a 2, e stata seguita da una significativa 
riduzione degli sconti ai grandi supermercati. 
7. Le conseguenze di welfare deUa discriminazione del prezzo fra gli 
acquirenti 
L'analisi ora condotta permette di affermare che la discriminazione 
del prezzo sara una caratteristica generale qualora un settore oligopoli-
stieo rifornisca un altro scttore composto di imprese di dimcnsioni 
eterogcnee, a prescindere dal fatto che Ie imprese acquirenti possiedano 
o meno potere monopsonistico. Nei settori produttori di beni di consu-
mo, questa discriminazione si verifiea nella maggior parte dei casi attra-
verso I'imposizione di prezzi di Iistino da parte dei fornitori parallela 
all'offerta di sconti e riduzioni agli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni, 
sconti indipendenti 0 eccedenti i risparmi di costo derivanti dal riforni-
re questi acquirenti. Le condizioni favorevoli agli acquirenti di grandi 
dimensioni assumono anche la forma di seonti per la pubblicita, esten-
sioni del eredito, fornitura di servizi speciali (come it merchandising) e 
di qualche altro beneficio non collegato direttamente al prezzo. 
Per esaminare Ie implicazioni di welfare di questo tipo di discrimina-
zione del prezzo tra acquirenti di dimensioni diverse, confrontiamo una 
situazione oligopolistica in cui la discriminazione del prezzo e permessa 
rna nella quale i cartelli di fissazione del prezzo sono iIlegali, con una 
situazione in cui la discriminazione del prezzo e iHcgale (es. in base ad 
una Icgislazione tipo Robinson-Patman). Le variabili maggiormente rile-
vanti sono probabilmente due: 
a. l'effetto della discriminazione suI IiveHo di prezzo del settore forni-
tore e, in definitiva, sui IiveHo di prezzo per il consumatore finale. 
Qualora la discriminazione del prczzo tra acquirenti di dimensioni 
diverse faccia aumentare il liveHo medio del prezzo al di sopra di 
quanto si verifichcrebbe in presenza di una politica di prezzo unifor-
me, allora si avni una perdita di benessere derivante da una alloca-
zione sub-ottimale delle risorse al settore. 
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b. I'effetto della discriminazione del prezzo consistente nell'aIterare la 
eoneorrenza nel settore acquirente con il risultato che Ie imprese ehe 
opera no in esso, saranno spinte a crescere oltre la dimensione ern-
eente, e che la concentrazione vemi aumentata. 
Se i settori oligopolistici fornitori adottano de1le strategie di limit 
pricing, aHora il livello medio dei prezzi desiderato dai fornitori in 
regime di discriminazione di prezzo sara al di sopra del livello medio 
derivante da una politica di prezzo uniforme. Qualora i fornitori oligo-
polisti desiderino impedire l'entrata saranno tuttavia costretti a far pa-
gare un prezzo unico a tutti gli acquirenti, e aBora i1 livello del prezzo 
sara determinato dalle pili basse barriere all'entrata in qualsiasi sub-set-
tore del mercato. Se Ie barriere all'entrata sono inferiori per Ie fornitu-
re di grandi dimensioni, allora impedendo la discriminazione i prezzi 
praticati ai piccoli acquirenti saranno ridotti fino a raggiungere quelli 
pagati dagli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni. 
Questo ragionamento trascura pero iI secondo fattore che contribui-
see a determinare la discriminazione del prezzo a favore dei grandi 
aequirenti: il venir meno della collusione oligopolistica quando ci si 
trovi di fronte a grandi acquirenti. Questo fattore spinge nella direzio-
ne opposta: se la discriminazione del prezzo viene impedita, anora gli 
oligopolisti saranno di molto aiutati nel coordinare i propri prezzi al 
fine di evitare la concorrenza. 
L'effetto netto risultante da queste forze opposte costituisce un ar-
gomento da indagare empiricamente. Non sono ancora state condotte 
rigorose ricerche empiriche circa gli effetti d'una legislazione anti-discri-
minazione suI comportamento dei prezzi. Si nota comunque, fra colora 
che seguono il problema con attenzione, una virtu ale unanimita di 
opinioni, basata suH'osservazione e sull'analisi a priori, suI fatto ehe 
I'effetto di proibire la discriminazione del prezzo consiste nell'aumenta-
re i1 liveno medio dei prezzi di vendita nei settori oligopolistici. Negli 
Stati Uniti I'influenza del Robinson-Patman Aet ncUo scoraggiare la 
eoncorrcnza di prezzo nci scttori oligopolistici e stata partieolarmcnte 
evidente. Corwin Edwards (\ 959, pp. 630-1), neUa sua indagine sugJi 
effetti del Robinson Patman Act e giunto aUe segucnti conc1usioni: 
"E' probabile che nei settori oligopolistici I'aver vietato concessioni disc rim ina-
torie abbia ridotto il principale tipo di concorrenza di prezzo che ancora esisteva 
in condizioni di produzione e di vendita concentrata. E' probabile che in un 
settore che ha raggiunto una intesa mediante accordo diretto ... I'eliminazione degli 
sconti di prezzo non·sistematici abbia rimosso la principale debolezza dell'intesa". 
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Questa opmlOne e stata ribadita dal Ministero della Giustizia degli 
Stati Uniti nella sua relazione sui Robinson Patman Act (US Depar-
tment of Justice, 1977). 
Nella sua analisi dell'Australian Trade Disputes Act (1974), iI comi-
tato nominato dal governo ha concIuso che I'effetto principale della 
proibizione della discriminazione del prezzo non concorrenziale e stato 
un aumento generale nei prezzi medi (Trade Practices Act Review 
Committee, 1976). Questa conc1usione e stata sostenuta in un'indagine 
empirica che ha scoperto come moite imprese industriali abbiano fatto 
uso delle cIausole contro la discriminazione del prezzo contenute nel 
decreto per eliminare 0 per ridurre 'i lora livelli di sconto in modo di 
elevare i prezzi medi verso i prezzi di listino (Norman, 1976). 
Le pressioni responsabili dell'attivazione della concorrenza di prezzo 
tra fornitori oligopolistici che cercano di instaurare rapporti d'affari 
con acquirenti di grandi dimensioni possono riversarsi in altri settori 
del mercato, e causare una diminuzione generale dei prezzi. 1\ processo 
e stato spiegato da un testimone del Domestic Council Review Group 
on Regulation Reform americana (cfr. Ministero di Giustizia degli Stati 
Uniti, 1977, p. 157): 
"Quando un venditore desideroso di conc1udere affari decide di fare 
una concessione di prezzo, a chi la accord era? Quasi inevitabilmente 
ad un cIiente che ritiri ingenti quantitativi. Questa operazione garanti-
sce un'elevata convenienza economica e quindi e probabile che il primo 
beneficiario di una rottura dei prezzi praticati in precedenza nel settore 
sia I'acquirente di grandi dimensioni. Supponiamo che il venditore n. I 
si sia assicurato un ottimo cliente cio significa che qualcuno ha perso 
un buon cIiente, ed in questo senso ora dispone di capacita in eccesso 
e deve cercarsi un aitro acquirente. Vengono cos! moitiplicate Ie pres-
sioni per un'altra concessione di prezzo. 
Infatti, nella misura in cui percepisce di aver perso questo buon 
cliente, iI secondo venditore e motivato, per ragioni varie a rispondere 
a110 stesso modo, e forse ad insediare un c1iente di grandi dimensioni 
del primo venditore. Ed iI processo viene tipicamente generalizzato 
fino a quando questi prezzi off-list si diffondono nella maggior parte 
delle categorie al dettaglio. E' possibile che da ultimo iI settore razio-
nalizzi iI processo di determinazione del prezzo con la creazione di 
nuovi prezzi di listino che ritlettano il Iivello dei prezzi divenuto pili 
basso e pili vicino al costo reale". 
La tendenza verso la concessione di sconti a c1ienti selezionati al 
fine di espandersi all'interno di una situazione generale di concorrenza 
di prezzo e stata dimostrata dal1a concorrenza di prezzo attuata nel 
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mercato britannico della benzina tra iI 1975 e il 1977. Le notevoli 
riduzioni concesse ai dettaglianti di grandi dimensioni (come Asda) e 
l'introduzione di sconti selettivi per dettaglianti particolari in determi-
nate zone da parte delle maggiori compagnie petrolifere hanno condot-
to ad una concorrenza di prezzo a livello generale, culminato nel ribas-
so di prezzo del listino all'ingrosso della Shell nel luglio 1977 (Mono-
polies Commission 1979). Comunque e iI prezzo finale del prodotto al 
consumatore e non il prezzo nei mercati intermedi quello rilevante per 
il benessere economico. Assumendo che la misura degli sconti e delle 
concessioni di prezzo agli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni sia sufficiente 
per ridurre iI prezzo medio pagato ai fornitori al di sotto di quello che 
deriverebbe da una politica di prezzo uniforme, ne deriverebbe forse 
un prezzo di vend ita al consumatore pill basso? Se iI settore al detta-
glio e concorrenziale ese, in particolare, c'e concorrenza tra i detta-
glianti che si procurano i prezzi i pili favorevoli, allora gli sconti e Ie 
concessioni di prezzo agli acquirenti di grandi dimensioni saranno tra-
smessi ai consumatori, e questi minori prezzi al dettaglio fisseranno 
anche i prezzi di vend ita per i piccoli dcttaglianti. Se, d'altra parte, il 
settore al dettaglio non e concorrenziale, allora i prezzi pill bassi pagati 
dai grandi dettaglianti non devono essere trasmessi in avanti e, nel caso 
di una politica di prezzo collusiva fra i dettaglianti, i prezzi al dettaglio 
verranno probabilmente fissati come un margine di ricarico sui prezzi 
d'acquisto pill alti. 
La struttura del commercio al dettaglio di molti beni viene general-
mente considerata concorrenziale: la concentrazionc dei vcnditori e Ie 
barriere all'entrata sono normalmente basse in confronto ai settori in-
dustriali (benche nei mercati locali la concentrazione dei venditori pos-
sa essere abbastanza alta). Le pill importanti limitazioni ad un compor-
tamento competitivo nel scttore al dcttaglio sono probabilmente: a) la 
determinazione del prczzo al dettagiio in base a margini di ricarico 
consuetudinari per il commercio e, b) I'adesione dei dettaglianti ai 
prezzi al dettaglio consigliati dai produttori. In entrambi questi due 
casi Ie differenze nei prezzi d'acquisto tra i dettaglianti avranno come 
conseguenza probabile una poJitica di prezzo dei dettaglianti pill indi-
pendente e quindi pill concorrenziale. Le differenze fra i prezzi di 
acquisto fra i dettaglianti in concorrenza rendono impossibile I'adesio-
ne a prezzi al dettaglio basati sull'applicazione di un margine di ricari-
co percentuale uniforme, mentre i prezzi pill bassi caricati a certi detta-
glianti di grandi dimensioni Ii spingeranno a ridurre i prezzi al di sotto 
di quelli consigliati dai fornitori allo scopo di aumentare iI proprio 
volume di vendita (in parte allo scopo di ot tenere vantaggi supplemen-
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tari nelle condizioni d'acquisto). 
L'evidenza empirica circa la misura in cui la concessione di prezzi 
pill bassi ai dettaglianti di grandi dimensioni viene riflessa nei prezzi al 
dettaglio e limitata. L'indagine di Ward sui settore distributivo nel Re-
gno Un ito (Ward, 1973) ha fornito alcune prove circa la relazione fra 
gli sconti concessi ai dettaglianti e i margini distributivi sui fin ire degli 
anni '60 per sei gruppi di prodotti: tabacco, pasticceria, elettrodomesti-
ci, ferramenta, tappeti e prodotti farmaceutici. In tutti i gruppi di 
prodotti gli sconti e Ie concessioni di prezzo ai dettaglianti di grandi 
dimensioni sono aumentati durante it periodo; soitanto nel caso degli 
elettrodomestici e del tabacco e risultato evidente come essi venissero 
pienamente riflessi in bassi prezzi al dettagIio. Per gli altri prodotti, la 
mancanza di forte concorrenza sui prezzo al dettaglio pub riflettere 
una mancanza di sensibilita al prezzo al consumo di questi beni. Quan-
do i consumatori sono molto sensibili al prezzo, come nel caso dcgli 
alimentari, la concorrenza sui prezzo al dettaglio tendeni ad essere 
aspra, benche sia degno di nota come nel commercio di genere di 
drogheria nel Regno Unito Ie catene di dettaglianti abbiano guadagnato 
in media margini lordi e profitti netti pill alti dei dettaglianti indipen-
denti (Development Analysis Ltd. 1977). 
Gli effetti della discriminazione del prezzo sull'efficienza del settore 
d'acquisto sono meno ambigui. I prezzi pill bassi praticati agli acqui-
renti di grandi dimensioni piuttosto che a quelli piccoli consentono aile 
grandi imprese di prendere it posto delle piccole (per mezzo della 
concorrenza sui prezzo 0 di attrazione di risorse delle piccole verso Ie 
grandi imprese prescindendo dall'efficienza relativa delle diverse dimen-
sioni aziendali). La perdita di benessere derivante dalla distorsione nella 
distribuzione dimensionale delle imprese nel settore acquirente e pari al 
costo della maggiore quantita di risorse utilizzate nel settore d'acquisto 
per fornire 10 stesso output. La perdita massima di benessere si verifi-
cherebbe qualora it differenziale di prezzo consentisse ad una dimensio-
ne aziendale inefficiente di controbilanciare il proprio svantaggio di 
costo nei confronti della dimensione pill efficiente. Questo sarebbe pari 
alia dimensione del differenziale di prezzo per unita di input moltipli-
cata per it numero totale di inputs acquistati dal settore. La perdita 
minima di benessere sarebbe zero e si verificherebbe: 
a. qualora Ie differenze di prezzo tra imprese corrispondessero a diffe-
renze di efficienza tra imprese di diverse dimensioni; 
b. qualora Ie differenze di prezzo fossero insufficienti a controbitancia-
re Ie differenze di efficienza relative a dimensioni aziendali; 
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c. qualora l'efficienza in termini di costo non mutasse con la dimensio-
ne aziendale. 
E' difficile valutare la misura in cui la discriminazione del prezzo in 
favore dei dettaglianti di grandi dimensioni ha avuto come risuItato 
una distribuzione dimensionale inefficiente fra Ie imprese al dettaglio 
nel Regno Unito. Sembra probabiJe che gli sconti a favore dei detta-
glianti di grandi dimensioni abbiano costituito un fattore significativo 
nel sostenere l'espansione della quota di mercato nel commercio al 
dettaglio relativa alle catene di negozi. Lo UK Committee of inquiry 
on Small Firms (1971, p. 292) ha notato: 
"Esistono delle economie di scala nel commercio al dettaglio, rna 
sono relativamente piccole; di per se stesse non possono essere respon-
sabili della crescita delle grandi catene di supermercati che ha costitui-
to 10 sviIuppo piu dram matico nel commercio al dettaglio a part ire 
dalla guerra. Secondo i1 nostro punto di vista, la causa principale del 
successo delle cat ene, anche per la relativa scarsa diffusione dei super-
mercati indipendenti, e la capacitci delle catene di ottenere condizioni 
molto vantaggiose dai produttori di alimentari e da altri fornitori ... II 
fatto e che i vantaggi concessi alle catene da questo livello di discrimi-
nazione del prezzo non possono essere superati con aumenti di effi-
cienza da parte degli indipendenti". 
La maggior parte delle indagini condotte nel Regno Unito sulla pro-
duttivita nel settore distributivo non fornisce aIcuna prova concIusiva 
sull'efficienza relativa delle diverse dimensioni aziendali. George (1966) 
ha scoperto che non esistevano differenze nella produttivita del lavoro 
fra Ie catene di dettaglianti e gIi indipendenti della stessa dimensione 
media. Ward (1973) ha scoperto che la performance dei negozi a cate-
na in termini di crescita della produttivita non e stata superiore a 
quella degli indipendenti. Cos! parrebbe che, mentre la discriminazione 
del prezzO ha costituito un importante fattore nell'incoraggiare la cre-
scita delle dimensioni aziendali nel commercio al dettaglio, i suoi effet-
ti sull'efficienza possono venire considerati neutrali. 
Nel caso degli Stati Uniti non sembrerebbe che la legislazione contro 
la discriminazione del prezzo abbia condotto a risultati particolarmente 
positivi nella protezione del dettagl~ant~ piu piccoli: P~ra~onando gli 
Stati Uniti al Canada, dove la leglslaZlone sulla dlscnmmazione del 
prezzo e stata in gran parte inefficace, si nota una proporzione fra 
negozi al dettaglio appartenenti a catene e indipendenti pressapoco 
uguale: 
188 
42 
% dei punti di vendita appartenenti ad imprese con un solo punto di vendita 
U,a (1967) Canada (1966) 
Commercio al 
dettaglio in complesso 87,S 87,4 
Drogilerie 84,6 81,2 
Drug stores 83,S 81,7 
(Ministero della Giustizia degli Stati Uniti, 1977, p. 187) 
Condizioni favorevoli per gIi acquirenti di grandi dimensioni possono 
non solo causare l'espansione delle irnprese al dcttaglio che sono al di 
sopra della dimensione efficiente ottimale, rna questo incoraggiamento 
alia crescita delle dimensioni aziendali ne! commercio al dettaglio pub 
favorire 10 sviluppo di posizioni monopolistiche in questo scttore. Cer-
tamente Ia concentrazione dei venditori e cresciuta fino a livelli mode-
ratamente elevati in alcuni tipi di commercio al dettaglio. E' state 
stimato che, nel Regno Unito, Ie dieci maggiori imprese determinavano 
il 34 per cento del1e vendite al dettaglio di generi di drogheria nel 
1970. Un aumento della concentrazione del dettagIio accrescera la ca-
paeiU dei dettaglianti di grandi dimensioni di ottenere ingenti sconti 
dai lora fornitori, rna, nella misura in cui il potere di mereato dci 
grandi dettaglianti aumenta, si riduce la necessitci di questi di trasferire 
al consumatore i piu ampi sconti ottenuti. Nel Regno Un ito, mentre e 
evidente che I'aumento della concentrazione in molti settori del com-
mercio al dettaglio ha coinciso con una maggiore concorrenza di prez-
zo, la possibiliU che l'aumento del1a concentrazione riduea alia fine la 
concorrenza al dettaglio deve essere considerata un rischio nel lungo 
periodo. 
Per riassumere Ie tesi fin qui esposte: gli effetti della discriminazione 
del prezzo a favore degIi acquirenti di grandi dimensioni sui prezzi 
medi di vendita ai clienti sono incerti. L'osservazione empirica suggeri-
see che tale discriminazione, lasciando libera la concorrenza di prezzo 
nei mercati oligopolistici, probabilmente abbasseni il prezzo medio di 
vend ita del settore fornitore e, qualora la distribuzione a1 dettaglio sia 
competitiva, cib condurra a minori prezzi al consumo. Allo stesso tem-
po i prezzi d'acquisto differenziati condurranno probabilmente ad una 
distorsione della dimensione aziendale del settore acquirente che po-
trebbe accrescere i costi del1a distribuzione. In ogni trasferirnento da 
un aumento dell'efficienza allocativa nel settore fornitore ad un au-
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mento dei costi nel settore acquirente, e probabile che la perdita di 
benessere causata da quest'ultimo fenomeno, prevarra sull'aumento di 
benessere derivante dal primo. Williamson (1968) dimostra che i gua-
dagni di benessere che derivano da un aumento dcll'efficienza nell'allo-
cazione delle risorse conseguente ad una riduzione del livello dei prezzi 
monopolistici vengono piu che compensati da aumenti anche minimi 
nei costi delle risorse. Comunque questa conclusione non considcra 
altri fattori che modificano l'efficienza nei settori venditori ed acqui-
renti. L'aumento nella concorrenza sui prezzo favorito dalla concorren-
za sui prezzo nel settore venditore, sara probabilmente accompagnato 
da risparmi nei costi delle risorse utilizzate causati da una riduzione 
nell'efficienza "x". Crew & Rowley (1970) hanno dimostrato che Ie 
riduzioni nell'efficienza "x" costituiscono probabilmente un guadagno 
di benessere quantitativamente importante che deriva dalla maggiore 
concorrenza. Allo stesso tempo, prezzi differenziati nel settore distribu-
tivo incoraggeranno probabilmente una politica di prezzo indipendente 
e, quindi, piu concorrenzialc a livello di dettaglio. Essa pub anche 
condurre a riduzioni dell'inefficienza. 
8. Conclusioni ed implicazioni politiche 
Gli effetti sui benessere economico della discriminazione del prezzo 
tra acquirenti di dimensioni diverse sono complessi. L'effetto netto 
della discriminazione del prezzo rispetto la politica di uniform pricing 
sui benessere economico, dipendeni dalla struttura e dal comportamen-
to competitivo dei settori fornitori ed acquirenti e in particolare dalle 
seguenti circostanze: 
1. se la tendenza all'aumento dei prezzi verso i piccoli acquirenti, favo-
rita dalla discriminazione dei prezzi, sia piu che compensata dall'atti-
vazione della concorrenza di prezzo tra i fornitori oligopolisti stimo-
lata anch'essa dalla discriminazione dei prezzi; 
2. se il settore distributivo per i prodotti in questione e concorrenziale 
e, quindi, se i prezzi favorevoli per acquirenti di grandi dimensioni 
incideranno sui prezzi al dettaglio; 
3. se I'incentivazione alia formazione competitiva dei prezzi favorita 
dalla differenziazione del prezzo incoraggia la eliminazione dell'inef-
ficienza nel settore fornitore e/o acquirente; 
4. fino ache punto la discriminazione del prezzo a favore delle imprese 
di grandi dimensioni favorisce la crescita delle dimensioni aziendali 
nel settore acquirente al di sopra del IOTO livello ottimale. 
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Questi fattori spingono in direzioni contrarie, e l'analisi economica 
non fornisce alcuna giustificazione per proibire la discriminazione del 
prezzo. Ogni legislazione contro la discriminazione del prezzo, quindi, 
deve essere basata su ulteriori considerazioni quali il desiderio di man-
tenere i piccoli commercianti come categoria 0 il bisogno di proteggere 
Ie piccole attivita al dettaglio allo scopo di conservare vitalita economi-
ca nelle piccole citta 0 nei paesi. L'analisi non sostiene nemmeno Ie 
dispute di molti economisti che hanno asserito che la legislazione con-
tro la discriminazione del prezzo e intrinsecamente anti-competitiva e 
contraria agli interessi dei consumatori. 
L'analisi ora condotta circa I'analisi di prezzi differenziati tra acqui-
renti di grandi e piccole dimensioni suggerisce anche che la legislazione 
contro la discriminazione del prezzo pub costituire il migliore approc-
cio a questo problema, anche quando, in casi particolari si ritiene che 
la discriminazione sia contraria all'interesse pubblico. Come ho mostra-
to, la discriminazione di prezzo a favore di acquirenti di grandi dimen-
sioni pub esistere soltanto nel caso in cui i fornitori possiedano almeno 
un certo potere di mercato. Nei paesi in cui la discriminazione del 
prezzo tra gli acquirenti viene considerata un grave problema, parrebbe 
possibile adottare provved imenti efficaci applicando la legislazione esi-
stente per controllare gli abusi di pot ere del mercato piuttosto che 
introducendo proibizioni speciali contra la discriminazione del prezzo 
o misure per reprimere il "potere d'acquisto". 11 problema della discri-
minazione del prezzo consiste sostanzialmente nel fatto che i settori 
manifatturieri oligopolistici sono in grado di far pagare i prezzi mono-
polistici agli acquirenti di piccole dimensioni, rna sono costretti a far 
pagare prezzi concorrenziali a quelli di grandi dimensioni. Cosi, anche 
se il Iivello globale dei prezzi e dei prafitti di un settore fornitore pub 
non essere eccessivo, e possibile che, in relazione ai piccoli acquirenti, i 
prezzi ed i profitti guadagnati dai set tori fornitori oligopolistici siano 
tali da giustificare una azione correttiva da parte delle autorita prepo-
ste al controllo della concorrenza. 
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The Influence of Large Buyers on Price and 
Public Policy towards Price Discrimination 
Competition law and price discrimination 
Price discrimination has traditionally been viewed, both by economists and by com-
petition law, as an aspect of monopoly behaviour. The economic analysis of dis-
criminating monopoly shows that price discrimination will increase the monopo-
list's profits above that which could be earned under uniform pricing, while the 
effect of price discrimination upon the monopolist's output is ambiguous. 1 Under 
the competition laws of most European countries individual cases of price dlscri-
mination which involve the exploitation or extension of market power by a domi-
ant firm can be dealt with under anti-monopoly legislation. The Fair Trading Act 
of the United Kingdom, the 1957 Act Against Restraints of Competition of West 
Germany and Article ~6 of the Treaty of Rome allow the relevant authorities to 
prohibit price discrimination where practiced by a market dominating firm.2 
In recent years there has been a growth of interest in price discrimination which 
is not seemingly related to monopoly exploitation but is the result of the abi lity 
of large buyers to negotiate with their suppliers more favourable prices than are 
small buyers. The focus of attention has been the distributive trades where the 
ability of large retailers and distributors to obtain favourable prices, discounts 
and rebates has been regarded, at least by small retailers, as resulting in unfair 
and inefficient competition in the retai I sector. In a number of European coun-
tries legislation has been introduced to outlaw price differences which are 
unrelated to differences in costs of supply or which have anti-competitive effects. 
In Ireland specific orders have been made under the Restrictive Practices Act to 
prohibit price discrimination in groceries (1973), petrol (1961, 1972 and 1975), 
and certain other products. In France the 'Loi Royer' of 1973 introduced harsh 
penalties for price discrimination. In Austria the Federal Law of 29 June 1977 
supplemented the Cartels Act to allow the Cartels Court to prohibit the offer of 
differential terms to retai lers without relevant justification. All these measures 
bear close ressemblences to the 1935 Robinson - Patman Act of the United States. 
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In both lurope and North America legislation to prohibit unfair or uncompetitive 
price discrimination has followed periods of rapid structural change in retai ling 
Involving increases in seller concentration and the replacement of small retail 
establishments by much larger units. The 1930's saw the introduction of super-
markets into North America and the rapid expansion of chain stores, developments 
which occurred in Europe during the 1950s and 60s and continue today. 
In both continents legislation has been strongly backed by small retailers and, 
it would appear, the measures have been concerned more with protecting the 
interests of small retailers than with the pursuit of more active competition or 
improved industrial performance. Indeed the opinion of most economists and informed 
observers has been that the effect of prohibition of price discrimination in North 
America has been to restrict rather than to promote competition. In its review 
of the working of the Robinson-Patman Act, the U.S. Department of Justice con-
cluded that the Act: "promotes high prices, restricted entry, and inefficiency 
in the distribution of goods; and it has encouraged the creation of illegal 
pricing exchanged by competing manufacturers". (US Department of Justice 1977 
p.Z60) • 
Because legislation to prohibit price discrimination has been primari ly politically 
motivated, thorough analysis of the causes, circumstances and effects of price dis-
crimination in favour of powerful buyers has been largely absent from the policy 
debate. This paper briefly analyses the causes of preferential prices to large 
buyers and goes on to examine the welfare implications of this type of price dis-
crimination. In the light of this, some conclusions on the desirability of legis-
lation to prohibit price discrimination are drawn. 
Economic anal sis rice 
The analysis of the structure and behaviour of buyers has received little attention 
in the economics literature. Buyer structure is generally assumed away by treating 
the purchasing side of markets as perfectly competitive. an assumption which is 
reasonable only where a firm sells direct to households. Attempts to introduce 
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buyer structure have been in terms of simple monopsony and oligopsony models which 
have corresponded to elementary models of monopoly and oligopoly. The pure monop-
sonlst wi II use his power over market price to purchase a smaller quantity at a 
lower price than the perfectly competitive buying industry. 
Recently attention has been devoted to the influence of concentrated buyers on 
price. Studies by Brooks (1974) and Lustgarten (1975)3 show that the inclusion of 
buyer concentration ratios into regression equations relating industry profitability 
to market structure improves the explanatory value of the equations, buyer concen-
tration itself having a negative effect on the profitability of the supplying 
industry. Explanations for this abil ity of buyers to lower the price of a good 
below that paid by a competitive buying industry rest on the assumption that con-
centrated buyers, like concentrated sellers, coordinate their purchasing behaviour 
in order to exert monopsony power over price. "Oligopsony, analagous to oligopoly, 
would make buyers consciours of the potential impact of their own bids to purchase 
on the bids of other buyers. This interdependency might be expected to produce 
some collusion among buyers," (Lustgarten 1975, p.126). 
The ··collusive oligopsony" thesis is implausible for two reasons: 
(a) since the prices for most manufactured goods are set by sellers, 
the ability of buyers to recognise their interdependence is 
limited4, only in markets where buyers are engaged in compe-
titive bidding wi II their interdependence be recognisable and 
. d" f . b I 5 their coor Inatlon easl e 
(b) in most markets levels of buyer concentration are low and 
below the corresponding levels of seller concentration; buyer 
concentration is low in nearly all of the retai I trades in 
. 6 European countries. 
Moreover, the collusive oligopsony thesis predicts that buyer power will result in 
a lower market price for the product, but the principal factor which distinguishes 
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:! ." i nflue nce o f buyers on pr i ce is t ha t prices concessions are gained by indivi-
dua I buye rs. 
herefore to examine price differences between buyers it is necessary to analyse 
the influence of the individual buyer on the price of his own purchases and the 
behaviour of suppl iers in pricing to individual customers. "Buyer power 'l - the 
abi lity of large buyers to force price concessions from suppl iers - is therefore 
founded not on conventional market power but on bargaining power vis-a-vis individual 
sellers. It is frequently suggested that the basis of the superior bargaining power 
of large buyers lies in the costs which they can impose upon a supplier by the 
withdrawing of a substantial proportion of his business. Thus if the suppl ier 
is operating at or below optimal capacity the threat of a loss of large volume 
may be sufficient to induce him to negotiate a price which covers marginal but 
not average costs. But this analysis does not predict but only assumes discrimi-
nation by the supplier between large and small buyers. Threatened with a with-
drawal of custom and faced with excess capacity it would be profi table for a 
supplier to offer any customer, large or small, a price which covered marginal 
costs. The important question is why suppl iers are wi I ling to treat large but not 
small buyers as marginal customers? 
It is possible, however, to dispense with the notion of buying power and explain 
price discrimination between large and smally buyers in terms of the pricing 
behaviour of sellers. Price discrimination requires that sellers possess some 
measure of market power, at the same time large buyers can obtain price concessions 
even when they do not possess market power - thus price discrimination between 
buyers can be viewed as an aspect of oligopoly behaviour. It is suggested here 
that aifferential prices between large and small buyers reflect two factors: 
first differences in the level of entry barriers in supplying large and small 
buyers, second the greater difficulty of maintaining oligopolistic price coordina-
tion in the face of large buyers . 
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fhe level of barriers to entry in supplying large and small buyers 
It is assumed that oligopolists typically behave in a cooperative manner and aim 
at I limit pricing' - charging the highest price consistent with keeping new entrants 
out of the market. If entry barriers into the industry vary in height according to 
the size of customer which the entrant supplies, then limit pricing implies that 
established firms wil I discriminate between different sizes of customer. Several 
reasons may be given why barriers to entry, will be lower for new entrants seeking 
to supply large buyers than those seeking to supply small buyers: 
I. Lower unit costs of sel ling and distribution in supplying large customers. 
Costs of marketing and distribution fall sharply when sales are increasing 
from an initially low level, the fall is more moderate for high levels of 
sales. Thus entrants to the market which can initially only expect a small 
proportiun of each customer1s purchases wi II face a bigger cost disadvantage 
vis-a-vis established suppliers in supplying small buyers than in supplying 
large buyers. The result is that established suppl iers can earn a higher 
margin on sales to small buyers than to large without attracting the entry 
of smaller suppliers. 
L. A higher elasticity of demand from large than from small buyers. 
The tendency for differences in costs of selling and distribution to lead to 
a higher I imit price in the supply of smal I, as opposed to large, buyers wi 11 
be reinforced if the demand of the smaller buyers is less elastic than that 
of large buyers. In the retai I trade, for example, the survival of small 
retai lers has been partly due to their ability to differentiate their services -
e.g. by flexible openin~ hours, supplying speciality goods, offering local supply 
to small communities. Because of this differentiation and the tendency for small 
retai lers to be used for low value purchases, the elasticity of demand facing 
the smal I retai ler is probably lower than that facing the large retailer. As 
a result the drived demand of small retailers from the manufacturer will be less 
elastic than that of large retai lers. 
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j. The ability of large firms in the distributive trades to undertake the 
marketing of consumer goods. 
In consumer goods industries a major barrier to new entry is the handicap of 
an unknown brand in markets dominated by differentiated established products. 
To establish his product on the market the newcomer must either spend dispro-
portionately heavily on advertising and promotion, or offer his product at a 
substantial price discount. It is possible, however, for the large wholesale 
or retail distributor to eliminate the entry barriers arising from product 
differentiation by established producers by supplying the products of new 
entrants under the distributor's own brand. The increase in concentration in 
many retail trades which has encouraged the introduction of retai lers' private 
brands has involved a transfer of the marketing function from manufacturer to 
distributor and has struck at the very heart of the market power of oligopoly 
suppliers of branded consumer goods. 
4. Encouragement by large buyers of new entry. 
Even if new entrants do not suffer any major cost disadvantages in competing 
with established manufacturers, a firm seeking to enter a market and win market 
share from established firms must view his investment as a risky venture. This 
is particularly so in oligopoly industries where the competitive reactions of 
established firms to a new supplier are uncertain. Large buyers can exercise 
an important role in reducing risk by guaranteeing the potential entrant some 
level of business. A notable example was the encouragement given by Pet-foods 
Ltd to Reads Ltd to enter the UK open-top metal can market in competition with 
Metal Box (Monopolies Commission 1970, paragraphs 88 and 141). 
~. The opportunities for backward integration by large buyers. 
In the last resort barriers to entry are ineffective in protecting the sales 
to large buyers because of the ability of large buyers to integrate backwards 
into the supplying industry. The market for metal cans provides an interesting 
example. The favourable terms offered by Metal Box to Its major UK customers 
reflected their ability to manufacturer their own requirements (Monopolies 
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Commission, 1970, paragraphs 247 and 248). The propensity for large food 
processors to integrate backwards into can manufacturer was demonstrated in 
the US between 1950 and 1960 when many food processors began self manufacture 
in response to a withdrawal of their favourable purchase terms which seemed 
likely to infringe the Robinson-Patman Act (Adams 1967, p314). The ability 
of vehicle manufacturers to exert strong bargaining power against monopoly 
and oligopoly component suppliers rests fundamentally on the vehicle manu-
facturers proven ability to manufacture their own components. Thus the market 
power of component suppliers is only effectively utilised in the replacement 
parts trade. The result is a substantial differential between the prices 
charged to vehicle manufacturers and the standard wholesale price to garages 
d · . b 7 and component Istrl utors. 
The difficulty of maintaining collusive prices against large buyers 
The tendency for oligopoly industries to quote preferrential prices to large buyers 
will result not just from profit maximising behaviour by the industry, but also from 
the difficulty of coordinating their prices to large buyers and so maintaining prices 
above their competitive levels.
8 
The difficulty of achieving oligopolistic price coordination in the face of large 
buyers arises principall~ from the heterogeneity of transactions with large buyers. 
Where an industry's product is basically uniform and the methods of marketing and 
distribution the same, then the costs of supplying different customers will be simi lar 
and a single list price with adjustments for the location of the customer and size 
of his order can be quoted to all customers. Such simplicity in pricing greatly 
faci litates price parallelism among oligopolists. Transactions will tend to be 
homogeneous between small customers since the small volume of each customers pur-
chases make individual variations in product, packaging or delivery method costly. 
Large manufacturers on the other hand may require components of non-standard gauges 
and many chain retailers demand special stock carrying and delivery arrangements 
from thei r suppl iers (see Blois 1972). 
This greater heterogenity of the transactions with large buyers means varIations 
in costs and consequently prices changed to large buyers tend to be individually 
negotiated. Price parallel ism, or indeed any form of price coordination between 
oligopoly suppliers is extremely difficult when prices are individually negotiate 
\~ith customers sincer effective coordination requires that individual suppliers 
conduct their negotiations at the same moments of time and they maintain communi-
cation with one another to ensure consistency of terms. 
Cost differences between suppliers. 
The maintenance of any price parallelism between oligopolists requires some measu' 
of agreement as to the optimal price for the industry. Agreement requires a simi· 
larity of cost conditions between suppliers. However, even if the different 
suppliers have similar costs, when negotiating special terms with large customers, 
it is likely that individual firms wi I I have quite different perceptions of the 
costs involved in supplying individual customers depending upon firms' convention~ 
regarding the treatment of overheads and their estimates of cost/volume relation-
ships. Thus while suppliers may be able to agree on the standard price for their 
product of some form of cost-plus pricing, such consensus is less likely in indi-
vidual quotations to large buyers. 
The tenaency for competition to break out between suppliers in seeking the busines 
of large customers wil I be encouraged by the behaviour of buyers in seeking price 
quotations from suppliers and keeping informed as to the cost conditions and com-
petitive factors affecting individual suppliers. Such information has a fixed 
cost and its acquisition may be uneconomic for the small buyers. This ability 
to seek out bargains was an important explanation of A and P's ability to purchase 
at lower costs than its competitors and was one of the major cost savings in its 
switch from I'ocal to central buying (Adelman 1953 p.440). This tendency of the 
large buyer to seek out and take advantage of any low prices avai lable in the 
market is on economy of large scale buying and has nothing to do with power in 
the market. 
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The size of discounts to large buyers 
The level of discounts, rebates and other price concessions in excess of savings 
In supply costs is likely to be influenced inter alia by: 
I. the level of concentration in the supplying industry. 
The abi lity of large buyers to obtain a preferential price depends upon prices 
to small buyers being above their competitive level so that some margin for 
negotiation is avai lable. The opportunity for a substantial price differential 
to emerge between large and small buyers will tend to increase as the price of 
the product increases above its competitive level with increased concentration. 
At the same time increased concentration wi II tend to increase the collusive 
abi lity of oligopoly suppliers not only against small buyers but, at high 
levels of concentration, against large buyers too. Therefore we might expect 
the price differential between large and small buyers to vary with seller 
concentration in the form of an inverted U. At low levels of concentration 
large buyers are unable to gain any advantage because prices are at their 
competitive levels in anyway (thus chain stores do not have great advantages 
over independent shops in the purchase of competitively supplied fresh produce 
such as fruit, vegetables and meat). At very high levels of concentration 
price differentials again close as oligopoly collusion and monopoly power 
become effective against all buyers. In the UK and the USA discounts to large 
retai lers are particularly high in oligopolistic food processing industries: 
fluid mi lk, ice cream and cookery products in the USA (see FTC 1966) and bread, 
frozen foods and ice cream in the UK (Monopol ies Commission 1976a, 1976). In some 
particularly concentrated UK industries however such as plasterboard and fletton 
brick manufacture (IOO~ monopolies) and pet food, household detergents and 
breakfast cereals (highly product differentiated duopolies) the price concessions 
to large customers were noticeably absent (Honopolies Commission 1968, 1970, 
1977) . 
2. excess capacity in the supplying industry. The tendency for competition to 
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break out between oligopolists in seeking the business of large customers 
will be influenced by the degree of excess capacity in the industry. Where 
variable costs are below average total costs - and the difference may be 
considerable in industries with high fixed costs - then suppl iers may be 
willing to gain additional business or hold on to existing large customers 
at prices that only cover the variable costs of supply. In the UK bread 
industry, the exit of Spillers from the market in 1978, which had the effect 
of reducing excess capacity as well as reducing the number of major suppliers 
from three to two, was followed by a siqnificant reduction of discounts to 
larqe supermarkets. 
The welfare consequences of price discrimination between buyers 
The above analysis predicts that price discrimination will be a general feature of 
markets where an oligopoly industry suppl ies an industry where firm size varies, 
whether or not the buying firms possess monopsony power. In consumer goods industrie 
this discrimination occurs most commonly through the maintenance of parallel list 
prices by suppliers with the offer of discounts and rebates to large buyers which 
are unrelated to or exceed the costs savings in supplying these buyers. Favourable 
terms to large buyers also take the form of promotional allowances, extended credit, 
the provision of special services (such as merchandising) or some other benefit not 
directly linked to price. 
To examine the welfare implications of this type of price discrimination between 
buyers of different sizes we compare a situation of oligopolistic competition where 
price discrimination is allowed but price fixing agreements are illegal with a 
situation where price discrimination is i I legal (e.g. by some kind of Robinson-
Patman-type legi'slation). Two effects are likely to be of particular importance: 
(a) the effect of price discrimination on the level of price of the supplying 
industry and, ultimately, on the level of price to the final consumer. 
If price discrimination between buyers of different sizes raises the 
average level of price above that which would occur under uniform pricing, 
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then the welfare loss arising from a sub-optimal allocation of resources 
to the industry will occur. 
(b) the effect of price discrimination in distorting competition in the buying 
industry with the result that firms in the buying industry are encouraged 
to grow beyond their most efficient scale and concentration is increased. 
If oligopoly supplying industries adopt limit pricing strategies then the 
average level of prices under price discrimination desired by suppliers wi II 
be above the average level under uniform pricing. If oligopoly suppliers wish 
to forestall entry yet are constrained to charge a single price to all buyers 
than the price level will be set by the lowest entry barriers in any sub-sector 
of the market. If entry barriers are lower to large than to small suppliers 
then by preventing price discrimination prices to small buyers wi II be reduced 
to those which are received by large buyers. 
However, this prediction ignores the second factor which causes price discrimi-
nation in favour of large buyers: the breakdown of oligopolistic collusion in 
the face of large buyers. This factor operates in the opposite direction: if 
price discrimination is prevented then oligopolists are greatly assisted in 
co-ordinating their prices so as to avoid competition. The result will be that 
prices to large buyers wi II tend to be raised towards the collusive prices 
charged to small buyers. 
The net effect of these opposing forces is a matter for empirical investigation. 
There is an absence of rigorous empirical research into the effects of anti-
discrimination legislation on pricing behaviour. However, based on observation 
and a priori analysis, there is virtual unanimity in the opinions of informed 
observers that the effect of banning price discrimination is to raise to average 
level of selling prices in oligopolistic industries. In the United States the 
influence of the Robinson-Patman Act in discouraging price rivalry in oligo-
polistic industries has been particularly evident. Corwin Edwards (1959 pp630-1) 
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concluded in his study of the effects of the Robinson.Patman Act: 
lilt is probable that in oligopolistic industries 
the outlawing of discriminatory concessIons has 
reduced the principle kind of price competition 
that still existed under conditions of concentrated 
production and sale. It is probable that in an 
industry that has achieved conspirary by direct 
agreement ••••• the elimination of unsystematic 
price cuts has removed the principle weakness 
of the conspiracy." 
This view as amplified by the US Department of Justice in its Report on the 
Robinson Patman Act (US Department of Justice 1977). 
In its review of the Australian Trade Disputes Act (1974), the government appointed 
committee found that the principle effect of the section prohibiting uncompetitive 
price discrimination was to generally increase average prices (Trade Practices Act 
Review Committee 1~76). This conclusion was borne out in an empirical study which 
found that many manufacturing enterprises had used the anti-price discrimination 
clauses of the Act to either eliminate or to reduce their levels of discount so 
as to move average prices towards list prices (Norman 1976). 
The pressures which are responsible for the outbreak of price competition between 
oligopoly suppliers in seeking the business of large buyers may spillover into 
other sectors of the market resulting in a general lowering of prices. The process 
was explained by a witness to the U.S. Domestic Counci I Review Group on Regulatory 
Reform (see U.S. Dept. of Justice 1977, p.IS7): 
"When a seller hungry for business decides to make a price concession, 
to whom will he make a concession? Almost inevitably to effect the 
large sale. There is more payoff in it, and therefore it is more 
likely than not that the first beneficiary of a break from the pre-
vai ling prices in such an industry wi II be to a large buyer. 
Assuming that Seller No. I has gained a large buyer, someone has 
lost a good customer, and in that sense now has excess capacity 
and has to go looking for some other buyer. So, the pressures are 
magnified for another price concession. 
Indeed, to the extent he finds out how he lost this good customer, 
the second seller is motivated for a variety of reasons to respond 
in kind, ana perhaps attack a large customer of the first seller. 
And the process is typically generalized until these off-list prices 
filter down through most of the retail categories. Perhaps ultimately 
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the industry rationalizes its pricing process by printing 
new list prices which reflect the now somewhat lower level 
of prices and more nearly reflecting real cost". 
The tendency for discounting to selected customers to expand into general price 
competition is shown by price competition in the U.K. petrol market between 1975 
and 1~77. Large rebates to large retailers (such as ASDA) and the introduction of 
selective discounts to particular retilers in particular areas by the major oil 
companies, expanded into general price competition which culminated in Shell 
reducing its scheduled wholesale price in July 1977. (Monopolies Commission 
However it is the final price of the product to the consumer and not the price in 
intermediate markets which is relevant to economic welfare. If we accept that the 
size of discounts and price concessions to large buyers is sufficient to reduce 
the average price of the suppliers below that which would occur under uniform 
pricing. would this result in a lower average selling price to the consumer? 'If 
the retai I sector is competitive and if, in particular, competition exists between 
the retailers which secure the most favourable prices, then discounts and price 
concessions to large buyers will be passed on to consumers, and these lower retail 
prices will set the selling prices for small retailers too. If, on the other hand. 
the retai I sector is uncompetitive. then the lower prices received by large retailers 
need not be passed on and, in the event of retailers pricing collusively, retail 
prices are likely to be determined by a mark-up on the higher buying prices. 
The structure of most retail trades is generally regarded as competitive: seller 
concentration and barriers to entry are usually low in relation to manufacturing 
industries (though in local markets seller concentration may be fairly high). The 
most important li~itations on competitive behaviour in the retail sector are likely 
to be (a) retai 1 pricing by reference to retai I margins which are traditional to the 
trade and (b) the adherance by retailers to manufacturers' recommended retail prices. 
In both of these cases differences in buying prices between retai lers are likely to 
result in more independent. and therefore more competitive. pricing by retailers. 
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Differences in buying prices between competing retailers make untenable the adheranci 
to retail prices based on the application of uniform percentage mark-ups, while lowe, 
prices to certain large retailers wi II encourage them to reduce prices below those 
recommended by suppliers in order to increase their volume sales (partly in order 
to obtain further advantages in buying terms). 
Empirical evidence on the extent to which lower prices to large retai lers are reflect 
in retai I prices is limited. Ward's study of the distributive sector in the U.K. 
(Ward 1973) provided some evidence on the relationship between discounts to retai lers 
and distributive margins during the late 1960's for six product groups: tobacco, 
confectionery, domestic electrical appl iances, hardware, carpets and pharmaceuticals. 
In all product groups discounts and price concessions to large retai lers increased 
over the period but only in domestic electrical appl iances and tobacco was there 
clear evidence of these lower prices being fully reflected in low retail prices. 
In the other products lack of strong retai I price competition may reflect a lack 
of consumer price sensitivity for these goods. Where consumers are highly price 
sensitive, as in food, retai I price competition will tend to be strong, although 
even in the UK grocery trade it is notable that chain retai lers earned on average 
higher gross margins and net profits than independent retai lers (Development Analysis 
Ltd 1977). 
Less ambiguous are the effects of price discrimination between buyers on the efficienc 
of the buying industry. Lower prices to large rather than to small buyers enables 
large firms to replace small firms (by price competition or the attraction of resource 
by large from small firms) irrespective of the relative efficiencies of different 
sizes of firm. The welfare loss from the distortion in the size distribution of firms 
in the buying industry equals the cost of the increased quantity of resources employed 
in the buying industry for supplying the same output. The maximum welfare loss would 
occur where the price differential enabled an inefficient size of firm to just offset 
its cost disadvantage relative to the most efficient size of fi rm. This would be 
equal to the size of the price differential per unit of input multiplied by the total 
number of inputs purchased by the industry. The minimum welfare loss would be zero 
and would occur 
(a) where price differences between firms corresponded with efficiency differences 
between firms of differing sizes, 
(b) where price differences were insufficient to offset the relative efficiency 
differences of different sizes of firm, or 
(c) where cost efficiencies were invariant with firm size. 
The extent to which price discrimination in favour of large retailers has resulted 
in an inefficient size distribution of retailing firms in the U.K. is difficult to 
assess. It seems likely that favourable discounts to large retai lers has been a 
significant factor encouraging the expansion in the share of retai I trade accounted 
for by chain stores. The UK Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms (1971, p292) noted: 
"There are economies of scale in retailing, but they are comparatively 
slight; in themselves they cannot account for the growth of the great 
supermarket chains, which has been the most dramatic development in 
retai ling since the war. In our view one of the main reasons for the 
success of the chains, and for the comparative rarity of independent 
supermarkets, is the ability of the chains to exact highly advantageous 
terms from food manufacturers and other suppliers ..••..• The point is that 
the advantages which price discrimination on this scale gives to the multi-
ples cannot be overcome by increased efficiency on the part of the independents". 
Most U.K. studies of productivity in the distributive sector provide no conclusive 
evidence of the relative efficiencies of different sizes of firm. George (1966) 
found that for multiple and independent retai lers of the same average size of shop 
there was no difference in labour productivity. Ward (1973) found that the performanc 
of multiples in terms of productivity growth was not superior to that of independents. 
Thus it would seem that, while price discrimination has been an important factor 
encouraging the growth of firm size in retailing, the efficiency effects have been 
broadly neutral. 
For the United States it would appear that the law against price discrimination has 
not been particularly successful in preserving smaller retailers. Comparing the 
US with Canada, where the price discrimination law has been largely ineffective, 
the numbers of multiple and independent retail shops are in much the same ratios: 
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% of retail establishments operated by 
single establishment retailers. 
USA (1967) Canada (1966) 
All retailing 87.5 87.4 
Groceries 84.6 81.2 
Drug stores 83.5 81.7 
(US Department of Justice 1977 p.18]). 
Not only may favourable terms to large buyers cause the expansion of retail firms 
which are above optimal efficient size, this encouragement to growth of firm size 
in retai ling may encourage the development of monopoly in retai I trades. Certainly 
seller concentration has increased to moderately high levels in some retai I trades. 
It has been estimated that in the United Kingdom ten largest companies accounted 
for 34% of retai I grocery sales in 1970. Increased concentration of the retai I 
wi I I increase the abi lity of large retai lers to obtain large discounts from their 
suppliers, but, to the extent that the market power of large retai lers is increased, 
the necessity for large retailers to pass on larger discounts to the consumer is 
reduced. In the U.K., whi Ie there is evidence that increased concentration in many 
retai I trades has coincided with increased price competition, the possibility that 
increased concentration wi II ultimately reduce retai I competition must remain a 
long term risk. 
To summarise SO far; the effects of price discrimination in favour of large buyers 
on the average sel ling prices to customers is uncertain. Observation suggests that 
such discrimination, by unleashing price comeptition in oligopolistic markets is 
likely to lower the average selling price of the supplying industry and where retail 
distribution is competive, wi II result in lower consumer prices. At the same time 
the differential buying prices are likely to lead to a distortion of the size of 
fjrms in the buying industry which may increase costs of distribution. In any 
trade-off between increased allocative efficiency in the supplying industry and 
increased costs in the buying industry, it is likely that the welfare loss from 
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the latter effect wil I outweigh the welfare gain from the former. Wi Iliamson (1968) 
shows that welfare gains arising from an increase in the efficiency of resource 
allocations from a reduction in the level of monopoly prices are outweighed by 
very small increases in resource costs. However, this conclusion i gnore$ 
other factors affecting efficiency in the selling and the buying industry. The 
increase in price competition which is encouraged by price competition in the sel ling 
industry is likely to be accompanied by savings in resource costs due to a reduction 
in X-inefficiency. Crew & Rowley (1970) have argued that reductions in X-ineffi-
ciency are likely to be a quantitatively important welfare gain arising from 
increased competition. At the same time differential buying prices in the distri-
butive trades is likely to encourage independent and, therefore, more competitive 
pricing at the retai I level which may also result in reductions in inefficiency. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The effects upon economic welfare of price discrimination between buyers of different 
sizes are complex. The net effect upon economic welfare of price discrimination as 
opposed to uniform pricing wi II depend upon the structure and competitive behaviour 
of the supplying and buying industries in particular on: 
(i) whether the tendency for price discrimination to raise prices to small 
buyers wi II be outweighed by the effect of price discrimination in encoura-
ging price competition between oligopoly suppliers. 
(i i) whether the distribution sector for the products in question is competitive 
and, therefore, whether favourable prices to large buyers wi II be reflected 
in retai I prices. 
(i i i) whether the inducement to competitive pricing which price differentation 
provides encourages the elimination of inefficiency in the supplying and/or 
the buying industry. 
(iv) how far price discrimination in favour of large firms encourages the growth 
of firm size in the buying industry above its optimal level. 
These factors operate in opposing directions and economic analysis does not provide 
any case for a general prohibition of price discrimination. Any general legislation 
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against price discrimination must therefore be based on additional considerations 
such as the desire to maintain small traders as a class or the need to protect 
small retai I businesses in order to maintain the economic life of small towns and 
vi llages. Neither does the analysis support the arguments of many economists who 
have claimed that legislation against price discrimination in inherently anti-com-
petitive and contrary to the interests of consumers. 
The above analysis of the causes of differential prices between large and small 
buyers also suggests that legislation against price discrimination may not be the 
best approach to this problem even where the discrimination is believed in parti-
cularcases to be contrary to the public interest. As has been shown, price discri-
mination in favour of large buyers can only exist where suppliers possess some 
meas.Jre of market power. In countries where price discrimination between buyers 
is considered a serious problem it would seem possible that effective action could 
be taken by applying existing legislation to control the abuse of market power 
rather than introduce special prOhibitions of price discrimination or measures to 
curb "buying powerll • The problems of price discrimination is essentially that 
oligopoly manufacturing industries are able to charge monopoly prices to small 
buyers b~are forced to charge competitive prices to large buyers. Thus, even 
though the overal I level of prices and profits of a supplying industry may not be 
excessive, it is possible that, in relation to small buyers, prices and profits 
earned by oligopoly supplying industries are such as to warrant remedial action 
by the competition authorities. 
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FOOTNOTES 
I. For a discussion of the welfare effects of monopolistic price discrimination 
see M. Policies towards Market Power and Price Discrimination in George and 
Joll (1~75) 
2. An interesting case of the application of Article 86 to price discrimination 
is the United Brands case (Common Market Law Reports 1978). 
J. Lustgarten's results were contradicted by those of Guth et al (1976) who used 
a different measure of buyer concentration and a much small number of obser-
vations. 
4. 
!>. 
o. 
7. 
b. 
Bauer and Varney (1952) found that the market prices for Nigerian groundnuts 
rarely exceed the official minimum producer price in areas where only two pur-
chasing companies operated, while in those areas where the number of buyers was 
larger, premiums over the minium price were general. A study by Mead (1966) 
of the auction prices for Douglas for timber found the ratio of auction prices 
to producers
' 
reserve prices to be positively related to the number of buyers. 
Investigations by MacAvoy(1962) and Mead (1967) into the pricing of leases for 
the exploitation of oil and natural gas found that prices fall significantly as 
the number of bidders becomes very small. 
A survey by Atkin and Skinner (1975) of methods of pricing used by 220 UK 
companies found that 55% operated published price lists, 47% had internal price 
I ists, ~3% negotiated prices individually with customers, and 43% priced through 
forma I tender. 
For !>3 US industries Guth et al (1977) found that in only 6 did buyer concentra-
tion exceed seller concentration. 
lxamples of the price differential in certain vehicle components:-
Champion Spark plugs 
Automative Products 
6" clutch. 
Retail price Wholesale price 
25p 
605p 
14-18p 
approx. 450p 
Price to Vehicle 
Manuf ac tu re rs 
less than 22P 
160p 
(initial equipment) 
302p 
(rep lacements) 
(Source Monopolies Commission 1963, Monopolies Commission 1968) 
However it must be noted that a further reason for the price differential is the 
important complementari ly between the initial equipment market and the replacemen 
market. Thus a price may be different even to the same buyer according to 
whether the component is initial equipment or a replacement. 
Stigler's theory of oligopoly (1962) addresses itself to this issue, and shows 
that colluding oligopolists wil I offer secret price cuts to the limit where their 
gains in market shares make their price cutting behaviour evident to fellow 
suppliers. Stigler's analysis predicts that secret price cuts will be offered 
to large rather than to small buyers. However the theory is applicable only to 
oligopolists with a price fixing agreement such that departures from the agreed 
price by individual firms will, if detected, result in disciplinary action by 
the industry. 
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Recent developments in the control of 
price discrimination in countries 
outside North America 
BY R. M. GRANT-
A notable recent feature of the international development of 
competition policy has been renewed interest in the control of 
price discrimination. Legislative measures to prohibit certain 
forms of price discrimination have been introduced in Austria, 
Australia, France, Germany and Ireland. Current concern over 
price discrimination, particularly that arising from retail buying 
power, is also indicated by the U.K. Monopolies Commission 
inquiry into retail discounts and the investigations by the German 
Monopolies Commission and an OECD Working Party into 
buying power. As in other areas of antitrust policy, legislative 
developments in the industrialized countries outside North 
America have lagged by several decades behind those in the 
U.S.A. and Canada. While the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act and 
Canadian price discrimination law (section 498 of the Criminal 
Code) were introduced in the mid-1930's, the price discrimination 
measures of other countries have been features of the 1970's. 
This article examines the experience of the four countries 
which introduced significant measures to control price dis-
Lecturer in Business Economics, City University Business 
School. London. England. 
(i; 1981 by Ftd<ral L ... I PublicalloM, Inc, 
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crimination between 1972 and 1974: Germany, Ireland, France 
and Australia. The measures introduced in the four countries 
differ considerably; the effects and effectiveness of the different 
approaches to price discrimination control are compared. The 
primary objective of this survey is to resolve some of the general 
issues concerning legislation toward price discrimination. Can 
such legislation be effective? Are the anticompetitive conse-
quences of the cure worse than the disease itself? Are laws to 
prevent price discrimination the appropriate policy toward the 
basic problem? The answers to these questions are particularly 
relevant to the future of the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act. One of 
the principal weaknesses of the debate over the Act has been the 
failure to determine whether the problems of price discrimination 
control in the U.S.A. arise from the particular features of the 
Robinson-Patman Act and its interpretation or whether such 
problems are endemic to all attempts to control price discrimina-
tion. 
The background to and objectives of price 
discrimination legislation 
Competition policy, like other aspects of commercial and 
economic policy, will tend to reflect the economic conditions of 
the time. This section examines briefly the extent to which the 
measures to control price discrimination introduced in Western 
Europe and Australia during the 1970's have common objectives, 
reflecting similar economic conditions, and how similar these 
conditions are to those which gave rise to the 1936 Robinson-Pat-
man Act. 
It is generally agreed that the intent of the Robinson-Patman 
Act was not so much the promotion of competition as the 
protection of small business (especially small retailers) from 
unfair competition ari"ing from the superior bargaining power of 
larger rivals. I The priority which Congress attached to this 
I See, for example, U.S. Department of Justice, Report on the 
Robinson-Patman Act, Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 101·113. 
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protective function of the legislation reflected the circumstances 
of the time: the acute depression of the 1930's together with 
particular pressure on small retailers from the rapid expansion of 
chain stores. Although the circumstances in which price dis-
crimination legislation has been introduced into other countries 
were far less severe than those which engendered support for the 
Robinson-Patman Act, one close parallel between the two periods 
was the threat to small independent retailers posed by the expan-
sion of chain retailers. Until the 1950's Western Europe and other 
industrialized countries were comparatively insulated from the 
two major innovations which had induced structural change in 
American retailing: the chain store and the supermarket. The 
superimposition of large scale, technically advanced forms of 
retailing on a traditional retail sector gave a powerful impetus to 
small retailers and, to a lesser extent, manufacturers to seek 
measures to curb the power of the big retailers. The table shows 
the growth of large scale retailing and the decline of independent 
retailers during the period 1962-1971. 
It is notable that the three EEC countries that showed the 
greatest increase in the share of retail trade held by large-scale 
retailers and the greatest decline in the share of independents-
Share of Large-Scale Retailers· in Total Retail Trade 
Change J961-J9:'J 
% % % 
France 19.4 28.7 + 9.3 
Germany 23.4 32.6 + 9.2 
Ireland 12.7 21.7 + 9.0 
Italy 4.8 8.8 + 4.0 
Netherlands 24.2 29.1 + 4.9 
U.K . 45.5 50.3 + 4.8 
• "Large-scale retailers" are defined as mUltiple shop organisations, department 
and variety stores, consumer cooperative and mail order houses. 
SOURCE: National Economic Development Office, The Distributive Trades in 
the Common Market. H.M.S.D. 1973. 
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France, Germany and Ireland-were the three EEC countries 
which introduced measures to control price discrimination during 
the early 1970's. In Italy, on the other hand, where the dominance 
of the independent retailers was unaffected by new developments 
in retailing (due primarily to restrictions on the establishment of 
large retail stores) pressure for control over price discrimination 
has been insignificant. In the U.K. the early introduction of chain 
stores and supermarkets resulted in a slower rate of structural 
change with more effective adaptation of the independent sector 
to the new circumstances. 
Although ministerial statements tend to emphasize the pro-
competitive rather than the protective objectives of proposed 
legislation, it is clear that the price discrimination measures 
introduced by governments have been oriented toward the main-
tenance of the small retailer. The price discrimination law of 
France is of particular note in this respect since, unlike the 
legislation of all other countries, the illegality of price discrimina-
tion is not dependent upon the discrimination causing injury to 
competition. Moreover the French price discrimination law (like 
that of Austria) forms a part of a more general law aimed at 
safeguarding the interests of small businesses. In Ireland empha-
sis was given to the need to maintain retail outlets in less 
populated areas. In Germany and Australia. on the other hand, 
price discrimination controls were introduced as part of more 
general legislation strengthening competition policy. In Australia 
in particular. considerable emphasis is placed on the limitation of 
the price discrimination law to cases where a substantial detri-
ment to competition occurs. Even here. however, it is notable that 
an official review of Australian competition law regarded the 
primary aim of the price discrimination provisions to be "to 
advantage small business. especially small retailers."l 
Thus in Western Europe and Australia, as in the United 
States, provisions against price discrimination occupy a special 
2 Trade Practices Review Committee, Report to the Minister for 
Business and Commercial A//airs. Commonwealth of Australia, Can-
berra. 1976, para. 7.2. 
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place within the body of competition law. While legislation to 
prevent cartels, monopolistic abuses and mergers are unambig-
uously directed toward the stimulation of competition with the 
consumer as the chief beneficiary, price discrimination laws are 
aimed at preventing unfair competition, the intended benefi-
ciaries being primarily small businessmen. 
Problems of applying general antitrust legislation 
to price discrimination 
The need for special measures to deal with the problem of 
price discrimination arises from the inadequacies of general 
antitrust legislation in preventing unfair or uncompetitivc;! price 
discrimination. The antitrust laws of most industrialized coun-
tries outside the U.S.A. focus upon two areas: restrictive business 
agreements and the abuse of dominant market positions. Under 
such legislation competition authorities can prevent price dis-
crimination only where it is practiced by a cartel or a monopoly 
supplier. In Britain and the EEC, for example. dbcriminatory 
pricing by dominant suppliers has auracfed particular attention 
from th'~ con:petition authorities. l This type of price discrimina-
3 In the U.K., dominant firm investigations by the ~1onopolies and 
Mergers Commission have resulted in the condemnation of price 
discrimination in a number of cases, including Rank-Xl!rox (Report on 
the Supply of Indirect Reprographic Equipment, H~1S0. London, 
1976), Birds Eye Froten Foods (Report on the Supply of Fro:en 
Foodstuffs, HMSO, London, 1976), Metal Box (Report on the Supply 
of Metal Containers, HMSO. London. 1970). Discriminatory discount 
terms were also criticized as anticompetitive and undesirable by the 
Price Commission before its disbanding in 1979 (see Report on Cad-
bury-Schweppes Foods Lid., HMSO, London, 1978). Legislative 
powers to control price discrimination by individual firms on a case-by-
case basis have recently been extended in the U.K. by the introduction 
of the Competition Act, 1980, which provides inter alia for the inwsti-
gation and prohibition of anticompetitive practices undertaken by a 
particular firm. In the European Community the principal case estab-
lishing the scope of article 86 against discriminatory pricing hy a 
dominant supplier was the successful prosecuti,'n of United Brands in 
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tion approximates the textbook case of monopoly price dis-
crimination involving either the exploitation of monopoly power 
through taking advantage of different demand elasticities in 
different markets or the extension of monopoly power through 
selectively predatory price cutting. However, it bears little rela-
tionship to the predominant form of price discrimination which 
gave rise to concern in North America during the 1930's and in 
Western Europe during the past two decades: that between large 
and small retailers in the purchase of manufactured foods. Here 
the source of the discrimination is not so much the market power 
of the supplier as the exercise of bargaining power by large 
purchasers. This would imply that legislation against restrictive 
agreements and dominant market positions should be applied not 
to price discrimination by suppliers but against the buying power 
of large purchasers. In practice, however, such approaches are 
not feasible: the share of total purchases in an industry which 
large retailers account for is seldom sufficient to bring them 
within the scope of monopoly policy,' while buying groups tend 
to be formed by small buyers whose aim is only to match the 
bargaining power of large buyers. 
The Australian price discrimination law: a "modified 
Robinson-Patman II 
Of the countries that have introduced general prohibitions on 
price discrimination, that of Australia most closely resembles the 
the Chiquita banana case (see "United Brands Company v. E. C. 
Commission," Common Market Law Reports Vol. XXI. 11 & 18, April 
1978). 
.. In the U.K., monopoly law applies equally to the buyer as to the 
seller side of the market, yet no cases of buyer monopoly have been 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, partly because of 
the tendency for buyer concentration to be low relative to seller 
concentration. Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome covers the abuse of 
dominant market positions in the EEC. Only two cases have been 
brought involving market dominance by buyers: the Gema case (see 
O.J.L. 134 of 20 June 1971) and the Eurofirma case (see 3d Report on 
Competition Policy, May 1974). 
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Robinson-Patman Act of the U.S.A. While section 46 of the 1974 
Trade Practices Act which deals with the abuse of market power 
by market dominating enterprises' could be directed against prke 
discrimination by a monopoly seller or the acquisition of prefer-
ential terms by a market dominating buyer, section 49 (repro-
duced in appendix 1) greatly extends the scope of competition law 
in relation to price discrimination by specifically prohibiting 
anticompetitive discrimination. The main features of section 49 
are: 
Discrimination between purcha~ers in prices, discounts, rebate\. 
credit, payments or the provision of services is prohibited where it 
has "the effect of substantially lessening competition" in the primary 
or secondary markets. 
The prohibition does not apply to discrimination which makes 
reasonable allowance for differences in the co!>t of supply or which 
results from the good faith meeting of competition; the onus of proof 
for these exemptions lying with the defending parry. 
It is illegal to induce, attempt to induce or knowingly receive a 
prohibited discrimination. 
The similarities between section 49 and the U.S. Robinson-
Patman Act both in structure and words are so many that one 
commentator described the section as "a modified Robinson-Pat-
man Act. "6 In applying to purchases of "like grade and quality" 
the section echoes Robinson-Patman, and there are close parallels 
in the exemptions given to cost justified price differentials and 
the "good faith" meeting of competition. The principal dif-
ferences between section 49 and Robinson-Patman arise from the 
attempt by the Australian legislators to avoid some of the 
5 Section 46 states: "A corporation that is in a position substan-
tially to control a market for goods or services shall not take advantage 
of the power in relation to that market that it has by virtue of being in 
that position: (a) to eliminate or substantially damage a competilor 
... , (b) to prevent the entry of a person into that market or into 
another market, or (c) to deter or prevent a person from engaging in 
competitive behaviour in that market or in another market." 
6 Ann R. Everton, Price Discrimination. A Comparative Study in 
Legal Control, MeB Monographs, Bradford, 1976. 
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problems which have been evident in over 40 years of U.S. 
experience with price discrimination law. In particular, there is a 
clear desire of the Australian government to avoid the rigidities 
and anticompetitive effects of Robinson-Patman. Thus, section 
49 contains no absolute prohibitions against any discriminatory 
practices such as those which feature in sections 2(d) and (e) of 
the Robinson-Patman Act and also in France's price discrimina-
tion law (in relation to cash payments and gifts) and in the Irish 
Groceries Order (in relation to credit). 
Section 49 is more orientated toward the promotion of com-
petition than Robinson-Patman. In both section 49 and Robin-
son-Patman the illegality of price discrimination depends upon an 
adverse impact on competition. But while under Robinson-Pat-
man it may be sufficient to show that a single competitor of the 
supplier or purchaser has been injured by the discrimination, 
section 49 requires "the effect of substantial lessening competi-
tion in a market." Furthermore, proscribed price discrimination 
under section 49 covers only discrimination "of. . . magnitude" 
or of a "recurring or systematic character" -the purpose being to 
exclude the unsystematic price dispersion that characterizes com-
petitive pricing and is the usual result of dynamic market forces. 
The priority which section 49 attaches to the promotion of 
competition contrasts sharply with the price discrimination 
measures of the French and Irish governments. 
The desire of the Australian authorities to avoid the confusion 
and differences of interpretation which have arisen in relation to 
Robinson-Patman is indicated by the more careful delimiting in 
section 49 of the type of discriminatory conduct which is prohib-
ited and the scope of the exemptions. Thus it is stated that 
substantial lessening of competition must be in "a market in 
which the corporation supplies" (i.e., the primary market) or the 
purchasers supply (i.e., the secondary market). Similarly the cost 
differences which justify the discrimination are explained to be 
"in the cost or likely cost of manufacture, distribution, sale or 
delivery resulting from the differing places to which, methods by 
which or quantities in which the goods are supplied to the 
purchasers." 
224 
Price discrimination 601 
Yet despite the care taken in the framing of section 49 and the 
emphasis placed upon the promotion of competition, the initial 
results of the introduction of the price discrimination law appear 
to have been confusion among businessmen, hostility from in-
dustry and from economists, and a dampening of price and 
discount competition. Assessment of the effects of price dis-
crimination law is difficult, partly because section 49 has not 
been enforced with any vigor by the Trade Practices Commission. 
In its annual report for 1974-1975 the Commission noted: "The 
price discrimination area is a particular area that the Commission 
has so far left to private action, although none has yet been 
brought." As a result little guidance was offered to industry with 
respect to the uncertainties inherent in the legislation. Among the 
issues requiring interpretation either by the Commission or by the 
courts were: Which costs are relevant? How closely should they 
be related to price differences? How great is a "substantial" 
lessening of competition? What constitutes a "good faith" meet-
ing of competition? 
In the absence of active enforcement either by the Commis-
sion or by private parties, the impact of section 49 has been 
largely through voluntary compliance. For a period of 4 months 
from October I, 1974, when the Act was put into operation, the 
enforcement of the price discrimination provision was delayed to 
allow "a reasonable time for persons ... to become familiar 
with the new limitations on the freedom to discriminate between 
customers" (Attorney-General of Australia, l Murphy QC). 
During this period the pricing practices of much of Australian 
industry appear to have been extensively revised. The Australian 
Industries Development Association (AIDA) found that because 
of uncertainty over the law and fear of a rigid enforcement policy 
by the Trade Practices Commission, many companies abandoned 
all or part of their discount schemes, especially any "loyalty" 
discounts to larger buyers. 7 
7 N. R. Norman, Trade Practices Regulation: An Analysis. Aus-
tralian Industries Development Association, Canberra, 1976. 
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The AIDA survey includes some interesting replies from 
companies 'on the effects of the 1974 Act. The section on price 
discrimination attracted the greatest number of criticisms. The 
general view was that while the competitive position of small 
buyers relative to large was improved, the major impact of 
section 49 was to raise the general level of prices in industry. The 
survey found that suppliers' sales staffs were greatly confused by 
the Act and that the main effect of section 49 was for discounts 
to be reduced to rates that could clearly be justified on cost 
grounds. The result was an increase in average net prices. 
Following widespread criticism of the price discrimination law 
and concern over the operation of other sections of the Trade 
Practices Act, the change of government in 1975 was followed by 
the appointment in 1976 of the Swanson Committee to review the 
working of the Act. In its report the Committee was highly 
critical of the value of section 49 dealing with price discrimina-
tion. It was noted that in oligopolistic markets, selective price 
reductions to particular buyers may be the principal form of price 
competition. Such price cuts may "not only be a trigger to more 
competitive pricing in the particular market segment, but it may 
actually lead to an overall reduction of price levels in that 
market!" The Committee supported its analysis by the suggestion 
that the introduction of section 49 was followed by a general 
increase in average prices. Its conclusion was that "in the Austra-
lian context of the conduct of a large buyer who is endeavouring 
to secure price cutting in his favour, whether it is discriminatory 
or not, may be more procompetitive than anti-competitive. Sec-
tion 49 had substantially reduced price flexibility the detriment of 
which outweighed any benefits to small firms."' The repeal of 
section 49 was recommended. 
The government initially accepted the Swanson Committee's 
recommendation and an amendment bill including the repeal of 
8 Trade Practices Review Committee, Report to the Minister for 
Business and Consumer Affairs. Canberra, 1976, p. 45. 
9 Ibid .• pp. 45-46. 
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section 49 was introduced in December 1976. But following 
support for the retention of section 49 by small business organi-
zations, the repeal of the section was dropped from the bill. 
With the ending of uncertainty over the possible repeal of 
section 49, controversy over the section has diminished and it has 
been possible to identify more clearly the policy of the Trade 
Practices Commission in interpreting and enforcing the price 
discrimination law. The most obvious feature has been the 
absence of any court proceedings by the Commission. The Com-
mission has preferred to operate through investigation, discussion 
and encouraging voluntary compliance. In the case of Pilkington, 
Australia's sole manufacturer of flat glass, a detailed investiga-
tion of complaints over discriminatory terms of supply was 
followed by Pilkington revising its pricing structure with the 
result that the Commission decided not to take proceedings 
against the company. 10 
The most important feature of the Commission's enforcement 
policy has been the strong emphasis given to the condition that 
illegal price discrimination must involve a substantial lessening of 
competition. Thus, despite over 180 complaints concerning al-
leged price discrimination up to mid-1979, many were found 
either not to involve any substantial lessening of competition and 
some "were really complaints about the presence of competi-
tion." II In the supply of petrol, a sector which has been the 
subject of considerable investigation by the Commission, it was 
found that the price discrimination that existed was primarily a 
reflection of active price competition and structural changes in 
the industry. Not only was competition not "substantially less-
ened:' but increased discounting at the wholesale level was 
resulting in lower retail prices. 1z In attempting to identify price 
10 Trade Practices Commission, Fifth Annual Report. Year Ended 
30 June 1979, Canberra, 1979, pp. 129-139. 
II Ibid., p. 116. 
12 Ibid .• pp. 117-129 . 
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discrimination which has anticompetitive effects the Commission 
has suggested that price discrimination likely to contravene sec-
tion 49 is likely to have 
at least some of the following elements: 
a supplier with significant market power whose discrimination is 
substantial, recurring, and affects a large proportion of the trade 
efficient resellers whose opportunity to compete effectively is put at 
risk by the discrimination against them 
the reseUers discriminated against having limited opportunity to look 
elsewhere for supplies on better terms 
big buyers pressirog for discrimination 
alternative suppliers small or weak or facing entry barriers that may 
be erected or reinforced by discrimination foreclosing access to 
leading outlets. I) 
This attempt to limit the application of the law to instances 
where price discrimination has substantial anticompetitive effects 
distinguishes the Australian price discrimination law from that of 
other countries which have introduced general legislation against 
discrimination. In the Australian case there has been no attempt 
to regulate the price and discount structures of industry in 
general. At the same time. the overall impact of the legislation 
will depend mainly not on those few cases where the Commission 
has taken steps to enforce the price discrimination law. but upon 
the extent to which suppliers have voluntarily revised their terms 
of supply to comply with the law. It is possible that the uncom-
petitive and inflationary effects that were discerned when the 
legislation was introduced were the result of an o.verreaction by 
suppliers. Recent investigations. however. by the Trade Practices 
Commission into the grocery trade seem to support the view that 
the price discrimination law has had a general influence. It was 
generally agreed that section 49 had had some effect in limiting 
the power of large buyers and narrowing the dispersion of 
discount rates between large and small buyers. ,. This result was 
confirmed by a survey by the U.K. Food and Drink Industries 
J3 Ibid .• p. 143. 
14 Ibid .• p. 141. 
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Council: the majority of respondents felt that there had been 
some measure of compliance with section 49. I! To the extent that 
the price discrimination law has had a general influence on 
trading terms, it could be argued that it has inevitably had the 
effect of blunting price competition. 
The general legislation prohibiting price discrimination 
-the case of France 
Of the countries that have introduced special legislation to 
prohibit price discrimination the most extensive measures are 
those introduced by the French government. Until recently com-
petition policy received a low priority in France due to the 
preference of the French government for planning backed by 
extensive state intervention as the basis of its economic strategy. 
The rigorous approach to price discrimination contrasts markedly 
with the much weaker policy toward restrictive agreements, 
monopolies and mergers. The reason is that the measures against 
price discrimination were viewed not so much as a weapon of 
competition policy but as a means of protecting small business-
men anJ an integral part of the system of price controls (which 
have only recently been dismantled). The basic price discrimina-
tion law of France is contained in the Loi d'Orientation du 
Commerce et du I' Artisanat (Act Regulating Trade and Crafts) of 
1973-commonly known as the Loi Royer after M. Royer, the 
principal sponsor of the bill." The Act states: 
Section 37 No producer, trader, manufacturer or craftsmen shall 
1. apply discriminatory prices or conditions of sale which are not 
justified by corresponding differences in the price of articles or 
services applied. 
IS Food and Drink Industries Council, Results of FDIC Sunl!Y on 
Legislation 10 Control Discounts and Related Practices, London, Janu-
ary 1979, "Australia," pp. S-6. 
16 Provisions against price discrimination have been in force since 
1945 (article 37-1-a of Statute No. 45-1483 of 30 June 1945). The early 
measures, although strengthened in 1958, appear to have been of limited 
effectiveness. 
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2. circumvent subsection I above by directly or indirectly giving any 
re-seller gifts in kind or in cash or free services. 
A producer must furnish any reseller who so requests with his 
price lists and his conditions of sale. 
Section 38 No re-seller shall seek or knowingly accept from a 
supplier any benefits contravening section 37. 
In addition, section 41 limits the credit which is extended to 
traders for purchases of perishable foodstuffs to 30 days follow-
ing the end of the delivery month. The purpose is to prevent large 
traders from using their buying power to insure that their sup-
pliers finance them. Section 4S allows individuals to initiate civil 
actions for damages by the victims of illegal practices. The most 
noticeable feature of the price discrimination sections is that all 
price differences unrelated to cost are prohibited. This is quite 
different from the laws of the United States, Canada, Australia 
or West Germany where some competitive harm must be c;hown. 
The absence of any reference to competition reflects the fact that 
the principal objective of the law was the protection of small and 
medium sized retailers. A notable aspect of the law is the desire to 
achieve transparency in pricing through the requirement that 
prices and conditions of sale must be made available to any 
reseller. Circumvention of the published terms is prevented by the 
prohibition of gifts and cash payments to reseUers and by comrol 
of credit terms under section 41. 
It is interesting to compare the simplicity and clarity of the 
French antidiscrimination law with the complexity of other coun-
tries' legislation (particularly the antidiscriminatic;m provisions in 
the Irish Groceries Orders). Because the French law makes no 
concessions to the need for flexibility of trading terms and takes 
no account of the restriction of price competition which such 
inflexibility might cause, the definition of illegal price discrimina-
tion is greatly facilitated. 
To explain the price discrimination law in greater detail, the 
Circular of 10 January 1979 Concerning Commercial Relations 
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between Enterprises (the "Circulaire Scrivener") was issued. I 7 
Such circulars do not have any legal force and in principII: are 
only administrative guidelines. However, since they represent the 
government's interpretation of the law and its intentions for 
implementation. they are very influential upon business. The 
circular explains the purpose of the antidiscrimination sections 
and carefully defines the terms "discrimination," "supplier," 
"justified by a corresponding difference in the cost of supply," 
and other terms included in the Act. The circular goes into 
considerable detail over the trading practices which may con-
travene the price discrimination sections and how they should be 
altered in order to insure compliance. Thus, the circular notes 
that discriminatory prices and conditions may involve not only 
discounts and rebates but delivery conditions, credit term'), and 
payments for services not actually rendered by the purchaser. In 
the case of price differentials between the goods which a manu-
facturer supplies under his own brand and goods which the 
manufacturer supplies under his customers' house brands, these 
differentials must be justified. e.g., by reference to savings In 
production and marketing costs. 
It is diffkult to assess the effectiveness of the price dis-
crimination provisions of the Loi Royer. Thl! numher of cases of 
discrimination falling within the terms of the bw whkh ha\'e 
been reported by the competition authorities points to active 
enforcement. Between 1976 and 1978 the numhers of offenses 
notified under sections 37 and 38 rose from 196 to over 60()," 
The great majority have been under section 37. only about 12 
percent of cases have been against the inducement or receipt or 
discriminatory terms by buyers. The main effort of the authori-
ties has been against cash payments and gifts from suppliers 10 
retailers. 
17 Circulaire relative aux relations commerciales entre enterprises, 
Ch. Schrivener, Le Secretaire d'Etat aupres du Mini'me delegue a 
l'Economie et aux Finances, Paris. 10 January 1979 (English translation 
by OECD). 
18 See Annual Reports on Competition Policy in GECD Member 
Countries, OEeD. Paris . 
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Enforcement has concentrated upon administrative proceed-
ings with a strong emphasis on securing voluntary compliance. 
Few cases have been taken to court by the authorities and to date 
(September 1980) no judgments have been issued in any of these 
cases. Few court cases have been initiated by private parties. This 
relative absence of court actions appears to reflect partly a 
reluctance by both government and private parties to initiate 
cases involving price discrimination because of doubts over the 
ability of the court to interpret and apply the law successfully in 
such a complex area of commercial relations. It also indicates the 
willingness of offending parties to accede to the wishes of the 
competition authorities due to the criminal status of contraven-
tions of the French competition law and the heavy fines which 
such contraventions attract. 
The impact of the price discrimination law t1r0n prices, 
discounts and competition depends largely upon the degree of 
compliance achieved. Officials of the Directorate-General for 
Competition and Consumer Affairs have indicated that consider-
able success has been achieved in eliminating some of the worst 
examples of off-invoice cash payments and rebates. However, in 
limiting discounts to large retailers to levels justified by savings in 
supply costs, progress has been acknowledged to have been 
limited. As to the effect on prices, while some tendency for 
di~counts to large retailers to diminish has been noted, any 
general effect of the legislation in increasing the average net 
prices of suppliers could not be identified because of the effects 
on prices of the relaxation of price controls which coincided with 
the more active enforcement of the price discrimination 
measures. 
A survey by the British Food and Drink Industries Council 
reported that there had been only limited compliance by manu-
facturers with the terms of the antidiscrimination law. The 
majority of respondents believed that the measures were only 
enforced by the authorities against the worst examples of dis-
niminatory malpractices and that the law was being given a more 
tlexi ble interpretation by officials than that indicated by the 
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Circulaire Scrivener. However, the existence of the Loi Royer was 
regarded as important by smaller retailers in providing them with 
a bargaining counter against their suppliers. I' 
With the recent shift in France government policy toward the 
revitalization of market forces with increased emphasis being 
placed on competition policy, it is difficult to forecast the future 
development of price discrimination control. In view of the 
rigidity of the French price discrimination law (particularly as 
interpreted by the Circulaire Scrivener) and its close association 
with the previous system of price controls, it might be expected 
that the current climate of economic policy would have en-
couraged a more relaxed interpretation and enforcement. How-
ever, officials of the Directorate-General for Competition and 
Consumer Affairs have expressed the view that, with greater 
freedom of businessmen to negotiate prices, there is a greater 
need for a legislative framework governing conduct in the market 
of which the price discrimination law forms an integral part. 
The application of restnctlve practices legislation to the 
problem of price discrimination: the case-by-case approach 
of Ireland 
In the smaller countries of Western Europe the extent of 
import competition and the priority attached to the exploitation 
of scale economies, means that discretionary, case-by-case ap-
proaches to competition policy have been adopted in preference 
to general prohibitions of monopolies, restrictive practices or 
mergers. Thus, the competition legislation of Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Netherlands and Sweden involve few outright 
prohibitions of particular practices, but confer on their competi-
tion authorities fairly wide powers to investigate and take reme-
dial action in individual cases of anticompetitive behavior or 
monopolistic market structures. 
19 Food and Drink Industries Council, Results of the FDIC Survey 
on Legislation to Control Discounts and Related Practices, January 
1979. 
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Irish competition law is embodied chiefly in the 1972 Restric-
tive Trade Practices Act which consolidated and amended the acts 
of 1953 and 1959. 20 The Restrictive Practices Commission may 
inquire into the supply and distribution of a particular category 
of goods and, where certain business practices are found to be 
contrary to the public interest, is empowered to recommend 
remedial action. The Minister for Industry, Commerce and 
Energy may then introduce a legislative order to enforce the 
Commission's recommendation by prohibiting restrictive or un-
fair practices or taking action "to ensure equitable treatment of 
all persons." The Examiner of Restrictive Practices initiates 
inquiries and is responsible for implementing the Commission's 
recommendations. 
The 1972 Act makes no explicit reference to price discrimina-
tion although among the "unfair practices" listed in the Third 
Schedule to which the authorities "shall have regard in the 
exercise of their functions" is: "Without just cause ... to give 
preference in regard to the supply of goods or the provision of 
services." Yet despite the vagueness of this reference to dis-
criminatory practices and the fact that price discrimination was 
not an important issue in either of the first two inquiries of the 
Commission (Radio Sets and Accessories, 1955 and Building 
~atcrials, 1955), identical recommendations against price dis-
crimination were included in these reports and similar recommen-
dations featured in subsequent reports: 
A supplier shall not. as respects goods (of like grade, quality or 
quantity) to which this order applies, differentiate by means of any 
rebate, refund, discount, credit or any other similar concession or by 
the provision of any service, facility, or other consideration of value 
between one purchaser for resale and another purchaser for resale 
(being purchasers of the same class),21 
~(I The 1978 Mergers, Take-overs and Monopolies (Control) Act 
extended competition law to cover monopolies and mergers. 
~1 See article 15 of the Restrictive Trade Practices (Building Mate-
rials) Order, 1955 and Restrictive Trade Practices (Radio Sets and 
Accessories) Order, 1955. Similar articles were included in the orders 
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There are similarities of wording between the price discrimina-
tion article and section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and in 
some respects the coverage of the Irish measures is wider than 
that of Robinson-Patman: the Irish orders do not require that the 
price discrimination should injure competition and there is no 
provision for "cost-justification" or "meeting competition" de-
fenses. This absence of any reference to competition in the Irish 
orders may be indicative of the greater weight which the Irish 
competition authorities attach to considerations of fairness and 
equality of treatment than to the maintenance of active competi-
tion. H0wever, the Irish price discrimination orders only apply to 
discrimination between supplies of "like grade, quality or quan-
tity." This means that the Irish orders are subject to the same 
weakness as the original section 2 of the Clayton Act-that the 
prohibition does not apply to the most common form of price 
discrimination: that between large and small buyers. Further-
more, the Irish orders are concerned only with price discrimina-
tion between purchasers of the "same class." 
In grocery products not only has price discrimination been the 
central issue in the Commission's inquiries, but the attempts to 
enforce controls over price discrimination have involved the 
competition authorities in unprecedented controversy. Rising con-
centration in the grocery trade during the late 1960's and growing 
dissatisfaction expressed by small retailers and wholesalers over 
their terms of purchase led the Commission to institute an inquiry 
into the supply of grocery goods in 1971. In the Commission's 
report of 1972, price discrimination was the central issue, with 
concern being directed primarily toward the issue of fairness 
rather than toward the effects of price discrimination upon 
competition. 22 The Commission identified the relationship of 
discounts to costs savings as the appropriate criterion for fair-
relating to Motor Cars (1956), Carpets (1960), Hand Knitting Yarns 
(1962), Jewellery Watches and Clocks (1968), and Electrical Appliances 
and Equipment (1971). 
22 Fair Trade Commission, Report of the Enquiry into Grocery 
Goods, Dublin. 1972. 
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ness: " ... unfairness is where there are differences in discounts 
which are totally unrelated to objective considerations such as 
savings in costs and which reflect merely the strong bargaining 
positions of certain customers."H 
The main provisions of the Groceries Order of 1973 are set 
out in appendix 2. The major features of these pro,·isions are: 
E\'ery supplier is required to prepare a statement of his terms of 
supply which ~hould include an indication of the nature and extent of 
anv supplementary terms (those negotiated with individual cus-
tO~l('rs). The statement of terms must then be made available to the 
Examiner of Restrictive Practices and to any wholesaler or retailer 
who demand~ it. 
Di~counts may be related either to the distribution junctions of 
resellers or the quanlil)' or value of the goods. 
Qualit:. discounts should "take rea~onable account of the costs of 
... deliveric~." 
Di,c()unt~ related to aggregate purchases over a period of time should 
lakc "rca~onable account ... of the number of places to which the 
... upplicr is required to deliver the goods and the frequency of any 
such deliveries." 
r<:rIllS and conditions "shall be rea~onable" and shall not "unfairly 
l)r unju·;tly" cause establi~hed distributors to be forced out of 
bu,iner,s or prevent new distributors from setting up business. 
Surrlementary terms individually negotiated between suppliers and 
diqributors shall not be substantially bigger than standard discounts 
and ,hall be "determined by reference to standard criteria." 
A retailer or wholesaler shall not induce a supplier to sell to him on 
terms which contravene the Order. 
Payment of advertising allowances by suppliers to retailers and 
wholesalers is prohibited. 
The Order is a curiously unwieldy amalgamation of require-
ments and prohibitions concerning terms of sale in the grocery 
trade. While some of the provisions set out fairly detailed 
:3 Ihid .• para. 121. 
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requirements for the structuring of discount scales (e.g., by 
defining the criteria to which discounts and rebates should be 
related), other provisions are remarkably vague (e.g., that "terms 
and conditions ... shall be reasonable," that "rates of discount 
. . . take reasonable account of . . . costs of . . . deliveries"). 
The reason for this rather complex set of provisions appears to be 
the desire of the Commission to provide practical and detailed 
guidance to the trade, while at the same time avoiding the 
rigidities of pricing practices which resulted from the enforcement 
of the Robinson-Patman Act. 
In practice the Order seems to have been almost entirely 
ineffective. While some major suppliers of food products at-
tempted to revise their terms of sale to comply with the Order, 
such revisions had the effect of offending either wholesalers or 
multiple supermarket operators which resulted in one or the other 
group taking boycott action. 1 ' Following complaints from the 
Examiner that the imprecise wording of the Order was resulting 
in conflicting interpretations and that the presence of powerful 
wholesalers and retailers was impeding enforcement, a special 
review of the operation of the Order was instituted. 
Despite the difficulties experienced in enforcing the Order and 
the arguments of manufacturers that the regulation of suppliers' 
terms restricted competition and was unfair to suppliers when the 
cause of discrimination was the exercise of buying power, the 
Commission recommended only minor amendments to article 3. 
These recommendations were directed toward greater flexibility 
in the terms of supply which were allowable thus: 
discounts could be related not just to the functions of the distributor 
and the amount of goods purchased but also to "any other objective 
24 The introduction of new terms by W & C MacDonnell was 
followed by certain wholesalers boycotting margarine suppliers. The 
revision of discount scales for tea by J. Lyons & Co. and cheese by 
Golden Vale Food Products in June 1974 resulted in similar boycotts by 
supermarket groups. See Restrictive Practices Commission, Report of 
Special Review of (he Operation of the Restrictive Practices (Groceries) 
Order. 1973. Dublin, 1975, pp. 51-52. 
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criteria which are designed to promote efficiency in supply or 
distribution and which are necessary in the legitimate interests of the 
suppliers' business." 
discounts ~hould take "reasonable account of economies of supply 
and dIstribution" and not as previously of the costs of delivery. 
the requirement that o~'erriding discounts be related to the number 
and frequency of dcIi\eries was dropped. 
These recommendations were given effect in the Restrictive 
Practices (Groceries) (Amendment) Order, 1978. 
The effect of the amendments was greatly to relax the prohibi-
tions against discriminatory discount terms, but at the same time 
the amendments did nothing to clarify the limits of the law. 
Indeed, the greater flexibility which was introduced, particularly 
that of allowing discounts to be justified by "any oth,:::, objective 
criteria .. ," increased the vagueness of the Order. Little prog-
ress has been made in implementing the Order, While the Ex-
aminer has pursued discussions with suppliers and distributors 
over the adjustments in trading terms required by the Order, 
boycotts have continued, In certain discriminatory practices other 
than in prices and discounts, enforcement of the Order has been 
more effective. Thus, restrictions on the length of credit which 
would be offered to distributors and the prohibition of advertis-
ing allowance5. appear to have been effectively implemented-
probably reflecting their lack of ambiguity and greater ease of 
identifying contraventions, 
The Irish experience clearly demonstrates the difficulties of 
int roducing controls over price discrimination, which try to 
combine the prevention of unfairness with the provision of a wide 
margin of flexibility for suppliers and purchasers, Providing 
flexibility inevitably leads to uncertainty and conflicting interpre-
t:ltions which greatly increase the difficulties of insuring volun-
tary compliam:e. But probably the most significant factor in the 
Irish experience has been the failure of the competition authori-
ties to pursue a vigorous implementation of the Order bringing, 
\\ here necessary, court actions against contraventions of the 
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Order. This unwillingness to invoke the law would seem to reflect 
the belief that as complex an issue as price discrimination and as 
vague a piece of legislation as the Groceries Order would involve 
the courts in enormous problems of interpretation and would 
possibly result in unsatisfactory decisions from the point of view 
of the competition authorities. 
The treatment of price discrimination as an abuse of 
market power: the case of Germany 
The price discrimination law of Germany is the most limited 
of any of the four countries surveyed in this article. Despite this, 
the issues of buying power and discriminatory conditions of sale 
have been the subjects of much debate in Germany. The limited 
scope of the price discrimination law reflects, almost paradox-
ically, the strength of the German government's commitment to 
an active competition policy-the principal objection of the 
German government to a more general prohibition of price 
discrimination is that it may encourage price inflexibility and 
weaken the competitive market mechanism. 
The basic antitrust law of Germany is contained in the 1973 
Act against Restraints of Competition (ARC). Section 26(2) of 
the ARC specifically prohibits discriminatory terms of supply 
under certain conditions: 
Market dominating enterprises ... shall not unfairly hinder, directly 
or indirectly, another enterprise in business activities which are 
usually open to similar enterprises nor, in the absence of facts 
justifying such differentiation, treat such an enterprise directly or 
indirectly in a manner different from the treatment accorded to 
similar enterprises. Sentence I shall also apply to enterprises and 
associations of enterprises, insofar as suppliers or purchasers of a 
certain type of goods or commercial services depend on them to such 
an extent that sufficient and reasonable possibilities of dealing with 
other enterprises do not exist. 
This section represents only a modest extension of the powers 
of the Cartel Office to prohibit price discrimination from the 
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general powers conferred on the Cartel Office to prohibit the 
abuses of power by market dominating enterprises (section 22 of 
the ARC). B The key element in section 26(2), which widens the 
scope of the price discrimination law beyond that implied by 
section 22, is the sentence which extends the prohibition of 
discrimination and hindrance to relationships of dependence 
between suppliers and purchasers. What is clear, however, is that 
section 26(2) is not and was never intended to be a general 
prohibition of discriminatory practices. An underlying theme of 
German competition policy has been a concentration upon the 
sources of market power rather than controlling the manifesta-
tions of market pcwer. Thus, in relation to price discrimination, 
the competition authorities have been principally interested in the 
buying power which is the most common source of discrimina-
tory prices and discounts. 26 
The swpe of section 26(2) in relation to price discrimination is 
far from clear, however. In the first place, the relationships of 
-----------------------------
> Section 22 states that an enterprise is market dominating if it has 
no competitor or is not exposed to any substantial competition or has in 
relation to its competitors a paramount market position, defined by 
financial strength. access to markets, links with other enterprise!' or 
barriers to the entry of other enterprises. Market domination is pre-
sumed to exist where for a certain category of goods: an enterprise has a 
market share of one third, three or less enterprises have a combined 
market share of one half, five or less enterprises have a combined 
market share of two thirds. 
~(, In addition to the ARC which contains the principal statement of 
Ccrmany's competition law, the Act Against Unfair Competition (Ge-
setz gegen unlauterer Wettbewerb) which deals primarily with consumer 
rrotection. has also been used to prevent certain forms of discrimina-
tion arising from the exercise of buying power. In a case involving a 
supermarket's demand for a cash payment from a supplier in return for 
slocking a particular coffee product, the supreme court ruled that such 
".:ntrance fees" are illegal under section 1 of the Act (WuW/E BGH 
1.t66. Decision of 17 December 1976). In another case the Court of 
Appeals of Hamm found the demands of a retailer for advertising 
allowances from a supplier to be illegal (WuW IE OLG 1975. Jubilaums-
zeitung). 
240 
.. 
Price discrimination : 617 
dependence outlined in the second sentence of the section is not 
precisely defined, and it is not clear how far this sentence extends 
the prohibition of discrimination beyond market dominating 
enterprises. Second, "the facts justifying" differentiation is left 
quite vague. Third, it is not clear how far section 26(2) together 
with section 22 is capable of controlling discriminatory terms 
arising from the abuse of buying power by large purchasers. 
It was the clarification of these issues, and the third in 
particular, which was the concern of the Monopolies Commission 
in its 1977 report on Abuses of demand power and possibilities 
for controlling it within the framework of the Law against 
Restraints on Competition. 27 With regard to the provisions 
against the abuse of monopoly power in section 22, the Commis-
sion found that the control of "abuse by market dominating 
enterprises when applied to buyers does not present any difficul-
ties that are fundamentally different from those which occur 
when it is applied to sellers." However, to increase the effective-
ness of section 22 against buying power the Commission recom-
mended that individuals should be able to apply to the Cartel 
Office for the initiation of proceedings, that injured parties 
should be able to claim damages, and that the Cartel Office 
should be empowered to carry out investigations into markets 
where competition is restricted due to the conduct of buyers. 
The circumstances necessary to establish the dependence of 
one enterprise upon another have not been clarified either by the 
Cartel Office or the courts. The Monopolies Commission in its 
report believed that a supplier's dependence upon a buyer (or 
group of buyers) could "be traced back to inadequate or unrea-
sonable possibilities of using other buyers." This might exist "in 
respect of suppliers to important purchasing associations. • . or 
the suppliers of components to motor vehicles manufac-
27 Monopolies Commission, Abuses of demand power and possibil-
ities of controlling it within the framework of the Law against Re-
straints of Competition, 29 November 1977 ("Summary of Results" 
translated by OECD). 
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turers." Most of the cases of discrimination or hindrance involv-
ing relationships of dependence have been concerned with the 
refusal to supply a branded product to a dependent retailer. 21 
The only successful actions by the Cartel Office against price 
discrimination under section 26(2) have involved market 
dominating suppliers. I n the X-ray contrast media case, the 
supplier of contrast media was found to have violated section 
26(2) by charging wholesale prices to distributors and retail prices 
to retail pharmacies.: 9 In 1975 the Cartel Office proceeded 
against a mail order house for demanding additional discounts of 
3 to 5 percent from its suppliers, but the case was dropped 
because price discrimination could not be proved, primarily 
because of the refusal by most suppliers to accede to the de-
mand. l " In 1978 the Cartel Office began investigating the alleged 
abusive buying practices of furniture buying associations against 
furniture manufacturers. but no court action has so far re-
sulted. 31 
The principal means by which discriminatory price conces-
sions to large retailers have been combated in Germany has been 
through the establishment of competition rules by individual 
industries which must be registered and approved by the Cartel 
Office. These competition rules are directed toward the 
furtherance of effective and active competition and may be 
enforced by the Cartel Office. The competition rules established 
by the Association of Branded Goods Manufacturers in May 
:' The principal case is that of Rossillger Skis. where the refusal by 
(he German distributor of the skis to supply a retailer was found by the 
Federal Supreme Court to be discrimination against a dependent pur-
chaser (see Annual Reports on Competition Policy in OECD Countries. 
OEeD. Paris. 1976 no.2. pp. 24-25). 
~IJ See Annual Reports on Competition Policy in OECD Countries, 
op. cit .• 1976 no.2. pp. 31-32. 
w Ibid .. 1978 no.2. p. 36 . 
. 11 [hid .• 1978 no.2. p. 35. 
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1976, and subsequently by 26 other associations, ban specific 
discriminatory practices, including the granting of free gifts or 
special allowances by suppliers. ll 
The main area of debate in Germany over policy toward price 
discrimination has concerned the adequacy of the existing law for 
controlling discriminatory practices, particularly those which re-
sult from the abuse of buying power by large purchasers. Despite 
proposals from the General Association of German Retail Trade 
for a general ban on price discrimination, the competition 
authorities have consistently opposed any prohibition on price 
discrimination which is not founded upon the abuse of market 
power. The Monopolies Commission has been the most forthright 
in its belief in the adequacy of the existing law and its opposition 
to any more general measures against buying power or dis-
criminatory practices. In its report the Commission noted: 
There was no intention in the ARC to enact a general prohibition of 
discrimination, aimed at eliminating disadvantages suffered by the 
competitors of the major buyers in the retail sales market, because 
they obtain less favourable prices, discounts and terms in their 
purchasing. Such a prohibition produces negative economic effect 
because encouragement to purchase goods as economically as possi-
ble is excluded and the trend towards price competition as a result of 
investment competition is neutralised. A general prohibition of dis-
crimination considered in isolation from differences of costs would 
immediately recreate hidden discrimination in the economic sense 
because it would compulsorily impose the same prices despite dif-
ferent supply costs. A prohibition which permitted an exception 
owing to the difference in costs would lead to prices being pegged to 
costs. Such a prohibition would be irreconcilahle with dynamic price 
competition. J) 
The Cartel Office has supported the view of the Monopolies 
Commission on the undesirability of any general prohibition of 
price competition because of the threat of such control to com-
petition and to the flexibility of market prices, although it has 
J2 Ibid., 1977 no.2, pp. 34-35 and 1979 no.2, p. 41. 
33 German Monopolies Commission op. cit., "Summary of the 
Results" para. 18. 
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been less satisfied with the adequacy of the existing law in dealing 
with the problems arising from buying power. In relation to 
discrimination arising from buying power the federal government 
has declared that "Competition is not an institution guaranteeing 
survival or even adequate earnings." However, the Cartel Office 
would take action where discriminatory concessions to large 
buyers "have a detrimental effect on market structure . . . e.g . 
. . . increasing concentration on the buyers' or the sellers' side 
... [or \vhere the] choice of consumers is restricted."u The 
initiative for extension of the scope of section 26(2) over dis-
criminatory practices and the abuse of buying power has come 
principally from the Federal Economics Ministry. In the Fourth 
Act Amending the ARC, first proposed in 1977 and enacted in 
19RO. section 26(2) was amended in two respects. To extend and 
dari fy the law with respect to the abuse of buying power, it was 
made illcgal for a market dominating enterprise or an enterprise 
\\ i I h dependent suppliers to require another enterprise to grant 
lInju~lificd preferenlial terms. The amendment also specified the 
conditions for the dependence of a supplier on a buyer: depen-
dence is to be assumed where the buyer "regularly obtains special 
benefits not granted to similar purchasers.")S 
14 A nnual Reports on Competition Policies in OECD Countries. 
01'. cit .. 1979 no.2, pp. 45-46. 
J< The precise amendments were as follows: 
(a)The following sentence 3 shall be added to subsection (2):"For 
the prohibition procedure pursuant to Section 37a (2) a supplier 
of a certain type of goods or commercial services shall be 
presumed to depend on a purchaser within the meaning of 
sentence 2, if, in addition to the price reductions or other 
considerations customary in the trade, that purchaser regularly 
obtains special benefits not granted to similar purchasers." 
(b)The following subsection (3) shall be added: "(3) Market 
dominating enterprises and associations of enterprises within 
the meaning of Subsection (2) Sentence 1 shaH not use their 
market position to cause other enterprises in business activities 
to accord them preferential terms in the absence of facts 
juslifying such terms. Sentence I shall also apply to enterprises 
and associations of enterprises within the meaning of subsection 
(2) sentence 2, in relation to the enterprises depending on 
them." 
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Assessment of the impact of the legislation 
In the four countries surveyed, as in the United States, 
measures toward price discrimination have been among the most 
controversial and problematic areas of competition policy. There 
is little evidence that the ability of the four countries to learn 
from the U.S. experience with its price discrimination law has 
facilitated their introduction of price discrimination measures. In 
Australia and 'Ireland in particular, the prohibitions on price 
discrimination have aroused tremendous controversy with strong 
opposition from large retailers and some manufacturers. 
The foremost criticism of price discrimination measures is 
thal they are inherently anticompetitive. By permitting only those 
price differentials that are cost justified, discrimination law 
eliminates competition in discounts (often the principal form of 
price competition in concentrated industries) hence assisting oli-
gopolistic price coordination. Similarly, new entry is discouraged 
by preventing price cutting in particular markets. Thus more 
uniform prices also tend to be higher prices. At a more general 
level it is alleged that any control over prices must inevitably 
strike at the heart of the competitive market mechanism. Thus, 
while price discrimination law may be needed to prevent unfair 
competi!ion and arrest the tendency toward monopoly in the 
distributive sector, the cost may be less vigorous price competi-
tion among suppliers. The anticompetitive effects of price dis-
crimination law have received particular attention in the United 
States. 16 
The differences in the scope of the price discrimination 
measures among the four countries largely reflect differences in 
36 For an analysis of the tendency for price discrimination law to 
discourage price competition see Corwin Edwards, The Price Dis-
crimination Law, Brookings Institution, Washington. D.C .• 1959; U.S. 
Department of Justice. op. cit., 1977 pp. 40-41. The arguments concern-
ing the anticompetitive effects of the Robinson-Patman Act are summa-
rized in Frederick Rowe. "Political Objectives and Economic Effects of 
the Robinson-Patman Act: A Conspicuous U.S. Antitrust Policy 
Failure," Zeitschrijt Jue die gesamte StaatswissenschaJt (forthcoming). 
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the priorities accorded to these conflicting goals of the fairness of 
competition and the effectiveness of competition. In West Ger-
many, the emphasis on competition and the free play of market 
forces has resulted in a price discrimination law that represents 
only a modest extension of the general provisions against monop-
olistic abuse. The Australian price discrimination law places a 
strong emphasis on price competition by proscribing only dis-
criminatory terms which substantially reduce competition in the 
market. The widespread concern in Australia over the potentially 
uncompetitive effects of the price discrimination section has 
resulted in the Trade Practices Commission adopting an ex-
tremely cautious and gradualist approach to its enforcement. In 
Ireland and France, on the other hand, the illegality of price 
discrimination is independent of any injury to competition. The 
generality and rigor of the French antidiscrimination legislation 
reflects the low priority assigned to price competition auJ market 
for.:es during the early 1970's. 
In the fOllr cOllntries surveyed, as in the United States, 
ar;ul1lerm th3t price discrimination law is restrictive of price 
Ct'lllpct it ion are ba'icd on the a priori analysis of oligopoly pricing 
h'ha\ ior rdlher than on any empirical studies. Nowhere has any 
thorough el:Onomctric investigation of the effects of price dis-
.:rirnination legislation on the level of prices been undertaken,)' 
and the only reasonably extensive survey of the impact of price 
dis.:rimination legislation appears to be the above-mentioned 
AIDA qudy in' Australia.)' Since the study is based on opinion 
,1' The U.S. Department of Justice report summarizes the evidence 
\\ hich has been reported as to the effects of Robinson-Patman on 
competitive beha~ ior (op. cit., pp. 239-243). The principal study is that 
of Professor Brooks (published in Hearings before the Special Subcom-
mittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act, 91st Congress, 
2d Session, Vol. 2 (1970) at 278). Brooks' findings and conclusions were 
criticized buth by Wolfe ("Reform or Repeal of the Robinson-Patman 
Act -Another View," 21 Antitrust Bulletin 237 (1976» and by econo-
mists at the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (see U.S. 
Department of Justice, op. cit .• pp. 239-240) . 
. 1~ N. R. Norman, Trade Practices Regulation on Analysis, op. cit. 
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rather than measurement, its results showing an inflationary 
impact of the legislation must be treated cautiously, although 
similar conclusions have been reached by the Swanson Committee 
and other independent observers. l9 All that can be concluded is 
that, while the view that price discrimination laws are likely to 
restrict price competition is eminently plausible and commands 
the support of the overwhelming majority of informed opinion, 
in the absence of any valid empirical evidence the verdict must 
remain open. . 
The existence of any effects of price discrimination measures 
on competition presupposes that the measures are complied with. 
While it is not possible to observe the degree of compliance in 
each country, it is clear that the enforcement of price discrimina-
tion legislation involves substantial difficulties. Since discrimina-
tory terms of supply will normally arise from bilateral negotiation 
between individual suppliers and purchasers and, since the scope 
for discrimination extends to credit terms, merchandising and 
advertising allowances, price discrimination is a particularly diffi-
cult phenomenon to observe. Moreover, it is clear that in France, 
Ireland and Germany there is little enthusiasm among the 
authorities responsible for enforcing them, for the antidis-
crimination measures. 
Even where a reasonable level of compliance is achieved, the 
possibility remains that businessmen will have circumvented the 
legislation by introducing discriminatory terms of supply which 
do not contravene the provisions of the price discrimination law. 
It has been noted in the United States that one effect of the 
Robinson-Patman Act has been to encourage a proliferation of 
retailers' private brands and minor differentiation in the packag-
ing and physical attributes of products supplied to large re-
39 See: Trade Practices Review Committee, Report to the Minister 
for Business and Consumer Affairs, Canberra, 1976, p. 45; also, Food 
and Drink Industries Council, Results of the FDIC Survey, "Australia," 
pp.6-8. 
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tailers.- o The adjustment of supply conditions and arrangements 
to circumvent the price discrimination law has also been reported 
in Australia and France." 
Probably the most important single factor which has inhibited 
the active enforcement of the price discrimination legislation has 
been uncertainty over the precise limits of the law. Such uncer-
tainty discourages active enforcement by the competition authori-
ties and impedes compliance by business. The introduction of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act was followed by considerable 
confusion among businessmen as to the amendments in trading 
terms required by the price discrimination section. In Ireland 
conflicting interpretations of the antidiscrimination provisions of 
the Groceries Orders have been a significant factor in the disputes 
bet ween multiple retailers, wholesalers and food processors. In 
Germany there appears to have been a lack of consensus of 
opinion among the Monopolies Commission, Cartel Office and 
Economics Ministry as to the precise limits of the existing law and 
the need for amendment. 
The problem of uncertainty appears to be greatest in those 
countries which have attempted in the drafting of their price 
discrimination legislation to avoid the rigidities of pricing that 
may result from too pn:cise a relationship of price differentials to 
co~t differentials. The most notable example in this respect is that 
of the Irish Groceries Order. Furthermore, the amendments made 
in 1978 to the Order, which were aimed at allowing greater 
flexibility to suppliers in their pricing policies, served only to 
increase uncertainty and confusion over the distinction between 
prohibited and permitted price discrimination. In France, on the 
other hand, the relative simplicity of the legislation-a blanket 
prohibition of price differentials not justified by cost dif-
40 See U.S. Department of Justice, Report on the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, op. cit., pp. 75-78. 
41 See: Food and Drink Industries Council, Results of FDIC SUfL 
l·e.~; op. cit., "Australia," p. 6, "France," p. S. 
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ferences-has meant that the uncertainty and disagreements evi-
dent in other countries has been largely absent. Even in France. 
however, one difficulty experienced by all the other countries 
remains: how are supply costs to individual customers to be 
measured? Although France's Circulaire Scrivener goes further 
than any other country in providing detailed guidance as to the 
cost factors which are relevant as a justification for differentials 
in discounts and prices, ultimately the allocation of the costs of 
manufacture, marketing and distribution to individual customers 
must be an arbitrary exercise. 
In view of the uncertainties concerning the meaning and scope 
of the price discrimination laws, it might be expected that the 
courts would play an important role in the interpretation of the 
statutes and in deterring infringement of them, as has occurred in 
the United States. Yet in none of the four countries have the 
competition authorities shown any eagerness to prosecute illegal 
price discrimination in the courts. In Ireland and Australia in 
particular, it would seem that the complexity of the legal and 
economic issues involved in cases of price discrimination and the 
difficulties of presenting and assessing evidence in such cases has 
discouraged the authorities from taking cases to court. In Ireland 
this reluctance may have been reinforced by the fear of a possible 
adverse judgment. 
In these circumstances the role of private court actions (al-
lowed in all four of the countries except Germany) is clearly 
enhanced. It would appear, however, that the same uncertainties 
that have deterred the competition authorities from making use 
of the legal system have also discouraged private parties. More-
over, in none of the countries is there the incentive to antitrust 
litigation similar to those provided under the "triple damages" 
provisions of U.S. antitrust law. 
As a result, therefore, enforcement strategy in all four of the 
countries surveyed has been based upon the encouragement of 
voluntary compliance. Yet in the absence of court cases, not only 
is there a lack of an effective deterrent to the infringement of 
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price discrimination legislation, but the absence of court rulings 
on t he precise meaning and limits of the law means that it is not 
clear how business should adjust their terms of supply and 
purchasing conduct in order to comply. 
In France the combination of government guidance through 
circulars to industry and administrative action in apparent con-
traventions of the law appears to have been moderately effective 
in securing some measure of compliance. In Ireland, on the other 
hand. the greater confusion over the meaning of the price 
discrimination measures applying to the grocery trade, together 
with the unwillingness of business to comply, has resulted in the 
measures being almost entirely ineffective. In Australia the effec-
tiveness of the authorities' cautious approach to enforcement is 
difficult to assess. While the controversy which followed the 
introduction of the price discrimination law has largely abated, 
this may reflect the Trade Practices Commission's narrow in-
terpretation and limited enforcement of the measure rather than 
the willingness of businessmen to comply. In Germany the limita-
tion of illegal price discrimination to uncompetitive price dif-
ferentials imposed or induced by enterprises which are either 
market dominating or have dependent suppliers or purchasers has 
meant that the problems of the other countries in encouraging 
compliance with generally applicable price discrimination 
measures, have been largely absent. 
Conclusions 
Although the price discrimination laws of the four countries 
surveyed show considerable variation, as do their antitrust laws 
as a whole, the common problems experienced by the countries 
and the close parallels with those of the United States enable 
some general conclusions concerning the legal control of price 
discrimination to be drawn. 
It should first be noted that measures against price discrimina-
tion differ from most other areas of antitrust policy. In all four 
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countries the primary intent of the measures was the protection 
of small business from unfair competition rather than the stimu-
lation of competition. In all the countries, as in North America, 
measures to control price discrimination followed the contraction 
of the small retail sector in the face of expanding multiple 
retailers. 
In all countries the possible anticompetitive and price increas-
ing effects Of prohibiting price discrimination have been of 
concern. Even where the prohibition of price discrimination is 
dependent upon evidence of a substantial reduction in competi-
tion (as in Australia), it seems likely that such measures will 
reduce the vigor of price competition. In all countries the price 
discrimination measures have given· rise to problems of enforce-
ment. These are the result of the difficulty of detecting price 
discrimination and a lack of energetic enforcement by the com-
petition authorities. Low levels of compliance and enforcement • 
are encouraged by uncertainty over the limits of the price dis-
crimination laws. Price discrimination is a difficult concept to 
define. The greater the effort that is made to avoid the anticom-
petitive effects of price discrimination control by limiting prohibi-
tion to "uncompetitive" or "unreasonable" price discrimination, 
the greater is the difficulty of unambiguously distinguishing 
between legal and illegal price discrimination. 
It is clear, therefore, that the control of price discrimination is 
far from being a costless activity. In addition to the enforcement 
costs of the competition authorities and the courts, there are the 
costs arising from reduced flexibility and competitiveness of 
prices and the costs incurred by firms seeking to circumvent the 
legislation. These findings are relevant to the debate over the 
future of the Robinson-Patman Act. The occurrence of many of 
the same problems, which have beset the Robinson-Patman Act, 
in countries which have taken quite different approaches to the 
control of price discrimination, suggests that these difficulties are 
inherent in any attempt to control price discrimination. The 
relevant questions in relation to the Robinson-Patman Act are 
therefore not "How should the Act be amended in order to 
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eliminate the problems which have arisen from it?" but "Are 
there particular features of the Act which have especially undesir-
able effects?" and "Is the Act achieving the optimal balance 
between the fairness of price competition and the vigor of price 
competition?" 
In view of the various problems associated with price dis-
crimination law, the question arises as to whether statutory 
controls over price discrimination are the appropriate policy 
response to the root problem. The principal source of price 
discrimination appears to be the buying power of large pur-
chasers rather thar. the monopolistic behavior of suppliers. While 
in all four countries the price discrimination laws extend to the 
inducement of discrimination by buyers, such provisions are 
among the least satisfactory aspects of the various laws. Not only 
i, the inducement of price discrimination difficult to identify but 
it is often impossible to distinguish between hard bargaining and 
the abuse of buying power. It may further be argued that to 
concentrate upon price discrimination is to divert attention from 
the source of the problem to its manifestation. To this end it may 
be argued that the approach of the German authorities who have 
sought not to regulate price discrimination, but to acquire powers 
to deal effectively with the sources of such discrimination, 
whether it be the power of sellers or of purchasers, is not only the 
most direct approach to the problem, but may ultimately prove to 
be the most successful. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Australian Price Discrimination Law-
Section 49 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 (as 
amended) 
49. (1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, discriminate 
between purch"asers of goods of like grade and quality in relation to-
(a) the prices charged for the goods; 
(b) any discounts, allowances, rebates or credits given or allowed in 
relation to the supply of the goods; 
(c) the provision of services or facilities in respect of the goods; or 
(d) the making of payments for services or facilities provided in 
respect of the goods, 
if the discrimination is of such magnitude or is of such a recurring or 
systematic character that it has or is likely to have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition in a market for goods, being a 
market in which the corporation supplies, or those persons supply, 
goods. 
(2) Sub-section (1) does not apply in relation to a discrimination if-
(a) the discrimination makes only reasonable allowance for dif-
ferences in the cost or likely cost of manufacture, distribution, 
sale or delivery resulting from the differing places to which, 
methods by which or quantities in which the goods are supplied 
to the purchasers; or 
(b) the discrimination is constituted by the doing of an act in good 
faith to meet a price or benefit offered by a competitor of the 
supplier. 
(3) In any proceeding for a contravention of sub-section (1), the onus 
of establishing that that sub-section does not apply in relation to a 
discrimination by reason of sub-section (2) is on the party asserting that 
sub-section (I) does not so apply. 
(4) A person shall not, in trade or commerce-
(a) knowingly induce or attempt to induce a corporation to discrimi-
nate in a manner prohibited by sub-section (I); or 
(b) enter into any transaction that to his knowledge would result in 
his receiving the benefit of a discrimination that is prohibited by 
that sub-section. 
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(5) In any proceeding against a pt!rson for a contravention of sub-sec-
tion (4), it is a defence if that person establishes that he reasonably 
believed that, by reason of sub-section (2), the discrimination concerned 
was not prohibited by sub-section (1). 
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APPENDIX 2 
Extracts from the Irish 
Restrictive Practices (Groceries) Order, 1973 
3 (1) (a) A supplier shall prepare and maintain a statement . • • con-
taining the terms and conditions upon . . • which he sells 
grocery goods .•. and shall effect a sale ... subject to those 
terms and conditions. 
(b) ... a statement ... in relation to supplementary terms 
(should contain) a general indication of the nature and extent 
of those terms. 
(2) The terms and conditions aforesaid may make provision for 
discounts of different amounts . . . related to the different 
functions . . . performed by purchasers or the quantity of 
value of the goods. 
(3) ... discounts related to the quantity or value the goods-
(a) shall, in the case of discounts related to the quantity or value 
of single deliveries, . . . take reasonable account of the costs 
of such deliveries. . . , 
(b) shall, in the case of discounts related to the quantity or value 
of ... purchases ... over a period of time, ... take 
reasonable account ... also of the number ... of places to 
which the supplier ... deliver(s) the goods and the frequency 
. . . of deliveries. . . . 
(4) The terms and conditions ••• shall be reasonable, having 
regard to all the circumstances, and shall not be such as 
unfairly or unjustly-
(a) to cause. . . the cessation of the business of a wholesaler or 
retailer, 
(b) to prevent a person from commencing business as a wholesaler 
or retailer, or 
(c) to discriminate against any wholesalers or retailers. 
(5) (a) ... 'supplementary terms' means any terms or conditions 
... providing for a rebate or discount in relation to ..• 
(i) ... purchases ... in excess of specified quantities over 
a period of time or 
(ii) promotion of sales. . . by means of special arrangements 
for a limited period by the wholesaler or retailer. 
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4 (I) 
(2) 
(3) 
5 
-: 1I) 
9 
(b) Where the terms and conditions ... include supplementary 
terms-
(i) any discounts. rebates or allowances for which such terms 
make provision shall not be substantially bigger than those 
[provided under standard terms). 
(ii) supplementary terms shall be determined by reference to 
objective criteria. . .. 
A supplier shall furnish to the Examiner a copy of the 
statement [of terms and conditions) .... 
A supplier shall furnish to the Examiner a copy of any 
amendment of the statement. .. . 
A supplier shall. if requested ... by a wholesaler or retailer. 
furnish ... a copy of the statement .•.. 
I f the examiner is satisfied that the operation by a supplier of 
the terms and conditions contained in the statement ... 
constitutes unfair discrimination in favour of or against any 
wholesaler or retailer ... the supplier shall ... m<ike such 
amendments of the terms and conditions ... as may be 
specified by the Examiner ... to eliminate the unfair dis-
crimination. 
A person \\ ho is a wholesaler or retailer shall not. whether by 
the use of threats or inducements or otherwise. induce a 
supplier to sell grocery goods to him on ... terms and 
conditions other than those contained ... in the statement 
prepared by the supplier pursuant to Article 3 of this Or-
der .... 
A supplier shall not make any payment or allowance to a ... 
wholesaler or retailer. . . in consideration of the carrying out 
by that person of advertising of the goods .... 
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COMMUNICATIONS 
ON THE THEORY OF DIVERSIFICATION: 
A COMMENT 
R. M. GRANT· 
In basing a theory of diversification on a non-optimising managerial model 
of the firm C. J. Sutton (1973) encounters two problems common to many 
attempts to apply the newer models of the firm to business behaviour and 
industrial organisation: 
1. Testable predictions over a wide range of business behaviour are not 
readily derived from these models. The comparative static properties of 
the models are clearly defined only for the output decision of the firm, 
the response of other aspects of business behaviour, in particular the 
investment decision to changes in exogenous variables is unclear. 
2. Where definite predictions are derived from the newer models they are 
often consistent with the predictions of the profit maximising model. Since 
the former involve working with more variables and constraints, the 
principle of Occam's razor suggests a preference for the latter. 
This comment makes the following points: 
1. The investment behaviour of the firm cannot easily be predicted from the 
objective function of the firm postulated by Sutton and his theory of 
diversification is the result of questionable ad hoc behavioural assump-
tions (Section I). 
2. Sutton's theory is consistent with the behaviour of the profit maximising 
firm. The profit maximising approach is to be preferred as simpler and 
less restrictive, and, since it can more easily take account of the influence 
of uncertainty, a potentially more predictively accurate theory (Section In. 
Section III examines Sutton's arguments for preferring the • behavioural' 
approach. 
The objective function of the firm in Sutton's model is taken from 
Williamson's 'staff model' (Williamson, 1964) where managerial utility 
is a function of the level of staff expenditure (S) and the size of the dis-
cretionary investment budget (JD) which is the residue of after tax profits 
(17') in excess of the minimum level of profit consistent with the existing 
management maintaining control of the firm (17'0)' 
u= U(S.ID) 
wherelD = R - C - S -17'0 
and R = R(X, S) 
R - total revenue 
C - total cost 
X. - output 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
• I am grateful to G. K. Shaw and M. Jones-Lee for comments. Errors are my own. 
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Assuming non-maximisation of utility, diversification. according to 
Sutton's analysis. will take place for two reasons: 
I. If profits fall below 1To the firm will seek more profitable investment 
opportunities in new industries-' cost push' diversification. Low profit-
ability is a characteristic of industries with declining output. 
2. The use of discretionary investment funds depends upon the preferences 
of managers. Production staff are assumed to support the directing of new 
investment towards the expansion of existing activities while marketing 
staff prefer entry into new industries. 'Market pull' diversification 
depends upon the strength of the marketing department within the firm. 
Thus diversification CD) depends on the rate of growth of the firm's 
present markets (X') and the firm's marketing expenditure as a proportion 
of net output (M). 
D = D(X',M) (4) 
Ignoring for the moment Sutton's modifications to the Williamson model 
and considering only the basic managerial model. we can derive no simple 
theory of the determinants of diversification. Diversification involves • the 
spreading of its operations by a business over dissimilar economic activities • 
(Arney, 1964, p. 252) which may be measured most easily by the increase 
in the number of industries in which a firm operates during a particular 
time period. Since there is a minimum efficient size to most investment 
projects. diversification will depend upon the amount of net investment by 
the firm and on its ranking of diversifying and non-<iiversifying projects. 
Maximisation of utility over time by the Williamson firm where 
U = I,U,(S" ID,)(l +r)-' (5) 
will not involve radically different investment behaviour from that of the 
profit maximising firm. since the objective of the utility maximiser is to 
increase the size of its future investment budget and provide funds to addi-
tional staff expenditure. The differences in investment behaviour are due to 
the positive utility derived from staff expenditure by the Williamson firm. 
The Williamson firm will continue investment to the point where for the 
marginal project j 
(6) 
Where no borrowing constraint operates we may expect the utility maximiser 
to invest more than ,the profit maximiser for the same reasons that the 
utility maximiser produces at a higher level of output: staff expenditure 
by the utility maximiser produces at a higher level of output: staff expendi. 
ture by the utility maximiser is continued beyond the profit maximising 
level, and staff expenditure increases revenue. The ranking of investment 
projects by their discounted utility flows will differ from their ranking by 
net present value due to (i) differences in the marginal revenue returns from 
staff expenditure on investments in different industries, (ii) differences in the 
rate of discount employed by the utility maximiser and the profit maximiser, 
and (iii) variation in the marginal rate of substitution of Sand ID over time 
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The problems of predicting the investment behaviour of the managerial 
investment preferences. The resulting theory of diversification is based 
entirely on these preferences and on the existence of a profit constraint and. 
the general utility function including both discretionary investment and staff 
expenditure becomes redundant. It is these assumptions of preferences 
between investment in existing and new activities which are the most 
questionable parts of the analysis. It seems equally likely that in oligopolistic 
industries the primary goal of marketing staff will be the maintenance and 
expansion of the firm's share of existing markets. In the case of production 
staff. long run objectives may best be served by supporting diversification 
into industries with a similar technOlogical base. 
The complexity of the Sutton model and the restrictiveness of its 
assumptions would be justified if the resulting hypothesis of the determinants 
of diversification was at variance with the predictions of simpler models of 
the firm and if the hypothesis was supported by empirical evidence. Neither 
is true. The 'coarse test' of the model is inconclusive. possibly due to the 
discrepancy between the theoretical concept of diversification (the extension 
of the product range of the firm) and the empirical measure (the growth in 
the ratio of non-primary to primary output). Also the relationship between 
growth of output. marketing expenditure and diversification is not inconsis-
tent with profit maximising behaviour. We proceed by developing the profit 
maximising approach. 
II 
Under uncertainty. investment by the neo-classical firm is directed 
towards profit maximisation and risk minimisation. For the corporate firm 
operating in the interests of its owners these two objectives are combined 
in the single objective of maximisation of the market value of the firm's 
equity at every point of time. By developing a theory of the optimal invest-
ment behaviour of the firm to achieve this objective. we can predict the 
determinants of diversification and compare them to Sutton's hypothesis. 
Assuming perfectly competitive securities market with no transaction 
costs where there exists a consensus as to the subjective probability distribu-
tion of returns to securities, Lintner (Lintner. 1965) shows how mean-
variance portfolio theory may be used to determine the equilibrium prices 
of securities. The valuation of the equity of firm i at the beginning of period 
o WIO) is a function of BiO ' the expected total return to investors during the 
period. and KiO' the risk of the equity's return which cannot be eliminated 
by the holding of diversified portfolios. this is the 'systematic risk • of the 
securities. Thus ViO is the present value of the certainty equivalent of H jo 
v'o = (HIO -yKlo)(l+r*)-l (7) 
where r* is the riskless rate of interest and 'Y is the market price of risk. H jo 
is made up of Dlo • the expected dividend during period o. and t"1J. the 
expected value of the equity at the beginning of the next period. 
R;o = 15;0 + ~1 (8) 
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K Io is the covariance between (Hlo - VI~)' the net return on company i's 
equity. and the net return on the equities of all quoted companies. The 
random walk hypothesis of share price movement suggests that the current 
price of a security adjusts to its expected price. thus 
~l = l'io (9) 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) and extending over n periods we have 
" Yio = L (D,,-yK,,)(1+r*)-'+Yio(1+r)-n (10) 
,=0 
the latter term tending towards zero as n becomes large. 
DII is the firm's net cash flow in period t multiplied by the retention 
ratio (1;. Viewing the firm as a collection of independent investment projects 
the jth project yielding an expected net cash flow in period t of 
z,j,(DIt = O,l:jZIj,) 
with a systematic risk of klJI> then substituting into (10): 
Yio = l:,l:ja,(zlj,-yklj,Xl +r·)-' (IJ) 
Maximisation of ViO means that investment projects are ranked by the 
firm by the present value of the certainty equivalent of the neP cash flow 
and. in the absence of any external borrowing constraint. investment is 
continued to the point where for the marginal project the present value of 
the certainty equivalent of the net cash flow is equated to zero 
l:,(zilll,-ykl",,) = O. (12) 
The amount of diversification by the firm depends on the expected net 
returns from diversifying investment projects and the systematic risk of the 
return' compared to that for investment projects within the firm's existing 
activities. To formulate a testable hypothesis of the determinants of diversi-
fication the determinants of our expectational variables fll and klJ must be 
postulated. 
kiJ we can expect to be determined primarily by the covariance of the 
past returns from similar investments in the same industry with returns 
from all equities. ZIJ is a function of many variables. Assuming constant long 
run average costs (as indicated by most empirical studies), expected returns 
are determined by expected demand conditions. The major determinant of 
the expected rate of growth of market demand is the past growth rate of 
demand. The relationship between past rate of growth of output and invest· 
ment demand (and therefore between past rate of growth and expected rate 
of return) is strongly supported by empirical evidence (Eisner and Nadiri, 
1968). Expectation of the demand conditions facing the individual firm are 
1 Net of factor payments (other than capital depreciation) and interest costs. 
2 Textbook treatments of diversification emphasise the risk reducing role of 
diversification; however it is only reduction in that part of the variance of the firm's 
earnings that is correlated with general economic fluctuations which increases the 
market valuation of the firm. 
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also determined by expectations of the price-output behaviour of com-
petitors. Generally the higher the level of concentration in an industry, the 
more sensitive are established firms to attempts by one firm to expand its 
market share. and the lower will be the expected profitability of investment. 
For diversifying projects, a major determinant of the return on invest-
ment is barriers to entry. High barriers to entry are associated with above 
average profit rates, so that the profitability of entry depends upon the 
specific competitive advantages of the diversifying firm which enable it to 
overcome entry barriers. Since the most important barriers to entry are the 
product differentiation advantages of established firms, successful entry 
depends on the marketing and innovating skills of the firm which will be a 
function of the firm's expenditure on marketing and research and develop-
ment. Thus: 
D, = D(Xh R,. Mb c .. K,) OJ) 
oD oD oD oD oD 
oX < 0; oR' oM' oK' oC > 0 
where R, is the firm's R&D expenditure as a proportion of net output, C, is 
the concentration ratio in the firm's existing markets and K, is the systematic 
risk of the firm's net cash ftow. 
Sutton's hypothesis that diversification is determined by the rate of 
growth of output of the firm's present markets and the firm's marketing 
expenditure is therefore compatible with profit maximising behaviour. The 
difference in the two approaches is in the additional variables postulated 
by the profit maximising hypothesis: in the managerial model the effect of 
seller concentration and R&D expenditure is uncertain, and the managerial 
model does not consider risk while maximisation of shareholder welfare 
implies that the greater is the systematic risk of the firm's earnings, the 
greater is the incentive to diversify. 
Empirical testing of the two hypotheses is possible using Census of 
Production data on diversification in manufacturing industry between 1958 
and 1963. Table 16 of part 132 of the Report on the Census of Production 
for 1963 classifies firms into 51 industry groups by their primary output 
and shows their operations in other industry groups. D, measures the growth 
in the average number of other industry groups in which each firm in 
industry i operates establishments in between 1958 and 1963. D, is not an 
entirely satisfactory measure of diversification: the census industry defini-
tions do not correspond to the economist's concept of an industry, the 
measures are distorted by non-disclosures of information, the five year 
period is too short, and the measure of diversification fails to distinguish 
between pure diversification and vertical integration. 
Linear regressions of on the 41 industry groups for which information is 
available yield the following results (t values in brackets): 
(1) D, = 0·150+0·000565 X;-0·719 M, Rl = 0·254 
(1.31) (2.64) 
6 
261 
82 R. M. GRANT 
(2) D/ = 0·096+0·000174X;-0·249 M,+0·937 R/+0·OO393 C, R2 = 0·643 
(0'40) (4'80) (1'32) (1.79) 
X. is the rate of growth of the output of principal products of industry ; 
1954-63 
M. is marketing expenditure of firms classified to industry; as a proportion 
of net output in 1963 
R. is research and development expenditure in 1955 by firms classified to 
industry i as a proportion of net output (from Dept. of Scientific and 
Industrial Research estimates) 
and C. is CR3 of industry; in 1958 (estimates from M. Sawyer, 'Concentra-
tion in British Manufacturing Industry', Oxford Economic Papers. 
Nov. 1971). 
The evidence fails to provide strong support to either hypothesis. Neverthe-
less the profit maximising hypothesis performs less badly than the be-
havioural alternative (where the signs of both variables are opposite to those 
predicted). Inclusion of Rand C increases the correlation coefficient and 
makes the F ratio for the regression significant at the 0·01 level, but fails 
to resolve the positive sign of the X' coefficient and the negative sign of 
the M coefficient. One explanation is the exclusion of the systematic risk 
factor which is not easily estimable. High cyclical variability of profit is a 
result of high cyclical variability of demand and capital intensive production. 
Both characteristics are associated with intermediate goods industries and 
it is in these industries that marketing expenditure is low (lowest marketing 
is in the iron and steel industry and in the insulated wire and cable industry, 
the highest is in the soap. oils and fats industry and in pharmaceutical 
preparations). Thus the negative relationship between marketing expenditure 
and diversification may reflect a positive relationship between primary indus-
try risk and diversification and a negative correlation between risk and 
marketing expenditure. The positive influence of primary industry growth 
rate on diversification suggests imperfection in the capital market. Our model 
assumes a perfectly elastic supply of investment funds to the firm at the 
riskless rate of interest. The introduction of imperfections in the form of a 
borrowing constraint or the cost of external finance exceeding that of internal 
finance would cause the level of total investment expenditure by the firm to 
be related to its current profits. which will be positively correlated with rate 
of output growth. Thus it is possible that the growth rate of primary industry 
output has a dual effect on diversification which is obscured by the linear 
regression: while the relative return on diversifying investment is inversely 
related to primary industry growth. the level of total investment is positively 
related to output growth. 
III 
Sutton's preference for the behavioural over the profit maxtmtsmg 
approach is due to his belief in the explanatory and predictive superiority 
of the former. 
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By concentrating on the decision process, behavioural theory may provide 
a better ex post explanation of diversification capable of explaining • devia-
tions from representative behaviour' and analysing the timing of adjust-
ments. The ability of the behavioural theory to explain both the normal 
and the deviant behaviour of the firm is a result of the theory's vagueness 
and ambiguity. Thus R&D expenditure mayor may not stimulate diversi-
fication depending on the nature of the R&D projects, the nature of the 
production process, the values of other variables and the time period con-
sidered. As is often the case in economic theorising, the cost of realism is 
operationalism. The complex interaction of different variables in the Sutton 
theory means that the precise functional form of the relationship cannot be 
specified and the parameters cannot be estimated. 
Nor is the behavioural theory free from Sutton's criticism that the profit 
maximising approach is dependent upon the expectations of management 
rather than on current values of observable variables. Cost push diversifica-
tion is instigated by profits falling below 1/"0' which is not directly observable 
but is determined by managerial expectations of the take-over behaviour of 
other firms. 
The choice between alternative hypotheses in the analysis of some eco-
nomic phenomenon depends upon the purpose of our study. If our purpose 
is to predict the extent of future diversification by industrial groups of firms 
or to analyse the impact of diversification on market competition rather than 
to explain past diversification decisions by individual firms, then the profit 
maximising approach is preferable to the behavioural theory. 
University 01 St. Andrews 
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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE INTER-INDUSTRY 
PATTERN OF DIVERSIFICATION BY U.K. 
MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES. 
Summary 
Evidence of the diversity of output of larger U.K. manufacturing enterprises1 
in 1958, 1963 and 1968 is provided in the Reports on the Census of Production. 
The Censuses show that between 1958 and 1968 diversification was a significant 
and general trend in manufacturing industries and an important element in the 
growth of firms during the period. Moreover diversification seems to be part of 
a longer term trend in U.K. industry and part of the typical development 
pattern of the large firm. A theory of the firm's diversification decision is 
proposed and from this theory predictions are made of the structural features 
both of a firm's primary industry and of outside industries which are likely to 
encourage diversification from the one industry to the other. The power of the 
model in explaining the pattern of diversification between SIC manufacturing 
orders in the period 1963-68 is weak, due in part to the wide variety of factors 
influencing diversification and to the aggregated form of the data. Nevertheless, 
the results show the importance of research and development effort in encourag-
ing diversification and the stimulus to diversification given by profitability and 
risk in firms' primary industries and high rates of output growth in outside 
industries. While the findings offer no clear conclusions regarding the impact 
of diversification upon economic performance, the results are consistent with the 
propositions that (i) diversification encourages technical progress in industry 
and (ii) diversification increases the efficiency with which resources are allocated 
between industries. 
The diversification trend in U.K. manufacturing industry 
Diversification is an increase in the diversity of a firm's output (a decrease in 
diversity being 'specialization').' The diversity of a firm's output may be 
measured by the number of separate industries in which a firm produces, by 
the ratio of a firm's 'non-primary output' (output of products classified to 
industries other than its main industry) to the firm's total output,3 or by some 
composite measure.· 
• This article was prepared while I was employed at the University of St Andrews; it should 
not be regarded as reflecting the views of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 
1 A 'larger enterprise' as defined by the Census is one or more companies under common 
control and employing 100 or more persons. 
• Some writers (e.g. Arney 1964, Berry 19711, Goreki 1975) define diversification statically, the 
'degree of diversification' of a firm being the diversity of its output. The dynamic definition used 
here corresponds more closely to normal business usage orthe term. 
a 'Employment' could be substituted for 'output' to give an alternative measure. 
• Berry (19711) proposes an index of diversification similar to the Herfindahl Index of 
Concentration. The appropriate measure of diversification depends upon the purpose of the 
study: for examining the diversification decision entry into additional industries is the crucial 
issue, for analysing resource allocation changes in the proportions of firms' outputs in different 
industries is the better measure. 
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Census of Production data allow measures of average diversification to be 
calculated for groups oflarger enterprises classified by 5 I industry groups for the 
period 1958 to 1963 and 17 SIC manufacturing orders for the period 1963 to 
1968. Because of the change in the basis of classification, measures of diversifica-
tion cannot be accurately calculated for the ten-year period as a whole. 
Diversification was a significant and general trend among manufacturing 
enterprises during the period. Between 1958 and 1963 the proportion of 
enterprises operating in more than one of the 51 industry groups increased from 
14.8 % to 22.7% and the ratio of 'non-primary' to total net output for all 
enterprises increased from 14.6% to 19.2%, the ratio increasing in all but 6 of 
the 51 industry groups. Between 1963 and 1968 the proportion of enterprises 
operating in more than one of the 17 SIC manufacturing orders increased 
marginally from 18.0% to 18.9%, but the ratio of non-primary to total nct 
output rose from 14.1 % to 16.9 %. While this increase in the proportion of 
diversified output took place in 15 of the 17 SI C manufacturing orders, it was 
enterprises employing more than 1,000 persons which were entirely responsible 
for the diversifying growth. 
Nor was diversification an unimportant source of growth for firms over the 
period. Between 1958 and 1963 when the average net output of firms employing 
over 100 persons increased from £0.761 m to £ I. 240m 70.4 % of this growth was 
within firms' primary industries and 25.6% in outside industries. From 1963 
to 1968 average net output increased to £1.929m; of the increase 25.9 % was 
in SIC orders other than firms' main order. 
Although pre-1958 Censuses give no information on diversification, evidence 
from company histories and mergers suggest that the treml towards diversifica-
tion is a long-term one, continuing from the beginning of the twentieth century, 
if not before then. Studies of the growth of large firms in the British and 
American economies by Channon (1973) and Chandler (1962) respectively, 
suggest that diversification is part of the typical pattern of development of the 
modern firm from single product manufacture Vt'rtically and horizontally into 
technically related products, followed by broader spectrum diversifying growth. 
The expansion of firms between industries essentially involves a replacement 
of the allocative role of factor markets by managerial allocation of productive 
factors. Diversification is thus an integral part of the process by which market 
organization of production has been gradually replaced by the corporate 
organization of production, a process which has been one of the characteristic 
features of the development of 'managerial capitalism'. To explain the diversi-
fication trend we must examine the relative roles of the firm and the market in 
organizing production, explain the limits of the organizational function of the 
firm and suggest why these limits may recede over time. 
Coase (1937) viewed the organization of production within the firm as an 
alternative to organization by the market, the former being distinguished by the 
existence of the entreprenurial direction of factors of production as opposed to 
their movement and co-operation through price incentives to individual input 
owners. Planned production within the firm will replace market organization 
whenever the costs of managerial production are less than the costs of market 
organization. Marginal managerial costs tend to rise (due to control loss or 
rising supply prices of inputs), the firm will therefore 'expand until the costs of 
organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of 
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carrying out the same transaction on the open market or the cost of organizing 
in another firm' (Coase 1937, p. 295). 
Thus multi-product will tend to replace single product firms whenever 
production in multi-product firms with input allocation between divisions by 
managerial direction can be carried out at less cost than production in single 
product firms with allocation of inputs between products by factor markets. 
Over the post-war period the costs of production by multi-product compared to 
production by single product firms will have been reduced by: 
(i) the increasing emphasis on the financial, marketing, product development 
and distribution activities of the firm relative to physical production -
since these 'head office' functions tend not to be highly specialized to 
individual products and, because they have fairly large minimum efficient 
sizes, there tends to be economies from multi-product operation; 
(ii) the developments in management technology in the form of information 
handling systems and new forms of corporate organization, such as the 
multi-division structure, have tended to reduce the costs and increase the 
efficiency of the multi-product firm relative to the single product firm. 
The analysis of A1chian and Demsetz (1972) suggests that diversification is a 
natural direction of growth for established firms even without the changing 
relative costs of organization required under the Coase theory. Alchian and 
Demsetz attribute the existence of the firm to the need for a monitoring of input 
productivity to ensure efficient production. The information collected by the 
firm on the performance of inputs in difTerent combinations provides the 
established firm with an important advantage over the new firm in the exploita-
tion of a new investment opportunity. The new firm must hire inputs individually 
in markets where information on input qualities is a scarce and costly resource, 
and, even then, information relating to individual inputs may give little 
indication of the performance of combinations of inputs. Thus, in an economy 
where new demands and new technology emerge, we can expect these oppor-
tunities for new investment to be exploited primarily by the diversification by 
established firms r~ther than by the creation of totally new enterprises. 
A theory of the firm's diversification decision 
While the theories of the organization of production can explain the tendency 
for firms to diversify over the long term in response to long-term factors such as 
the accumulation of non-marketable information by established firms and the 
fundamental changes taking place in the economy, in the shorter period the 
growth patterns of individual firms will be the result of conscious managerial 
decision-making in response to the economic conditions facing the firm. 
To formulate some simple hypotheses to explain the diversification by firms 
from one industry to another, a number of simplifying assumptions are made: 
(i) 
(ii) 
Since the concern of this paper is with the inter-industry patterns of 
diversification by groups of firms, diversification is explained in terms 
of the structural characteristics of industries ignoring the individual 
characteristics of firms which may influence the decision to diversify. 
The diversification that we shall be concerned with explaining is the entry 
of established firms into new industries. The problem is that new entry 
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can take place either by internal or external growth and the determinants 
of each will differ: the former depending upon comparative rates of 
return on new capital, the latter depending upon the acquiring company's 
valuation of the victim's assets relative to the stock market's valuation. The 
assumption here is that both forms of diversification are influenced by 
the same factors. Firms will be indifferent betwecn internal and external 
diversification either in perfect capital and securities of markets or if thc 
stock market correctly anticipates take-overs. Even in the absence of 
these conditions diversification by either internal or external growth will 
be influenced by the same industrial factors, the choice of method 
depending upon the nature of barriers to entry into the industry and the 
nature of the diversifying firm's productive resources. Merger and internal 
expansion may, indeed, be complements rather than substitutes - a 
typical pattern of diversification is acquisition proceeded by internal 
investment by the parent company.1 
(iii) It is assumed that firms operate in their shareholders' interests, maximizing 
shareholders' wealth by maximizing the market value of the firm's equity. 
This objective is adopted for its plausibility and convenience. Diversifica-
tion has often been regarded as directed towards increasing profits and 
reducing risk, maximizing share prices allows both these considerations 
to be combined into a single objective. 2 
Given these assumptions, we may investigate the diversification decision of 
the firm in terms of the attractiveness of in the firm's existing activities relative 
to im'estment in a new industry. 
The capital asset pricing model predicts that in perfectly competitive securities 
markets with no transactions costs, utility maximization by risk-averse investors 
results in equilibrium security prices being determined such that: 
where Vcr 
Vu 
r 
v. = <r - fJZrM (.\1 -- rV.,,) ~ r (I) 
is the market value of firm x's equity at the beginning of the 
period; 
is the market value of all quoted securities at the beginning of 
the period; 
is the expected vallie of Z.r. the uncertain return on VI: during 
the period; 
is the expected value of Af, the uncertain return on VM during 
the period; 
is the riskless rate of interest; 
1 The industrial pattrrn of divrrsification is similar to the industrial pattrrn of conglomerate 
merger. For the period 1958-68 the coefiicient of rank correlation between the average number 
of conglomrrate acquisition~ by ea('h enterprise in ~very SI~ order and the average measure ?f 
diversification for ~ach SIC order (measured the IIlcrease III the average number of orders In 
which each enterprise was represented) was 0,730 . 
t In fact, the assumption of motivation may not be a vital consideration in deducing the 
determinants of diversification. Hypotheses of the determinants of diversi!ic,:,tio~ on the basis of 
different objectives have bern proposed by Penrose (1959) (long run maXImIzation of profit and 
growth), Sutton (1973) (m!lnag.crial welfare satisfaeing) .. and Kelly (1,974) (pr?fit ,:"axi",lizing). 
Since diversificalton requires IIlvestment finds and slIlee managertal securtty IS ultImately 
dependent upon s?me ,mini!",allevei ofp~ofitability the different objectives imply broadly similar 
determinants of diversification. See also Grant (1974). 
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flZxM is the systematic risk of the return -(x which is 
Cov (-(x, M) 
VaT (M) 
-(x is made up of dividend payments, Wx, and the change in the market 
value of the equity over the period, Vx. Stevens (1974, pp. 322-23) shows that 
if the riskless rate of interest and the market's trade-off between risk and return 
are known with certainty in every future time period, then Vx is also known 
with certainty and equation (1) can be extended to the multi period case where 
V _ ~ W,./ - flWxt Me (J1e - TeVMe) 
xO - 1=0 (I + Te)e (2) 
Assuming dividends are equal to net profits, then for the firm with activities 
in several ind ustries: 
m 
Wxt = ~ Nett (-1 
where Hxlt is the earnings to shareholders from firm x's investment in industry 
i during time t. Substitution (3) into (2): 
V
ro 
= i ~ nXH - {lllxi/, Mt (1\11 - T,VMt ) 
. 1-01-1 (I + rt)1 
where fl Hxl/, Mt is the systematic risk of the return Hxlt • 
Thus the contribution of ~n investment to the value of the firm is equal to 
the certainty equivalent of its net return discounted at the riskless rate 01 
interest.1 For the firm operating in primary industry i contemplating diversifica-
tion into industry j, the decision whether or not to enter will depend on the 
contribution to the value of the firm from diversification: 
~ Ii.rlt - {lllx}l, MI (1\1, - rlVMt) 
1-0 (I + rt)e 
compared to that of an equal investment in the firm's existing industry: 
~ 11)·'t - {lllxl/, MI ( A1t - rtV.I/t) 
H (\ -1- rt)1 
The next task is to postulate the determinants of diversification in terms of 
observable variables so as to present testable hypotheses. 
The determinants of diversification 
The attractiveness of diversification compared to investment with a firm's 
existing activities depends upon the comparative returns of each investment and 
the comparative risks. On the basis of the above analysis and on previous 
hypotheses of the determinants of diversification, the following factors may be 
identified as influencing D/;. the diversification by firms operating in primary 
industry i into industry j. 
1 This analysis of the risk reducing role of diversification differs from that of other writers. 
Smith and Schreiner (1969) view the firm as wishing to minimize the total variance of its return. 
The conclusion derived above however is that, since portfolio diversification by investors can 
eliminate unsystematic risk, firms will seek only to minimize the variance of their return which 
is correlated with general market fluctuations. 
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The rate of growth of output in industry i (Xt) and in industry j (XJ). 
Firms will wish to diversify from industries offering a low return on new 
investment to industries offering a high return. A major determinant of the 
expected long run rate of return on investment in an industry will be the 
rate of growth of demand for the products of the industry. If expected 
future growth rates are based on current rates of growth of output, we 
should expect Dtj to be positively related to Xj and negatively related to 
Xt. 
The marketing effort (M1) and research and development effort (Rj) of 
firms classified to industry i. Marketing and R&D inputs may have several 
influences in increasing the expected profitability of diversification: the 
indivisibility of marketing and R&D inputs will tend to offer economies 
from multi-product operation, managerial expertise in marketing and 
product development will help the diversifying firms in overcoming entry 
barriers to other industries based upon differentiation, while R&D will 
tend to give rise to unpredicted innovations which cannot be applied in the 
firm's existing markets and can only be effectively exploited through 
diversifying into a new industry. On behavioural grounds Penrose (1959) 
and Sutton (1973) have stressed the role of marketing and technical 
personnel in stimulating search activity for new investment opportunities. 
The similarity in research and marketing efforts between the industries 
i and j (R;j, Mtj). If the R&D and marketing involvement of the firm 
provide an incentive for diversification through economies in these 
activities and through the ability to successfully overcome barriers to entry, 
we should expect that diversification from industries characterized by high 
marketing and R&D expenditures would be directed towards entry into 
industries with similar characteristics. Similarly, firms diversifying from 
industries with limited experience in innovation and marketing will tend to 
prefer entry into industries with similar low intensities of research and 
marketing, shunning industries characterized by aggressive promotional 
and technological competition, should therefore be positively related to 
MtjandRtj· 
The systematic risk in the firm's primary industry and outside industry 
(Pt, Pj). The effect of a firm's investment upon the value of its equity 
depends not only upon the expected return of the investment but also upon 
its systematic risk. Other things equal, diversification would be from low to 
high risk industries. The assumption made here is that the systematic risk 
of the returns on investment in industry i by a firm is equal to the syste-
matic risk of the return on the shares of companies within industry i. The 
systematic risk is an ex ante concept based on the probability distribution of 
expected returns, the estimates of systematic risk for individual industries 
are based on ex post returns on industry share indices. 
The profits of firms classified to industry i. Because of the costs of using the 
capital market, the constraints on borrowing and the large investment 
necessary for diversification, the ability to diversify is likely to be dependent 
upon the firm's generation of internal investment funds. Two factors will 
be important in determining the profits of a firm: firm size (S,) and the rate 
of profit in the firm's primary industry (Pj ). 
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To summarize our predictions: 
++++++ ++ 
DIJ = J (X" Xi> M" Rj, Af'f' Rtj, Bt, Bj, St, PI) 
where the signs show the ceteris paribus impact on diversification of an increase 
in the value of each of the independent variables. 
Empirical testing 
The above hypotheses of the determinants of diversification were tested using 
measures of DII derived from Census data on diversification betwecn the 17 
manufacturing orders of the SIC. Two measures of the diversification between 
industries i andj may be calculated: 
Dt} the increase in the proportion of the enterprises classified to industry i which 
also operate in industry j; 
D,j the increase in the proportion of the net output of enterpriscs classified to 
industry i which is of the products ofindustry j. 
For the purpose of examining firm's diversifying decisions D,j is the 
appropriate measure since it measures the entry of firms of industry i into 
industry j. 
I. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
The major deficiencies of the da ta were: 
The shortness of the five-year time period. 
The broadness of the SIC orders. The diversity between firms and their 
outputs within orders may be so great as to render average measures of 
diversification and other industry variables meaningless. While a finer 
industrial classification would certainly have been desirable, broad 
grouping should not completely obscure the systematic factors which 
determine diversification. An empirical study by Gort, Arora and 
McGuckin (1973) shows that using U.S. two digit industries (comparable 
in breadth to SIC orders) average diversification is a meaningful concept 
and valid conclusions on company decisions to diversify may be drawn. 
The measure of diversification includes vertical integration which is 
considered a special type of diversification and is likely to be influenced by 
factors additional to those influencing diversification between technically 
unrelated industries. 
For 36 observations Dtj cannot be calculated owing to undisclosed figures. 
The bias imparted by the omitted observations was particularly evident 
in Order IV (Coal and Petroleum Products) where the only calculable 
observations were zero. As a result Order IV was omitted. 
Multiple linear regressions of the 192 observations for which data was 
available gave the results summarized in Table I. Details of the measurement 
of the different variables are in the appendix. Equation I includes all the 
postulated independent variables, equation 2 excludes the marketing variables, 
equation 3 omits the other variables whose regression coefficients were not 
significantly different from zero. 
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T ABl.!~ I 
RESULTS or REGRESSION .'\:"!;\LYSIS 
---------_._------------------
Regressiun I 
- all ,'aria!:Jlcs 
XI 0.3257 
(1.5437) 
X; 0·35.')8 
(/.16,0) 
RI :0:3·379 
(I.7867) 
Ilf! -7.62 7 
(-'1.1737) 
Rlj 1O.~')2 
(2·t"gh,! 
Alij -1.263 
(o·3it;2) 
p, 5.3610 
(J.l:lg8 ::) 
PJ 4. 11151 (1.1600) 
... 
vi -0.0(1540 
( -0·3954) 
1'/ 0.02116 
(t .g020) 
Cocf:i..:;elll 
ofmultip!e 0·43 1!) 
correlation 
F\'alue g.yl/Ol 
Regres>ion '1 
- markl'lillg 
variables cxdllurd 
0. 2633 
(1.29~3) 
0·3.)13 (/.6HlIo) 
IH)98 
(1.37 26) 
10.111 
(~L11193) 
5·9::19·~ (::1.1366) 
4.°975 
(1.1543) 
0.00304 
(0.:.l636) 
0.0234 
(2.tI031) 
4·7437 
Regl't'ssion 3 
(t values in brackets) 
- insignificant 
variables excluded 
04i29 
(2.53511) 
16.616 
(3.°15 1) 
~·5671 
(2':H78) 
0.0116 
(dl83') 
6·9597 
The poor exph!natory power of the equations indicated by the low coefficients 
ofmll\tiplc correlati·')n is to be expected given the highly aggregated f(Jrm of the 
data and the exclu~ion of the many variables likely to influence diversification. 
The excluded variables fall into two groups: the str'Jctural and managerial 
chd.racteIistics of individual firms, z.nd industlY variables which have a lesser, 
though po~~ibly far from insignificant, impact on the attrnctiveness of diversifica-
tion by firm~. Exampics from this latter group incilHle concentration in primary 
and receiving indmtrics whicil wili affect the competitiv(, reactions of other 
firms, and the extent of unexploited eCOl:omi\~s of scale in firm's primary 
indu5trie~. I\everthekss tht: results do provide some illumination of the industry 
charact~ri5tics aiTecting dh'ersincation: 
I. Divcrsificadon wa:; dirt~cted to· .... ards high growth indu~trics (the coefficient 
of Xl is po~iti\'e and significant), though low growth in the firm's primary 
incu:;tries provided flO obser\'a~)k incentive to diversification. High sY5te. 
matic risk in firm/ primary industries, on the other hand, did stimulate 
I 
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div'.:r~;r.l,;dtion even though high risk i;, receiving indur,trics provided no 
ohvio1ls deterrent to diversifying firms. 
2. R & n st.-oJlgly imlucnccd divcrsificntion, R &. D effort in firms' prilllill'Y 
indust.ries stimulated divers:iication (R, positive and ~ignificant) and 
diversification was encourabed by a similarity in the degree of t~dl!lO­
logical progrrs,.iITlleS!> IA·tween illdu~ll'ies (R,j p,)sitivc and significant). 
The m,.rkcting funct;o;l, convrrsdy provides 110 corresp0l'd!ng ~ynt'rgistic 
impc,ols towards di',crsification (.\!I and .Hjj were imignific:mt), although 
it is possiblc thal marketing may act as a stimlllus to narrow spectrum 
divcl",ification \\·ilhin fIrms' primary ordas . 
3· The posit;·;c inl1uence of proilt:lb!lity wggc~ts th:lt the availability of 
internal finance docs constrain diversification. However, this conclllsion 
would imply th;;.t firm ~ize shoulJ abo h,n"c a positive influence (SI was 
clearly imignificunt).;\ possible explanation f0:' the absence of the inlluence 
of firm ~i/.e is the time period ch'Jsea: a SilTlllar analysis lor the period 
1953-(;3 ~hows di\'er~ificatioll to be strongl\' related to firm size. 
Dil1trJi./icatioll Illld ::o1lomic performa1lce 
(i) competition 
The :T.::Uor concern of economists over diversification has iJe("n clirectl:d at the 
possible anti-competltive dTccts of diversification b)' large comp .. Lllics. The 
above al:a1ysis provides no evidence relating to the competitive ctTcct1l of 
divI'r.;ifbdl)n. I t is worth noting, however, that the scarcity of direct e',idence 
of diversification reducing competition su~g~sls that thi~ concern is ov .. r 
exaggerated. Indeed in the U.K. where oligopolistic collusion is the rcsult 
chiefly of the adherence by firms to traditional f,ricing and marketing practices, 
diversifyin~ cntry by outside firms, whether by new entry or acquisition, is 
likely to sharpen competition. . 
(ii) technical progress 
The major result of the empirical analy~is is confirmation of the relationship 
reported by Arney (19G41, Ha~sid (1975), and Goreki (1975) divcrsifil',ltion i~ 
closely related to R&D dr.)r!. The ~ncouragernent to di\'Cl'sifieation Riven by 
hierh levels of R&D eXflenditure ar.d the tendency for firms operating in o . 
industrif's with high R &. D expenditure to divcrsify towards inclustri(~s with 
a silUilar R {:.;. D dr'Ji t suggc>t> th"t c!i..-cr:ii(\cation ctTe;-:; opportu~itics fcr the 
exploitation of scale ecnr.omies in R&D andior that diversification take5 
place tv e~\'pk,it ir.novatior.s applic:lblc outs:dc finns' existing indu~tries" In both 
cases diversification will encourage innovation and its diffusion. 
(iii) efficiency ofresourt:1'! alic:ation between industries 
As h<lS b-:en discmscd above, corporat.:: c1ivcrsiflcation involvl's a replacing of 
!::.:t~r ~:!rhe!:: by ~'l:t!1?:;~m~t\t ;'1 ,h,. rtll,~ of :"lk,t:;."tting r~~()urr,."", hpt\vrpn 
industries. 'rhe etlicitTI\:'y cfmana~enwllt in thi~: task in relation to the clTIciency 
of the market, b the n",ost important c(ln~;derdtion for t'coHOInic pcrf~)rll1i1nce. 
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Efficiellt rc~ourcc allocation would involvc firms s\\'itchin,~ resourc"s from 
low growth to high growth and high risk to low risk industries. Table I shows 
that while diversifying cntry i~ attracted lJy :ligh growth in the outside indu:;try, 
it is also positively (thmlgh insignilicantlYi rebteel to high grr.wth in the firms' 
p!':mary ind'lstry. A better lllea"lIre or tl\l! <.Iivrr,ification between pairs of 
industries for evaluating the efficiency of resource allocation is the D,j measure 
(the incrcas~ in the proportion of the O\llj~ut of fil'lllS in industr'f i which is of 
product!': falling into industry j). Efftcient <.t1l0cation would be indicatcd by 
Di } being por,iti"ely related to tile <.Iiilcrcllce in tl.e rate Gf growth of output in 
the firm's primary industry and the r;oJ'.-prinury inc.!mtr}' (XrX1) amI n('g<ltivcly 
rdated to the ditl;~!'ence is the ~ySi.cll~atie risk of the two indilst,'il~s (Ilr Bj ). 
Least sqma'es regression giH's the results: 
D j } = 20.226 + o.llR (Xi - XI) -- IO.5:.!2 (HJ - l?;) (1.20G) (-o.Hlg) 
R = 0.°956 
Although th~ signs of:hc coemcients sllppc·rt the hypothesis that di\'er~ifica tion 
directs rcsources intu industries of higher gW\\ th and lower I'i:;k, the rodTICielJlS 
?re insignifica1't. 
This lack of a conclusive result could reflect tbe limited opportunities for 
diversification a\'aibble to finm and low gwwth industries due to their inabilitv 
to generate sufficient internal finance. But the positive rdationship LCLwec;1 
diversification and primary industry growth rate and proiitability (sec Tal,le I), 
docs not .r,can that diversification in\'ol\'cs resource misallocation. Where 
retained profits arc the major source of <.ompall)' fihance <lild retained profits arc 
a less costly source of finance than external fm,ds, then the incHicieTlt atJoc<Hion 
of inve~tment funds is inc\ itable. The wider tbe range of inwstllient opportuni-
ties open to expanding firms. then the greater is the ellicienc), of their investmcnt 
of r("tainl'd earnings Ekely to be. 
A furthr.r consideration is that tIle ?lIocation of inputs by managements 
within the multi-product firm may allow a greater intl'r-illdu~try mohility of 
reS0urccs than the redeployment ofinputs between sir.gle prod\lct firms through 
the market. In~titutional restraints anJ government policies to limit unemploy-
ment have limited labour mobility in the V.K. The "bility of the diversified 
firm to reallocate labour between the production of different products without 
incurring unemployment and avoiding the loss of rension rights and the other 
aspects ofser.iority may be important bel~dits to ellicient rewttrce allocation. 
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ApPENDIX 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES IN REGRESSION ANA.LYSIS 
D,} - the increa~e betw .. en 1963 and 1368 in the percentage (If firT'lS eh.sified to 
SIC order i with operations in orderj (from Department ofTrad~ and Industry 
'Report Oil the Census of Production 1968', Part 1.,}8, Table 47). 
XI - the pefCf'ntage growth in Tlf't O'ltpllt of the principal p\'oduct~ of SIC order 
i between 1958 and 1968. 
R/ - R&D expenditure as a percenta~e of net output by firms in order i (from 
Dept. oi Scicmil-Ic & Inciustnai KI'Search ·1:.stlmatl'S of k.esollrce~ aevoted to 
Scientific & Engineering Res('arc~ & DC\Tlopmcnt in British ~ta:1l1f~lrtllring 
Indll~tI'Y', 1958). . 
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/II, - expenditure on advertising and market research in 19G3 as II percrntagc of net 
output by firms in order i (from C('nsm of Production IgeU, Part 1'':'0, T?blc 4). 
E,i _. the degree of similarity orR & D expenditure in orders i and';. Nt) is the prodllct 
of the dilTen:nces between lhe average R&D rxpenditlll'e.for all orgers (R) 
and the expenditures for order i and ordcr';, i.e. N,) = iR,. - R) (RJ - R). !v!,i - the degree of simibrity ofJllarketing expeuditurr in ordns i and';. Calculated 
asRjj,i.e.Mtj = (M, - M) (M,- .111). 
B, -- the systematic risk of the return on equities or firms ill ind\lstry i, whicl} is the 
syst(,ll1atie risk to the firm of the return~ in this indmtry. B/ wa~ calcubtn\ as 
the regression cocflicicnt of the weighted a'"clage ralC of rl'turn on the lqllity 
of firms classified to ~rc order i on tIl" rat~ ofr(·tlll'lI ol'tl1(, mark!·t index, The 
1'T Actuaries indllstry indiCt,s WtTe uy·d as IlH'aSUf'es of il1du~tr)' rates of eqllity 
returns and in the case of Tim her, Clothing and Footwear, and Le<lthcr, specht! 
indices were calculated. The FT all-share index was u~{"d as the l11arkct index. 
Quarterly data for Ig£i2-67 wI're llsed, 
S, - average net output in 1963 oft'ach enterpl'i~e in order i. 
P, - 'profit' as a percentage of output in order i in 1 ~fj3, whrrr 'l'l'0fil' "'" n('t 
output - wages and salarics - payments for certain servic('s (frOlI! C('mus of 
Production Ig68, rart 156, Table 5). 
275 
'PAPER' 6 
Applied Economics, 1981, 13, 205-214 
! I I 
The relationship beflveen risk and rate of 
return o~~ capital in U I( industry 
I 
R.M.GRANl' 
City University Business School, London, UK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Th~ dcte~inant~ of differences in profi~ ratcs 1J(.t~·ecll industries hds been a ii(:id ('f 
considerahle research effort hy industrial economists. Studies have been concclflcd with 
relating profit (as a percentage of sales or capital) to structural variables thollght to confer 
market power-seller concentration and barriers to entry.l One ((!ason f,)r the inconclusive 
results of thC50C studies, parliculariy in the UK, may be the implicit assumption that the 
competitive rate of profit is constant between industries. In reality the competitive ratc of 
profit will vary according to the degree of risK in the indu~try. Moreover, in the absence of 
any general theory of price formation under oligopcly, there are stronger thc(lretical 
reasons for expecting rate of profit to be related to risk rather than to seller conc~ntr<it;on. 
A further re<'50n for studying the relationship betw.:cn risk and the competitive rale of 
profit is to as~ist agencies of competition and regulation in estabii~hing 'fair rates of 
return' for individual companies. In the UK, government agencies have tended to identify 
'fair rates of return' with the average for industry as a whole with no quantit:Hivl! account 
being taken of risk. This paper eX<imines firstly the appropriate measure of risk which 
determines the competitive rate of re'urn on capital: the approach taken is to identify a 
firm's competitive rate of return on capital with its cost of capital, the rcJevant risk is 
therefore the risk on all the firm's securities; this is measured by the risk of the return on 
the firm's equities (ldjl~sted to take account of the risk arising flOm financial leverage. 
Secondly. the extent to which differences in the rate of return on capital for 88 UK firms 
in 12 broadly competitive industries can be attributed to differences in levels of risk: the 
data show a strong positive relationship between risk and return on capital at both firm 
and indu:;uy h:vei. 
The principal novelty of the paper is the usc of measures of risk derived from s~curities 
markets to explain ditierences in the rates of return on capital earned by manufacturing 
companies. Although th·! relationship between risk and return on securities has been 
subjected to extemive empirical testing, relatively few studies have related differences in 
IUK studies include Cowiing and Waterson (1976), Hart and Morgan (1977). Holtennan (1973) 
'iI".: ;~i'diiiLaJt:iI-3nirazl \ i ~n4). 
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firms' rat: of return 011 capital to risk, and these have used measures of risk based on the 
dispersion of rates of return on capital. 2 
II. COST OF CAPITAL AS A MEASURE OF THE COMPETITIVE 
RATE OF RE'fURN ON CAP!TAL 
Vndt!r pclf~ct competition the lung-run equilibrium rate of return <m capital for a firm is 
its cost of capital. A wealth maximizing finn invests to the point where, at the margin, its 
rate of return on capital is equal to its cost of capital. Where there is free entry anJ exit 
from markets, capital movernrnts between industries will eliminate quasi-rents on capital 
such that the average r31e of return for eac~ firm and for each industry is e\.juated to the 
cost of cepital for that t1Tm Cl.!ld for that industry. 
In the absem:e of uncer!~inty (and a!.suming a perfect c:lpital market) the cost of capital 
to every filln is the riskk~s rate of interest. The competitive rate of return is therefore, 
also equal to the. riskless rate of intere~t. {!nc1er \.lncrrtaip..ty the cost cf capital :c firm:; and 
the compctitivt: rute cf return on capital will vary between firms according to the degree 
of risk faf~eu by each firm as assessed t.y the s\.ippliers (If finance. 
III. THE COST OF CAPITAL UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK 
For a fin"l operatil"!g in the interests of its owners and seeking to maximize the market 
value of its securities the cost of capital (p) is the expected rate of return on the firm's 
securitie(':. For the wholly equity financed firm (i) 
Pi == E(R,) (1 ) 
where E(R;) is the expected value of tne rate of return on firm i's equity. The capital asset 
pricing model predicts that in perfectly competitive capital markets with no transactions 
costs, where investors' utility dt>pends upon the mean and ~tandard deviation of the 
anticipated returns on their asset portfolios, security prices are determined such that the 
expected rate of return on ~ecurity i, E (R.), is a linea:- function of the systematic risk of 
the rf!turn, p/ 
(2) 
2S:igler (1963) and Fi!'her and Hall (1969) examined risk as a determinant of inter-industry 
differences in rate of return on capital. Their measures of risk were based on variance of 
r~turns over time, skewness of the distrii>t't:on of returns and inter-coll1pany variability of returns. 
Such approaches in ... ol .... e: the !\rbitruy definition of a utility function for the finn. The ad\'3lltJge of 
identifying risk wi:h tne risk borne by the holders of the firm's so:curities is that It is consistent with 
::.i: ... :"~~;~,,I ,m,uruplilln oi trle firm seeKtng to c.perate in tile interests of its owners and it enables 
risk to be identified Jnd m:!asu.cd as a price oetermilled in t:,e ~ecuritles markets . 
.lFor an exp.::s:tion of the capilal asst't pncing model see Fama and Miller (1972) chapter 7. 
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where R I is th:! ri::.klcss rate of ilit~~rc:st, E (R m) is the expected ratc of return on the market 
ir.dcx, and pj is the iea!>t Sql!3d!S regression codficicnt of R; on Rm: 
cov(R j , R",) 
-;2(RUI)-
which is that part of the variance of R j which cam-:ot be eliminated by [".:>rtfolio 
diversification by investors. 
FOI the wholly equity financed firm, B is the appropriate measure of risk in determining 
both the return on a company's equity and the company's competitive rate of return (n·) 
(3) 
In the case of f:rms financed by both dt!bt and equity, the cost of capit~l is t!iC weighted 
:r;cr:l;c of tliC Chpc.;;teJ eait;) c-l r:!(Urn en the firm's SCCUrIties 
p, "=' C',E(R,) + (1 - el,) r:(D;) (4) 
wrere ~. is !hc r~~io of t~c market v;,li.e or equity (0 the market value of ,,11 t!1e firms 
securities and £(D,) is the expectt:d rate of rctl;Tn on the firm's fix('d interest s(:curitie~. 
A!.suminl! that firms are "b!e to offer !:lJfficicr.t :;ccurity for thdl fixeu interest 
borrowing that t~ey are able to borrow at the riskless rate of interest (i.e. all risks are 
bome by equity t;old~~ then E (D,) = R f. Substituting for E(R.) from Equation 2 
r.j* = Pi = R, + afiIE(Rm) -- RrJ (5) 
or alternatively 
""t - R, .". pj - Il, = afi,[E(R m) - RJ. (6). 
Thus for the firm financed by eq'Jity and debt, cost of capital and rcturn on capital in 
excess of risk free rate of interest is di{cctly proportional to «.Pi-the systematic risk of 
the firm's equity adjusted for leverage. 
The reason why aj3; is the appropriate measure of risk for determining the competitive 
rate of return of firm i, is that f3 j' the risk of firm i's equity return, reflects two sources of 
ri:;k: the inherent risk arising from firm i's operations and the financial risk which arises 
from leverage.4 Adju~tment for leverage has the .effect of eliminating the purely financial 
risk. . 
IV. ESTIMATING THE COMPETITIVE RATE OF RETURN 
The variabll!s hl EquJtio!1s 1 to 4 aoow reprc~t;nt investors· expectations and are not 
direc~lv observable. However a gOO(i. deal of empirical evidence shows that a useful 
e~timate of the ex-ante P is provideci by a Iea~t squares regression coefficient of ex-post 
~;s ',;.:l!' .;.>~ hi l:l~ ",rIO wouici De aifectea If:ler alia tly the variability of the demand for the firm's 
Drodu,~t, the capita! ir;tel"!5ily of the finn's produ.::iofl precess, uncertainty ari!oing from competItion 
in price £and :nnovation. 
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values of R, on ex-post values of R m' R f may be equated with the rate of interest 011 a short 
tenn default-free bond.s For competitive industries, the competitive rate of return un 
C3pital (x·) ca:1 be ~quatcd with the actual rate of return {;or} earned over a period of 
several years. ThilS Equation 6 may be estimated as a regression equation to examine the 
relationship between risk and return 
(7rj - RJ = a + b(aJJ;) (7) 
where the e~pectcd value of a is 0 and the expected value of 11 is (E(R m) - R J. However 
two major complications affect the estimation of the relationship between risk and return 
on capital: the first is the unrealistic assumption that finns' fixed interest borrowing is at 
the riskless rate, and the second is the problem of taxation. As regards the return on 
company debt, E(D) will invariably be in excess of the riskless rate of interest. Decause of 
the different treatment of dividends and interest under the UK tax syst~m it is necessary 
to d:st!!1g~::;h b.:t .... ccn the two typt:s of fixed interest borrowing by companies: the r('turn 
on preference shares (like that on ordinary shares) is subject to corporation t:IX but under 
the tax-credit system income tax is not levied, while the interest Oil corporate debt 
es('~pes corporation tax but is suhject to incoOlt:! iax. 
T&king these complications into account the cost of capital Equation 4 becomes 
p; :: al~(R;) + 6;E(RJ + (11 -=- B{1 - aj - B,)E(D,) (8) 
where E(RJ is the expected return on finn i's preference shares. 0 is the market value of 
finn i's preference shares as a proportion of the market value of all firm i's securities. T is 
the rate of corporation tax and t is the standard rate of income tax. 
Assuming t:,at the bond market is efficient and the best cSiimate of next period prices 
bond are cunent bond prices, E(P;) and E(D;) can he identified with the current yields on 
these securities, P; and D j • Thus Equation 8 can be estimated as follows 
n; = Q + b(rxJ3;) (9) 
where n; is the rate of a return on capital in excess of the riskless rate of interest and 
adjusted for the differences in firms' leverage .and differences in the returns on fixed 
interest securities6 i.e. 
(
1 - T) nj = 7r; - a,R, - 8Pj - "l=t (1 - a; - B,)D,. (10) 
'For a non-technical discussion of some of the empirical studies testing the capital asset pricing 
model see Modigliani and Pogue (1974). 
6In fact. the quantitative significance of the adjustments made to the naive estimating Equation 7 for 
taxation and E(D,) being greater than R I is small. The reasons are that the differences in leturn on 
loan capital between different medium-sized firms is not great and when account i .. lakt"n of the ta>: 
... '; .. autagc:s uf uei)( iinance, the cost of this source of capital is not mUl'h greater than the riskless 
rate of interest. 
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From the Stock Exchange industrial classification of th:! securities (Stock Exchange, 1976) 
12 industry grou[)s were selected. They were sekcted for their broadly competitive 
structures: (a) supplying products with a weighted average concentration ratio for the five 
largest firms of less than 60%, (b) reac;onable homogeneity in the group of products 
supplied and (c) fJlatively low entry barriers.' . 
From the 12 industry gmujJs, firms with a lIet employed capital of less than £3 million 
were excluded since small companies were unli;'ely to have highly mal kctable shares 
which might upset the calculation of b(.'ta coefficients.s In addition a few comp~nies were 
excluded either because their market share made it likely that they might exercise market 
power (e .g. London Brick was excluded from the brick indu5try) or because the main 
activity of the firms w:ts ol.ltsirle the produt.:t range 0f the i.~d~~!r)' (th'J: firm!: ::pcda!izing 
in leather manufacture and shoe retailing were excluded from the footwear industry, and 
nlln!> proJuc.:ing mainly speciali~t papers (e.g. Eucaiyptus Pulp Mills Ltd and Transparent 
Paper Ltd were excluded from the paper industry), 8R firms Jem<liflp.c.i. 
A least-squares regression of Equation 9 on the individual company data gave the 
following result 
n; = -11.804 + 20.515 a,P; 
(2.855) (4.405) 
where R 2 is 0.1857, the F value is 19.405 and the T values are shown ill brackets. 
The regression result shows risk to be a highly significant determinant of return Oil 
capital (significant at thl! 1 % level). The low R ~ is to be expected in view of the large 
number of other fadors influencing thp profitability I)f individual companies (notably 
efticiency). The signtficant negative sign of the regression constant is contrary to the 
predicted value of zero. The major reason is probably that the measures of return on 
capital and cost of capital are not entirely consistent with regard to changes in the price 
level. Cost of capital was estimated on the basis of monetary returns unadjusted for 
inflation. Return on capital however was measured on an historic cost basis whkh 
excludes from profit the increase in the value ~f capital assets arising from inflation. Thlls 
the return on capital was.understated compared with cost of capital, but there is no rcason 
to believe that this would significantly effect relative returns on capital bet' .... een industries 
'Fer three industries, the illdustric~ defilll!d in the Stock Exchange's classification were narrowed in 
order to limit the range of products covered, thus: the Contracting industry was narrowed to 
HOllsetlllilding, Paper and Packaging to Paper, and Meat Wholesaling was di~tingui5hcd from the 
Food Processing industry. . 
SA major problem of calculating beta coefficients arises from the bias arising from the 'non-trading 
effect'. For thinly-traded shares, the prices published in the 'Offid3l D:lily List' may relate to 
transactions many days earlier. "lbe result is to bias beta estimates downward for the shares of small 
companies or other companies with a relatively small market for their shares. The beta estimates 
!!s:~ !o.::rc r.i;:.k~ u" c;.::" ..... i .... .:. :ul ,:ic IJlH,-"clJi,lg eli<.;\:!, in:I'~c ti,e uCl:ision to eltduue smail 
eomoanies from I.he sample. The prob!'!m of the non-trading effect in relation to UK share <!Ilta is 
di~~~ed by Franks el al. (i 977). 
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Fig. 1. Industry averages for udjusted exCt'ss ralc of return Oil capital (£1) ar.d risk (ap). 
and between firms. In addition it is aiso likely that because of increa~es in comp,,,"y 
taxation, price controi and econcmi~ recession, return on capital earned by UK industry 
as a whole eluring the. early 19705 w~s below the competitive ratc. Estimates by Flemming 
et !II. (1976) show that between 1973 E'nd 1975 real post-tax rate of return on capital fell 
below leal cost of c3pitaJ by a substantial margin. 
Grouping the company data bto 12 industry average!! eliminates i:1tra ·ind:J~try 
v?riations in rrofitabili~ and i.1creases the Rl between risk and rate of return to 0.7152. 
Regression results for the industry averages are not shown since no additional inform~tio:l 
is added to the indi\'idual company data and industry groupings give disproportionate 
weight to the indllstries with few firms. Fig. 1 shows the risk and rate of return for 
individual induslrie~ i:1 relation to the regression line plotted for individual company data. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The competitive Tate of return O!l capital for a finn is equal to that firm's cost of capita\. 
C.ost of capital varies oetween firmsaccoraing 10 risk ,,( firm's securities as perceived by 
investors. Assuming that firms can borrow at the riskless rute and there io; no taxation, 
cost ci capital (and therefore, return on capital) is a linear function of the systematic risk 
of the firm',; equity weighted by the firm's equity to debt ratio. In the absence of these 
assumptions, rerern on c3pital mllst lIC adjusted to maintain the linear rdation between 
risk and retum 011 capital. For 12 cOll!petitivdy-stntctured UK industries risk was a highly 
significant and quantitatively important explanation of ciiffere!!t;I!S i:-: r:t:: c! ;.:::umi on 
capital fer th~ period 1971-75. Risk was also signifi.:ant in explaining the differences in 
rehlill on cepitaJ earned by inci\'idual firms ill these industries, although there the amount 
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of variation cxplamrd was mudl smaller. The results suggest that the weak e"planatory 
powt:( and inconsistent results of models ' .... hirh have been used to relate differences in 
profitability between UK industries to differences in m:uket structure may he dUI!, in palt, 
to a failure to take account of risk differences between industries. 
APPENDIX. 
Industry and Ccmpany 
BRICKS 
G. II Do>vlJing 
Ibstock Johnson 
Maidenhead Inveslm"!ntl' 
Red!and Ltd 
Iod,jstry (lvt'ragr 
PAL"1T 
Blu[lddl PerlTlogl&ze 
Camrax Holdirlgs 
Dufay Ditumastic 
International Paint 
Leyh10d p .. int 
D. MacPherson 
Manders Holjir.gs 
Industry average 
'nMBE;{ 
A3ron~1l B~os. 
Bambergers 
Browl1lee 
J. Carr (Dor-croster) 
Hollis and ESA 
International Timber 
J. Lathttrn 
Magnet an..! Svutl:ems 
Wm. Mallinsons 
May and Ha'iY!lI 
Mont!!g'Je Meyer 
Parleer Timber 
Pheonix Timber 
Sauah Timber 
Industry average 
HOUSEBUILDING 
Belt Bros. 
r:&j'~i"t~ 1 IG'!~:[t'65 
D. Charles 
AYcrage rate 
of h .. tuTn Oil 
capital (7r) 
(%) 
14.3 
23.5 
9.8 
26.2 
15.1 
19.8 
11.6 
15.6 
12.5 
11.4 
14.9 
27.3 
16.6 
12.1 
IS.7 
12.3 
13.0 
13.1 
26.4. 
16.0 
21.9 
14.8 
21.9 
]4.9 
28.4 
29.9 
21.6 
19.2 
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Adjusted excess 
return 011 Risk 
cllpital (If) factor 
(%) (ap> 
4.0 0.810 
13.1 1.131 
-1.1 0.650 
15.8 1.078 
g.O 0.917 
4.7 0.594 
9.5 1.151 
1.3 0.507 
5.2 0 . .527 
2.1 0.910 
O.S 1.093 
4.2 0.868 
4.0 C.808 
16.0 0.922 
3.1 1.063 
1.8 0 . .520 
5.4 0.967 
1.4 0.963 
2 . .5 0.781 
2.8 0.748 
16.0 0.921 
5.S LOS 1 
11.3 0.896 
4.4 1.068 
11.6 0.934 
4.6 0.792 
18.1 0.968 
7 . .5 0.900 
19.6 0.744 
10.2 0.045 
8.9 1.140 
... ~ 
( 
I 
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: I I Average rate Adjusted excess 
I I of return Oil return on Risk 
t I capital (If) capital (If) factor I, Industry Rf1d Company (%) (%) (ap) !/ 
.' 
j f .. ir.il..!w Estates 56.4 46.1 1.027 
/ M. J. GiceS':m 14.0 3.7 1.0J3 
/ Grca\'cs Organization 21.9 11.6 1.293 
/ Baa:!!t Developmer.!s 19.6 8.9 1.151 
I Crouch Group 13.8 3.5 1.275 
R. M. Douglas 19.0 8.7 0.882 
Higgs and Hlll 12.5 1.6 0.889 
H. C. Jones 18.9 8.6 0.975 
London and Northern 13.7 3.2 1.060 
Y. S. L.,ve!! 14.0 J."1 0.797 
Onne Dt:ve!opments 30.7 20.2 1.213 
Ward Holoings 13.6 3.3 0.986 
G. Wimr:>eY 17.1 6.8 ) .180 
Industry average 10.5 1.031 
FOOTWEAR 
Chamberlain Phipp!> 13.6 3.2 0.586 
Church and Co. 20.1 9.8 0.788 
K. Sho~s 16.9 6.4 0.821 
Norvic Secs. 8.5 -. 2.2 0.739 
Stead and Simpson 11.7 1.4 0.947 
Ward White 10.5 0.1 0.855 
Jndusfry average 3.1 0.789 
BOILERMAKERS 
Babcock and WikolC 11.4 1.0 0.874 
Clarke Chapman 11.4 0.8 0.848 
Green's Economiser 15.1 2.5 0.683 
In~ernatiollal Combustion 11.4 1.1 0.708 
Indu~try average 1.4 0.778 
MECHANICAL HANDLING 
Acrow 13.1 2.5 0.846 
Bamford:; 8.2 - 2.1 0.734 
Blackwood !fodge 19.1 8.7 0.911 
H. Blammer 28.4 18.1 0.676 
J. H. Fenner 21.4 11.1 0.978 
Herb~rt Morti~ 4.6 . - 5.8 0.;61 
Stothert and Pitt 6.6 - 4.3 0.892 
Industry average 4.0 0.828 
PtnYfPS AND VALUES 
Amal. Power Engineering 12.3 1.7 0.969 
British Steam Spec. 16.5 6.0 0.697 
Hopkinsons Holdings 11.4 1.0 0.894 
Martonair 29.4 19.1 0.876 
i't:gic;;r nalll.!n;h:y 20.2 9.8 1.036 
Spirax S"rco 20.2 9.8 0.711 
IndustT'j average 7.9 0.864 
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I I 
i A veragc rate Adjusted e"Xce:!.s 
I of return on return on Risk 
Industry and ~ompan} capital (If) capital (It) fa-::tor (%) (%) (:rP) 
i 
HEATING A.ND VENTILATING 
Had.::n Callier 13.7 3.4 0.824 
Hall Thennotank 13.8 3.3 0.896 
M. K. Refrigeration 41.7' 31.4· 1.004 
My!.On Group 52.3" 42.0· 1.262 
Walseley Hughes 17.2 6.8 0.913 
Industry average 17.4 0.930 
PAPER 
Alliance Adler 12.2 1.9 0.829 
Assoc. Paper Mills 8.4 - 2.3 0.521 
Bemrose 14.7 3.4 0.964 
Bunzl 17.4 7.1 0.375 
Cutler Guardbridge 7.5 - 2.8 0.808 
Dickinson Robinson G.-oup 15.6 5.1 0.883 
Ea~: Lanes. raper 9.5 -1.1 0.571 
Invercsk 6.8 - 3.7 0.838 
Reed ar.d Smith 6.7 - 4.2 0.553 
Industry average 0.4 0.771 
WOOL TEXTILES 
Ailed Textile 16.6 6.3 1.011 
British Mohair 9.7 1.3 O.iS04 
Bulmer and Lumb 7.8 - 2.5 0.812 
Dawson Int. t2.8 0.9 0.565 
J. Foster and Son 7.6 - 2.9 0.821 
J. Haggas 26.1 15.8 0.844 
Illingworth Morris 8.6 - 1.9 0.722 
Parkland Textile '.~ 9.9 0.4 0.849 
Sirdar 14.0 3.2 0.688 
Industry average 2.8 0.791 
MEAT WHOLESALING 
FMCb 12.9 1.4 0.503 
·Years 1973-75 only. 
bAli other firms in this industry were excluded on the basis of sma!! size. 
Calculation of the variables 
Averp.ge rate cf return on cavltul (If) was profits net of depreciation befvre interest ar.d 
after tax as a proponion of average capital employed for the years 1971-75. (Source: 
De~t o! bdu5~'y :;:;t vf :>lC11l0aruizc:d company accounting information). 
System:atic ris~ or ordinary shares (fi) were calculated by Datastream International I..td. 
The beta coefficients were calculated by simple linear regressions of the returns to each 
214 R. M. Grant 
security on the returps to a market index of 1000 ordinary shares. The returns were 
measured ior 52 periods of 4 weeks (i.e. over 4 years) up to Jallu",ry 1976. 
The riitio of ~uity to the v.&lue of aU securities (a) was calculated at the market 
valuation of securities at January 1976. 
Rate or return G~ cnpital in ex('~. or the rl'iklcss l'8te, adjusted for wation and fixed 
interest yidds (n) was calculated from 1t and R I as indicated in Equation 10. 
The riskless rate I of interf'.st (R t) was identified with the rate of interest on 3 month 
. 13"1 I Treasury u s.: . 
I 
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PAPER 7 
THI: MaNO~OllES COM~JlISSION Ar~D THE RATE OF RETURN 
ON CAPITAL: A COMMENT 
i 
R.M. GRANT-
I 
The recent atucle by O.A. Bello (I) criticises the use by the Monopolies Commi-
ssion of the ~verage rate of return on capital for industry 3S an indicator of the 
reasonllble rate of profit fOT a monopoly supplier, and 3fbues that the regulation 
of a firm's profitabIlity with reference to such an average will result in a failure 
to maximbe economic welfare. The purpose of this note is to poin t oul lhat 
Bello's criticisms are founded on an erroneous view of the use mad:! by the 
Monopolies Commission of rate of return comparisons and a misconception 
concerning the purpose of such comparisons. While Bello's chief result, thlt the 
regulation of a monopolist's rate of n:turn on capital results in a welf;ue loss. is 
th~oretically correct, the primary prohlem which the Monopolies Commission 
faces in mine the accounting ~3ta for dominant firms i~ to infer the cxr!oitat;on 
of monopoly power. To this elld Bello's suggestion that a finn's cost of capi tal is 
the appropriaie indicator of the "reasonable" rate of return on capital deserves 
careful consideration. 
Bello's criticism of the Monopolies Commission'5 lise of compalisons of rate of 
return on capital seems to stem from two fundamental misund~rstandir.gs: 
1. that the average rate of return on c(lpital earned by manufacturin3 industry 
is a guidepost used by the Commission for defining the reasonable rate oi return 
for a monopoly supplier. The practice of using the avera£e retUl1l for industry as 
a public interest guidl!post was attributed to the Commission by Rowley (2), and 
Bello perpetuates this m>1h dE-spite the cautions which llave been expre~-;ed by tile 
Comnussiou concerning the interpretation of such comparisons! • In the Breakfast 
Cereals Report (3), for example, the Commission noted: 
"These average figures for manufacturing industry as a whole a.'1d for the 
food industry show that Kellogg's recent profits. , . are high compared to 
those of other companies, we regard the averages as no more than a yardstick 
for the purposes of making comparisons .and not as providing any firm 
indication of the -maximum level of profits ,,'ruch migh t be considered 
justifiable", (para 95) 
The fact that averages for industry are not regarded by the Commission as 
defming a reasonable or desirable r~te of return for a company is deai from a 
reading of the Commission's conclusions to its monopoly reports. In the reports 
"The author is Lecturer in Business Economics at the City Unillersity Business 
School. (Paper receil'ed January 1978, revised May 1978) 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 5,4(1978) 387 
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on Cat and Dog Foods (4) and Electrostatic Rcprographic Equipment (5), the 
return on capital earned by Pedigree Pet foods and by Rank Xerox were not 
criticised despite their being, respectively, about three times and about twice 
the average for manufacturing industJy. 
2. Bello assumes that~ not o~y has the average rate of return been u!>cd to indicate 
the "reasonable" rate of return, but that the average rate of return has been used 
by the Commission to regulat\! the prices and plofits of dOlllillarit finlls. TIlis vit!w 
not only confuses the primarily investigatOlY role of the ~fonop(llit:) romnaission with 
the more rcg1l1:ltory flmction exercised by·the Office of·Fair Tracing. but is mis-
guided with regard to the kinds of recommendations made by the Commission in 
its reports into dominant firm monopolies. In general the COll1l11issi;)n's preference 
has been for measures which stimulate competition (e.g. through the redu::tion of 
entry barriers) as opposed to the direct regulation of prices and profits. In the 
rdotively small number of cases where the Commission has rewrnmcr,deu a 
r;::duction i:l the pr::;c~ and pofit~ of a do:rjr.:nt f:rr:-!, ~~Y!:r h::!s t!~~ C~\~mi~sio'1 
recommended that the prices and profits should bl: reduced to the point where 
the firm i~ earniug a return on capitai which is the average for illou';lry as a whole1 . 
Thus a major conclusion of Bello's paper, that the use of the average return on 
capital to regulate the profits of monopoly firms will .esult in the regulated finn 
selecting input proportions that are not welfare maximising. is of limited interest. 
The purpose of the Monopolies Commission's comparisons of a firm's return . 
on capital with some average for industry has been to determine whether or not 
the firm has exploited its monopoly position to charge prices which are above the 
competitive level. To this end the Commission normally considers a variety of 
evidence. In addition to comparisons of return on capital, the Commission 
normally considers profits as a proportion of sales revenue, the firm's prices in 
relation to th-::se of competitors, and changt's in pric'!s over ~jrne ill relation to 
costs and general price indices. 
The problem of inferring the existence of monopoly' profit from a comparison 
between a dominant firm's return on capital ytith that of manufacturing 
industry as a whole is indeed immense. In an economy in long run equilibnum 
in the absence of uncertainty and efficiency differences between firms then 
differences in rate of return on capital (valued at opportunity cost) would 
indicate differences in market power. In practice, differences be tween a firm's 
return on capital and the industry average reflect a number ()f factors. 
In particular Bello doubts whether any economic Significance can be attributed 
to the Commission's comparisons of accounting rates of return since "book 
rates of return are poor measures of the true (DCF) rates of return" (1, p.237). 
True rates of return, suggests Bello (I, p.238), should be based upon the concept 
(If opportunity cost. nus is correct, but in its measurement of return on capita! 
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the Commission has attempted to minimise the problcm:. associated with account· 
lIIlCY rates of return. To avoid incomparabilitics due to differing accounting 
conventions between firms the Commission obtains financial dat.a on a stalldardised 
basis. 3 To deal with the divergence between accounting measures of profits and 
ass'!t values the Commission has for some years sought asset values on a replacement 
cost basis and in its recent reportc; profits have been mr3Surect on a CUHf~nt cost 
basis. 
Two further problems are (a) the difference between anticipated and realised 
rrofib (or, as Bello puts it, "ex ante" and "ex post" rates of return) due to the 
influence of random factors and (b) the absence of long run eqUilibrium in the 
economy which may result in firms eaming short term profits above or bc;low 
their long run rates due to fluctuations in demand and other dynamic factors. 
By averaging rat..:s of return over a fiye or six year period both of these problems 
are partially alleviated. 
As regards risk, Bello states that "to argue that the dominant firm shouhl earn 
... n a-.eragc rate of return implies that the firm is suojed to average ri~k" (i ,p.238). 
Tills is true, but in comparing a firm's return to the av~rage for industry the 
Commission has attempted to take into account the riskines!I of a firm's 
operations. In several enquiries the monopoly supplicrs have claimed that their 
operations were subject to high levels of risk4 • In its reports the Commission has 
recognised that high risk justifies an above average return on capital and the 
Commission has sought to evaluate the degree of risk by examining the extent 
of cyclical tluctuations in the demand for the firm's product, the capital 
intensity of production, competition and the vulnerability cf the firm to technical 
·change. 
Probably the most importan t single hindrance to the use of profit data to indicate 
monopoly pricing is the variations in efficiency b~t.,..'cen firms. Some assessment 
of the efficiency of the monopoly supplier ha~ been a feature of almost all 
domiIlant firm reports, but the Commission has not attempted in its reports to 
quantify the comparative efficiency of firms. An exception was the Cat and Dog 
Foods report (4) where the rate of return on capital earned by Pedigree Petfoods was 
adjusted to take account of a number of the company's efficient practices. 
One of the positive results of Beno's a~alysis is that the "reasonable" or, more 
correctly, the competitive rate of return on capital for a firm ~hould equal the 
cost of eapitai to that firm. Although Bello gees on to note that us;ng cost of 
capital to determine the level at which a firm's return on capital is to be regulated 
will still rc:suli in a departure in the firm's choice of input proportions from the 
socially optimal ratio. this does not detract from the value of the cost of capital 
measure as an indicator of monopoly profit. 
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_o\ssuming perfect c~pital markets and a perfectly elastic supply of capital to the 
finn, the rate of return on capital earned by a firm in competitive equilibrium 
would be eqllal ~o the firm's average cost of capital. As an indicator of the 
competitive ratelof return for an individual firm, cost of capital also has the 
advantage of taking account of the riskiness of the firm's operations (as assessed 
. by the suppliers ,of finance). The major difficulty of using cost of capital is. as 
recognised by Bdlo (I, p,239); the difficulty of estimating the co~t of equity 
capital to the tlnn. The lack of consensus among finance specialists as to the 
appropriate method of estimating cost of capital would render controversial its 
use by a pubiic regulatory body. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy tllat the Review 
Board for Government Contracts has changed from using average return on 
capital for industry to a cost of capital approach in determing UIC target rate of 
return for non-competitiye go\'crnment contracts. (9, pp 13- 23). It is not clear 
however, that the use of a cost of capital criterion would significalltly alter the 
Commission's c0!lc1usions 2S to the rea~onablelles~ of the return on capital eamed 
by monopoly suppliers. Estimates by Flemming et a!. (8) show that, when 
averaged over st!veral yeMs, tlle Jcvi&iion of the ;eOiI pest·tix rctul'il eii '''f,i!:-.l 
for manufacturing L'ldustry from reai cost of capital was small. although betwetm 
1972 and 1975 the effects of recession, price contro1 wage inflation and taxation 
combined to push return on capital significantly below cost of capital. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Bello's criticism of the u~e by the Monopolies Commission of the average rate 
of return for industry as indicating the reazonab!e rate of return for a monopoly 
supplier is unjustifieo. The Commission's reports show an awareness of the 
problems of such comparisonz 3.'l:i attempt to rniIllrnise such problems. Criteria 
other than return on capital are used to evaluate whether a firm is exploiting 
mnket power. 
2. Dello's conclusion that the use of the average return on capital to regulate a 
monopolist's prices 3Jld plOfi~s is inefficient is of limited relevance to the 
Monopolies Commission since its recommendations indicate a preference for 
measures which will encourage comp::tition ~ather than direct regulation of 
prices and profits. Where regulation has been recommended the average return 
on capital fOT industry has not been used as the regulatory norm. 
3. Cost of capital has several advantages over t. ... c a ..... eragc r::turn en capital ~ 
an indicator of a firm's competitive rate of return, but estimating cnst of capital 
postS fonr.idablc difficulties. 
NOTES 
I Bello is a!;o factually incorrect when he states th~t "These pubUc lnte!e!t guidepOits are 
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of ~ix varictiec" (1, p. 231). These six differen t bdicator~ of the rate of return on capital 
in manufacturin!( industry we:e identified by Rowley (2) and rculed to the period prior 
to 1968 wh~n the Conum~siJn wa~ in UII: p~u"";ss of developing its own scr:cs of dat'! 0"1 
thp. profitability oi manufacturing industry. 
2 Since 1960 in only five Tl'rorts has the MO:lopolics Commission critici~ed the It'vel of 
the plices a"d profin of the monopoly suppl;cr 3S excessive. These were: Elcetrkal 
Equi;->tl1I'Tlt for Lar.d Vehidt>s (Lucas and Olamrion). Co\ollr Film (Kodak). Houschold 
Detergents Wnile";!r and Plocior and Gamble), D!lordiazcpoxiJe amI Dia~cr<ln (Roeh!?) 
r.nd Contrac(!ptive Shcath~ (LonGon Ru':lber Co.). In ~ll of these cases the Cor.lmissinn 
recommero<led a reduction in price. but only ill th~ Contlaceptil'c Sh('alhs report was the 
Cllt in plict related to a rt"com:',1cnded rate ofrcturn on capital. 
3 Capital employed is m.:a'U1",d before drduction of bank II)JlIs and t.vcrdrafts. inl'cstment 
grants, pro\1siollS for lr:.x on current years profIts, and dividends proro~d and pa~·ablt'. 
but excludes goodwill snd Oth~l intal.:;jtks (~ce, for tllamplc. 6. iOO!'lot('$ to p.4S) 
CJmpar.ies· dcpr~dation figurl's ~e sometlmcs adjusted to bri!lg thl'm bto line .. i:lJ tI.e 
rates allowed hy tl'e Inland Re'!er.1.!c fc: tJ); YUipose. (7,1'.107). 
4 See the reperts on Flat Glas~. Man·maM Fi!ltP.~. Clutch ~kcb.llisrns. Cip!c\lc rille! Rods, 
Primary Datteiies and Cor.t:aceplive Shealhs. In tltt' reports (In C!utch Mechanisms. 
Cigarette FIlter Rods and indirect Flf'ctr<'<tHlo- R~pro>=:phi;:EGui~mcnt (RJnl..·X":It)~) 1111: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Commh;;ion gave particular promiJ1ence to risk as justifying ab\Jl'c :Jl'rragc rctums or. 
capital. 
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PAPER A. 1 (in Roy Jenkins ed. Britain and the EEe, 
Macmillan, London, 1983) 
6 The Impact of EEe· 
Membership upon UK 
Industrial Performance 
ROBERT GRANT 
INTRODUCTION: EXPECTATIONS AT THE TIME OF 
ENTRY 
During the years immediately prior to Britain's accession to the 
European Community, considerable attention was devoted to the 
likely effects of membership upon the British economy. Despite the 
controversy generated in the debate over membership, a substantial 
degree of consensus emerged as to the probable economic impact. It 
was clear, for example, that budgetary contributions and higher food 
prices would involve a substantial outflow on the balance of payments 
and would boost the rate of inflation during the transition period. The 
impact on the industrial sector was less clear-cut. It was generally 
considered that the effect of the elimination of tariffs between Britain 
and the EEC combined with a loss of Commonwealth, EFTA and Irish 
preferences would result initially in an adverse movement in the 
balance of trade in manufactures. The 1970 White Paper, Britain and 
the European Communities, An Economic Assessment, estimated an 
adverse movement in the non-food trade balance of between £ 125 
million and £275 million. With higher import prices for food and the 
large net budget contributions, an adverse movement in the balance of 
payments of up to £1000 million was foreseen. 
However, these impact effects of entry were generally regarded as 
being of less significance than the longer-term consequences for the 
rate of growth of the British economy. The nature and sources of the 
dynamic effects of entry were seldom made explicit. The most preval-
ent argument of the pro-marketeers was that Britain's incorporation 
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into the Community would cause her rate of economic growth to 
converge towards the higher rates experienced by the EEC(6).1 The 
mechanism envisaged by the advocates of entry was that EEC mem-
bership would increase the potential for export sales, enabling the 
country to embark upon the desired strategy of 'export-led growth'. 
Not only did the EEC provide a large and affluent market on Britain's 
doorstep, whose growth of income per head exceeded that of Britain's 
traditional export markets, but Britain's prospects among her estab-
lished customers were becoming increasingly gloomy due to erosion of 
Commonwealth preferences and the imposition of trade barriers by 
industrialising Third World countries. 
A more detailed consideration of the dynamic effects of member-
ship was provided in the 1970 White Paper. The potential for in-
creased economic growth was seen as arising not only from the ability 
of British industry to expand exports of manufactured goods but also 
from (i) the stimulatory effects of increased competition; (ii) the 
increased investment which would arise from increased competition 
and export expansion; (iii) the exploitation of scale economies, in 
particular, the benefits to technologically-based industries from the 
ability of British companies to grow to the size required for adequate 
R&D.2 
Belief in the beneficial character of the dynamic effects of EEC 
entry was far from unanimous. For example, Professor Kaldor, while 
endorsing the nature and the importance of the dynamic effects of 
entry, considered that the adverse static effects of entry in terms of an 
increasing trade deficit, a rise in domestic prices and costs, large net 
budget contributions, and loss of real income would be so severe as to 
result in dynamic effects of entry which would depress rather than 
stimulate economic growth (Kaldor, 1971). 
Despite these differences of opinion as to the quantitative impact of 
the different effects, it is apparent that at the time of Britain's entry to 
the EEC there were some clearly formulated notions as to the nature 
of the impact of membership on British industry which were based 
upon the forecast of changes in UK trade and a diagnosis of the sources 
of Britain's low rate of economic growth. In this chapter I shall 
reexamine the arguments concerning the impact of the EEC upon 
British industry in the light of almost a decade of membership, drawing 
upon recent research into British trllde performance and the deficien-
cies of growth and productivity in British industry. The main body of 
the chapter is in two sections: first, a summary of the principal changes 
in UK trade associated with Community membership; second, an 
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examination of the principal ways in which the EEC has influenced the 
growth of the UK industrial sector. 
THE TRADE EFFECTS OF EEC MEMBERSHIP 
The influence of EEC membership on British industry has occurred 
principalJy through the changes in UK overseas trade which have 
resulted from incorporation within the Community. Despite consider-
able research into this topic, definite conclusions about the impact of 
the EEC on UK trade cannot easily be drawn. All that can be observed 
are the changes in the volume and pattern of trade since entry. Not 
only are the separate 'trade-creating' and 'trade-diverting' effects 
predicted by the theory of custom unions empirically inseparable, but 
it is impossible to distinguish the effects of EEC membership from the 
effects of the oil price shocks, recession, North Sea oil, and the various 
other factors which have since 1973 so radically altered the interna-
tional economic climate and the trading position of the UK. 
The principal effects on UK trade have arisen from the changes in 
UK tariff rates consequent upon EEC entry. But even here it is 
difficult clearly to identify those changes which have directly resulted 
from Community membership. At the time of entry, Community 
membership promised a substantial fall in protection for British indus-
try - not only were tariffs between the UK and EEC to be eliminated, 
but the Common External Tariff of the EEC was on average below the 
average UK tariff on manufactures. However, the historical fall in UK 
average tariffs since 1973 overstates the impact of the EEC since tariff 
rates were declining worldwide during the 1970s as a result of the 
multilateral tariff negotiations. Of the reduction in UK average tariff 
rates between 1959 and 1977 only between one quarter and one third 
were the result of EEC membership (Morgan, 1980). Since the late 
1960s the average tariffs of the OECD countries on industrial products 
were reduced by 36 per cent in the Kennedy Round and by 34 per cent 
in the Tokyo Round, reducing rates of tariffs on most manufactures to 
very low levels (as shown in Table 6.1). 
Thus UK entry into the EEC did not involve quite so drastic a-
change in Britain's commercial relations with the rest of the world as 
appeared in 1973. Certainly the notion of the EEC providing an 
'expanded home market' for British manufacturers and a secure 
springboard for export sales to non-EEC markets fails to take account 
of the low tariff rates on manufactured goods throughout the indus-
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TABLE 6.1 Post- Tokyo Round 
average tariffs on all industrial pro-
ducts (excluding petroleum) 
US 
Japan 
EEC 
Austria 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
SOURCE OECD 
percent 
4.3 
2.7 
4.6 
7.7 
5.5 
3.1 
4.0 
2.2 
trialised world and of the non-tariff barriers and characteristic differ-
ences between national markets within the EEC.' 
Despite these various factors which might be expected to limit and 
obscure the impact of the EEC on UK trade, the evidence on the 
changing pattern of UK trade after 1973 shows a remarkable shift in 
both imports and exports towards the EEC (9) (Table 6.2). 
TABLE 6.2 UK visible trade with 'he EEe as a proponion of total UK visible 
trade 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 (04)-82 (01) 
Exports to EEe as % 
of total UK exports 
29.7 
28.1 
30.2 
32.3 
33.8 
32.2 
35.5 
36.8 
38.1 
42.6 
43.1 
42.1 
Imports from EEe 
as % total UK imports 
28.4 
30.7 
33.8 
35.7 
35.3 
38.5 
38.4 
40.0 
43.3 
45.2 
42.7 
-+3.'l. 
SOURCE The United Kingdom balance of payments, 1981, OECD internal 
paper (1982) based upon GAIT "ab. 
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How far was this shift in British trade towards the countries of the 
EEC the result of Community membership? David Mayes has meas-
ured the EEC effect by comparing the actual EEC shares of UK trade 
in individual product groups with the shares which would have occur-
red if the trends of 1962-72 had continued. Figure 6.1 gives the results 
for just three product categories. 
For almost all categories, the share of EEC (6) both in UK imports-
and the UK exports rose substantially above the extrapolated trends. 
Exceptions were imports and exports of raw materials which were not 
subject to any significant tariff changes and broadly followed the trend 
lines, exports of machinery and transport equipment whose increases 
were broadly in line with pre-1973 trends, and UK imports of trans-
port equipment, the EEC share of which had fallen, largely due to UK 
imports of Japanese cars. 
In addition to a diversion of trade towards the EEC. Community 
membership has resulted in a substantial growth in the volume of UK 
trade. Between 1972 and 1978 the ratio of total trade to GNP of the 
UK rose from 33.5 to 48.5 per cent, compared with a rise for the EEC 
(6) from 36.6 to 45.3 per cent. 
The effect of these trade changes upon the total output of UK 
industry depends most directly upon whether EEC membership has 
increased exports by more than imports. Table 6.3 shows that EEC 
membership coincided with a substantial worsening of the balance of 
trade both with the EEC and the world as a whole. For manufactured 
goods there is a similar worsening of the trade balance with the EEC. A 
clearer perspective emerges from Table 6.4 which shows changes in 
the trade balance on manufacturers as a proportion of trade. The 
worsening of the UK trade balance with the EEC on manufactured 
goods is part of a general, though less severe, worsening of the overall 
UK trade balance on manufactured goods. An adverse impact of the 
EEC upon UK trade in manufactured goods is also indicated by 
Mayes's comparisons for individual commodity groups of actual trade 
with projections of pre-1973 trends: increases in the EEC shares of 
UK imports above trend levels substantially exceed the increase in 
EEC shares of UK exports above trend levels. 
The main trade effects of Britain's accession to the European 
Community are. therefore. a substantial shift in the direction of trade 
towards the EEC. accompanied by a worsening of the balance of trade 
with the EEC particularly in manufactured goods. At the same time 
the picture is not wholly gloomy. The improvement in the overall trade 
deficit since 1977 has. of course. been largely due to North Sea oil. but 
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TABLE 6.3 UK trade balances with the world and with the EEC(9) 1970-80 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981/82b 
All goods 
World EEGa/ 
$m $m" 
- 2416 - 237 
-1590 -747 
- 2 715 - 1619 
- 8 275 -2986 
-15413 - 5 587 
-9508 -5800 
- 9918 -4295 
-6197 -4345 
-6942 -5095 
-11997 -6440 
- 3 521 -1688 
-2838 -5988 
Manufactured goods 
World EECa. 
~i $m $m 
+ 5 348 
+6853 
+ 6 211 
+3782 
+4200 
+8645 
+ 7944 
+9626 
+7541 
+3585 
+ 8933 
+5190 
+ 1020 
+735 
+41 
-707 
-1736 
-1293 
-4916 
-1542 
-2996 
-6175 
-3600 
• Measured as: EEC reported imports from UK minus UK reported imports 
from EEC. This is to correct for an overstatement of UK exports to the EEC 
arising from the British recording of exports on a consignment rather than a 
destination basis (see Morgan, 1981, pp. 63 -4). 
b 1981 (04) to 1982 (0 1) on an annual basis. 
SOURCE DECO Foreign Trade Statistics. 
even in the case of manufactured goods, the erosion of the UK trade 
surplus with the world and the increasing deficit with the EEC since the 
mid-1970s are not as dramatic as might have been expected given the 
combination of sluggish productivity growth, high cost inflation and an 
appreciating exchange rate. Indeed, Table 6.5 shows some stabilisa-
TABLE 6.4 UK trade balance in manufactured 
goods as a percentage of total UK trade in man-
ufactured goods 
World EEConly 
% % 
1970-2 + 19.3 +6.3 
1973-5 +9.6 + 6.3 
1976-8 +9.6 - 8.1 
1979-80 +4.2 - 8.6 
1981 (04)-82(01) +3.6 
SOURCE DECO Foreign Trade Statistics. 
298 
94 Britain and the EEC 
TABLE 6.5 The UK's share of the man-
ufactured exports of the 12 major indus-
trialiud countries 
Percent 
1955-8 19.0 
1959-62 16.7 
1962-5 14.7 
1966-9 12.0 
1970-3 10.1 
1974-7 8.8 
1978-80 9.2 
1981(Q4)-82(Ql) 9.0 
-SOURCE Mayes (1982, 'The Trado Ef· 
fects of the EEC', p.38, 
updated. 
tion in the UK's share of manufactured exports by the developed 
countries during the late 19705. It remains clear, however, that man-
ufacturing trade performance has deteriorated more rapidly with the 
EEC than with non-EEC countries. This may partly reflect the dif-
ficulties faced by British manufacturing industry in adjusting to the 
new environment of the EEC and also the continuing high value of 
sterling against the major continental currencies. Even when these 
factors are taken into account, however, there remains a question 
mark as to the long-term competitiveness of British manufacturers in 
the sophisticated, consumer-orientated markets of the EEC. 
EEC MEMBERSHIP AND THE GROWTH OF THE UK 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
The 1970 White Paper contended that the dynamic effects of EEC 
membership on UK economic growth would be far more important 
than the impact effect on trade. Subsequent analyses have confirmed 
this view. For example, David Mayes's survey of the trade effects of the 
EEC concluded that 'even a trivial feedback effect on to the rate of 
economic growth of the participant countries will tend to dominate the 
welfare effects of changes in trade flows' (Mayes, 1982, p. 46). 
In examining the effects of EEC membership upon the growth and 
growth potential of the UK industrial sector, I shall follow the conven-
tional approach of dividing the sources of increasing real output per 
employee between increases in capital per employee and increases in' 
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output per unit of input. This chapter focuses chiefly on the latter 
source of growth, and in particular on the impact on input productivity 
which has occurred through the effect of EEC membership on the 
extent and direction of the structural adjustment of British industry. 
INVESTMENT 
The relatively minor emphasis which is given to investment in this 
chapter reflects, first, evidence that lack of investment in fixed capital 
is not the dominant source of the low rate of economic growth in the 
UK and, second, the apparent absence of any strong effects of EEC 
mem bership upon the volume of UK investment. Since Solow's finding 
that only 12.5 per cent of the increase in US output per man-hour was 
attributable to increased capital (Solow, 1954), considerable interest 
has been shown in the contribution of investment to economic growth. 
Denison estimated that less than onelquarter of the growth of GDP per 
person employed in the UK between 1950 and 1962 was due to 
investment (Denison, 1968, p. 235), and more recently Caves found 
differences in the value of capital per worker between matched US and 
UK industries had an insignificant effect upon the differences in labour 
productivity between the two countries (Caves, 1980, p.171). The 
contribution of investment in industrial fixed capital to growth is 
extremely difficult to distinguish since investment not only increases 
productive capacity but also acts as an avenue for the introduction of 
new technology and a means of achieving the adjustment of industry 
structure. It has been argued by Pavitt, however, that the shift of 
emphasis from process to product innovation means that the linkage 
between capital investment and technical progress is becoming weaker 
in the industrialised countries (Pavitt, 1979). 
While trade expansion arising from economic integration may pro-
vide a stimulus to investment, the evidence is far from clear-cut and my 
concern here is solely with the impact of the EEC on flows of direct 
investment to and from the UK. Community membership has affected 
these, first, by removing most legal impediments to investment be-
tween member countries and, second, through the trade effects of 
EEC membership. The latter are complex. The elimination of trade 
barriers between Britain and the Community would have tended both 
to reduce two-way direct investment, to the extent that trade and 
direct investment are substitutes, and increase direct investment, to 
the extent that complementary relationships exist - particularly 
through the establishment of overseas marketing and distribution 
subsidiaries by manufacturing firms. 
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More important for the UK is likely to have been the effect of EEC 
membership on inward investment from non-EEC countries - particu-
larly from the United States. The principal argument has been that the 
popularity of the UK as a destination for direct investment has been 
increased by the ability to use the UK as a base for European 
manufacturing and distribution operations. 
Table 6.6 shows that while there was rapid growth in the flows of 
both inward and outward direct investment during the 1970s, the 
dominant directions were between the UK and North America. There 
was some growth in the share of EEC countries in inward direct 
investment to the UK, but the share of UK direct investment going to 
the EEC fell over the period. As regards flows of direct investment 
between the UK and the non-EEC countries, there was a fall in the 
UK's share of total direct investment into the OECD countries (from 
7.4 per cent in 1968-73 to 6.1 percent in 1974-8), butthisfall would 
appear to be only a continuation of a longer-term trend. It is notable 
that the UK's share of US overseas direct investment in manufacturing 
has remained steady during the later 1970s (Table 6.7) as has the UK's 
share of the US overseas capital stock (Table 6.8). 
In recent years there has been a shift in emphasis from a lack of 
investment in plant and equipment towards a lack of investment in 
TABLE 6.6 Direct investment into and out of the UK 
1970-2e; 1973-~ 1976-8':-' 1979 1980 
EEC (9) 
in the UK £m 48 95 251 270 157 
% of total 12 13 22 15 6 
by the UK fm 208 352 489 34 483 
""--'-- . 
.3i 
l % of total 
21- 'U.. , '. -- .. t1 
N . A"e.(-i~ 
, in the UK fm 271 392 681 1114 1760 
% of total 66 53 60 61 68 
by the UK fm 167 448 761 1801 1896 
% of total 26 31 34 64 54 
Total 
in the UKfm 408 734 1139 1818 2576 
by the UKfm 653 1456 2257 2788 3491 
• Annual averages. 
-
SOURCE The UK Balance of Payments, 1982. 
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TABLE 6.7 The percentage of total overseas US manufac-
turing investment in the UK 
1976 
12.6 
1977 
13.5 
1978 
13.6 
1979 
14.3 
1980 
15.8 
1981 (est) 
15.7 
SOURCE Financial Times, 2 December 1981, p. 4. 
TABLE 6.8 The percentage distribution of US 
overseas direct investment - based on end year 
stock values 
1966 1970 1974 1979 
Europe 31.6 33.5 40.6 42.3 
UK 10.5 10.6 11.4 12.6 
SOURCE International Investment and Multi-
national Enterprise (OEeD, 1981). 
human capital as an explanation of the low level and low rate of growth 
of output per employee in British industry. Comparisons of levels of 
education and training of the British and German labour forces show 
clearly the high proportion of the British labour force with no educa-
tional or technical qualifications as compared with the high proportion 
of the German labour force with intermediate qualifications (Prais, 
1981). Membership of the EEC can influence the stock of human 
capital available to British industry through the removal of restrictions 
on mobility of workers within the EEC. It appears, however, that no 
significant labour migration has occurred between Britain and other 
member countries. Compared with other European countries the UK 
has very small proportion of its labour force working abroad. At the 
same time British industry has not benefited from any significant 
inflow of skilled labour from elsewhere - the principal flow of labour 
into the UK is from the Irish Republic and largely consists of unskilled 
labour. 
Hence, the evidence both on direct investment flows and labour 
movements does not give any clear indication as to EEC membership 
having any impact upon the stock either of physical or human capital 
available to British industry. 
302 
98 Britain and the EEC 
CHANGES IN OUTPUT PER UNIT OF INPUT 
Increases in output per unit of input in the industrial sector arise from 
two main sources: technical change and structural adjustment involv-
ing the reallocation of resources from low- to high-productivity em-
ployment. 
I shall not attempt any examination of the impact of the EEC on the 
technical progressiveness of British industry. The determinants of 
technical change and the role of innovation in the growth process are 
too poorly understood and the ways in which EEC membership might 
affect technical change are too many to allow any simple hypotheses to 
be ventured or conclusions to be drawn. Nevertheless it is likely that 
EEC membership has had some important effects on technical change: 
increased competition is likely to accelerate the diffusion of innova-
tions and may act both as an incentive and a constraint upon invest-
ment in innovation, economic integration may enable companies to 
exploit economies of scale and risk spreading in R&D and may 
facilitate transnational technical cooperation. In addition the activities 
of the Community in harmonising patent law, regulating licensing 
agreements and promoting research may encourage technical pro-
gress. 
The remainder of the chapter is concerned with the influence of 
EEC membership upon the structural adjustment of British industry. 
It is being increasingly recognised that one of the major constraints 
upon the economic growth of the mature economies since 1973 has 
been inadequate adjustment of economic structures. Not only has 
there been an increased need for structural adjustment as a result of oil 
price rises, increased competition from low-cost manufacturing coun-
tries, and other shocks to the international economy, but the capacity 
for adjustment has been reduced by stagnation, inflexibility of relative 
prices and the unresponsiveness of economic units to price incentives 
(OECD, 1982). Although the problem is a general one for the older 
industrialised countries, there is evidence to suggest that the industrial 
structure of Britain is specially resistant to adjustment pressures 
(Jones, 1980, pp. 118-21). 
In examining the effect of EEC membership upon structural change 
in British industry it is convenient to distinguish between interindustry 
and intraindustry adjustment. 
Interindustry structural adjustment involves the movement of fac-
tors of production from products facing declining demand to products 
facing expanding demand. Intraindustry structural adjustment in-
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volves changes in the size distribution of plants and firms as resources 
are reallocated towards the optimal sizes of plant and firm, and the 
reallocation of resources from inefficiently managed to efficiently 
managed firms. In view of the substantial growth of trade between 
Britain and the EEC since 1973, it is to be expected that Community 
membership will have exercised a powerful influence on both aspects 
of structural adjustment. The reduction in UK trade barriers resulting 
from EEC membership is conducive to the reallocation of resources 
between industries through specialisation on the basis of comparative 
advantage. The changing identity of Britain's closest trading partners 
is likely to influence the direction of such specialisation by altering the 
nature of Britain's comparative advantages. Increased specialisation 
also provides the potential for exploiting economies of scale within 
Britain's industrial specialisms. Such economies are likely to be of 
primary importance in industries where, due to very large minimum 
efficient plant size, or the very specialised nature of the market being 
served, or the heavy costs of research and development, the domestic 
market is too small to sustain commercially viable operation. Finally, 
the increased pressure of competition consequent upon EEC member-
ship is likely to speed the reallocation of resources from inefficient to 
efficient firms within the same industry and to hasten the elmination of 
suboptimally-sized plants and firms. 
Having outlined the ways in which EEC membership might be 
expected to have stimulated structural change in British industry, let us 
look at the evidence. 
INTERINDUSTRY SPECIALISATION AI':D EEC MEMBERSHIP 
The extent of interindustry adjustment The view that adjustment of 
the structure of output of British industry to the changes in the world 
economy during the 1970s has been particularly slow is clearly re-
vealed in an analysis undertaken by the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (Table 6.9). 
The table shows that with regard to changes in value added across 
eighteen manufacturing sectors the UK ranked among the lowest of 
nine European countries during the 1970s, although the disparity was 
less marked than in the previous decade. In terms of employment, UK 
structural change remained comparatively very low during the 1970s-
probably reflecting characteristics of the UK labour market. 
If EEC membership had stimulated changes in the structure of UK 
output by inducing increased industrial specialisation, this would be 
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TABLE 6.9 Interindustry structural adjustment and growth in the manufactur-
ing sectors of nine European countries 
Structural change 
in value added at Structural change Annual % growth 
constant prices in employment of real output 
1958/60 1970 1958/60 1970 1958/60 1970 
to to to to to to 
1968/70 1978 1968/70 1978 1968/70 1978 
Belgium 10.7 10.2 6.5 7.8 6.5 3.4 
Finland 10.4 8.7 7.9 6.3 6.9 3.1 
France 9.4 13.2 7.9 6.8 6.3 4.4 . 
Gennany Ie.%.. 7.7 7.8 5.8 6.3 2.0 
Italy 9.4 6.6 6.7 5.3 8.3 2.9 
Netherlands 13.6 7.9 7.8 7.4 6.8 2.9 
Norway 9.3 9.0 7.8 7.6 5.3 1.5 
Sweden 11.2 6.8 6.7 7.4 6.9 0.7 
UK 7.7 7.3 5.5 3.5 3.3 0.7 
NOTE The index of structural change (c) is measured .:.,----- .. 
C"= );(ai2 -ail)' •. ) -------.--------------- -.--
- ~... ~~.--C-fOr~-( ail where ail is the share of branch i of output or 
employmEFJjn period 1 and ai2 the share in period 2. 
---------SOURCE Economic Survey of Europe in 1980 (New York: United Nations, 
1981). 
indicated by increased specialisation in Britain's trade. Government 
economists (Smith et aL, 1982) have shown, however, that the stan-
dard deviation across MLH industries of the ratio between the trade 
balance and domestic sales was less in 1979 than in 1970 - indicating a 
fall in trade specialisation. At the same time, however, the standard 
deviations of both export/sales and import/sales ratios increased which 
was interpreted as evidence of increased intraindustry trade specialisa-
tion. This pattern of decreased interindustry specialisation and in-
creased intraindustry specialisation was particularly evident in trade 
with the EEC. 
The apparent failure of EEC membership to stimulate any 
5ubstaqtial interindustry reallocation of resources during the 1970s is 
also/indicated by the fact that, despite the rapid growth of UK trade 
withthdEEC, the industrial composition of UK exports remained 
relativ~stable. At the same time there was a substantial change in the 
co~osition of Britain's manufactured imports. The implication is that 
-changes in the pattern of final demand in the UK were accomodated 
1--
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largely by changes in the composition of imports rather than of 
domestic output. 
TABLE 6.10 Structural change in the 
indus/rial composition of the exports and 
imports of eight European countries 
1970-8 
Exports Imports 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
16.3 
6.0 
4.2 
7.6 
8.0 
3.6 
8.8 
6.5 
9.4 
11.1 
14.1 
10.7 
9.5 
5.4 
10.1 
15.3 
SOURCE Economic Survey of Europe in 
1980(1981). 
One explanation for the comparative lack of structural change of 
UK industry could be that the UK's manufacturing sector was already 
specialised in the growth industries of the 1970s. A correlation across 
eighteen manufacturing industries of relative specialisation for each 
industry in 1970 and each industry'S rate of growth in Europe between 
1970 and 1978 gave the following results: 
France 
Germany 
Sweden 
UK 
- 0.3397 
+0.1183 
+ 0.0795 
+0.0995 
These figures show UK manufacturing industry to have been in a 
broadly neutral position with regard to industrial specialisms in 1970, 
but more favourably placed than France. 
The direction of interindustry adjustment Since in advanced 
economies comparative advantages in manufacture are not primarily 
the result of exogenous factor endowments, but are created through 
investment in capital, innovation and human skills - the consequences 
of interindustry structural adjustment for economic growth depend 
chiefly upon the extent to which the direction of structural change is 
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towards industries with the highest growth potential. On the basis of 
the UN Commission for Europe's eighteen-sector breakdown of man-
ufacturing industry, it is possible to calculate the extend to which the 
interindustry structural changes of 1970- 8 were directed towards the 
faster growing industries. Regressing the change in relative specialisa-
tion in each of the eighteen industries (flS i) on the growth rate of each 
industry (G,) gave the following results 
Constant Regression coefficient 
France - 5.594 + 1.338 
(- 0.8680) (2.303) 
Germany - 2.576 -0.06045 
(-1.371) (- 0.3568) 
Sweden - 0.4351 - 0.1630 
(-1.021) (-0.87118) 
UK + 3.986 - 0.7593 
(1:301) (-2.748) 
(t-values in brackets) 
1 he strongly negative relationship between the UK's changes in 
specialisation and growth in output reflect the fact that all the indus-
tries where the UK increased its share of European output were those 
with a stagnant or declining output. These included tobacco, clothing 
and footwear,'rubber, printing, textiles and leather. This pattern of 
spcialisation reflects a tendency for the UK to maintain its output of 
low-technology products whose output is increasingly shifting towards 
developing countries. 
To what extent, if at all, can EEC membership be held responsible 
for the failure of British industry to adjust towards the growth indus-
tries of the 1970s? At the time of entry it was believed that the affluent, 
sophisticated consumers of the EEC would provide a stimulus for the 
development of technologically-based, high-value added industries in 
the UK. An alternative view, however, would be to argue that within 
the EEC the UK represents a low-wage economy with a high propor-
tion of its labour force unskilled. To the extent that the EEC achieves 
significant protection against imports from the newly-industrialising 
countries through the Common External Tariff, the Multifibre Agree-
ment and various voluntary export restraints, then the UK is encour-
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aged to specialise in the production of low skill-intensity products. 
An indication of the failure of EEC membership to stimulate the 
development of technologically-based, skill-intensive industries is 
provided by the analysis by Smith et al. (1982) of the determinants of 
the UK's trade specialisation. While similar studies for West Germany 
and Sweden have shown human capital variables to have a strong 
impact on trade performance of individual industries, for the UK 
human capital variables only had a positive impact on trade perfor-
mance with less developed countries and had an insignificant impact 
on UK trade with the EEC. Also the R&D variable had no significant 
impact on UK trade performance. 
The service sector and the EEG The discussion so far has been 
exclusively in terms of structural adjustment within the manufacturing 
sector. However, probably the most fundamental long-term trend in 
UK industrial structure is the decline in manufacturing relative to 
services. Between 1970 and 1980 the contribution of manufacturing to 
GDP fell from 33 per cent to 23 per cent, while the contribution of the 
service sector (excluding the ownership of dwellings and public ad-
ministration and defence) rose from 45 to 50 per cent. While this 
phenomenon is common to the economic development of all mature 
industrial economies, the disparity between the relative growth rates 
of manufacturing and services has been particularly large in the UK, 
reflecting, in comparative international terms, the inefficiency of UK 
manufacturing and the efficiency of many parts of the service sector. 
Hence there is a broad consensus that the major areas of international 
comparative advantage of UK industry lie chiefly in services, for 
example, in financial services, computer services, consultancy services 
and, to a lesser extent, in shipping and retail distribution. 
The reduction in trade barriers consequent upon accession to the 
EEC would be expected to accelerate the structural adjustment from 
manufacturing into services and would be accompanied by an increase 
in the trade deficit on manufactured goods and an increase in the trade 
surplus on services. 
The problem for the UK, however, has been that EEC trade-
liberalisation has been asymmetric between manufacturing and ser-
vices. The elimination of tariffs and the reduction in non-tariff restric-
tions. on manufactured goods have not been accompanied by any 
widespread dismantling of the multifarious regulatory requirements 
and restrictive practices which have hampered international trade and 
competition in many service industries.· 
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T AI1LE 6.11 Trade in services in total and with the EEC (9) 
Credits 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Total private sector and puhlic 
corporation services (£ hill ion) 5.19 6.63 7.73 10.02 11.60 12.32 14.16 15.41 16.29 
of which EEC (%) 26 26 25 24 24 23 24 24 23 tJj 
\.v transport and travcl (£ billion) 3.26 4.19 4.65 6.05 6.99 7.11 IU5 8.98 9.13 ~. t) 
0 of which EEC(%) 32 31 30 30 30 29 30 29 28 S· 
-.0 
financial services (£ hill ion)" 0.60 0.79 1.03 1.30 1.39 1.54 1.60 1.60 1.95 $:l ::s 
of which EEC (%) 17 20 21 19 18 19 21 23 22 s:::.... 
:r-
other services (£ hill ion) 1.33 1.65 2.05 2.67 3.22 3.67 4.21 4.83 5.21 
'" 
of which EEC (%) 14 15 14 14 14 13 13 14 16 h1 ttl (') 
Balance of Service Trade 
Total private sector and puhlic 
corporation services (£ hillion) 1.20 1.60 2.09 3.11 3.68 4.41 4.48 4.98 4.75 
of which EEC (%) 4 6 7 9 11 8 10 8 4 
&Figures for financial services are net of debits (which arc negligible). 
L. 
SOURCE The United Kingdom Balance of Payments, 1982. 
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Table 6.11 provides evidence of the limited effect of EEC member-
ship on UK trade in services. Between 1973 and 1980 service receipts 
from the EEC have maintained a roughly constant proportion of the 
total from all countries and the expansion in the proportion of overseas 
earnings of the financial sector has been modest. The overall picture is 
that the EEC has remained a surprisingly small market for the UK 
service sector and has made a very minor contribution to the UK's 
surplus on service trade. 
INTRAINDUSTRY STRUcruRAL CHANGE AND EEC MEMBERSHIP 
Lack of research into the effects of EEC membership on the internal 
structure of UK industries makes it impossible to present any informed 
account of the impact on productivity of EEC-induced changes in the 
internal structures of industries. Suffice to say that even leaving aside 
the specific impact of EEC institutions upon individual industries 
(through, for example, anti-trust interventions, subsidy schemes, crisis 
cartels), the contribution of Community membership to the increased 
competitive pressure faced by most UK industries since 1973 is likely 
to have caused substantial reorganisation within industries, with im-
portant consequences for productivity. 
An aspect of intraindustry structural change on which it is possible to 
offer more informed commentary concerns the impact of EEC mem-
bership on the exploitation of scale economies by British firms. Prior to 
entry, it will be recalled, considerable weight was given to the view that 
Community membership would enable UK firms and plants to lower 
costs and improve innovative performance by growing beyond the 
confines of the home market. How far has EEC membership enabled 
exploitation of scale economies? 
Most recent research has failed to find support for this view that a 
limited home market had resulted in UK firms and plants being of 
suboptimal size. Caves's analysis of the sources of productivity differ-
ences between US and UK industries found that a variety of variables 
measuring the scale of firm and plant in UK industry had no significant 
influence on the productivity differential (Caves, 1980, p. 169). Re-
search by Prais into plant sizes in the UK, Germany and US has shown 
the presumption that UK plants were of suboptimal size compared 
with countries serving larger markets is largely unfounded. Table 6.12 
shows that across manufacturing industry, UK plant size (measured by 
employment) exceeded that of Germany and the US at the lower 
quartile and median levels. 
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TABLE 6.12 Median plant sizes by numbers of employees in Britain, Gumany 
and US, 1970-3 
Britain 
Germany 
US 
All manufacturing 
440 
410 
380 
Light industries Heavy industries 
240 
140 
210 
820 
1080 
810 
SOURCE Prais (1981) Productivity and Industrial Structure, p. 27). 
In those industries where British plant size is particularly small in 
relation to Germany and the US - in steel and motor vehicles, for 
instance - this may be a reflection not of suboptimal British plant size, 
but a smaller optimal UK plant size because of the strike-proneness of 
large British plants in these industries (Prais, 1981, pp. 261- 3). 
Even if plant sizes are below the minimum efficient level in some UK 
industries, the consequences for production cost and productivity of 
suboptimal scale of plant are small in relation to the differential in 
output per employee between Britain and more advanced industrial 
countries. Of the thirty-seven products examined by Pratten, for 
twenty-seven of them, production at a plant one-half of minimum 
efficient size involved an increase in unit cost of 15 per cent or less 
(Pratten, 1971). Prais estimated that in 1975 German manufacturing 
output per employee exceeded that of the UK by 30 per cent, while for 
the United States the differential was 200 per cent (Prais, 1981, 
pp.259-61). 
Evidence on comparative firm sizes, though fragmentary, rejects 
even more strongly the notion that one source of the UK's productivity 
disadvantage lies in small firm size in comparison with European 
competitors. Of the 500 largest companies by turnover in 1972, 182 
were British (Times 1000, 1973). Moreover, the fall since 1973 in the 
number of British firms in the 500 largest European firms shows no 
'catching-up' by large British firms which would be implied by subopti-
mal size vis-a-vis their Continental counterparts. Comparatively large 
British firm size is also indicated by comparisons of seller concentra-
tion ratios between EEC countries. A survey by the EEC Commission 
showed that for those industries where comparisons were possible, 
four-firm concentration ratios were generally higher in the UK than in 
Germany, France or Italy during the early 1970s (HMSO, 1978, 
pp.63-4). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The chief problem in examining the impact of the EEC upon UK 
industrial performance has been that a decade of Community mem-
bership has coincided with a period of unprecedented change in 
economic conditions both nationally and worldwide. Hence there is an 
acute problem of identification which is compounded by the difficulty 
of specifying the commercial and economic relationships with other 
countries which would have existed had Britain remained outside the 
Community. This chapter has not attempted to grapple with these 
problems of identification on any rigorous basis, but has simply 
examined some of the major trends and changes which have occurred 
in the 1970s in the light of some simple hypotheses as to the effects 
which might have been expected from an a priori analysis. 
The most obvious consequence of Community membership has 
been growth in the volume of UK trade and its redirection towards the 
EEC. The effect of these trade changes on total manufacturing output 
is not easy to assess. The worsening of the UK trade balance with the 
EEC in manufactured goods after 1973 must be viewed in the light of 
the long-term deteriorating trend in British trade performance, the 
continuing productivity gap between Britain and much of the EEC, 
and the adverse initial impact effects which were forecast prior to 
entry. Hence, although EEC membership has clearly failed to stimu-
late any revival in manufacturing trade performance, it is far from 
apparent that British industry would have been better placed to 
withstand the increased international competition of the 1970s by 
remaining outside the Community. 
The expansion of trade between Britain and the EEC appears to 
have done little to encourage greater change in the structure of 
manufacturing output. Even more serious, the changes in specialisa-
tion have been towards increasing concentration on industries which, 
on a _ basis, are declining. There is limited evidence that EEC 
membership may be reinforcing the tendency of British businessmen 
to concentrate upon the production of goods embodying low levels of 
skill and technology whose production is increasingly shifting towards 
the newly industrialising countries. Membership of the EEC also 
appears to have done little to stimulate the growth of those service 
industries in which Britain has a significant comparative advantage in 
relation to the other countries of the EEC. 
It was not possible to assess the impact of the EEC upon the internal 
structure of individual industries or their input productivity. One fact 
312 
108 Britain and the EEC 
which does emerge, however, is that the scope for productivity im-
provement through exploiting economies of scale of plant and firm 
level appeared limited as a result of EEC accession. 
The suggestion, therefore, is that while there have been no obviously 
disastrous consequences for the growth of British industry as a result of 
EEC~cdssion, there is no evidence of any benefits being generated. 
This~s kot to say that Britain should not have joined the EEC in the 
first place, even less to imply that the prospects for industrial growth 
woutbe enhanced by leaving. The absence of significant benefits from 
Community membership is more likely to be a failure {the British 
government and British business to exploit the opportunities made 
available btnembership, than an inevitable result of the institutions 
and policies of the Community. 
I am reluctant on the basis of the limited evidence of this chapter to 
offer prescriptions for economic and industrial policies. Some of the 
facts speak for themselves, however. The lack of structural adjustment 
and the failure of industry to establish a strong export base founded on 
technological know-how and labpur skills suggests a failure to invest in 
plant, i~vation and training. qyernment must create the conditions 
conducive to such investment. Most fundamental, however, British 
governments should seek to create greater stability in their policies so 
as to reduce the uncertainty which encourages a short-term, risk-
averse attitude among businessmen and investors. Past ambivalence of 
political parties towards the Community, and opposition commitments 
to future withdrawal have been particularly detrimental to business 
efforts to exploit the economic advantages of membership. Govern-
ments have also done little to encourage the exploitation of compara-
tive advantages by British industry, particularly where this has necessi-
tated the government taking a leading role in the shaping of Communi-
ty policies. In this context, the lack of strong pressure for the more 
substantial liberalisation of Community trade in services may be 
noted. 
NOTES 
1. As late as 1975 the CBI stated: 'the chief argument for membership of the 
EEC is the opportunity it offers of sharing in the Community's rate of 
economic growth which has long been substantially higher than that of 
Britain' (CBI, 1975, p. ii). 
2. The economies of scale argument attracted widespread support during the 
early 1970s and led to exaggerated claims being made by some of the more 
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ardent pro-marketeers. Sir Frederick Catherwood, former director-
general of NEDO, for example, envisaged that increased specialisation 
would mean that the output of certain products would be increa!>ed by up 
to five times with savings in average cost of between 10 and 50 per cent 
(Catherwood, 1973). 
3. The lack of perception of the EEC as a single home market for European 
companies is apparent from the attitudes and organisation of a sample of 
German ai!3ritish companies. See Arth~r D. Little (1979). 
4. In banking, for example, it was not until 1977 that the first Council 
directive on the coordination of banking laws and regulations was 
adopted. Ev'n Jhough most forms of overt discrimination in national 
banking regri'lation against banks from other EEC countries have been 
removed,!frs1rpparent that the seemingly uniform regulatory practices 
frequently operate in favour of domestic banks (see Maycock, 1981). 
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A SURVEY OF STRUCTURAL POLICIES AND THEIR EVOLUTION IN THE BRO AND UK 
A. Introduction by R.M. Grant 
4.1 Chapter 3 discussed some of the factors which account for the divergence in the development of structural 
policies between the UK and BRO. Among the more important were: 
4.2 
B. 
4.3 
4.4 
the greater severity of economic problems in the UK, in particular balance of payments weakness and an 
insufficient rate of industrial expansion which has made it difficult to absorb the labour displaced by 
declining industries and increasing productivity, which has created a greater need for structural policies in 
the UK; 
the influence of a more market-orientated economic philosophy in the BRO as compared with the growing 
prominence of interventionist thinking in the UK; 
the different priorities accorded to the common policy objectives of employment, balance of trade and 
growth in the two countries; 
differences in political and administrative structure and constraints. 
In this chapter it is shown how these factors have influenced the development and operation of structural 
policies in the BRO and UK by describing the main features of structural policies. 
In common with elsewhere in the report, practical considerations necessitate concentration on particular 
areas of structural policy. As explained in paragraph 1.8, the main interest is in structural policies which 
aim at the achievement of macro-economic goals, and hence we exclude structural policies aimed primarily 
at influencing the allocation of resources to particular sectors such as housing policies, transport policies, 
health and social services. In both countries the most prominent field of structural policy since the mid· 
1960s has been selective industrial intervention, particularly financial assistance for individual firms and 
industries. It is this area of structural policy upon which attention is concentrated, an emphasis further 
justified by the fact that, in relation to regional development policies, agricultural policies and compe· 
tition policies, selective industrial intervention is an area of structural policy which has, until recently, 
received scant attention from economists. 
Structural policy in the BRO 
The principles of structural policy. Before 1967 structural intervention by the BRO in industry was limited 
and consisted primarily of a collection of ad hoc measures designed to meet specific problems. In the 
immediate post-war period government intervention was necessitated by the problems of reConstruction 
followed by the need for regional assistance measures in the areas affected by partition. The problems of 
certain basic but unprofitable industries, notably coal mining and the railways influenced government 
provision of financial assistance, as did the need to develop certain technologically-based industries such as 
aircraft and atom ic power. I n general, however, structural interventions were restricted and structural policy 
was not viewed as a means for achieving such national economic objectives as growth and employment. 
The limited role of structural policies reflected an,\antipathy towards state intervention in the economy 
which is indicated by the avoidance of the term 'subsidy' in policy statements during this period. 
The 1967 Stabilisation and Growth Law established the principles of state intervention for the achievement 
of macro-economic goals. The motivation for increased state intervention was the slow-down in the rate of 
growth of the German economy during the 1960s accompanied by stronger cyclical fluctuations and, in 
particular, the recession of 1967. As already pointed out, the Act set out the macro~conomic objectives of 
policy as 
stability of the price level, 
a high level of employment, 
external balance, and 
a constant and acceptable rate of economic growth, 
and established a policy framework in the form of Annual Economic Reports (Jahreswirtschaftsberichte). 
The Act in identifying the need for structural policies and the requirement that the Federal government 
should publish a separate Subsidies Report indicated the importance it attached to financial aids. The aims 
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of structural financial aids were classified by the Act as: 
structural maintenance - the safeguarding of jobs and wages, the stabilisation and increase of producers' 
income and maintenance of production; 
structural adjustment - the improvement of adjustment flexibility, the acceleration of adjustment pro-
cedures, reduction of excess capacity and avoidance of too precipitate adjustment; and 
productivity - increasing sectoral growth potential and stimulating innovation. 
Between 1968 and 1970 the framework and principles of structural intervention were established in four 
policy statements: Principles of Regional and Sectoral Structural Policies (Bundestagsdrucksache 1968), 
the Principles of Structural Policy for Small and Middle-Sized Companies (Bundestagsdrucksache 1970) 
and two Structure Reports (Bundestagsdrucksache 1969 and 1970). 
Structural policies were designed to fulfil two objectives. First, promotion of growth, in which case the 
emphasis should be on 'future orientated' industries, the appropriate types of aid being productivity aid and 
adjustment aid to accelerate structural adjustments. Second, social objectives requiring the avoidance of 
unemployment and social tension and upheaval directed attention towards contracting industries by using 
maintenance aid to control structural adaptation and adjustment aid to alleviate the effects of structural 
adaptation. The emphasis of the policy outlines was heavily on adjustment and to a lesser extent on 
productivity aid, the role of maintenance aid being viewed as very limited. Selective policy measures 
(Marktsteuerung) should not supercede or prevent the operation of market forces, but should aim only to 
facilitate, accelerate or retard them, as was clearly established in the Principles of Sectoral Structural 
Policy: 
'Primarily it is the managers of industry who are responsible for the necessary structural adaptation in the 
context of the freely competitive economy; 
Special government aids and other interventions can only be used if the economic circumstances affecting 
individual sectors are undergoing excessively rapid and sharp changes, and if the process, left to itself, 
would result in undesirable economic and social consequences; 
Government aids must take the form of help for self-help, and can be granted only if they will durably 
strengthen the competitive ability of the enterprises; 
The aid must be of a temporary nature and digressive in character, and must not restrict the functional 
viability of free competition.' (DECO 1971, p.16) 
Structural economic policies in the BRD have mainly involved the provision of financial incentives through 
grants, loans, interest remissions and tax concessions. These subsidies are provided primarily by the Federal 
government but also by the Linder and by local authorities. Administration of subsidies is undertaken by 
the following Federal ministries: 
Federal Ministry for Economics (assistance to industry) 
Federal Ministry for Transport (assistance to shipping, the railways and airlines) 
Federal Ministry for Food, Agriculture and Forestry (agricultural support) 
Federal Ministry for Town, Planning and Housing (assistance for housing and social infrastructure) 
An additional source of financial assistance has been the European Recovery Programme established initially 
with US funds to administer reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. The ERP Special Fund now finances a 
number of different programmes, primarily those involving regional development, but also for environmen-
tal protection, labour market incentives and selective industrial schemes. Although financial incentives are 
the main tools of structural policies and indeed the only ones strictly compatible with the concept of the 
market economy, other forms of intervention are used the for the achievement of structural goals (e.g. the 
promotion of cartels, state guarantees for loans and the encouragement of industrial reorganisation). 
Concentrating on government subsidies alone, the trend during the post-war period has been almost con-
tinuously upwards, reflecting a steady increase in government intervention in industry. For the period before 
1966 estimates of financial assistance have been published by Zavlaris (1970). Although the coverage and 
classification of subsidies differs from that in the later Subsidy Reports, the figures reveal a remarkable 
growth in aid to industry and agriculture during the late 19505 and early 19605 (see Table 4.1). From 1966 
official statistics of subsidies in the form of direct financial aid (grants and loans) and indirect financial aid 
(tax relief) are available in the bi-annual Subsidy Reports. The Reports cover the financial aids of the 
Federal Government and, since 1971, of the Linder and local authorities as well. The Reports exclude aid 
from the ERP and support for the railways and postal service. Included, however, are some financial aids to 
households in the form of housing subsidies and tax allowances. The subsidy payments are classified by: 
type of aid - maintenance, adjustment and productivity aid (see Table 4.2); 
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recipient sector - food agriculture and forestry, industry, transport and housing (see Table 4.3). Indus-
trial aid is further broken down into particular programmes (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.2 shows an uninterrupted expansion of total subsidies between 1966 and 1978. The breakdown 
of total assistance between the various forms of aid - maintenance, adjustment and productivity - shows 
the importance of maintenance aid which accounted for about one half of direct subsidies and about 55 per 
cent of tax allowances up until 1974, after which the proportion of total aid devoted to maintenance fell. 
This predominance of maintenance support seems surprising in view of the statements of role and objectives 
of structural policy which have regarded the maintenance of particular industries as justifiable only in 
special circumstances. The breakdown of subsidies by sectors and programmes in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 sheds 
light upon the prominence of maintenance support: the major recipients of government aid have been 
agriculture, mining and industries located in less favoured regions. These subsidies have been devoted pri-
marily to the maintenance of employment for social and strategic reasons. 
As has been already noted, the main focus of our attention is on structural policy towards industry since 
industrial policy is the area of structural policy which is most closely related to the macro-economic goals 
of growth, employment and balance of payments. The breakdown of industrial support the Table 4.4 
reveals the enormous growth in grants and loans to the mining and energy sectors between 1973 and 1975, 
the growth in assistance to aerospace and innovation and the regions and the recent growth in subsidies 
to manufacturing industry. Support for individual industries is discussed in some detail in the following 
sections. 
Regional structural policies. Unlike the UK where regional problems have focused upon well-defined peri-
pheral reg;ons and declining industrial areas highly dependent upon coal mining and heavy industry, the 
regional problems of the BRD are more 'sub-regional', involving a number of different areas distributed 
across the whole country. During the 1950s the Federal Regional Promotion Programme (Regionales 
Forderungsprogramm) offered low interest loans to industry and local authorities in annually delineated 
'emergency areas', while special assistance was provided to border areas under the Zonal Border Promotion 
Act of 1951. During the 1960s the emphasis of regional policy changed with the increasing problems which 
arose from the decline of the coal mining and iron and steel industries of the Ruhr, the criteria for regional 
assistance were changed and Federal policy placed more emphasis on infrastructure investment and less on 
assistance to industry. 
The Programme for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structure (Gesetzuber die Gemeinschafts-
aufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur) of October 1969 established a comprehensive 
approach to regional planning involving joint action by the Federal Government and the Lander in the 
identification and the assistance of less-developed regions through the establishment of joint planning 
committees. Regional policies have been formulated within a series of programmes. The current programme 
is the sixth plan covering 1977-80 [see Casper (1978) J. The principal incentives offered to industry are: 
the investment allowance - a 7.5 per cent grant covering almost all investment projects in the assisted areas; 
the investment grant - a discretionary investment grant of up to 25 per cent of project expenditure; 
ERP 'soft loans' available to small and medium-sized firms for projects not eligible for investment allowances 
and grants; and 
special depreciation allowances with an initial depreciation allowance of up to 50 per cent, these special 
allo~ances being available only in the Zonal Border Area. 
In addition to financial support for private industry, regional policy measures include investment in infra-
structure (notably roads and urban renewal), removal assistance for workers, retraining allowances and the 
freight transport subsidy for firms in the border area. 
Of particular interest for the purpose of comparing UK and West German approaches to regional policy is 
the use of planning and quantitative criteria and measures in the regional policy of the BRD. Assisted areas 
are delineated periodically on the basis of a weighted combination of three indicators: shortage of employ-
ment opportunity, income per head and level of infrastructure. While legislation establishes the maximum 
rates of assistance, limitations and criteria for policy measures, implementation is undertaken under the 
annual framework plans (Rahmenplan) of each planning committee. 
I n addition to the basic framework of regional planning, special regional assistance is available under particular 
chemes, for example the particularly heavy support for West Berlin, the Tourist Promotion Areas and the 
~ 975-77 employment creation scheme to counter the problems of redundancies at Volkswagen. 
4.17 Assistance to particular industrides in the
f 
BRO.. Se.ledctive .financhial assistance has been offered to a relatively 
small number of extractive an manu actunng In ustnes. T e major recipients have been coal mining, 
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Table 4.1 
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE, 1951-65 
9 month 
year DM millions 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959· 1960 1961 2962 1963 1964 1965 
Food, Agriculture P 274.7 440.6 416.8 552.7 676.3 1293.6 2011.2 2157.8 2360 2075 2870 3515 3830 3990 4610 
T 710 745 830 830 885 940 1240 
3070 2820 3700 4345 4715 4930 5850 
II Industrial Sector P 24 53 72 73 71 414 438 270 130 240 255 260 440 660 870 
T 2165 2530 3505 4030 5185 5530 5985 
2295 2770 3760 4290 5625 6170 6855 
W 
III Transport· P 28.7 41.6 43.9 45.3 79.9 95.8 134.3 157.3 200 220 400 405 445 475 490 
I--' 650 560 570 500 600 670 855 ~ \.0 00 
850 780 970 905 1045 1145 1345 
IV Housing P 50 56 62 72 64 78 131 129 140 145 295 335 385 465 525 
T 985 1155 1275 1415 1525 1655 1770 
1125 1300 1570 1750 1910 2120 2295 
Notes: P - payments (grants and loans) 
T - tax allowances 
• - railways, airports, lufthansa, shipping 
Source: Zavlaris (1970) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I , 
I 
Table 4.2 I 
TOTAL FINANCING AID, 1966·78 I 
I 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1 
Total Assistance (OM mnl 13,339 15,565 18,573 19,895 24,690 27,382 29,736 33,191 35,518 36,819 39,439 41,268 42,063 
Total Grants & Loans (OM mn) b,549 7,490 8,849 8,572 10,965 10,387 10587 12,325 13,212 13,700 15,278 16,833 16,554 
Total Tax Allowances (Om mn) 6,790 8,072 9,274 11,323 13,725 16,995 19,149 20,866 22,306 23,119 24,161 24,385 25,509 
Maintenance (% of total) 55.2 61.2 49.1 55.4 51.1 50.1 50.7 51.1 35.2 33.8 35.2 34.5 
Adjustment (% of total) 42.0 35.9 44.9 38.1 41.9 42.1 41.3 42.2 54.3 57.4. 55.1 56.1 
\.;J Productivity (% of total) 2.8 2.9 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.8 8.0 6.7 10.5 8.8 9.7 9.4 l\) 
0 .po. 
1.0 
Note: In addition to assistance to companies, these figures include assistance to households, mainly in the form of subsidies for housing and saving. 
Source: Subsidy Reports 
Table 4.3 
SUBSIDIES BY SECTOR, 1966·78 
7966 7967 7968 7969 7970 7977 7972 1973 1974 7975 1976 1977 7978 
Food, Agriculture P 2855 2678 2604 2158 2168 2687 2064 2850 3225 3218 3162 3136 3246 
and Forestry T 873 881 1041 1186 1237 1483 1745 1917 1834 1995 1962 1998 2005 
Total 3828 3559 3645 3344 3405 4170 3809 4767 5059 5213 5124 5134 5251 
II Industrial Sector P 692 1107 1230 867 1077 1024 1149 1605 2054 1935 1796 2272 2588 
(Without Transport) T 2608 3799 3826 4800 5449 6686 7670 7926 8513 7613 7975 7784 8044 
Total 3300 4906 5056 5667 6526 7710 8819 9531 10567 9548 9771 10056 10632 
II Transport P 111 103 158 261 275 302 458 568 601 672 871 912 1295 
(Without Rail) T 484 491 680 807 833 846 847 967 1014 1061 1104 1146 1218 
Total 595 594 838 1068 1108 1148 1305 1535 1615 1733 1975 2058 2513 
W VI l\) Notes: (1) Financial assistance by the EEC (mainly to agriculture) is excluded. 0 
I--' (2) Subsidy payments by the Federal government, lander and local authorities are included. Since 1970 Federal tax allowances have amounted to a little under half of total allow· 
ances to the above sectors. 
P = Direct payments (grants and loans) 
T= Tax allowances 
Source: Seventh Subsidy Report 
Table 4.4 
SUBSIDIES TO THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
DM millions 
7966 7967 7968 7969 7970 7971 7972 7973 7974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
GRANTS AND LOANS 
Mining 278 786 960 493 379 280 458 913 1215 889 770 991 1323 
Energy and raw materials 255 161 47 18 16 78 28 47 226 349 196 309 379 
Aerospace and innovation 26 48 84 122 186 248 256 269 294 289 297 354 321 
Special technological support 63 63 53 35 
Regional structural measures 43 55 78 136 240 190 215 167 146 159 244 228 193 
Other measures 90 57 61 98 256 228 192 209 173 186 226 337 337 
TOTAL 692 1107 1230 867 1077 1024 1149 1605 2054 1935 1796 2272 2588 
TAX ALLOWANCES 
Mining 235 219 349 350 361 363 346 172 355 292 287 277 287 
- of which Federal 88 79 120 125 153 148 139 77 58 130 127 123 125 
Regional structural measures 1135 2195 2305 3017 3470 4490 5343 5790 6255 5595 6183 5900 6175 VI 
W - of which Federal 419 1323 1396 1624 1811 2306 2653 2916 3110 2795 3114 2990 3097 
l\) Banking 569 680 433 454 492 570 598 535 64 643 358 414 444 
l\) 
- of which Federal 156 183 107 115 196 231 244 210 260 294 154 156 171 
General industry 669 795 739 979 1126 1263 1383 1429 1339 1083 1117 1193 1138 
- of which Federal 264 246 261 286 465 524 577 561 536 410 416 447 498 
TOTAL 2608 3799 3826 4800 5449 6686 7670 7926 8513 7613 7975 7784 8044 
of which Federal 927 1831 1884 2150 2625 3209 3613 3746 4064 3629 3811 3716 3891 
Source: Seventh SubsIdy Report 
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mineral oil production, shipbuilding, nuclear energy, aerospace, computers and electronics. The objectives 
in supporting these industries have been to reduce dependence on overseas supplies of strategically import-
ant inputs (notably in the case of the energy industries), to prevent excessive increases in unemployment 
(in the case of coal mining and shipbuilding) and to encourage innovation through supporting R&D (aero-
space, computers and electronics). Policies towards the shipbuilding (and shipping) industries and the com-
puters industry are examined in the following two chapters, the main features of structural policies towards 
the other industries are described below. 
The coal mining Industry of the BRD is the sole German example of an industry in long-term decline which 
has received maintenance assistance from the Federal government on a large scale, Government intervention 
was prompted by the declining demand for coal which began with the world recession in 1958 and con· 
tinued throughout the 1960s. The measures introduced were: 
an import tariff on coal (1959 Coal Customs Duty); 
a subsidy for the transportation of coal (1960); 
taxes on heating oil (1960); and 
restrictions on the use of heating oils including stock piling obligations and import duties. 
In addition, measures were introduced to relieve the regional problems associated with the decline in the 
number of coal miners. 
The Law on Adjustment and Restructuring of Coal Mining (1968) introduced a comprehensive framework 
of government intervention and state aid directed towards the structural reorganisation of the industry. 
A Federal Commissioner for Coal Mining was appointed with powers to allocate production between mines, 
guide investment and promote rationalisation and concentration. Under the influence of the Commissioner 
the greater part of the industry merged into three companies: Ruhrkohle AG, Eschweiler Bergwerksverein 
and Saarbergwerke AG (owned jointly by the Federal Government and Saarland). During the 1970s the 
principal direct financial support for coal mining has been in adjustment aid for investment, reorganisation 
and closures while the principal maintenance support has been in the form of taxes on competing sources 
of energy (notably the mineral oil tax and Kohlepfennlg paid by electricity consumers) and voluntary and 
mandatory requirements for the electricity and steel industries to purchase domestic coal. The rapidly 
increasing price of crude oil since 1974 has reinforced the Government's efforts to maintain its coal indus-
try. In recent years the coal industry has been hard hit, however, by the recession in the steel industry. Sup-
port for 1978 to~lIed about DMS,OOO mn in~luding the additional Federal and Linder support measures 
announced in April and May 1978 (German Tribune, 11 June 1978). 
Government policy towards the coal industry is of considerable interest since not only does it contrast 
with the typical unwillingness of government to support declining industries, but the structural inter-
ventions by government are quite inconsistent with the principles of Marktkonformes Mittel. Industrial 
policy measures. nor~allr con~idered to be ~onsistent -w:ith the competitive market mechanism are non-
discriminatory fmanclal Incentives. However, m the coal Industry not only has government been willing to 
intervene directly to force consuming industries to increase their use of domestic coal, but government has 
also severely restricted competition in the industry by reorganising it into fewer companies and imposing 
upon.it a regulatory commission. 
Federal support for the production of civil aircraft has many similarities to support for the computer 
industry. Both are examples of technologically based industries in which the high costs and uncertain 
returns from R&D make it unlikely that either industry could survive without at least some initial support 
from government. Both occupy a strategically important position, the computer industry because of the 
key role of electronic technology in the future development of the industrial sector, and aircraft industry 
because of its initial defence role. The enormous cost of civilian aircraft development, the need for inter-
national cooperation and the oligopolistic structure of the industry internationally has meant that the 
aircraft industry has been often regarded as one in which the principle of workable competition cannot be 
invoked and the industry has been subject to considerable government intervention. Government has 
encouraged mergers with the result that the industry is reorganised into two companies: VWF -Fokker and 
MBB. In common with the UK and France, the aircraft industry of the BRD has suffered from the ina-
bility to achieve sufficient sales of individual models to reap the benefits of scale economies. Also in com-
mon with the UK and France, government policies have been influenced by considerations of national 
prestige and over-oPti~istic proje.ctions of comme~cial success. Both the VFW 614 short haul aircraft and 
the Franco-German aIrbus have Incurred substantIal losses caused by high development costs and limited 
sales - the direct result of failure to break into the US market. 
4.22 Considerations of economic and defensive strategy and self-sufficiency which have been identified as 
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important motives in the financial support of the coal, computer and aircraft industries, are the dominant 
influence on Federal assistance for the oil industry. The dependence of the economy on imported crude oil 
and the absence of any German-based multinationals in the international petroleum industry has meant 
that disruption of oil supplies has been regarded as a major threat to the security of the BRD_ Government 
promotion of mergers in the coal industry was paralleled by a similar policy in the oil industry from 1968 
onwards_ In the interests of security, it was considered that at least one quarter of the nation's supply of 
crude oil should come from German firms (Kruster, 1974, p.77). DEMINEX, a joint venture involving 7 
oil companies, was established with government encouragement and government backing of DM575 mn 
over six years. The company was expected to engage in exploration for new sources of petroleum and to 
form joint ventures with other oil companies and the governments of producer countries for the ownership 
and operation of oil and gas fields. 
4.23 The activities of the Federal Government in encouraging increasing concentration in the oil industry have 
been the subject of considerable controversy. In 1974 the government-backed merger between YEBA, the 
state-owned energy conglomerate, and a smaller oil company, Gelsenberg AG, was turned down by the 
Cartel Office. The decision was overruled by the Economics Minister only to be upheld by the Monopolies 
Commission. 
4.24 It would seem that the government's strategy for the internal growth of the domestic oil industry has been 
a failure with no major discoveries of crude oil and few joint ventures with other companies. In 1978 a 
takeover of YEBA's petroleum interests by BP was turned down by the Cartel Office. 
4.25 Structural policy and firm size. An industrial policy based on the maintenance of the market system for the 
allocation of resources might be expected to adopt a neutral position towards enterprises of different sizes 
allowing the competitive mechanism to promote the emergence of optimally-sized firms. In practice a range 
of measures has been introduced to assist investment by small and medium-sized business (SMBs). The 
justification for such measures is, first, that some measure of public support is needed to offset the handi-
caps which face 5MBs in capital markets, in sponsoring R&D and in complying with legislation and govern-
ment regulations; second, 5MBs provide important sources of output and employment growth and an 
entree for new managerial talent and innovative ideas to the industrial sector. A further factor influencing 
the Government's attitude towards 5MBs is that in Germany 5MBs account for a smaller share of indus-
trial employment (12 per cent) and industrial production (10 per cent) than in any otherOECD country. 
The support measures include: 
low interest loans for capital investment by 5MBs by the Reconstruction Loan Corporation {at 6Yl per 
cent rate of interest} together with special assistance for 5MBs in textiles and clothing and leather and 
footwear {1974}; 
adjustment aid for 5MBs from the ERP {1975}; 
tax concessions to SM Bs to enable them to carry forward losses {1976}; 
a special programme for assisting the establishing of new firms {DM270 mn budgeted in 1977 with an 
additional DM600mn in 1978}; and 
assistance for 5MBs introducing new innovations (funds increased from DM10 mn in 1976 to DM15 mn 
in 1980). 
6 During the early 1970s total financial assistance to 5MBs was as follo~s [O.E.C.D. (1978)) 4.2 
4.27 
1971 1973 1974 1975 
DM millions 342 429 458 490 
As ind'icated above, since 1975 the number of programmes assisting 5MBs and the amount of expenditure 
has increased considerably. 
I n spite of the assistance by government to 5MBs and the general support which government has expressed 
for the principles of the competitive market economy, in some industrial sectors government policy has 
fostered the growth of large-sized firms. Apparently influenced by the ideas contained in Galbraith's 
New Industrial State (1968) and Servan-Schreiber's Le Defi Amerlcain, the Federal Government recog-
nised a need for large companies capable of competing in international markets and keeping abreast of 
technological change. Herr Schiller in particular emphasised that competition was not to be regarded as 
a policy goal, but as one of a range of policy instruments [see Schiller (1955)1. In a comment upon the 
Cartel Office Report for 1967 the Federal Government stated: 'The Common Market and the trend to 
world-wide economic integration have created new premises for competition. Larger markets demand in 
many ways larger and more efficient company units ... The Federal Government is concerned to remove 
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obstacles which stand in the way of concentration of enterprises now blocked by cartel law, so that the 
. development of firms of optimum size will not be hindered.' (Stellungnahme der Bundesregierung zum 
TlJtlgkeltsbericht des Bundeskartellamtes fur 1967, pp.2-3, quoted in Kuster (1974). Concern over sub-
optimal sizes of firms and plants may seem surprising in view of the large average size of large plants in the 
BRD (see paragraph 2.57 above) though, on average, industrial concentration is lower in the BRD than the 
UK (see paragraph 2.53). While the favourable attitude of the Federal Government towards increasing com-
pany sizes undoubtedly encouraged mergers between large manufacuring firms between the mid-1960s 
and early-1970s, with the exception of coal and oil industries (see above), the Federal Government does not 
appear to have taken a direct role in effecting industrial mergers. 
4.28 Structural policies towards the labour market. Structural change in industry is dependent not only on the 
investment decisions of firms but also on the responses of workers to changing employment opportunities 
and incentives. The ability of an economy to take advantage of technological change and the changing 
structure of final demand partly depends upon the degree of occupational and geographical mobility of the 
labour force. In the BRD high labour mobility has been greatly facilitated by the presence of a large number 
of foreign workers. Until recently, the principal manpower problem has been the continuing demand of 
Germany's growing manufacturing industry for highly skilled personnel necessary for the maintenance of 
Germany's export strength based on high quality, technologically advanced manufactured products. To 
avoid serious manpower shortages in key skilled occupations, the Federal Government has placed consider-
able emphasis on vocational training and incentives to occupational and geographical mobility. Manpower 
and employment policy is carried out by the Federal Employment Bureau which implements the Vocational 
Training and Employment Promotion and the 1971 Act on Vocational Training. In 1975 there were 271 ,000 
persons undergoing state-supported vocational training and retraining schemes and about another 200,000 
. who undertook other supported training (OECD, 1978, p.120). The types of training for which financial 
assistance is available are: 
conversion courses for workers faced with redundancy; 
adaptation courses for entrants to new jobs; 
occupational advancement courses for workers seeking to improve their skills and qualifications within a 
particular occupation; 
refresher courses for workers seeking to maintain their level of skill; and 
Pre-training and preparatory courses for young people between 16 and 18 before taking up employment. 
Table 4.5 shows expenditure by the Federal Employment Bureau (note that this includes expenditure on 
unemployment benefits as well). 
T.wle 4.5 
EXPENDITURE BY THE FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT BUREAU 
Personnel training assistance 
of which: initial training 
further training 
retraining training 
subsistence allowances during training 
Assistance to training institutions 
Assisting entry ihto employment 
Rehabilitation of handicapped persons 
Short.time working allowances 
Bad weather pay 
Aid to productivity in building industry in winter 
Other aid to building firms and workers 
Employment creation measures 
Unemployment benefits 
Supplementary unemployment benefits 
TOTAL PAYMENTS 
Source: DECO, 1978, p.114 
DM million 
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2,802 
277 
374 
159 
1,991 
64 
186 
434 
2,207 
396 
50 
17 
127 
7,766 
776 
15,743 
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Until the mid-1970s government policies towards the labour market were concerned chiefly with encour· 
aging skill acquisition and greater efficiency in the allocation of manpower resources. With the emergence 
of structural problems of industry and higher rates of unemployment after 1974 the Federal Government 
has become increasingly involved in the maintenance of employment on social grounds. In 1975 the first 
programme of wage subsidies was introduced for firms offering non·temporary employment to unem· 
ployed persons. The scheme operated for six months with an expenditure of DM600 million. Further 
programmes for increased support were introduced in 1976 and 1977. In May 1977 the budget for employ· 
ment creation measures was increased from DM650 million to DM 1150 million with particular emphasis 
on work creation for the long term unemployed and training courses for school leavers. Considerable use 
has been made too of short term working and various work·sharing arrangements. 
Structural policy in the UK 
Structural intervention in theory and practice. In contrast to the BRD, structural policies in the UK have 
not been formulated within such a coherent set of principles as those of the social market economy. As has 
been noted in Chapter 3, the much heavier emphasis on structural economic policies in the UK as compared 
with the BRD primarily reflects the view that UK's greater need for structural intervention follows from its 
less satisfactory economic performance. The increasing resort by UK governments to industrial intervention 
would seem to have been encouraged by the failure of more traditional tools of macro-economic policy to 
achieve the elusive goals of stability and growth. While UK structural policy has been moulded more by 
pragmatism and political opportunism than by philosophical considerations, it is possible to identify certain 
directions of economic thought which have been influential. The post·war German faith in the political 
virtues and economic efficiency of the competitive market system found little echo in the UK debate over 
economic policy, and even under Conservative governments it is difficult to identify the introduction of 
any significant constraints on government intervention in industry arising from a belief in the efficiency of 
the free market system. Even in competition policy where controls over cartels, monopolies and mergers 
in the UK have pre-dated those of the BRD, the UK approach has been marked by extreme pragmatism 
with a lack of whole·hearted commitment to the principle of competition. In fact, the most influential 
direction of economic thought on the UK policy formulation has been a belief in the efficacy of govern· 
ment sponsored economic planning as a means of stimulating increased investment and economic growth. 
This belief that economic planning could remedy the poor performance of the UK with regard to growth, 
inflation and international trade, was greatly strengthened by comparisons with policy and performance 
in some other European countries. The indicative planning practices of France, the active role of the state· 
owned conglomerates in Italian industry and the wage bargaining system of Sweden were all held up during 
the early 1960s as models for the UK to imitate. 
Government attempts at a comprehensive structural policy within a medium·term planning framework have 
been associated with the role of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC). The establishment 
of NEDC in 1962 was stimulated by the success of French indicative planning and represented a remarkable 
conversion in the attitude of the Conservative party towards intervention in the economy. The NEDC pro· 
vided a forum of representatives, from government, business and the unions, backed by a planning office 
(NEDO) and a number of Economic Development Committees for individual industries. The work of NEDC 
was embodied in five year plans which represented a consensus view of economic growth and development 
and a commitment by government to orientate its policy towards the achievement of the growth targets. 
While the Conservative party's commitment to indicative planning during the 1960s was somewhat half· 
hearted, to the Labour government of 1964 national economic planning backed by extensive micro-economic 
intervention was the basis of its economic strategy. After 'the thirteen wasted years' of Conservative rule, 
the party's election manifesto promised 'a deliberate and massive effort to modernise the economy; to 
change its structure and to develop with all possible speed the advanced technology and the new science· 
based industries with which our future lies'. In addition to new ministerial powers and new agencies for 
government intervention in industry, the Labour government's policy was notable for its commitment to 
overall economic planning at the national level. Economic planning involved the creation of new planning 
institutions. The industry-based Economic Development Committees were supplemented by geographically 
defined Economic Planning Councils. The Department of Economic Affairs was established for the con· 
struction of national plans which were to be implemented through the machinery of NEDO, the EDCs and 
the Regional Economic Planning Councils. This bold attempt at indicative planning crumbled almost as 
soon as the National Plan of 1965 had been published. The introductions by government of deflationary 
measures in order to meet the balance of payments in 1966 made the growth targets of the Plan unattainable. 
4.33 The failure of the National Plan and the subsequent demise of the Department of Economic Affairs resulted 
in the discrediting of 'national planning'. In particular it was noted that it was easy to establish performance 
targets for the economy, but impossible to ensure they would be fulfilled without sufficient tools of 
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of government policy to influence the economy at macro and micro level. While the failure of planning in 
the 1960s may have encouraged the Conservative party to move towards a more market-<>rientated economic 
philosophy, no such tendency can be observed in the Labour party's approach to economic policy. Although 
the 1974-79 Labour Government made no attempt to revive medium-term planning of the national plan-
ning, its belief that government leadership and extensive industrial intervention in industry were necessary 
to overcome the fundamental problems of the UK economy was the basis of the I ndustrial Strategy launched 
in 1975. Unlike the National Plan, the Industrial Strategy involved no national targets for growth and em-
ployment and little coordinated planning at a national level. The approach was to use the organisation of 
the NEDC to identify structural and performance problems in individual sectors of UK industry, and then 
to formulate government policies to remedy these defects. Statements of the content of the Industrial 
Strategy were deliberately vague. In An Approach to Industrial Strategy (HMSO, 1975) the Government 
emphasised the need for economic policies to take a longer term perspective aiming in particular to remove 
the obstacles to long term economic growth rather than to concentrate on short term policies directed at 
the immediate problems of unemployment, inflation and balance of payments deficit. The only formal 
planning which the Strategy envisaged was at company level through Planning Agreements between govern-
ment and individual companies. This area of the Industrial Strategy was a conspicuous failure. In practice, 
the major thrust of the Industrial Strategy was to identify sectors of industry where economic growth and 
increasing productivity were supposedly hindered by inadequate investment and to introduce sectoral 
assistance schemes aimed at increasing and accelerating capital investment. 
At an ideological level, therefore, the history of economic policy since 1964 has consisted to two periods, 
1964-70 and 1974-79 when government was comm itted to extensive structural intervention in the economy, 
and two periods, 1970-74 and June 1979 onwards when government declared its support for market-
orientated economic policies. Yet neither under Conservative nor Labour government have the actual 
structural policies which have been introduced corresponded to any marked degree to the philosophical 
inclinations or election statements of the parties. In the case of Labour governments one would have expec-
ted structural policies to have taken the form of comprehensive programmes aimed at long-term goals of 
output and productivity growth and greater equality in income distribution. While Labour governments 
have been associated with increased structural intervention, the policies have comprised a variety of different 
schemes administered by different departments and agencies with little overall planning and directed more 
towards short- than long-term goals. Under the 1970-74 Conservative government the gap between principle 
and actual policies was even more evident. Apart from the abolition of a few interventionist agencies, there 
is no evidence of a shift towards laissez-faire policies and it was this government which established the frame-
work for selective industrial intervention that was to be subsequently expanded between 1974 and 1979. 
The contrast between ideology and practice is one which characterises UK economic policy in general, but 
is particularly evident in the case of structural policy towards industry. Despite differences in the economic 
philosophy of the Labo~r an~ Conser~ative parti~s, interventio~ in the ~conomy increased over tne period 
1964-1979 with only minor interruptions. Despite the emphaSIS of policy statements on the longer term 
problems of lack of investment and low growth industrial intervention has tended to be orientated more 
to short term employment maintenance than to long term growth. Again, despite the emphasis of the 
Labour party on coordination of economic policies with a framework of medium term planning, industrial 
interventions have been haphazard and ad hoc. This course of structural economic policies and the appar-
ently limited influence of economic philosophy reflects the dominance of circumstances over ideas. The ten-
dency for UK governments of quite different political complexions to adopt similar economic policies reflects 
not so much the pragmatism of policy makers as the severity of the short-term economic problems and pol-
itical pressures that constrain the choice of policy instruments and goals. We proceed by identifying some of 
the trends in UK structural policy and examining some major areas of structural policy towards industry. 
Instruments of structural intervention and trends in structural policy. In the UK as in the BRD structural 
economic policies have operated primarily through the provision of financial incentives to industry. Finan-
cial incentives have mainly been subsidies for capital investment: investment grants, tax allowances, low 
interest loans and interest relief grants. The forms of financial incentive and assistance offered by UK 
governments have bee.n more varied than in the B~D. In particular, subsid~es for the employment of labour 
have been important In the UK, notably th~ Regional E.mploymen~ Premium and the Temporary Employ-
ment Subsidy_ Also UK governments, particularly dUring the period 1974-79, have provided long-term 
finance to private industry in the form of equity capital. 
Unlike the BRD Subsidy Reports, the UK Government does not provide a comprehensive account of 
financial assistance to the private sector. Financial assistance to industry which takes the form of govern-
ment expenditure (Le. grants, loans and equity purchases) is classified in the annual White Papers on Public 
Expenditure. Table 4.6 shows expenditure by central government on industry and employment between 
327 
4.38 
4.39 
4.40 
4.41 
57 
1969/70 and 1977/78. The figures are misleading as an indication of subsidies to industry. First, the figures 
aggregate loans and grants, and, second, no account is taken of tax allowances. Calculation of the subsidy 
element in loans is difficult since it depends upon the rate of interest charged compared with that which 
would have been charged on an identical loan by a financial institution and also upon whether or not the 
loan is repaid (many of the loans made to unprofitable firms ultimately become grants). In recent years 
interest relief grants have become a particularly important method by which government provides selec-
tive assistance to industry. The Department of Industry has noted that this form of aid is advantageous from 
the Government's point of view since it involves less public expenditure than the provision of loans and the 
Department is relieved of the responsibility of evaluating the commercial viability of the project and 
administering the payment and repayment of the loan (see House of Commons, 1978, pp.15-17). 
Structural policies have not relied exclusively on financial incentives to encourage industrial adjustment and 
growth, and numerous instruments of direct intervention into the industrial sector have been employed by 
British governments. Regional development policies have traditionally involved governments in a range of 
direct intervention, notably direct control of industrial location and the provision of social and industrial 
infrastructure. Since 1964 governments have become involved on a w~der scale in direct intervention in 
industry to change industrial structure, to exploit new investment opportunities and to improve industrial 
performance. The work of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation in effecting mergers in several manu-
facturing industries and the promotion of new enterprises by the Department of Industry and agencies such 
as the National Enterprise Board and Scottish and Welsh Development Agencies are notable in this respect. 
The more flexible approach to public ownership than that represented by traditional nationalisation has 
been a significant feature of the past two Labour administrations: 1964-70 and 1974-79. The use of part-
public ownership to support financially particular companies and to encourage structural changes in industry 
was inaugurated by the Government's purchase of shares in the Fairfield shipbuilding company in 1964. 
By the beginning of 1979 the shareholdings of the National Enterprise Board covered a large number of 
companies in a wide range of industries. 
As we have noted, Table 4.6 is rather misleading as a guide to trends in financial assistance to UK industry. 
The Table shows that total expenditure on industry and the labour market was, in real terms, much the 
same in 1969/70 as in 1978/79, a peak being reached in 1974/7 5. The figures are distorted by the replace-
ment in 1970 of investment grants by investment allowances, investment allowances not being included 
in the Table. If payments of investment grants are excluded from the totals, then the Table shows that 
finance for industry and the labour market increased by 86 per cent in real terms over the period, with a 
remarkable increase of 171 per cent over the five year period 1969/70 to 1974/75. The decline in expendi-
ture between 1974/75 and 1978/79 is interesting, but closer inspection reveals that this is due not to a 
contraction of government industrial policy but to a change in the system of financing export credits and 
the abandonment of the severe restraint on nationalised industry price increases. 
Probably the principal change in industrial policy over the period has been the relative decline in the 
importance of regional assistance but it is not easily identified in Table 4.6 because the principal regional 
aid during the early 1970's 'higher investment grants in the development areas, is not included under 
'regional support and regeneration'. The growing importance of selective assistance to particular firms and 
industries is clearly indicated in the Table. Other trends which are worthy of note are the fall in expendi-
ture on aircraft development and production (notably the CQncorde and RB211 projects); second, the 
increase in government expenditure on the ,labour market. Some of these policy programmes are now 
discussed in more detail. 
Regional policy. In the UK, as in the BRD, regional policies have provided the foundation for the develop-
me~t of wider structural policies towards industry. A large part of the growth of industrial intervention in 
the UK during the 1970s has involved an extension of financial aids originally intended for regional devel-
opment to companies and industries outside the development regions. The origins of UK regional policy 
lie in the inter-war years, the 1934 Special Areas Act representing the first measures aimed at encouraging 
industry to site in particularly depressed areas. During the post-war period the regional problem is reflected 
in above average rates of unemployment in the well-defined regions of Scotland, North West and North 
East England, Wales and Northern Ireland with particularly serious problems affecting certain conurbations 
within these regions - notably Clydeside, Tyneside, Merseyside, and Belfast. The principal form of aid has 
been inducements to invest in the development areas in the form of investment grants, initial allowances 
and accelerated depreciation provisions. Higher rates of investment incentives were made available for the 
specially depressed 'Special Development Ar~as' (established. in 1967) and lower rates were introduced in 
1970 for 'Intermediate Areas', The most actIVe phase of regional policy was the period 1966 to 1970. The 
1966 I ndustrial Development Act introduced investment grants in Development Areas at the rate of 40 per 
cent of the cost of plant and machinery and.25 per cent of the cost of buildings. In 1967 the Regional 
Employment Premium introduced a cash subSidy of £1.50 per week for each full-time worker employed in 
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the Development Areas. In addition, industry was directed towards the Development Areas by means of the 
discriminatory issue of Industrial Development Certificates and by inducements in the form of advance 
factories and new towns. 
After 1970 the emphasis of regional policy changed. Investment grants were replaced by investment allow-
ances in 1970 (although regional development grants were reintroduced in 1972) and the Regional Employ-
ment Premium was withdrawn in 1973. The primary emphasis of regional policy after 1972 was towards 
a more selective approach. Under Section 7 of the 1972 Industry Act, the Department of Industry was 
empowered to offer Selective industrial assistance to individual companies and projects which would have 
the effect of creating employment in the Development Areas. The shift from generally available regional 
incentives towards selective incentives produced a basic change in regional policy. Although selective assis-
tance under Section 7 of the Industry Act is available only in the 'assisted areas', these areas include all of 
UK with the exception of the Midlands and the South East and the flexibility of the criteria. Moreover the 
growth in selective assistance to industries and firms outside the development regions has had the effect of 
further weakening the importance of regional incentives. This weaker emphasis on regional problems per se 
has partly reflected a change in the nature of industrial problems. During the 1970s unemployment has 
increasingly become a national problem and the growing severity of the problems of industrial decline, 
import competition and structural change have resulted in the emergence of localised economic problems 
outside the traditional development regions. Notable examples have been the rising unemployment in the 
West Midlands - traditionally a high income, high employment area - during the recession in the engi-
neering industries in the mid-1970s and the growing problems of inner city areas. Its unemployment and 
industrial decline have become associated more with particular industries than with particular areas. 
Selective assistance to industries and companies. While structural intervention by government in UK indus-
try through the provision of financial assistance to selected industries and companies has become a domi-
nant feature of UK industrial policy only since 1972, it is important to note that selective intervention by 
government in private industry is· over forty years old. During the inter-war period in particular 
the pressures on government posed by balance of payments difficulties and unemployment with 
its attendant social problems placed pressures on government which were similar to those posed by the 
problems of the post-war recessions. Structural intervention by government was primarily at an informal 
level using government influence on firms and industry, the encouragement of cartels and the introduction 
of protective tariffs rather than financial subsidies. Government policy towards the cotton industry through 
the 1936 Cotton Spinning Act and 1959 Cotton Industry Act was the first example of the formal approach 
to structural policy (Miles, 1968). 
Selective financial assistance to industry since 1966 has taken two main forms. First, assistance directed 
primarily towards the maintenance of employmen~ in i.ndustry, and secondly, assistance aimed primarily at 
the promotion of growth through support for capital Investment and research and development in newer 
and technologically-based industries. Both these objectives have been influenced by balance of payments 
considerations, and in almost all cases of support for declining industries and unprofitable firms, the 
industry or firm has been a significant exporter. Prior to 1972 selective assistance to industry was limited. 
The severe adjustment problems of particular industries - notably shipbuilding and cotton textiles -
resulted in legislation making available financial assistance for these industries. In addition, government pro-
vided substantial assistance to the aircraft industry partly because of the need to maintain the capacity 
to build military aircraft and partly through a belief in the importance of R&D spin<lff from aerospace . 
. Assistance took the form of grants for research and development costs and the requirement that the nation-
alised airlines purchase domestically built planes. Legislation empowering ministers to offer discretionary 
assistance to particular firms across industry as a whole was introduced by the 1964-70 Labour adminis-
stration as part of its policy to stimulate innovation and the development of science-based industries. The 
1965 Science and Technology Act and Development of Inventions Act increased government support for 
research and development, while the 1968 Industrial Expansion Act empowered the Minister concerned 
to give financial support in almost any form to projects designed to 'promote efficiency; to support tech-
nological advance; or to create, expand or sustain productive capacity' (HMSO 1968). The main bene-
ficiaries of the Industrial Expansion Act were International Computers Ltd (see Chapter 5), the aluminium 
smelting industry which was established in the UK with generous subsidies under the Act and the aircraft 
industry. 
The enormous growth in the amount of selective financial assistance to industry shown in Table 4.6 followed 
the passing of the Industry Act in 1972. The purposes of selective financial assistance have been described 
by the government as follows: 
to promote the development or modernisation of industry; 
to promote the efficiency of an industry; 
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to create, expand or sustain productive capacity in an industry, or in undertakings in an industry; 
to promote the reconstruction, reorganisation of conversions of an industry or of undertakings in an 
industry; 
to encourage the growth of, or the proper distribution of undertakings in an industry; and 
to encourage arrangements for ensuring that any contraction of an industry proceeds in an orderly way 
(Trade and Industry, 19 January 1979). 
Selective assistance can be offered under Section 7 and 8 of the Act. Section 7 assistance is designed to 
provide and maintain employment in the assisted areas, Section 8 assistance is available for the support of 
projects anywhere in the country so long as it benefits the economy and serves the national interest. In the 
case of selective assistance to individual companies under both Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, it would appear 
that the maintenance of employment in relatively unprofitable companies has been a dominant criterion 
in the allocation of aid. Table 4.7 below shows the most important allocations of financial aid to individual 
companies, in the great majority of cases aid has been to companies in serious financial difficulties and 
has been in order to maintain employment. 
In addition to selective assistance for individual companies and projects, a number of financial assistance 
schemes have been established under Section 8 of the Act to support investment in selected industries. These 
schemes have been closely linked to the Industrial Strategy of 1975-79, a principal feature of which was the 
establishment under the NEDC of sector working parties to identify areas where increased capital invest-
ment was necessary to relieve production bottlenecks and increase productivity. Table 4.8 shows the 
schemes introduced under the Act. They include a wide variety of industries, some such as the electronic 
and instrumentation schemes are in areas of high technology, most of the others are in more traditional 
areas where productivity and capacity growth has been hindered by inadequate investment. I n all cases, 
however, the basic reasoning has been the belief that unsatisfactory growth performance of British industry 
has beer! due in part to a lack of capital investment and the presence of capacity bottlenecks in certain areas 
of industry which have inhibited attempts by government to attain non-inflationary growth. 
The sectoral distribution of financial support. The use of selective financial assistance to maintain employ-
ment in declining industries and to rescue unprofitable manufacturing companies from bankruptcy raises 
the issue of whether government subsidies to British industry have the effect of inhibiting rather than 
promoting the structural adjustment of the economy. Some indication of whether industrial subsidies have 
had the effect of supporting low growth sectors of the economy is provided by the industrial distribution of 
financial assistance under the 1972 Industry Act in Table 4.9. Ranked by the amount of financial assistance 
per employee in each SIC order, no clear pattern emerges. Heaviest support would appear to be for basic 
manufacturing industries (notably coal and petroleum products, chemicals, metal manufacture) and ship-
building. In general, support would appear to be concentrated on low rather than high growth sectors of 
industry. The average level of assistance per employee in the six slowest growing orders was £568, in the 
six fastest growing orders it was £220. 
Industrial reStructuring and the promotion of new enterprises. Financial incentives to industry are generally 
regarded as market-orientated policy measures where the adjustment of market prices and rates of return by 
means of subsidies influences decision making by firms. Such a view is largely correct in the case of non-
discretionary assistance (e.g. Regional Development Grants) but in the case of selective assistance, the award 
of finance is a matter for discussion and bargaining between government and the company, such that govern-
ment is able to use the offer of financial assistance to influence a company's decisions in a number of 
respects. For example, the aid given to Chrysler UK involved the company agreeing to maintaining its 
Scottish plant (Linwood), producing certain models in the UK and signing a 'planning agreement' with 
government which gave government the right of consultation over the company's planning. In a number of 
areas government has sought to invervene directly in industrial structure both to reorganise industries 
through the promotion of industrial mergers and to encourage the establishment of new business ventures. 
Such direct structural intervention has been associated with particular government agencies. For example, 
the National Research and Development Corporation has been responsible for promoting the exploitation 
of British inventions, the I ndustrial Reorganisation Corporation was closely associated with the encourage-
ment of mergers, the National Enterprise Board has been responsible for encouraging the establishment of new 
enterprises aimed in particular at exploiting growth areas in industry .In all cases intervention has been accom-
panied by the provision of finance to the enterprises concerned, generally in the form of equity purchases. 
The work of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation during its existence from 1967 to 1971 is of par-
ticular interest on account of the large-scale structural reorganisations which it promoted in a number of 
manufacturing industries. The objective of the Corporation was to promote the industrial efficiency and 
international competitiveness of British industry in areas where market forces were not reSUlting in efficient 
performance, particularly where firm size was considered too small to maximise the benefits from scale 
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TabJe4.6 
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO UK INDUSTRY 
Reglonel support end regeneration 
Regional development grants 
Provision of land and buildings 
Selective a .. istance to industry In 
anisted areas 
Other regional support 
Regional employment premium 
Residual expenditure under repealed 
sections of the Local Employment 
Act, 1972 
Scottish and Welsh Development 
Agencies 
TOTAL 
Industrial Innovation 
_ General industrial R&D 
Department of Energy non-nuclear R&D 
Aircraft & aeroengine general 
R&D programme 
Concorde - development 
- production 
RB 211 
Other aircraft and aeroengine 
projects and allistance 
Space 
Nuclear 
TOTAL 
General support for industry 
_ National Enterprise Board 
Selective assiltance to individual 
industries, firms and undertakings 
Promotion of tourism 
Refinancing of home shipbuilding 
lending 
Interelt support costs of home 
shipbuilding lending 
Assistance to the shipbuilding industry 
Other support lervicel 
Investment grants 
TOTAL 
Support for nationalised industries (other 
than transport industries) 
compensation for price restraint 
Assistance to the coel industry 
_ Coal Industry Acts 
_ Pneumoconiosis scheme 
_ Other compensation 
TOTAL 
International trade 
_ Export promotion and trade 
co-ope,atiOn 
Refinancing of fixed rate export 
credits 
Interest lupport costs 
Cost Qcalation guarantees 
Regulation of domestic trade a,,!d 
industry & consumer protectIon 
TOTAL 
Functioning of the labour market 
_ Employment serllices and 
amployment rehabilitation 
Industrial training . 
Redundancy & maternity funti 
payments 
Industrial relations & other labour 
market services 
TOTAL 
Health and safety at work . 
Central & m iscelianeoul servIces 
_ Employment 
_ other 
Transactions in British Petroleum Company 
.hares 
GRAND TOTAL 
1970 
40 
14 
359 
70 
484 
61 
21 
177 
17 
88 
33 
31 
99 
527 
16 
24 
76 
1571 
16B7 
74 
2 
76 
22 
13 
35 
70 
79 
119 
13 
282 
74 
147 
3312 
60 
Year ending March 
1971 1972 1973 
38 
13 
333 
87 
471 
56 
26 
181 
21 
36 
104 
21 
136 
581 
18 
1 
73 
1428 
1520 
146 
70 
2 
217 
22 
3 
25 
78 
109 
132 
13 
330 
73 
89 
3307 
331 
29 
16 
302 
73 
420 
46 
28 
164 
39 
179 
66 
21 
121 
665 
31 
16 
-59 
1121 
1109 
107 
282 
2 
391 
19 
20 
81 
91 
176 
12 
359 
71 
68 
65 
3168 
19 
30 
1 
. 15 
253 
106 
425 
45 
33 
122 
64 
121 
6 
19 
124 
535 
19 
43 
108 
40 
·57 
683 
835 
128 
268 
45 
441 
17 
759 
2 
778 
99 
128 
119 
81 
428 
70 
67 
65 
3644 
1974 
223 
12 
50 
15 
227 
56 
584 
50 
2 
38 
81 
71 
43 
31 
24 
126 
465 
32 
63 
207 
47 
28 
-31 
416 
762 
748 
624 
9 
1381 
18 
813 
212 
26 
1069 
92 
116 
62 
·2 
269 
18 
85 
58 
4692 
£mn at 1978 prices 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
358 
22 
58 
16 
277 
730 
51 
3 
33 
73 
60 
88 
29 
30 
115 
482 
35 
30 
174 
57 
63 
-13 
173 
520 
1096 
114 
60 
14 
1285 
18 
796 
245 
35 
1093 
86 
138 
76 
10 
310 
16 
56 
76 
318 
4886 
428 
30 
74 
16 
303 
-4 
7 
853 
51 
9 
26 
58 
52 
-3 
93 
34 
139 
459 
12 
423 
22 
152 
43 
36 
1 
82 
771 
92 
60 
40 
17 
209 
18 
751 
204 
34 
1007 
118 
232 
135 
25 
510 
32 
43 
74 
3958 
452 
18 
35 
15 
269 
-15 
28 
803 
44 
13 
23 
32 
28 
12 
40 
157 
348 
158 
105 
20 
88 
54 
15 
26 
466 
82 
78 
160 
17 
616 
244 
·1 
28 
905 
150 
280 
114 
154 
697 
42 
53 
71 
3545 
385 
19 
34 
23 
3 
-10 
64 
518 
41 
18 
20 
25 
24 
-6 
5 
35 
114 
275 
368 
59 
20 
·98 
28 
35 
8 
6 
427 
91 
24 
115 
17 
-287 
127 
1 
32 
-110 
162 
31 I 
112 
291 
876 
42 
54 
90 
·590 
1698 
1979 
430 
30 
92 
30 
oS 
112 
686 
51 
24 
17 
21 
19 
29 
45 
33 
120 
358 
70 
225 
23 
10 
33 
30 
2 
2 
396 
136 
21 
157 
19 
193 
202 
1 
40 
454 
167 
374 
110 
324 
974 
44 
54 
110 
3232 
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Table 4.7 
MAJOR OFFERS OF SELECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES UNDER SECTIONS 
7 & 8 OF THE INDUSTRY ACT 1972 
Year 
1972/3 
1973/4 
1974/5 
1975/76 
1976/7 
1977/8 
Notes: 
... 
Company Amount SectIon of 
of offer the Act 
Mersey Docks & Harbour 3.50 7 
Govan Shipbuilders Ltd 35.0 7 
Camell Laird 20.0 7 
Kearney. Trecker and Marwin 1.25 8 
Norton Villiers Triumph 4.8 8 
Harland and Wolff _a 7 
Ferranti 6.0· 7 
Fodens 2.0* 7 
Kirkby Manufacturing & Engineering 3.9 7 
Scottish Daily News 1.2 7 
Austin & Pickersgill 9.0 7 
Sunderland Shipbuilders 25.0b 7 
Alfred Herbert Ltd 3.0· 8 
British Leyland 50.0· 8 
Kearney. Trecker and Marwin Ltd 3.5 8 
Norton Villiers Triumph 8.0· 8 
Synova Motors Ltd (Meriden motorcycles) 4.95 8 
Ferranti Ltd 15.0 7 
Triang Ped igree Ltd 3.5 7 
Sunderland Shipbuildings Ltd 6.0 7 
Alfred Herbert Ltd 26.18 8 
British Leyland 265.0c 
Cambridge Instrument Co Ltd 4.5 8 
Chrysler UK Ltd 162.5 8 
British Leyland 30.0 8 
Kearney. Trecker and Marwin Ltd 1.9 8 
Ford Motor Company 75.0 7 
British Leyland 150.0 8 
Loan guarantee only 
Financed jointly by Department of Industry and Northern Ireland government a 
b Including a payment of [16m to Court Line for its shipbuilding assets and a loan of [9m to Sunderland 
Shipbuilders. 
c This sum was for equity finance and was provided under the British Leyland Act 1975. 
Source: Industry Act 1972. Annual reports. 
Table 4.8 
SECTORAL SCHEMES OF ASSISTANCE UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE INDUSTRY ACT 1972 
Scheme Dote of Closing AssIstance 
Introduction date offered to 
31 March 1978 
fm 
Wool textile 
- Stage 1 19/ 7/73 31/12/75 16.7 
- Stage 2 29/11/76 31/12/77 1.2 
Ferrous foundry 5/ 8/75 31/12/16 78.4 
Machine tool 5/ 8/75 31/12/77 14.4 
Clothing 15/10/15 31/12/77 5.7 
Paper and board 15/ 6/76 30/ 6/78 11.5 
Non-ferrous foundry 24/ 1/77 31/ 1/78 4.6 
Electronic components 24/ 1/77 31/ 7/78 4.0 
Instrumentation and automation 1/11/77 31/12/78 1.5 
Drop Forging 8/11/77 31/12{78 nil 
Printing machinery 13/ 8/76 31/12/77 3.S 
Textile machinery 13/ 8/76 31/ 3/77 2.0 
poultrymeat processing 4/ 8/76 31/ 3{77 4.9 
Redmeat slaughterhouse 9/11 /76 30/11/78 3.3 
Source: Industry Act 1972. Annual reports. 
332 
62 
Table 4.9 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE 1972 INDUSTRY ACT 1972/3-1977/8 BY SIC ORDER 
SIC ORDERS Regional Selective Selective· Sectoral· Total Total Growth of 
development regional investment ass/stance financial production 
grants assistance scheme schemes ass/stance 797213 to 
(Section 7) grants under per 7977/8 
Section 8 employee 
£ 96 
II Mining and quarrying 80.0 1.4 82.2 236 59.4 
III Food, drink & tobacco 132.9 9.6 1.1 8.2 151.8 208 10.0 
IV Coal & petroleum products 75.5 0.2 75.7 1992 -6.3 
V Chemicals 271.6 19.1 5.0 295.7 698 32.8 
VI Metal manufacture 283.9 11.2 0.1 83.0 378.2 788 -18.5 
VII Mechanical engineering -80.4 32.1 1.3 19.9 133.7 142 -2.1 
VIII Instrument engineering 10.1 2.6 1.5 14.2 92 23.3 
IX. Electrical engineering 51.3 32.9 0.4 4.0 88.6 114 23.2 36.7 6.2 42.9 232 -10.3 X Shipbuilding & marine engineering 
XI Vehicles 41.1 16.3 2.3 59.7 78 ·1.1 
XII Metal goods nes 38.1 7.6 0.6 46.3 86 -3.0 
XII Textiles 50.5 18.7 0.2 17.8 87.2 165 ·7.4 
XIV Leather, leather goods & fur 2.8 3.0 5.8 \ , 139 -8.6 
XV Clothing & footwear 14.5 2.9 5.7 13.1 33 16.9 
XVI Bricks, pottery, cement, glass 50.6 4.4 0.8 55.8 200 11.0 
XVII Timber, furniture, etc 24.0 5.2 29.2 109 8.6 
XVIII Paper printing & publishing 51.7 7.6 10.5 11.5 81.3 146 3.6 
XIX Other manufacturing industries 34_5 13.8 1.3 49.6 146 ' 22.4 
XX Construction 105.6 1.9 107.5 83 -12.6 
Other 17.3 6.9 24.2 
TOTAL 1454.0 203.7 23.7 151.6 1833.0 194 6.0 
*Offers of assistance 
Source: Industry Act 7972. Annual reports, Annual Abstract of Statistics 
4.50 
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economies, innovation and export marketing. In a number of industries I RC promoted mergers resulted in 
the amalgamation of all the domestically owned producers into a single company, notably in car assembly 
(BMC and Leyland Motors)' heavy electrical goods (GEC, AEI and English Electric)' and ball bearings 
(Hoffman, Ransome and Maries, and Pollard). Table 4.1 0 shows the distribution of I RC finance between 
different industries. 
The National Enterprise Board established by the 1975 Industry Act has been less ambitious than the IRe 
in intervening to restructure private industry. It was designed to encourage investment into grow· 
ing and profitable areas of UK industry. In addition to acting as a management and holding company 
for state shareholdings in companies such as British Leyland, Alfred Herbert, Brown Boveri Kent Ltd 
Cambridge Instruments and other companies involved in government rescues and restructuring, the NEB ha~ 
taken an active role in promoting new enterprises in areas of rapid technological change - notably micro· 
electronics (see paragraph 5). It might be argued that the existence of agencies such as the NEB and IRC to 
undertake selective financial assistance for individual companies is to be preferred to the direct provision of 
aid by government departments as semi-independent agencies are able to adopt a more commercial strategy 
and may be subjected to less political pressures. 
Structural policies towards the labour market. Although this chapter has concentrated on structural poli-
cies towards industry, note must be taken of policies towards the labour market since these may be re-
garded as complementary and, to some extent, alternatives to industrial policy. The process of structural 
change in industry in recent years has been characterised by the relative immobility of labour with the 
result that increasing rates of structural unemployment coexist with large numbers of unfilled vacancies. 
The increasing expenditure by government on the labour market during the 1970s (see Table 4.7) reflects 
government's determination to encourage greater efficiency in the labour market both to stimulate economic 
growth and to avoid the social problems which accompany industrial change. 
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Table 4.10 
INDUSTRIAL REORGANISATION CORPORATION FINANCE BY INDUSTRY, 1967-71 
Automobiles 
Computers 
Aircraft 
Instrument engineering 
Ball bearings 
Heavy engineering 
Textiles 
Paper 
Shipbuilding 
Machine tools 
Nuclear energy 
Mechanical engineering 
TOTAL 
fm 
34.0 
18.0 
10.0 
9.5 
9.4 
7.0 
4.6 
4.0 
3.8 
2.9 
1.1 
0.7 
105.9 
4.52 The principal problem of the UK labour market has been seen to be an insufficient supply of trained man-
power, particularly skilled manual workers. The first comprehensive attempt at encouraging an expansion 
in industrial training was the 1964 Industrial Training Act which established a system of grants to encour· 
age training administered by Industrial Training Boards. The establishment of the Manpower Services 
Commission by the Employment and Training Act 1973 was aimed at a more integrated approach to 
labour market policies by bringing together employment information and exchange facilities and govern· 
ment trai"ing schemes under a single body. During the 1970s expenditure on industrial training and reo 
training has increased greatly, although this greater expenditure seems to have had little success in solving 
the problems of labour immobility and the shortage of certain categories of skilled labour. To a great 
extent, however, policies to encourage greater geographical and occupational mobility have been offset 
by other government policies. Incomes poliCies between 1972 and 1979 have had the effect of suppress-
ing wage differentials and preventing the normal operation of the forces of supply and demand in the 
labour market, while the Employment Protection Act of 1975 has made it more difficult for firms facing 
declining demand to shed excess labour. Measures directed at the short term maintenance of employment 
have directly operated against policies which have sought to achieve a more efficient allocation of labour. 
Selective support of unproductive and unprofitable companies has been discussed above, in addition the 
temporary employment subsidy has directly encouraged the retention of labour in unproductive employ. 
ment. The temporary employment subsidy may be regarded as a disguised subsidy to industry, the bene· 
fits of which have accrued to declining industries. Table 4.11 shows the distribution of the temporary 
employment subsidy by industry. 
Table 4.11 
PAYMENTS OF TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES BY INDUSTRY, 
18 AUGUST 1975 TO 31 MARCH 1977 
Clothing & footwear 
Textiles 
Leather 
Timber, furniture 
Shipbuilding 
Other manufacturing 
Non-manufacturing industries 
TOTAL 
Source: Financial Times, 30 Januuary 1978, p.21 
D. Conclusions 
Workers covered \ 
64,038 
52,864 
3,473 
7,164 
4,064 
74,055 
23,589 
229,247 
% of Industry 
labour force 
17 
11 
8 
3 
2 
1 
4.53 A detailed comparison of structural economic policies in the UK and BRD is complicated by the difficul· 
ties of obtaining comparable statistics on the amounts of financial aid and its distribution and the probe 
lems of distinguishing the practical operation of structural policies from official statement of policy aims 
and effects. Nevertheless, from the foregoing description of some of the principal features of structural 
policies in the two countries, some generalisations may be proposed. 
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The most obvious difference between the countries in the use of structural policy is the much heavier 
emphasis placed by UK governments on the instruments of structural intervention in attaining macro-
economic goals. This is evident in the greater expenditure in the UK on industrial subsidies (see Tables 4.4 
and 4.7). Comparisons of tax allowances involve numerous problems, buta simple'comparison of direct aid to 
industry (grants and loans) shows that in 1977 and 1978 UK industrial aid (excluding support for national-
ised industries) totalled £2,837 million (approx DM11 billion) while that for the BRD was DM4.9 
billion. This difference almost entirely reflects the more widespread use of subsidies in the UK. Comparing 
individual programmes shows that in the BRD grants and loans for aerospace and innovation and mining 
and energy exceeded those in the UK, while expenditure on regional support was broadly similar (though 
with a greater emphasis on tax allowances in the BRD). But, while in the UK almost all manufacturing in-
dustries receive some degree of selective subsidisation, financial aid to German manufacturing industry is 
restricted to very few industries, notably shipbuilding. 
The instruments of financial aid are broadly similar in the two countries - investment grants, grants to-
wards R&D, tax allowances for investment expenditure, low interest loans, loan guarantees and interest 
relief grants. The main differences lie in their application. In general, subsidies have been used far more 
selectively in the UK than in the BRD. In the BRD industrial support other than regional policy has been 
in the form of sectoral schemes together with more general schemes for innovation and small and medium-
sized businesses. The UK government, on the other hand, has acquired powers to offer financial support 
in virtually any form to almost any company, so long as the support is regarded as in the national interest. 
Such highly selective and discretionary powers for offering financial aid confers upon government the 
ability to make highly specific structural interventions in industry. The offer of aid to individual com-
panies has sometimes been conditional upon the detailed involvement of government in the companies' 
decisions. The wide powers of various government agencies to make loans and purchase equity has allowed 
these agencies, notably the IRe and the NEB to intervene directly in industry to effect structural change. 
The over-ruling of the market mechanism by direct structural intervention by government, extensions of 
public ownership and attempts at government to establish formal planning arrangements with individual 
companies would clearly be contrary to the prevailing economic philosophy in the BRD as well as to its 
Principles .of Structural Policy. 
Nevertheless, too great an emphasis on the formal aspects of structural policy may result in underestimating 
the powers of government to intervene in industry at the micro level. Even in Germany where a strong and 
stable consensus view has been taken of the limits of government intervention in the economy, it would 
seem that, in the search for solutions to economic problems, policy principles do not impose binding 
constraints. Both in the UK and the BRD an important area of industrial policy is at the informal level 
through persuasion and pressure on private sector organisations and companies. Galbraith has noted that, 
in the modern industrial state, government and industry are forced into close cooperation through mutual 
dependence. The increasing complexity of society results in expanding contacts between government and 
the private sector for the purpose of economic, social and environmental policies. Within such a frame. 
work, informal persuasion may be considered to be a more efficient and effective means of structural 
intervention than legislative controls and financial incentives through taxes and subsidies. Prior to 1945 
it was in West Germany rather that the UK where cooperation between business and government was a 
primary feature of economic policy and economic development. It is possible that the more selective 
interventionist approach of the British government to structural policy may reflect not only the commitment 
of the Federal government to the principles of the market economy but also the greater ability of the 
Federal government to command the voluntary adherence of German industry to national economic 
policies without the need for formal powers of intervention. This thesis is supported by the comparative 
success of the West German Government in its voluntary wage and price policies through the programme of 
Concerted Action, as compared with British governments' reliance on statutory powers over wages and 
prices. The ability of the Federal government to intervene informally in industry in the BRD is further 
assisted by the influential position of the banks in German industry and the close links between government 
and the banking sector. 
In both countries governments have stressed the need for structural intervention to be directed towards the 
promotion of industrial growth and technological advance. In both countries, however, financial aids have 
been used primarily for the maintenance of the output and employment in relatively unprofitable industries 
rather than towards the encouragement of growth industry. Yet comparing the two countries it is quite 
clear that the maintenan~e of declining i~dustries an~ u.nprofitable firms has been accorded a' far greater 
priority in the UK than In the BRD: MalO~enance aid 10. the BRD has been allocated mainly to mining 
the energy industries and transportation; With the exception of shipbuilding little aid has been given to 
declining manufacturing indu~tr.ies and virtually none to particular enterprises in financial difficulties. 
The contrast between the poliCies of the two governments towards their domestic motor car industries 
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is particularly revealing. In both countries the car industry experienced a severe recession in 1974/75 
with the major manufacturer facing financial difficulties. The response of the UK government was to 
acquire the equity of British Leyland and to offer it heavy financial support in order to maintain output 
and employment. In the BRD, the Federal government was faced with similar social problems and political 
pressures arising from the financial difficulties of Volkswagen. Its response, however, was not to interfere 
in the plant closures and redundancies by the company, but to offer financial incentives to the expansion 
of industry and employment in the areas affected by Volkswagen's contraction. 
4.59 It has been argued by Peters (1971) that the 'sectoral economic policy in the Federal Republic of Germany 
has greatly undermined general economic policy'. The purpose of structural policy has been to lend assis-
tance to the ailing rather than the growing branches of industry, reflecting according to Kuster (1974, 
pp.84-86), the political pressures exerted by the owners, managers and workers in declining industries on 
government. Yet, despite the growth in Federal government assistance to declining industries since 1975, 
in comparison with the UK, structural policy would appear to provide only limited interference with the 
process of structural adjustment through the market mechanism. Heavy subsidisation has been restricted to 
industries considered to be strategically vital (e.g. energy), where external benefits are considered important 
(e.g. transport), or which are technologically based, such as computers and aerospace. While maintenance 
and adjustment aid must inevitably retard the transfer of resources from declining to expanding sectors of 
the economy, these rigidities in the market mechanism may partly be overcome by encouraging mobility 
in the labour market. It is notable that during the period 1974-7S while government vocational training and 
retraining schemes covered about 114,000 persons in the UK, in the BRD the figure was 893,000 persons 
(OECD, 1978, pp.119-120).ln the case of geographical mobility in the UK in 1974/75 and 1975/7631,263 
workers were assisted in employment transfer schemes, compared with 697 ,253 under similar schemes in 
the BRD (OECD, 1978, pp.126-127). 
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CHAPTERS 
STRUCTURAL POLICIES IN THE UK AND BRD TOWARDS THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
by R.M. Grant and G.K. Shaw 
The differences in industrial policies that have been observed in the previous chapter reflect a number of 
factors including the different political and economic philosophies that have been influential in the post-
war period, the poorer overall performance of the British economy, differences in economic structure and 
structural change and differences in the political and economic constraints within which policies have been 
formulated. In the case of the computer industries of the two countries and the policies towards them, it is 
the similarities rather than the differences which are most apparent. The structure of the industry and its 
importance to the economy has been similar in both countries, the problems of the industry in the two 
countries have been virtually identical and the objectives of government policy towards the industry have 
been much the same. The computer industry therefore provides a particularly interesting study in the 
policy approaches of the two governments to a technologically-based growth industry. 
Motives for government support of the computer industry 
Government support for the computer industry in the BRD and the UK has taken place because of the 
importance of computers to industry and government in the modern economy and the contribution of 
computers to technological advance and economic growth. The DECD has compared the political and 
economic <;ignificance of the computer in the advanced economy with that of steel in industrialising econ-
omies [DECD (1969)]. Steel was regarded as a foundation for almost all other manufacturing industries 
and was of major importance in defence in the construction of ships and armaments. The computer's 
significance to industry, defence and public administration is the enormous expansion it makes possible 
in the processingof information. The UK Ministry of Technology noted in 1970 that 'now we have reached 
the stage where (the computer) is accepted as an integral part of the activities of government, banking, 
insurance, industrial management, transport control, retailing, production, engineering design, and scientific 
research and development' (Select Committee on Science and Technology, 1970, VoLl). In industrY,as 
in government, information is the basic input required for management and the introduction of com-
puters has improved the quality of manag~m~nt decision ma.king, increa.sed t~e efficiency of production 
and distribution processes, and has revolutionised the operation of the fmanclal sector. I n defence, com-
puters are vital for strategic and tactical planning and control, and for specific applications such as the flight 
control of ballistic missiles. The changes which computer technology has brought to industry have been 
referred to as the 'second industrial revolution'. Indeed, it may be that the computer revolution is only the 
first stage of a wider electonic revolution. The importance of the electronic technology to the future 
development of Europe has been recognised by the Commission of the European Communities: 'A strong 
capability in these related industries is essential to Europe's future' because: 
The character of our society will depend on our skill in using these new technologies, with their almost 
limitless possibilities. 
Most industries and many services will become dependent on these technologies. 
The remarkable growth rate of the market for these industries means that by 1980 they will be responsible, 
togeth!:r, for over 6 per cent of Europe's gross national expenditure. [Commission of the European Com-
munities (1976) VoLl p.ll. 
It is this rapid rate of growth of the computer and electronic industries as compared with the relatively 
sluggish growth of manufacturing industry as a whole in West Germany and UK during the 1970s which 
identifies this sector as a major source of employment and economic growth for the next decade. The rate 
of growth of the computer industry has been such as to develop from infancy in the early 1950s to being 
the world's third largest industry (after petroleum and automobiles) in 1977. The growth of output of 
computers and associated equipment in the UK and the BRD is shown in Table 5.1. The growth of the com-
puter industry has provided an i":,po:tant stimulus to growth. and technological advance in related indus-
tries - components, telecommUnications, consumer electroniCS and medical equipment. The increase in 
computing power and fall in computing cost made possible by the micro-processor suggests that the poten-
tial spinoff from electronic technology to the economy as a whole has yet to be fully realised. 
Governments' concern to encourage and protect their domestic computer industries is heightened by the 
key strategic role of computers and computer technology. This was explained by a British government 
minister: 'What is certain, is that the role of the computer and its ancillaries will continue to expand and to 
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penetrate both wide and deep into the nation's activities ... it is not surprising therefore that the computer 
and the national capaci ty to move forward into th is "computer age" should be a matter of deep pre-occupation 
not only to the British Government, but to all the Governments of Western Europe and to Japan. There is 
also evidence of the same pre-occupation in Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe and it is safe to 
assume the same will apply either now or in the near future in most other countries of the world.' [Select 
Committee on Science and Technology 1970, VoLl, (S.C5.T.)]. 
Concern by the two governments over the development of their domestic computer industries also reflects 
the domination of the world computer industry by American companies. In the late 1960's OECD esti· 
mated that US-owned companies accounted for about 90 per cent of computer installations in the western 
world, with one company, IBM, possessing about three-<luarters of the world market by value (c.f. Table 
5.2). IBM was the fourth largest US corporation in terms of capital employed and the IBM subsidiaries in 
France, Germany, UK and Italy form by far the largest European manufacturer of computers. In no other 
European industry is the dominant position of US muitinationals more apparent or has given rise to more 
national concern than computers. At the same time, however, both governments have been wary at putting 
at risk their access to American computer technology. The British government explained the problem as 
follows: 'We are confronted with a powerful and pervasive technology which will rapidly become decisive 
in most of the nation's activity - but with the danger of its being entirely under the control of American 
owned companies. Should one therefore adopt a chauvinistic attitude to repel the invader and seek to 
create an entirely indigenous industry? But to do this would not only undermine longstanding and Import-
ant trading relationships with the USA. It would also deny the UK the very kind of technological input it 
needs. Yet to fail to produce an indigenous industry would expose the country to the possibilities that 
industrial, commercial, strategic or political decisions made in America would heavily influence our ability 
to manufacture, to trade, to govern or to defend'. [S.C.S.T. (1970)]. 
The computer manufacturing industries of the UK and the BRD 
The size and growth of the computer industries of the two countries are compared in Table 5.1. By the 
mid-1970s the electronic data processing (EOP) industries were of approximately the same size. Up to 1975 
the UK computer industry achieved a higher rate of sales growth than the German industry, but since 1975 
the German industry has grown substantially faster. 
Foreign trade in computers in relation to the size of the domestic market and the output of the domestic 
computer industry is important in both countries. Table 5.3 shows imports and exports of computers. The 
figures must be treated with caution. The trade classification differs between the two countries, and the 
classifications have been revised over the period. Although the UK industry has exported a higher proportion 
of its output, the German computer industry appears to have been more successful in competing with 
imports - the market share of imports is much larger in the UK than BRO. Moreover, while BRD has had 
a strongly favourable trade balance in computers since 1974, that of the UK has been adverse. 
The structure of the computer industry in both countries reflects a single dominating factor - the enormous 
research and development expenditure required for any company to keep abreast of technological change in 
the industry. As a result, in both the UK and the BRO, the domestically-owned sector of the industry has 
developed by merger and rationalisation culminating in the formation of a single manufacturer of large and 
medium-sized mainframe computers. In the BRD Siemens acquisition of the computer interests of Tele-
funken-AEG made it the sole German-owned manufacturer of a range of computer systems. In the UK, the 
formation of ICL in 1968 was the climax of a long series of mergers and acquisitions among domestic 
manufacturers. 
5.9 In meeting the 'American challenge' in the markedt for medium and large computers, the UK has been in 
~ a far stronger position than Germany. As was note by the UK Select Committee on Science and Technology 
[1970 VoLl]: 'The UK is the only country outside America which has a significant indigenous computer 
indust~y capable of development into a world class international enterprise.' But while ICL held almost half 
the UK market in 1969, its market share has fallen compared with Siemens growth of its share of the 
German market (See Table 5.4). The problems facing the European computer manufacturer when com-
peting against the US-?wned multinationals is illu~trated by Table 5.5. As a percentage of sales revenue, 
ICL's Rand D expenditure exceeds that of the major manufacturers yet IBM s Rand 0 budget was twice 
the size of ICL's total sales revenue. 
5.10 ICL has developed and marketed its computers independently of other companies. Siemens on the other hand has developed its computers primarily in association with other companies. These associations have 
been unsuccessful and under these difficult circumstances Siemens' ability to expand its share of the West 
German computer market has been remarkable. Between 1963 and 1971 Siemens manufactured the RCA 
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Table 5.1 
COMPUTER PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT, BRD AND UK 
1971 7972 7973 7974 7975 7976 7977 
BRD 
Computer~ OMm 1691 1515 1277 935 1085 2045 
fm 210 233 212 172 240 505 
Peripherals OMm 1722 1310 1659 1439 1572 1820 
fm 213 202 275 265 347 450 
Total computer sales OMm 2419 3412 2825 2936 2374 2657 3865 
fm 285 423 435 487 437 587 955 
Employment (thousands) 33 34 39 41 40 36 38 
UK 
Computers OMm 1048 864 729 690 724 765 
fm 130 133 121 127 160 189 
Peripherals DMm 1177 1195 1434 1543 1805 1862 
fm 146 184 238 284 399 460 
Total Computer sales OMm 1576 2306 2292 2450 2652 2674 2697 
(MLH 366) fm 186 286 353 416 489 591 675 
Employment (thou~nds) 58 50 51 45 43 44 45 
Note: The exchange rates used were as follows: 1971 OMl = fO.118 1972 OMl = (0.124 
1973 OMl = fO.154 1974 OMl = £0.166 
1975 OMl = £0.184 1976 OM1 = £0.221 
1977 OMl = £0.247 1978 OMl = £0.262 
Source: UK Business Monitor; UK Census of Production, 1972; Production Produzierender Gewerbe 
Table 5.2 
THE WORLD COMPUTER MARKET: SHARES OF INSTALLED GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTERS BY MANUFACTURER 
(BY VALUE) AT 1.1.75 
Western West 
World Europe USA Germany UK France Japan 
IBM 56.60 54.40 68.76 61.56 39.72 58.46 35.50 
Honeywell 8.19 10.22 8.96 7.00 9.58 15.04 1.02 
Univac 6.52 5.68 7.61 5.29 4.80 3.97 7.50 
Comecon manufacturers 5.17 
Japanese producers 4.69 50.23 
Burroughs 4.64 3.28 5.74 1.09 5.26 3.77 3.22 
ICL 3.14 8.3 31.14 2.97 
Unidatal 2.68 8.82 17.56 9.91 
NCR 2.41 2.03 2.87 0.98 2.89 1.29 1.83 
Others 5.96 7.26 6.06 5.45 6.61 8.19 0.70 
Note: 1 = Includes Siemens 
Source: Third data processing programme ofthe Federal Government, 1976·1979 
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Table 5.3 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF COMPUTERS 
fm 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Analogue and hybrid IMPORTS 5.0 1.9 2.6 3.5 3.3 
machines EXPORTS 1.6 1.3 0.5 2.6 5.2 
Computer systems IMPORTS 11.7 16.2 25.0 28.6 39.5 
EXPORTS 47.7 43.6 72.0 95.0 108.3 
Central processing units IMPORTS 66.3 69.7 113.3 135.3 170.7 
EXPORTS 42.8 42.5 64.8 126.8 112.2 
Central memory units IMPORTS 19.8 30.6 36.3 42.5 53.5 
EXPORTS 32.1 33.2 41.7 49.3 34.5 
Punches, verifiers and IMPORTS 5.7 5.1 5.3 4.7 4.6 
calculators EXPORTS 2.0 2.6 3.8 4.0 9.2 
Other independent units 
for computing and data IMPORTS 11.7 9.8 22.2 25.5 
storage EXPORTS 3.7 4.4 7.2 8.0 
TOTAL IMPORTS 164.9 177.7 240.5 309.9 394.0 
TOTAL EXPORTS 206.4 193.6 312.2 408.2 411.2 
UK 
Automatic data processing IMPORTS 41.0 49.3 89.0 91.6 94.6 
machines EXPORTS 46.2 54.8 69.9 70.8 141.7 
Central processing units IMPORTS 12.6 18.4 17.3 33.1 69.3 
EXPORTS 4.3 5.0 10.7 6.7 34.8 
Peripheral and other IMPORTS 115.4 134.8 227.6 337.5 378.3 
units EXPORTS 114.9 152.9 191.8 263.3 273.5 
Parts IMPORTS 177.8 180.8 218.5 229.8 297.2 
EXPORTS 104.1 119.3 134.7 168.3 192.9 
TOT AL IMPORTS 345.8 383.3 552.4 679.4 879.4 
TOTAL EXPORTS 269.5 332.0 407.1 509.1 642.9 
Business monitor figures of 
computer exports 208.0 242.2 317.3 337.6 
Note: Deutsche marks have been converted to £ sterling at the rates shown in Table 5.2 
Sources: Aussenhandel, nach Waren und Liindem (Spezial handel); UK Overseas Trade StatIstics; Business Monitor 
Table 5.4 
MARKET SHARES BY VALUE IN UK AND WEST GERMANY, 1969 and 1976 
UK West Germany 
1969 1976 1969 1976 
IBM 28 46 46 
Honeywell 8 8 2 7 
ICL 49 26 1 1 
Siemens 13 19 
Univac 5 7 5 
Sources: Stoneman (1975) p.21, Soris Report (Turin June 1970), Financial Times, 19 February 1979 p.17. 
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Table S5 
SALES, PROFITS AND RAND 0 FOR SOME MAJOR COMPUTER MANUFACTURERS, 1976 
Pretax Profit/Sales 
Sales Profits Ratio R&D 
(1m) (1m) (1m) 
IBM 16,304 4,519 28 1,012 
NCR 2,313 173 7 94 
Burroughs 1,902 315 17 108 
Sperry Univac 1,438 96 7 159 
Honeywell 1,428 117 8 126 
Control Data 1,358 92 7 59 
Digital Equipment 736 119 16 58 
ICL 502 40 8 50 
Note: • = Group totals 
Source: Economist, 13.8.77, p.64 
Specta 90 series under licence. In 1971 RCA abandoned its computer interests and, together with Philips 
and CII, Siemens formed Unidata. In 1974 Unidata folded following Cll's decision to merge with Honeywell-
Bull. Since 1974 Siemens has concentrated on the independent development of a range of computers plug-
compatible with IBM. In March 1978 Siemens entered the small office computer market and later in 1978 
agreed with Fujitsu, Japan's leading computer manufacturer, to market Fujitsu computers in Europe. 
5.11 In the manufacture of small computers the UK's superiority in large computers is reversed; German manu-
facturers have been far more commercially successful. Table 5.6 shows the two countries' production and 
trade in this sector of the market. 
Table 5.6 
THE MARKETS FOR AND PRODUCTION OF MINI COMPUTERS AND SMALL BUSINESS SYSTEMS IN 1974 
Market Production Exports Imports 
fm fm fm fm 
WEST GERMANY 
5.4 1.8 Mini Computers· 9.7 5.7 
Small busi ness systems 72.0 87.0 34.0 19.0 
UK 4.4 0.6 Mini Computers2 9.3 5.5 
Small business systems 35.0 25.0 7.5 11.0 
Note: 1. General purpose mini computers costing up to $40,000 
2. e.g. Systems sold by Mixdorf, Philips, NCR, Olivetti 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1976, VoLllI, p.91. 
The comparative success of the German manufacturers may, in part, reflect the larger size of this sector of 
the market in the BRO. In 1973 the numbers of installed computers were estimated as follows: 
Very 
Small Small Medium Large Total 
West Germany 
UK 
3,584 
1,978 
8,196 
4,461 
2,233 
1,244 
417 
310 
14,330 
7,993 
source: Commission of the European Communities, 1976, p.67 
5.12 Despite the entry of large computer manufacturers (including IBM, ICL and Siemens) into the small com. 
puter market, this ~arket is s~p~lied primarily by specialist com.panies, notably the US·based Digital 
Equipment Corporation. The prinCipal German manufacturers are Nixdorf (with about 35 per cent of this 
market), Kienzle, Triumph-Adler (owned by Litton) and Dietz. In the UK specialist domestic manufactur-
ers of small computers such as Computer Technology Ltd, have not obtained a large market share as 
shown in Table 5.7. I 
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Table 5.7 
NUMBERS OF MINI COMPUTERS INSTALLED IN THE UK AT THE BEGINNING OF 1977 
Digital Equipment Corp. (US) 
Data General (US) 
OAL (US) 
GEC (US) 
Ferranti (UK) 
Computer Technology (UK) 
Sou rce: Financial Times 
4,337 
2,250 
1,800 
1,688 
791 
445 
5.13 One of the most significant features of the computer market in the two countries has been the growing 
importance of peripheral equipment - terminals, printers and magnetic memory units. Tables 5.2 and 
5.8 show that in both UK and BRD the output of peripherals now exceeds in value the output of central 
processing units and complete systems. In both countries the market for peripherals is dominated by US 
suppliers and their subsidiaries; Table 5.8 shows the share of the market supplied by imports was 82 per 
cent in the BRD and 77 per cent in the UK. 
Table 5.8 
THE MARKETS FOR AND PRODUCTION OF COMPUTER PERIPHERALS IN 1974 
Market Production Exports Imports 
fm fm fm fm 
WEST GERMANY 
Local computer l 
peripherals 560 104 19 475 
General purpose2 
terminals 96 56 20 60 
UK 
Local computer 1 
60 5 peripherals 260 205 
General purpose2 
44 14 terminals 100 70 
Note: 1. Discs, drums magnetic tapes, fast printers etc. 
2. Visual display, teleprinters, heavy terminals. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, .1976, VoLlII, p.89. 
C. Other sectors of the computer industry: Computer services and integrated circuits 
5.14 
5.15 
While the computer industry is normally identified with the manufacture of EDP hardware, there are two 
related sectors which from their importance to the national economies and public policy cannot be ignored. 
The first is computer services (the supply of software, data processing services and consultancy) the second 
is electonic components, notably integrated circuits. ' 
As the price of computer hardware has continued to fall in real terms so the relative importance of the 
labour intensive computer service industry, as measured by value of output, has grown. Table 5.9 shows 
the growth in total revenue of the UK computer services industry. Official statistics on the output of com-
puter services tend to be under-estimates. It is generally agreed, however, that software accounts for over 
half the total costs of bringing a computer system into operation, adding the value of other computer 
services would imply that the output of services exceeds the value of the output of hardware. 
Table 5.9 
SALES BY THE UK COMPUTER SERVICE INDUSTRY 
Tot 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Total billings £m 69.2 79.7 104.0 128.6 164.3 220.7 265.4 
of which: 
£m 7.7 11.1 13.8 15.2 18.4 30.3 UK public service clients 33.1 
Foreign clients £m 2.5 3.9 4.8 5.7 7.6 10.6 13.6 
Source: Business Monitor SDQ9 
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5.16 The importance of integrated circuits derives less from the value of their output (see Table 5.10) as from 
their role as the principal component for computers and the primary vehicle for the transfer of electronic 
technology to other sectors of the economy. American companies dominate a world market characterised 
by fierce competition in technology and price. Of a total world market for integrated circuits estimated at 
$ 3,150 million in 1976, US companies were estimated to have 62 per cent (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1976, VoLlII, p.95). The largest manufacturers are Texas Instruments, Motorola, Fairchild 
and RCA. IBM is also a large manufacturer but only for its own use. In Germany the manufacture of 
integrated circuits is led by Siemens and AEG-Telefunken. Siemens sales of integrated circuits amounted 
to about $ 75 million in 1978. In Britain the manufacture of integrated circuits is a relatively under-
developed area of electronic component manufacture. UK companies with interests in integrated circuits 
are Plessey, Ferranti and GEC. The UK accounts for 18.2 per cent of the Western European integrated 
circuit market as compared with 37.2 per cent for the BRO. Both West Germany and the UK have large 
negative balances in the trade of integrated circuits (Table 5.10). 
Table 5.10 
PRODUCTION, EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS AND OTHER MICRO-CIRCUITS 
7973 7974 7975 1976 1977 
Manufacturers' 
308 282 336 sales BRD DMm 276 444 
UK fm 30.4 40.8 37.4 49.0 73.6 \ 
UK Exports fm 7.2 15.0 14.3 21.1 41.2 >. 
27.1 43.0 46.6 70.5 99.2 UK Imports fm 
Source: Business Monitor PO 36. -.--,---,-~-.--.. -~ .. --.--
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policies of the BRD and UK governments towards computer technology and the computer industry: 
an overview 
BRO policies towards the computer industry have been in the form of three electronic data processing 
programmes between 1967 and 1979 which have covered financial support to the industry for Rand 0, 
research programmes undertaken by universities and institutes and the training of manpower for the effec-
tive use of computer technology. The programmes have been implemented by the Federal Ministries for 
Economics and Finance and the Federal Ministry for Education and Science. UK policies towards the 
computer industry and EOP technology have comprised a number of policy measures including some 
schemes offering financial assistance to individual manufacturers and for the development .of particular 
types of products, preference in public procurement, the finance of research by universities and other 
public sector organisations. Unlike West Germa~y, British polic~ ~as shown little evidence of overall co-
ordination. While support programmes for the Industry are administered by the Department of Industry 
(between 1964 and 1972 by the Ministry ofTechnolo~y) which also a~ts as the sponsoring department for 
the industry, central government procurement and policy on the use In government of computers is con-
trolled by the Civil Service Department, computer education and training is the responsibility of the Depart-
. of Education and the National Enterprise Board (NEB) has also been involved in providing finance to the 
industry. 
Probably the most noticeable single difference between the UK and West German policies towards their 
domestic computer industries is the much greater amount of financial assistance by the Federal government 
to the computer industry. Table 5.11 shows government expenditure on policies to develop EDP in West 
Germany, UK, France and Belgium. Comparing support for the computer industry and governmentexpendi. 
ture on research, expenditure by the UK government between 1971 and 1975 was far below that of the 
West German and the French governments. 
Table 5.11 
STATE AID FOR ELECTRONIC DATE PROCESSING, 1971·1975 
Assistance to Application and Education 
hardware industries research 
W. Germany DM70S,4 million DM784.6 million DM919.9 million (£112.9m) (£12S.5m) (£147.2m) 
UK £37.1 million [18.44 million N.A. 
france FF870 million FF616 million FF420 million 
Belgium BF19S0 million BF186.6 million N.A. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1976. 
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Table 5.12 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING IN WEST GERMANY 
7st programme 7967-7970 
Min. of Economics & Finance 
Min. of Education & Science 
Higher education 
Professional training centres 
TOTAL 
1969-1970 
R&D SUPPORT TO HARDWARE MANUFACTURERS 
DMl12.4m 
DM128.2m 
Min. of Economics & Finance 
Min of Education & Science 
DATA PROCESSING APPLICATIONS 
OM 57.0m Min. of Economics & Finance 
for software packages 
Min. of Education & Science for 
systems and development 
BASIC RESEARCH & SPECIAL PROGRAMMES 
OM 42.0m 
DATA PROCESSING EDUCATION 
OM 43.0m 
OM 4.0m 
Higher education 
Professional training centres 
DM386.6m TOT AL 
R&D SUPPORT FOR ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS 
OM 2.2m 1971-1975 
2nd programme 7970-7975 
OM 188.0m 
OM S14.7m 
OM 79.0m 
OM 479.0m 
OM 226.6m 
OM 7S7.9m 
OM 162.0m 
DM2409.9m 
OM 189.8m 
3rd programme 1976-1979 
R&D SUPPORT 
TO HARDWARE MANUFACTURERS 
System architecture and 
programme languages 
Data processing technology 
Remote peripherals 
Small Systems 
Medium and large systems 
APPLICA TlONS 
Information systems 
Medical information 
Teaching 
Computer aided design 
Process control 
Tele-processing 
Aid to users 
Shape recognition 
TRAINING 
Supra regional research programmes 
Scientific data exchange 
Regional computing centre 
Professional training centres 
Gesellschaf~fiir Mathematik = 
und Datenverbreitung 
TOTAL 
1976-1978 
1979 
DM S54.3m 
OM 73.0m 
OM 76.3m 
DM 62.0m 
DM 149.0m 
DM 194.0m 
OM 561.6m 
DM 165.0m 
OM 141.3m 
OM lS.Sm 
OM 66.0m 
OM 94.8m 
DM 31.5m 
OM 42.0m 
OM S.5m 
OM 264.2m 
OM 86.5m 
OM 6.0m 
OM 168.0m 
OM 3.7m 
OM 194.8m 
DM1574.9m 
OM 184.0m 
OM 200.0m 
-...J 
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5.19 In view of the similar objectives of the two governments in relation to their EDP industries and the similar 
problems faced by both industries, close parallels in the EDP policies of the two countries might be expec· 
ted. In both countries governments have sought to accelerate the technological development of their 
indigenous computer industries by means of subsidy. The primary means of achieving this have been Rand 
D subsidies to the manufacturers of computer hardware and the financing of research by public sector 
bodies (universities and special research centres such as the Gesellschaft fur Mathematik und Datenverar-
beitung and the National Computing Centre). However, UK policies differ from those of the BRD in being 
more selective and more interventionist than those of the BRD. Thus in providing support for Rand D 
most UK expenditure has been made available exclusively to ICl, whereas BRD support has been made 
available to a range of firms. Also, UK policy has extended beyond the offer of grants and loans to private 
firms to direct intervention in private industry (e.g. government was responsible for the merger which 
created ICl) and to the launching of new firms (the NEB has been responsible for launching new micro-
electronics and software firms). Unlike West Germany, the UK has pursued a particularly active policy of 
directing public purchases of computers towards domestically owned companies. 
5.20 Differences between the policies of the two countries are also apparent in the distribution of government 
aid between the different sectors of the industry. In the UK, support has been concentrated on mainframe 
computers (Le. the basic product range of ICl). In West Germany, on the other hand, assistance has been 
distributed more widely to cover small as well as large computers, peripherals and, most notably, software 
and elecctronic components. It woul4 seem, therefore, that while the UK government policy between 1968 
and 1975 was concerned chiefly with the~urvival of ICl, the approach of the German government has been 
to encourage the development of the EDP industry as a whole. 
Table 5.13 
UK GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL AID FOR THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 
1969/70 7970/7 7969/70 7970/77 7977/72 7972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 
£m £m £m £m £m £m £m em fm 
International Computer 
2.3 12.0 (Holdings) Ltd 4.0 3.3 9.5 10.2 8.3 3.3 
Advanced Computer Tech-
nology Project and other 
0.7 1.0 0.7 0.8 2.3 shared-cost computer projects 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.6 
Software products scheme and 
systems and software 
1.5 0.8 development 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 
Micro-electronics applications 
0.3 0.9 1.3 and production schemes 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.4 
Electronic component 
sectoral scheme 4.0 
TOTAL 4.7 4.3 3.3 15.2 13.9 12.8 11.1 6.6 7.S 
Also, government support 
for: Computer Aided 
0.5 0.4 0.7 1.0 Design Centre O.S 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 
National Computing Centre 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Sources: Research and Development Requirements Boards Reports, Trade and Industry 27 May 1977; 
Commission of the European Communities (1977) 
E. Government financial aid to the manufacturers of computer hardware 
The UK 
5_21 British government financial support for the computer manufacturing industry has until recently consisted 
primarily of assistance to ICl, the .part-publicly owned UK computer firm establish in 1968 from a govern-
ment-sponsored merger of the malor UK computer manufacturers, ICT and English Electric Computers. 
The resulting company, International Computer (Holdings) Limited (ICl) was owned 53.5 per cent by ICT 
shareholders, 18 per cent by English Electric, 18 per cent by Plessey and 10.5 per cent by the government 
Government was to appoint one director to the Board of ICl but was not to interfere in the day-to-da; 
managemen t of the company. 
5.22 Total finance provided by government amounted to £17m over 5 years. This included: 
(a) £3Y2m for ordinary shares of £1 each in lel, 2 shillings payable on issue and the balance in 1972' , 
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(b) £13Y2m from the Ministry of Technology over 5Y2 years as a grant towards R&D expenditure. 
5.23 
5.24 
5.25 
5.26 
This sum was agreed on the basis of ICl's estimates of its required expenditure on Rand D in order to 
maintain technological competitiveness with US manufacturers, and the funds which it was able to provide 
from its own resources. The intention was that by 1971 ICl should have developed its technology and its 
sales to the point where support for ICl's research and development, over and above allocations of funds 
for the development of specific projects, would be necessary. 
During 1971 it became evident that ICl could not be expected to maintain technological competitiveness 
with American companies without considerable support from government in the development of a new 
range of computers. On 3 July 1972 the Government agreed to provide ICl with £14.2 million over the 
period to September 1973 to assist ICl with the launch of its new series. The amount of this support 
took account of ICl's need to converge to two product lines originating from ICT and English Electric, and 
the financial pressures on ICl due to rising costs and the world wide recession in computer orders. On 
,4 July 1973 it was announced that the government would provide a further £25.8m to support Rand D 
over the period October 1973 to September 1976. These sums of financial support were in principle re-
payable by a levy on sales. Again the government re-affirmed its intention that Rand D support was tem-
porary and noted that if the support was successful 'then in the company year 1976-77 ICl expects to 
have reached a level of size and profitability adequate to make further Rand D support unnecessary' 
(S.C.s.T. 1973, Minutes of Evidence, p.28). 
This support programme for the period 1972-76 was based on an appraisal of ICl's requirements and 
resources undertaken by officials advised by management consultants and merchant bankers. The sum of 
f40m in aid was based upon ICl's Rand D expenditure on its 2,900 series of computers and the company's 
forecasts of its sales and cash flow over the period. The amount was to be recovered by a levy on ICL's pre-
tax profits during the 7 year period in excess of 7.5 per cent of turnover up to a maximum of 25 per cent 
of pretax profit and subject to an overall maximum of f40m (discounted at 10 per cent per annum). Moni-
toring was by the Department of Industry CSE division with the assistance of a firm of management con. 
sultants. Payments of instalments of aid were conditional upon 'the Department being satisfied that the 
progress of the Rand D programme and the financial and general state of the company are reasonably con· 
sistent with the expectation of commercial success; that the company is providing a reasonable contribution 
to the Rand D programme from its own resources, and that it does not without the consent of the Secre. 
tary of State pay more than a minimum dividend' [G.M. Field and P.V. Hills (1976)]. Since direct support 
ended in September 1977, ICl has not received finance from government specifically to support its Rand D 
programme, though ICl does benefit from schemes which are available to the industry as a whole. 
Government finance for more general programmes of Rand D in the computer industry has been com. 
paratively meagre. The principal scheme, the Advanced Computer Technology Project set up in 1963 to en· 
courage co-operation between computer companies and government research laboratories in basic research, 
was aimed at developing new components and. techniques in the computer field. The project was initially 
aimed towards pre-prototypes of new computer systems for future commercial production. In 1965 the 
scope of the scheme was widened to include all aspects of computer systems including peripherals and 
software. Selection of projects is undertaken with assistance from the ACTP Advisory Committee which 
includes representatives from the computer industry, the Department of Industry, government research 
establishments and the National Computing Centre. Government involvement is on a 50-50 cost sharing 
basis. All contracts contain a clause for the repayment of government assistance by way of a levy on sales 
or royalties arising from the projects. Expenditure on computer Rand D through ACTP and other shared 
cost Rand D schemes has been noticeably low as indicated in Table 5.13. 
UK suppliers of computers have also benefited indirectly from the subsidies which have been provided to 
purchases of computers. The 1966 Industrial Development A~t introduced ~nvestment grants to all firms. 
purchasing computers whether or not these firms were engaged In manufacturing. In 1970 these grants were 
replaced by investment allowances. The purpose of these .incentives was to encourage the adoption by 
industry of EDP technology rather than to support the national computer industry - the incentives were 
paid whether or not the computers were purchased from UK or foreign-owned suppliers. 
THEBRD 
5.27 Direct Federal government support for hardware manufacturers has been exclusively in the form of grants 
and loans for Rand D by manufacturers. The Federal Ministry for Education and Science supports basic 
research into EDP technology of a long run nature, the Federal Ministries for Economics and Finance con. 
centrate on financing the applications of innovations and technological knowledge to the development and 
production of marketable products. Table 5.12 shows the budgets of the three programmes. Under the 
first programme, assistance was initially in the form of 20 year loans at 3 per cent, these loans then became 
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Table 5.14 
PUBLIC SECTOR COMPUTER INSTALLATIONS IN NUMBER AND VALUE: BROKEN DOWN BY MANUFACTURERS 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Central Administrations Local Administrations Public Corporations Total 
value 96 by value 96 by value 96 by 
Manufacturers number £ million value number £ million value number £ million value number £ million 
National 
ICL 247 94.1 50.0 235 44.0 54.2 176 57.1 37.4 658 195.2 
GEC 268 11.2 6.0 18 1.0 1.2 105 6.3 4.1 391 18.6 
Ferranti 125 7.3 3.9 3 0.3 0.4 113 7.8 5.1 241 15.4 
Computer Technology 115 2.3 1.2 2 0.1 0.1 43 0.9 0.6 160 3.3 
Plessey 3 0.5 0.3 3 0.8 1.0 1 0.1 0.0 7 1.4 
Digico 41 0.2 0.1 10 0.1 0.1 30 0.2 0.1 81 0.4 
Others 22 1.1 0.6 3 0.1 0.1 15 0.5 0.4 40 1.7 
TOTAL 821 116.7 62.1 274 46.7 57.1 483 72.9 47.7 1578 236.6 
10 
I' Foreign 
IBM 86 31.3 16.6 85 18.2 22.4 118 50.5 33.0 289 100.0 r:--. 
-:t Honeywell 83 3.9 2.1 43 6.2 7.6 81 8.1 5.3 207 18.2 r<\ Univac 14 6.0 3.2 12 2.3 2.9 24 6.6 4.3 50 14.9 
CDC 15 13.8 7.3 3 0.2 0.1 16 14.0 
Burroughs 76 6.1 3.2 32 1.6 1.9 7 0.7 0.5 115 8.4 
DEC 264 4.3 2.3 147 1.9 2.3 147 1.9 1.3 556 8.1 
NCR 10 0.4 0.2 63 3.1 3.9 23 1.1 0.7 96 4.6 
Xerox Data 12 2.0 1.0 5 1.3 0.9 17 3.3 
Philips 20 0.2 0.1 29 0.3 0.4 12 0.1 0.1 61 0.6 
Others 186 3.6 1.9 52 1.1 1.4 580 9.0 5.8 818 13.7 
TOTAL 766 71.6 38.0 463 34.7 42.4 1000 79.5 52.0 2229 185.8 
TOTAL GENERAL 1587 188.3 100.0 737 81.0 100.0 1483 152.4 100.0 3807 421.8 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, 1976, Vol.III, p.119 
F. 
5.28 
G. 
5.29 
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interest-free covering 25 per cent of project costs and repayable only in the event of commercial success 
of the project. The major recipients of support under the first programme were the two domestically owned 
manufacturers of medium and large computers: Siemens and Telefunken-AEG. In the second and third 
programme not only were the budgets for Rand D support greatly increased but the percentage of project 
costs covered by government finance more frequently exceeded the basic 25 per cent level. Under the 
third programme assistance may be 25 per cent, 33 per cent or 50 per cert of production and develop-
ment costs dependent upon the degree of risk of the project. The highest rates relate to basic research and 
grants were repayable if the project was commercially successful. Since 1973 repayment conditions have no 
longer been maintained. Following the first EDP programme support for computer hardware manufac-
turers has been increasingly directed away from the large computer manufacturers and towards small com-
puters. Under the second programme over DM400 million was intended for Siemens, but this fell to around 
DM280 million in the third programme. In the third programme Rand D support for medium and large 
systems was budgeted at DM 194 million as compared with DM 149 for small systems. The policy of assist-
ing Rand D into the small computer sector sharply contrasts with UK policy where government has pro-
vided only the most meagre support to specialist manufacturers of small systems. The German government's 
emphasis on the small computer sector is particularly significant in view of the precarious position of the 
German large computer sector following Siemen's disastrous associations with other companies and the 
large Rand D requirement of Siemens following its decision to follow a 'go it alone' policy of developing 
IBM compatible equipment. German Rand D support also contrasts with that of the UK in the support 
it has offered for the development of peripherals. In the third programme a budget was specifically allo-
cated to the development of peripherals. As Table 5.1 shows, in both the UK and West Germany, the rate 
of growth output of peripherals has far outstripped that of computer systems and central processing units. 
Computer research by public sector bodies 
In both the BRD and the UK the development of EDP technology has been regarded as too important to be 
left entirely to the private sector and in both countries major contributions to basic research have taken 
place both in universities and research institutes. Publicly financed EDP research in the BRD has been 
mainly at the Gesellschaft fUr Mathematik-und Datenverarbeitung (I nstitute for Mathematical and Data 
Processing) (GMD), Bonn. Under the third EDP programme the budget for the GMD totalled DM194.8 
million. UK government expenditure on EDP research in public sector institutions has been a fraction of 
that in the BRD. Expenditure by the Science Research Council on computer-related research in the uni-
versities has averaged about £1 million annually during the 1970s. Rand D expenditure by the Computers, 
Systems and Electronics Requirements Board in government research organisations increased from £2.4m 
to £4.4m between 1974/5 and 1977/8. The principal government financed organisations engaged in 
research on computer applications are the Computer Aided Design Centre, the National Physical Laboratory 
and the National Computer Centre. 
Support to the computer industry through public procurement policy. 
Government policy regarding the purchase and use of computers in the public sector is of great importance 
to the computer industries of both countries since government is the most important single customer for 
computers and its level of purchases is the most important factor affecting the prosperity of the industry 
as a whole. In the UK the public sector market for computers was valued in 1974 at £421.8 million (35.1 
per cent) out of a total UK computer market of £1 ,199 million. In the BRD public sector demand accounted 
for about 12.5 per cent of a total market worth about £11,850 million at the beginning of 1975. The 
public sector is of particular importance to manufacturers because of its demand for very large systems and 
its willingness to lead the private sector in installing advanced technology and new computer systems. 
Clearly a discriminatory public sector procurement policy offers a particularly potent means of support 
for indigenous computer manufacturers and European governments have justified such preference on the 
grounds that the US government has traditionally pursued a 'buy American' policy on computers. In fact, 
US procurement policy has followed a s?mew~a.t more complex strategy, for, not only has preference been 
given to domestic manufacturers, but, In addition, the Federal government has sought to counteract the 
dominance of IBM by offering the bulk of its business to smaller manufacturers. 
Central government policy in the UK has, since 1965 been to purchase computers from British firms where 
reasonably possible and to encourage other public sector bodies to do likewise. Until 1968 the government 
sought competitive tenders from a number of diff~rent man.uf~cturers, then in 1.968 the purchasing pro-
cedure was modified so that for each order detailed negotiations were held With only three suppliers. 
F 1I0wing the computer merger a single tender policy was introduced. Government procurement policy 
w~s explained by the Civil Service Department as follows (S.C.s.T. 1970, voLl, p.445): 
'(1 ) To acquire large computers by single tender action from ICL, subject to satisfactory price, perfor-
mance and delivery dates. 
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Table SolS 
DP SYSTEMS INSTALLED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE BRD AT 1.11.1975 (SMALL SYSTEMS EXCLUDED) 
1. IBM 
Number 
(total) 
Number of 
rent ' 
Installations 
(1) 
80 
Number of 
purchased 
InstallatIons 
(2) 
7 
Expenses 
Monthly for 
rental purchasing 
(3) DM millions (4) 
13.5 37.8 
2. CDC 
87 
4 
1 
1 
3 
1 
4 
1 
0.1 3.6 
0.1 0.0 3. UNIVAC 1 0.0(5) 0.0 4. Honeywell-Bull 
S.DEC 3 1 
0.0(5) 6.7 
0.0(5) 0.0 6. CII 
7. Telfunken 15 
60 
4 
48 
11 
12 
1.1 15.0 
5.9 35.7 8. Siemens 
TOTAL 172 132 40 20.7 98.8 
Note: (1) Datal'rocessing systems the elements of wh~ch are pr~nc~paIlY leased. (2) Datal'rocessing systems the elements of which are principally purchased. 
(3) Expenses for leasing and services. 
(4) Expenses for purchased installations since 1971 and in operation. 
(5) Rounded 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1976. Vol.IlI. p.116 
5.31 
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(2) 
(3) 
To acquire smaller computers by single tender action (normally from ICL) when they are intended to 
lead-in to the use of a large computer of the same family or where there are other reasons for seeking 
a compatibility or flexibility ... 
In all other cases to seek competitive tenders from not less than three firms including at least one 
offering a system of British manufacture: to evaluate the tenders objectively - and to award the con-
tract on the merits of the evaluation, allowing preference in favour of any British machine provided 
that there is no undue price differential as compared with overseas suppliers, that the British machine 
is technically suitable and that no undue delay is involved.' 
Table 5.14 shows that national manufacturers have gained a far larger share of the public sector market 
than of the private sector market. At the end of 1974 ICL accounted for about 46 per cent of the value of 
public sector computers. 
In contrast to the UK, the BRD government has been scrupulously careful to avoid special preference to 
individual manufacturers, or even to national manufacturers as a group, in its purchasing policy. The 
computer purchases by the Federal government and ~ander are su.bject to strict rules which require all 
purchases to be put out to tender. Te~der~ are ass~ssed In terms of pnce and performance and only discrim-
ination in favour of European suppliers IS permitted. As a result European manufacturers at the end of 
1975 had a larger share of the German public sector market (44 per cent) than of the total market (20 per 
cent). IBM was the largest supplier of computers to the German public sector with Siemens as a close 
second. How far the policy of European preference extends to giving preference to non-German European 
manufacturers is difficult to assess, but it is noticeable that Siemens and Telefunken are the only European 
manufacturers with a significant share of the German public sector market. Table 5.15 shows the break· 
down of the German public sector market between suppliers. The European Commission has ruled that dis· 
criminatory purchasing of computers by governments must end by 1980. 
Government support for software 
Financial support by the UK government is relatively recent and the sums involved have been small. Despite 
the large value of software business in the two countries and its rapid growth in relation to the hardware 
industry, it has received much le~s attention from government than the manufacturing sectors of the EDP 
industry. This is particularly true In the UK where government support has traditionally been biased towards 
manufacturing industry and has tended to favour large rather than small firms. In 1965 the Advanced 
Computer Technology Project was e~tended to software, but little finance was provided for software 
projects. While ICL was able ~o be~eflt from general government support to develop its software services, 
specialist software firms received little or no government support. In 1973 the government established a 
software development scheme on a 50-50 shared cost basis. Between 1974/75 and 1977/78 however total 
expenditure under the ~heme amounted to only £~ million. Mo~e recently direct intervefion by g~vern­
ment into the software Industry has taken place With the establishment of Insac Data Systems ltd. a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the National Enterprise Board, which provides overseas marketing for UK 
software. An investment of £20 million over five years is envisaged. 
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In the BRD financial support for the development of software has been an integral part of government 
policy towards the EDP industry since the first EDP programme (1967-71), support for software develop-
ment has been provided by the Ministries of Economics and Finance on the same basis as support for 
hardware development. The first payments for software development were made in 1970. Under the 
first programme software support by the Economics Ministry was as follows: 1970 OM 3m (hardware 
DM30m), 1971 DM14m (hardware DM48m), (Select Committee 1971, VoLlII, p.32). Under the second 
EDP programme 1971-75 Economics Ministry support for software was budgeted at DM 100m, compared 
with OM 170m for hardware. The third EDP programme provides an even larger budget for computer 
applications. 
Financial support for integrated circuits 
Although the manufacture of integrated circuits is only a part of the electronic components industry with 
a modest production value, in both countries governments have introduced special schemes to encourage 
Rand 0 into manufacture of and application of integrated circuits. This reflects the growth potential of 
this sector of the electronics industry and the importance of these components in transmitting electronic 
technology to other parts of the economy. 
I n the B RD support for Rand D into electronic components has been the subject of four special programmes 
commencing in 1969 (see Table 5.11). Under the second, third and fourth programmes, the budgets for 
financial support have been almost identical - approaching DM200m. The major part of this budget has 
been for Rand 0 into integrated circuits and in the current programme support is concentrated on the 
very large integrated circuits. In all of the four programmes the major part of the budget has gone to 
Siemens with AEG-Telefunken taking a significant share of the remainder. 
In the UK, after virtually ignoring the electronic components industry, government departments and agen-
cies now appear to be falling over one another to establish schemes to encourage the development and 
application of micro-electronic technology. As one industry expert has noted: 'never have so many poli-
ticians jumped on so small a th ing as a micro-chip so late in the game' (Financial Times, 19 February, 1979, 
p.18). The principal schemes have been: 
Rand 0 Requirements Board for Computers and Systems and Electronics: - £7.4 million was made 
available in 25 per cent grants and 50 per cent shared most agreements between 1974/5 and 1977/8. 
The Electronic Components Scheme was launched by the Department of Industry under section 8 of the 
1972 I ndustry Act. A £20 million budget was fully committed by the end of 1977. 
The micro-electronics Industry Scheme was established in July 1978 with a five year budget of £70 million 
for 25 per cent grants and 50 per cent shared-cost projects for the development of micro-electronic prod-
ucts and processes. 
The two principal government-backed new ventures in integrated circuits have been support for two projects 
aimed at the establishment of plants to build very large scale integrated circuits. One, Inmost, is an entirely 
new venture backed by £50 million from the NEB. The other is a joint venture by GEe and Fairchild (a 
major US producer) backed by the Department of Industry. 
Examina'tion of the differences in the policies towards computers and the computer industry 
Our overview of UK and West German policies towards the computer industry identifies three major 
differences between the policies of the the two governments: the amount of financial support, the choice of 
policy instruments and the. distribution of support betwe~n the di~ferent sectors o~ the industry. In this 
section we examine these differences and attempt to explain them In terms of the different approaches In 
industrial policy in the two countries. 
The level of financial support 
As tables 5.12 and 5.13 show, Federal government expenditure on the computer industry in the BRD has 
far exceeded that of the British government. During the period 1971-75 West German state expenditure on 
support for the computer manufacturing industry and computer applications and research was at least four 
times greater than British government expenditure although the German computer industry was not much 
bigger than that of the UK. British support for its computer industry has also been small in comparison 
with that of the French and Japanese governments. The lower level of government support to the com-
puter industry in the UK might imply that the development of the computer industry in the UK has taken 
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a lower priority in the UK than in West Germany. However, ministerial statements and the active inter· 
vention by government into the industry clearly indicate that this is not the case. 
The level of UK support for the domestic computer industry compared to that in West Germany is brought 
into sharper contrast when compared with the far larger total budget for selective industrial support in 
the UK than in the BRO. Thus in the UK subsidies to the computer and electronics industry have been far 
less than the subsidies to shipbuilding, aircraft and motor vehicles. What emerges is that while German 
selective assistance for industry has been concentrated upon high technology growth industries and indus· 
tries deemed strategically essential, UK subsidies have been primarily to financially weak industries and 
enterprises for the purpose of maintaining employment. This difference in the distribution of support 
between UK and West German industries reflects the greater weight accorded by the British government 
to the reduction of unemployment than to the stimulation of economic growth and priority of short-
term over long-term objectives which has characterised post-war economic policy in the UK. 
It could be argued that because the UK computer industry possessed for most of the 19605 a more secure 
basis of independent technology than that of Germany, the needs of the UK for government support of 
EDP research and development were smaller. Certainly in the manufacture of large computers, ICl has 
benefited from the technological expertise which has been built up over a number of years through the 
pursuit of an independent development strategy. Siemens, on the other hand, was forced to develop its own 
computer technology at a late stage after the failure of its associations with foreign manufdcturers_ If such 
an argument influenced the British government in determining its level of assistance to the computer indus-
try, then it would have been based on a narrow p.erception of the c.omputer industry which ignored the 
importance in the industry of small computers, mIcro-processes, pertpherals and computer services - for 
in these sectors UK performance, as we shall see, has been unimpressive. 
The choice of policy instruments 
Two principal differences are apparent in the choice of policies which the two governments have used to 
encourage the development of their domestic computer industries. First, the range of policies introduced by 
the UK government has been wider than that of the Federal government and has involved greater direct 
intervention in the industry. In the BRO support for the computer industry has been entirely in the form of 
grants and loans towards research and development. In the UK, although most financial assistance has been 
in the form of Rand D support, measures to support the domestic industry have included discriminatory 
procurement policies (almost exclusively to the benefit of ICl) and the provision of long-term findnce 
(notably equity participation in ICl and the NEB in Inmos and Insac). The interventionism of the UK 
government is apparent in its promotion of the 1968 computer merger and its leading role in the estab-
lishment of the two micro-processor ventures, I nmos and GEC-Fairchild. 
Second, UK support has been more selective than that of the BRO. The bulk of assistance for the com· 
puter industry prior to 1976 was to ICL.ln the case of integrated circuits, assistance has been concentrated 
upon two new ventures with more limited support for the established manufacturers. Programmes which 
have been available to the industry as a whole, such as the Advanced Computer Technology Scheme, have 
been awarded only very limited funds. The EDP programmes of the Federal government have been selective 
- in the sense that Rand D support funds and officials retain some discretion in applying the cri terion set out 
in programmes concerning the eligibility of applying firms for support and in determining the amount of 
support. In particular it has been argued that Siemens recei~ed a disproportional share of the total budgets. 
However, the German programmes have not been selective between individual firms in the sense that 
support has been available to the industry as a whole. 
The more generalist, market-orientated support policies of the BRO government, as compared with the 
more selective interventionalist policies of the British government, reflect major differences in the approach 
to industrial policy already referred to. As shown in Chapter III, the post-war economic policies of German 
governments have been based on ec~nomi~ !iberalism with the competiti.ve mar~et rather than government 
as the principal regulator of economIc activity. To the extent that selective subSidies represent government 
interference with the market economy, the Federal government's EOP programmes indicates a willingness 
to modify the principle of a market economy but with a minimum of government intervention and with 
the express purpose of establishing a self-sufficient EDP industry. Moreover, the Federal Government has 
argued that the goals of its EDP progra~n:'e and th? methods of achieving them have not been in conflict 
with the principles of workable competl.tl~n. For Instance, the fostering of German computer manuf.le. 
turers has helped to create a more competItIve market for computer equipment in Germany by reducing the 
dominance of IBM. 
5.45 Competition has also been encouraged by making financial assistance available to all qualifying firms in the 
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industry rather than by concentrating support on particular firms, or, as has occurred in the UK, on a single 
firm. By assisting competing firms and avoiding concentration on a few particular sectors of the lDP 
industry, it is likely that the government's programmes have avoided the distortions in resource allocation 
which would have resulted from a more selective policy. 
It may also be argued that the limiting of subsidisation to Rand D is a further manifestation of the Federal 
Government's adherence to the principles of the market economy. The finance uf Rand D can be justi-
fied as a means for promoting workable competition. Not only is Rand D a particularly risky investment 
where returns are long term and uncertain and the capital market is unwilling to supply finance on a large 
scale, but in addition there are important economies (of scale and of risk·spreading) available to large multi· 
national firms which justifies initial assistance to smaller companies. Support for Rand D might also be 
justified as a means of promoting the external benefits of advances in EDP technology for other industries 
such as communications and engineering. 
British government policies towards private industry have not been affected by the same philosophic con-
straints as has German industry policy. While British policies have also concentrated on supporting Rand D 
and have been regarded as temporary supports to enable the industry to 'stand on its own feet', UK govern-
ments have been willing to achieve their objectives by public ownership and by discriminatory procurement 
policies. However, in comparison with other industries which have received government support over a long 
period (aircraft, shipbuilding, motor cars, textiles) in the computer industry there has been a more limited 
willingness on the part of government to set aside the market and to involve itself directly in company 
decision making over such matters as investment programmes, employment policy and locational decisions. 
Although the governemnt appoints two directors to the ICL board, there is no evidence of government 
using its power to influence decision making in the compi:lny. 
The distribution of financial assistance 
Probably the most significant difference between the policies of the two countries in terms of the influence 
on the development and performance of their computer industries is that while the BRD policies have been 
support programmes for the development of EDP industry as a whole, British policy was, until recently 
essentially one of backing ICL. This strategy of merging the industry into a single firm and then supporting 
it is one which has been a feature of UK government intervention in a number of industries including motor 
car manufacture, heavy electrical goods, ball bearings and sugar refining. Taken to its logical conclusion it 
means nationalisation, as has occurred in the steel, shipbuilding and aircraft industries. In the case of the 
computer industry the practical result has been the concentration of support on those products which have 
been manufactured by ICL: principally medium and large sized computer systems. Those products in which 
ICL has not specialised - small computers, peripherals and integrated circuits -- have received limited amounts 
of support in comparison with the support given to large computers and also relative to BRD aid for these 
sectors of the industry. The UK software industry has similarly been almost completely neglected by 
government until quite recently. While programmes have been introduced in recent years for the support 
of software (1972) electronic components (1973) and micro-processors (1977/78) these measures lagged 
considerably behind BRD assistance for these sectors of the industry. 
The concentration by the UK government on the large computer industry and ICL in particular and the late 
extension of government support to other sectors of the EDP industry reflects a number of factors. In the 
first place, government se:ms to have. identified the EDP in~~stry wit~ the manufacture of large computer 
systems. While the increaSing emphaSIS on small systems, miniS and micro-processors could not have been 
easily forecast at the beginning of the 1970s, it is certainly true that even in the late 1960s government had 
not fully recognised the importance of even peripheral equipment manufacture and software. Indeed, even 
after the Select Committee on Science and Technology drew attention to the importance of these sectors 
(see Moorman 1971 and Report to the Select Committee 1971), the UK government was slow to formu-
late policies towards these sectors of the industry. The failure to recognise the significance of the manu-
facture of computer equipment other than large computer systems and the importance of the services 
sector was probably exacerbated by the tendency for government industrial policy to be concentrated upon 
large manufacturing companies. The large-fir!l' bias of the British government was paralleled by a relative 
neglect of small and :nedium-sized fir":,s. T~ls co~trasts sharply with West Germany which has operated an 
active policy of assisting small and medIUm-sized firms. 
Since 1976 it is clear that a strong shift in the emphasis of British policy towards the EDP industry has 
taken place. The clearest evidence of this is the heavy assistance ~eing given to the manufacture and appli-
cation of micro-processors. In a speech to Eurocamp '78, Martin Lam of CSE Division, Department of 
Industry noted: 'The maintenance of an independen~ capability was the main objective when ICL was set 
up but more emphasis is now being placed on imprOVing the balance of payments in the computer field and 
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in making sure that the benefits of present and future developments in the computing techniques, particu· 
larly micro-processors; are properly transferred to British industry generally, including sectors which have 
hitherto not been regarded as included in the computer industry'. 
The effectiveness of policy towards the computer industry 
The principal problem encountered in measuring the effects of government policy on the computer indus· 
try in each country is to estimate how the industry would have performed in the absence of government 
policy. The approach followed here is a modest one which compares the performance of the computer 
industry in the two countries in terms of growth, trade balance and technical progress and attempts to 
relate performance differences to differences in government policy in the two countries. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.3 detail the output and imports and exports for the computer industry as a whole in the 
two countries. Although the UK industry has consistently failed to achieve a positive balance of trade in 
computer equipment, the rate of growth of output of the industry during the 19705 has compared favour. 
ably with that of the BRD. Thus, although the level of government financial support has been much lower 
in the UK than in the BRD, this has not had the effect of retarding the relative growth of the UK com· 
puter industry. The ability of the UK computer industry to export about half of its output between 1974 
and 1977 similarly indicates that a relatively meagre subsidisation of Rand D has not resulted in the UK 
computer industry falling behind its competitors in the technological race. 
In the individual sectors of the industry, however, the comparative performance of the UK and BRD shows 
considerable variation. Probably the most interesting contrast is between performance in the manufacture 
of large computer systems and performance in other sectors of the industry. As we have noted, B RD 
support has been for the development of the EDP industry as a whole, whereas UK policy was concentrated 
on the manufacture of medium and large computers by ICl. These policies are clearly reflected in the 
performance of the two countries' industries. The most impressive performance by the UK computer indus. 
try has been the ability of ICL to withstand competition from IBM and the other US multinationals in the 
main computer market. In other sectors of the market, however, notably in small computer systems 
peripherals and components (notably. integrated circuits), UK perfor~ance ~as been poor. ~ n contra~t, th~ 
performance of the BRD computer Industry has been more even: In medium and large Sized computers 
Siemens failed to establish itself as a major international supplier but has succeeded in increasing its share 
of the domestic market. In small computers, office computer systems and process control computers the 
German industry has been very successful with firms such as Nixdorf and Kienzle keeping the share of the 
market held by American and Japanese firms to the lowest for any European country. In integrated cir. 
cuits Siemens and AEG are among the largest European manufacturers (after Philips). 
Any assessment of UK computer policy must begin with an examination of the success of government policy 
towards ICL. By comparing the post·1968 performance of ICL with the performance of the constituent 
companies prior to 1968, Stoneman (1975) has attempted to measure the effects of the 1968 merger and 
the subsequent government support. Measuring the performance of British Computers in terms of their 
competitiveness with IBM computers, Stoneman found: 
ICL's relationship between price and size of computer differs from that for IBM, but generally ICL com. 
puters have been sold at higher prices than those of IBM once quality is standardised; 
There is no significant evidence of any change in the competitiveness of British computers relative to 
IBM's over the period 1960·1975 and no evidence that the 1968 merger affected the competitive position 
of the British industry. 
ICl's maintenance of competitiveness wth IBM was during a period when the rate of technological advance 
was accelerating and the requirements for Rand D expenditure to maintain technological competitiveness 
were continually increasing. 'The cost of developing a range of fourth generation machines (e.g. the ICL 
2900 series) to replace those of the third (e.g. ICL 1,900 series) is much greater than that required to reo 
piace second generation machines'. [Stoneman (1975), p.15]. The development costs of the ICL 2900 
series were estimated at £160m. Given ICl's sales revenue and pre-tax profits since its formation 'it is 
implausible to conclude that sufficient finance for the development of the 2,900 series could have' been 
generated internally by ICl and doubtful whether the funds could have been obtained on the capital market. 
ICl has also been fairly successful in maintaining its share of the UK market. Although between 1969 and 
1973 its market share fell, it has since then succeeded in maintaining its share of the market against its 
three major US competitors - IBM, Honeywell and Burroughs. Stoneman's conclusion is that 'the UK 
computer industry has been able to hold its own against the US companies ... this performance has been 
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achieved in a situation where IBM spends more on Rand D than ICl's total turnover. The efficiency of 
their Rand D process is therefore of commendable quality' [Stoneman (1975). pp.21·27 J • 
Despite the success of ICl in the market for medium and large computers, the relatively poor performance 
of the UK in other sectors of the computer market raises doubts as to the wisdom of the selective approach 
of the UK government. This is particularly so in view of the trends in the industry away from large com. 
puter systems and towards smaller machines. At the same time the market for central processing units has 
become increasingly competitive in price and technology with growing competition to IBM from smaller 
American manufacturers such as Amdahl and Intel and from Japanese companies such as Fujitsu and 
Hitachi. In the rapidly growing market for small systems, the costs of the central processor represents 
something between 5 and 10 per cent of total system cost. The rest is peripherals, communications equip. 
ment and so on. It is in the peripherals field that the UK is particularly weak. It has been estimated (Finan. 
cial Times, 21 February 1978, p.26) that the UK peripherals market is expanding at the rate of about 
3040 per cent a year of which a large proportion of the product is imported. While most of the major 
computer manufacturers have increasingly entered the peripherals field. (iCl which has been forced to con· 
centrate its Rand D and investment has concentrated on central processors through jointly NCR and 
CDC, and ICL has established CPI to develop peripherals. The other specialist UK manufacturer of periph· 
erals is Crico, now owned by the NEB.) 
BRD performance in peripherals has been far more impressive and, despite strong US competition, BRD 
manufacturers have achieved a consistently favourable trade balance. The ex tent to which the peripherals 
industry has benefited from government support for Rand D is impossible to assess, but it is clear that in 
some areas it is West Germany's leadership in certain areas of technology, apart from any marketing skills, 
which has been the key to success. Thus BASF's hold on magnetic media technology has been a vital part 
of the company's success in international markets. The situation in integrated circuits is similar. Heavy 
support by the German government for the development of micro-electronic technology seems to have been 
an important factor in establishing West German companies in the forefront of the electronic component 
market - though almost certainly lagging behind the USA and Japan. In the UK separate attempts by the 
Department of Industry and the NEB to establish companies to manufacture micro-electronic circuits 
seem to be a classic case of 'too little, too late'. 
It has been claimed that the widespread provision of public Rand D support throughout the EDP industry, 
often for competing developments by competing companies, wastes public money. Indeed, the funds 
supplied to AEG-Telefunken for the development of large computers were certainly wasted when the 
company gave up its interest in this field. However, to be selective in the allocation of government sup-
port requires that the government is able to fore~ast, with so~e accur~cy, future developments in the data 
processing market. In fact, the pace of technological advance IS so rapid that such forecasting can be little 
more than guesswork. I n this event, the prudent policy may be to provide government support to all 
research which looks promising. While the failure rate is likely to be high, such a policy can be justified in 
terms of the vital importance of EDP technology for technological progressiveness not only in the 
computer industry, but in communications, engineering, consumer electronics and, ultimately, industry 
as a whole. 
It is apparent that exercises in industrial planning, involving the selective subsidisation of particular firms 
and projects requires government to forecast, with some degree of accuracy, user demand and technological 
change over the medium term. Two issues arise here. First, how does the performance of government in 
forecasting the technologically and commercially successful projects of the future compare with that of the 
private sector? Second, is there a danger that the selective application of subsidies may involve high risks 
in industries where the rate of technological advance is rapid? Thus, might not a more prudent policy be to 
provide more general Rand D subsidies which do not distort competition within the industry? 
The UK policy of concentrating assistance on ICl may not only have meant a lack of government support 
for the other sectors of the computer industry, but may have positively hindered the development of other 
firms. Smaller firms both in the hardware and software sectors have been particularly critical of the British 
government's policy of buying large computers exclusively from ICL. While ICl and the government 
have regarded the single tender policy as necessary to provide ICl with a secure home market base for 
its international operations, it may be that the benefits to ICL from the policy have been outweighed by 
the costs to other firms in the industry. ICl preference in larger computers has often meant that ICL Is 
called on to provide complete systems, and software as well. Thus specialist suppliers of peripherals and 
software have felt that they have been excluded from the public sector market. Software suppliers have 
been particularly critical of the British government's reliance on its own resources for programme develop. 
ment and where external contracts have been offered they have often been allocated in a single package 
with the order for the computer system. The Select Committee noted: 'To many software houses the 
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symbol of Government neglect. was the London Airport Cargo EDP scheme where, in circumstances 
strongly suggesting government intervention, ICL having secured the contract for the project subcontracted 
the software implementation to an American-owned software house.' (1971, Vol 1, paragraph 171) 
Given a commitment to selective aid policies, the comparative neglect of the software industry by the UK 
government in comparison with the generous support offered by the BRD government would seem to have 
been a major omission. British software expertise has been generally regarded as second only to that of the 
Americans, and it is a sector where the Japanese and, to a lesser extent, the Germans have invested extreme-
ly heavily in order to develop their own software services industry. The growing cost of software in relation 
to hardware has provided considerable opportunities for the UK software houses, but the potenti.tI to 
increase overseas earnings, so it is claimed, has been limited by the fragmented nature of the industry. 
Conclusions 
In the UK and BRD the objectives of government policy towards the computer industry and computer tech-
nology have been similar: to support the industry because it is a growth industry, to encourage the develop-
ment of computer technology under domestic ownership and control because of the economic and strate· 
gic importance of this branch of technology, to encourage exports and limit imports of computer equipment, 
to encourage the assimilation of EDP technology by other industries. 
Nevertheless, the policies of the two countries show some differences .. While both governments have been 
concerned chiefly with supporting Rand D into computer technology, in the I3RD such support has been 
provided to the EDP industry as a whole, in the UK the policy has focused on support for leL. Not only 
has UK policy been more selective, it has also been more interventionist; UK policy mea~lIres have inclu-
ded public ownership, industrial restructuring and discriminatory public purchase policy; West German 
policies have been concerned exclusively with financing .R a~d D. West German policy has t.lken the form 
of three medium term programmes for the data processing Industry. UK policy has not heen provided as 
and when needed by the company and the recent shift of emphasis towards micro·processors, small systems 
and peripherals has been in response to recognition of deficiencies in the UK's [DP performance. 
Again, these contrasts in policy reflect general differences between the conduct of industri.1I policy in the 
two countries: UK industrial policy tending to be more selective, more interventionist, more conccntr,l\ed 
upon large firms, and heavily influenced by short·term factors. German indu~triJI policy has been Ic\s 
dirigiste and has sought to be compatible with the competitive market economy by avoiding direct structural 
intervention and discrimination between individual enterprises. 
West German expenditure on support for its computer industry has greatly exceeded that of the UK despite 
the fact that public subsidies to private industry are, in aggregate, far greatcr in the UK. This limited support 
for the computer industry in the UK reflects the greater priority given to the maintenance of employment 
than to the encouragement of growth and technological change. 
I n both countries the computer industry has achieved a rapid growth of output and exports and at thc s.lmc 
time there has been heavy import penetration, notably from the USA. I n the manufacture of medium and 
large computers, Britain has built on its early development of computer technology to devclop a profitahle, 
growing and internationally competitive indigenous manufacturer. Following a more hazard-strewn path, 
Siemens has achieved a similar position. With regard to small computers,· microprocessors, peripherals and 
software, the performance of the West German industry has been superior to that of the UK, despi te an 
early lead by the UK in many aspects of electronic technology. 
The differences in performance of the different sectors of the EDP industry in the two countries partly 
reflect public policy. The 'success' of ICL must, in part, be a result of govcrnment policy first in creating 
the company and second in supporting it by finance and prefcrence in government con;racts. The weak 
performance of the other, and more important, sectors of the industry must also reflect, in p,lrt, thc com. 
parative lack of government support in these sectors. In West Germany the major strengths of the [DP 
industry has been in those sectors which are weakest in the UK - small systems, peripherals and inte-
grated circuits - and it is notable that these sectors have been heavily supported under the Federal govern. 
ment's programmes. 
The low level of public support for the UK computer industry in relation to that of the Gcrman computer 
industry and in relation to other UK industries raises questions about the appro~riatcness of the priorities 
of UK industrial policy. The more general EDP support measures of the BRD as comparcd with the ad 
hoc selective support measures in the UK raises the question of whcther the quality of government fore-
casting and project selection in industries subject to rapid technological change is sufficicnt to justify the 
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greater risks of selective policies. From the evidence received in this Chapter, it would appear that the neglect 
of government of some of the most important sectors of the UK computer industry - notably small systems, 
peripherals, computer services and electronic components - provides an argument for more general industry 
support on the German model. The deficiencies of UK policy in relation to that of the BRD may also reflect 
the better information and more balanced forecasting which is encouraged by policy decision·milking which 
is firmly based on medium-term programmes for the industry as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 6 
STRUCTURAL POLICIES TOWARDS THE SHIPBUILDING 
AND SHIPPING INDUSTRIES OF THE BRD AND HIE UK 
by R.M. Grant & G.K. Shaw 
The relationship between the shipping and shipbuilding industries 
Although shipbuilding and shipping are quite distinct industries, their problems have bccn similM and 
policies towards one industry have an important influence on the othcr. Thcrefore policics towMds the 
two industries are considered together. There are close parallels in the competitive factors which influence 
the two industries. Both industries have to compete in an international market in which Japan is the IJrge~t 
supplier and in which fierce price competition is pr0vided by developing, also by Comecon countries. 
In shipbuilding Japan has accounted for almost one half of world output during most of the 19705 (sec 
Table 6.1); in shipping Japan has the largest merchant fleet including the flag of convenience countril~s. 
Brazil and South Korea in shipbuilding and Liberia and Panama in sh ipping are important sources of low. 
cost competition. In both industries Comecon countries represent a growing source of compl,titilln. The 
economic fortunes of the two industries tend to be closely correlated. Fluctuations in the demand lor 
shipping caused by cycles in world trade obviously create fluctuations in shipbuilding demand. Fixed CO\ts 
represent, for both industries, a high proportion of total costs, so excess capacity (such as exblS ill prc\cnt) 
encourages vigorous price competition. The close vertical relationship betwcen the two indu\tries &11\0 
means that policies affecting one industry have important indirect effects on the other. Thus an imrort.lI1t 
form of assistance given to the shipbuilding industries of UK and BRD has been subsidies pOlid to cu~tllmers. 
The spillover effects of support policies are not always bencficial. Assist,mcc to the world shirhuilding in· 
dustry aimed at maintaining output and employment in each country has grcatly cx.lCerbatcd the rrohlern 
of excess capacity in the world shipping industry. 
Although the two industries are closely related and face common economic problems, struclur.II policies 
towards them differ because of their different positions within the national economic structure. 1 hc 
shipbuilding industry is an important employer both in UK and BRD and its employmcnt is gcograrhiC<llIy 
concentrated. Shipbuilding is also an important customer of other industries, not<lhly steel. The shirring 
industries of BRD and UK are less integrated into the nation,ti economic structure. A high proportion of 
employees are non-national and in consequence fluctuations in the Icvcl of busincss do not havc slIch 
important consequences for the national employmcnt situation. The shipping camp.mics purch",c ~hirs 
and other inputs freely betw~en countries ac.cording to relative prices, so th.lt the fortunes of the supplying 
industries of the two countries are not entirely depcndent upon the domcstic shirring indll~tries. I\s a 
result, the maritime policies of the two countries have been concerned more with shirhuilding th.1I1 with 
shipping. This is particularly true in the UK where the level of financial assistance to shiphuilding and thc 
extent of structural intervention has been greater than for almost any othcr manufacturing indu~try, while 
policy towards shipping has comprised limited gencral support measures. This contrast of poli<.:ics is le~s 
evident in the BRD. First, the Federal Government has not been willing to adopt such intcrvcntionbt 
industrial policies as the UK Government. Second, German shipping policy has the import.lnt strategic 
objective of maintaining and expanding its merchant fleet. This is a reflcction of thc sm.!11 size of Germ,lny 's 
fleet (less than one third of UK tonnage). particularly in relation to Germany's very l.lrge overseas tr <Ide, 
(see Table 6.3). 
The structure of shipping and shipbuilding in the UK and West Germany 
Although in both countries the maritime sector is of great importancc to the national economy, the rcl,l-
tive importance and performance of shipbuilding and shipping varies between the two countries. In the UK 
shipping is the more important industry in terms of its earnings, assets, employment and contribution t~ 
the balance of payments. Indeed, ~ollowing the fall in the international position of the UK shipbuilding 
industry from 2nd to 7th place dUring the past 20 years (see Table 6.1), Britain's clJim to bc one of thc 
world's leading maritime nations is based on the importance of the UK merchant fll'et which, excluding 
the flags of convenience, is the largest after that of Japan (see Table 6.2). 
In the BRD the relative roles of shipping and shipbuilding are reverscd. Shipbuilding is more import.lnt Ih.1I1 
shipping in terms of earnings, employment and balance of payments contribution. Germany h'ls the 4th 
largest shipbuilding industry in the world in terms of 1977 output, but only the 11th l.1rgrst merch.lr1t 
fleet (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
The small size of the German shipping fleet is surprising in vicw of the position of Gcrm,tny as the world \ 
largest trading nation after Japan. The reasons are largely historical - the loss of most of Germ<lny's mcr. 
chant fleet during the Second World War and the subsequent partition of Germany and Europe which 
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Table 6.1 
THE SHARES OF WORLD SHIPBUILDING COMPLETIONS 
1956 1968 1969 1970 7971 1972 7973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
World Total (million GRT) 6.29 16.84 18.74 20.98 24.39 26.75 30.41 33.54 34.20 33.92 27.53 
of which: % 
Japan 24.04 49.06 48.09 48.00 45.07 48.01 48.05 50.04 49.08 46.08 52.05 
West Germany 17.03 7.02 9.05 6.03 8.01 5.02 6.03 6.04 7.03 5.05 5.08 
Sweden 7.07 6.05 6.07 7.03 7.06 7.06 7.05 6.05 6.04 7.04 8.04 
Netherlands 6.03 1.06 2.06 3.01 2.03 2.08 2.08 2.08 3.00 1.09 0.09 
France 4.04 3.07 3.07 4.01 4.05 3.08 3.09 3.01 3.04 4.09 4.00 
Italy 4.03 3.00 1.09 2.06 3.06 3.04 2.08 2.08 2.03 2.01 2.08 
Norway 3.00 3.06 3.03 3.04 3.06 3.01 3.02 2.09 3.01 2.02 2.01 
Denmark 2.02 3.01 3.02 2.05 3.00 3.06 3.03 3.02 2.08 3.01 2.06 
USA 2.00 2.02 2.05 1.08 2.00 1.08 3.02 2.02 1.04 2.04 3.07 
Spain 1.02 2.07 3.04 3.01 3.04 4.00 4.03 4.07 4.07 3.09 6.06 
Comecon countries * • • 5.07 5.06 5.01 4.09 4.02 5.00 5.06 5.08 
00 
\.tJ -.J 
V'1 Table 6.4 
00 ./ 
UK SHIPBUILDING: OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Completions of merchant 
ships number 152 138 144 134 139 137 134 144 140 104 
GRT ('000) 1046 814 1297 1259 1208 1069 1189 1203 1460 1008 
Estimated value (£m) 116 137 180 180 220 230 228 270 375 262.2 
F or overseas 
registration (£m) 51 38 34 51 59 61 62 98 144 133.2 
Total sales of shipbuilding and 
marine engineering-MLH 370 (£m) 551.8 648.3 749.9 810.0 946.4 12795 1365.0 
Employment ('000) 182.7 171.3 179.9 181.6 
Source: Business Monitor. Employment data from Census of Production 
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Table 6.2 
THE MAJOR SHIPPING NATIONS OF THE WORLD,1977 
GRT DWT Per cent 
(million) (million) (World GRT) 
Liberia 80.0 156.0 
20.3 
Japan 40.0 65.9 
10.2 
UK 31.6 51.7 
8.0 
Greece 295 49.3 
7.5 
Norway 27.8 49.2 
7.1 
Soviet Union 21.4 23.0 
5.4 
Panama 19.5 31.6 
4.9 
USA 15.3 
22.1 3.9 
France 11.6 20.1 
3.0 
Italy 11.1 
17.7 2.8 
West Germany 9.6 15.6 
2.4 
Source: Verband Deutscher Reeder, Seeschiffahrt 1977. 
Table 6.3 
IMPORTANCE OF SHIPPING TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES 
7970 7977 7972 7973 7974 1975 
Share of national trade 
carried by home fleet (%) 
UK 
Imports 31 32 31 30 29 31 
Exports 47 44 40 43 44 46 
WEST GERMANY 
Imports 25 23 21 17 15 18 
Exports 39 37 34 28 25 27 
Employment! UK 83 89 
(millions) West Germany 491 46 39 35 32 32 
Revenue UK 3299 3199 4044 4955 
(US~millionsl West Germany 2038 2160 1906 2007 2659 2778 
Note: 1 Induding nations and non-nationals. 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report 1977, pp.1I1.27 and V1.23-24 
affected Germany's traditional Baltic trade. 
6.6 The result of the different sizes of shipping fleets is that a much larger proportion of the UK's foreign trade is carried by the national fleet, and that the UK fleet must rely much more upon international cross·trading 
than the German fleet (see Table 6.3). As regards the shipbuilding industries, the UK purchases a much 
larger proportion of its ships abroad than do the Germans, and the German shipbuilding industry must 
look much more to export sales than the UK shipbuilding industry, 
6.7 Although shipbuilding was ~ne ?f. the, most rapidly growing se~t?rs ,of world manufacturing industry between 1960 and 1975, shipbUilding In the UK has been a declining Industry, Despite some short-lived 
booms during the 1960~ and 19:0s the trend i~ tonnag.e output has be~n downward, (see Table 6.4), The 
performance of the UK Industry In ~espect of price, qua~lty an.d the meetl~g of delivery d;ltcs has been poor 
in relation both to low-cost competitors (Far East, Brazil, Spain) and to hlgh-cost competitors (Scandinavi.\ 
Germany, France and USA): The factors whic~ characterise declining industries in Britain:- weak m,lnagc: 
ment, poor industrial relations, a concentration on short-term problems to the neglect of longer-term 
planning and budgeting, and a failure to respond to the changing requirements of the market have all been 
evident in UK shiobuildim"!. 
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Table 65 
WEST GERMAN SHIPBUILDING: OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT 
7968 7969 7970 7977 7972 7973 7974 7975 7976 7977 
Completions of merchant ships number 239 296 279 263 267 233 196 215 195 187 
of which inland 37 87 84 85 105 93 58 42 32 18 
GRT ('000) 1323 1779 1539 1990 1541 2053 2238 2386 2154 1618 
of which inland ('000) 41 87 116 137 172 140 73 46 48 27 
Value of new ships produced 
(OM millions) 2070 2547 2467 3072 3282 4190 3988 4575 5097 5454 
of which inland (%) 1.4 2.6 3.5 3.5 4.9 3.9 2.4 1.7 1.6 1.1 
Turnover of shipbuilding 00 
W industry (excluding non-ihip 1.0 
a- building activities) 
0 (OM millions) 2645 3178 3220 4018 4027 4891 5743 6293 6621 6545 
Export turnover of industry 
(OM millions) 1336 1663 1305 1859 2182 3001 2793 4255 4188 3885 
as % of turnover 45.2 47.7 36.2 41.5 48.2 55.6 44.7 60.5 56.6 53.0 
Export tonnage ('000) 843 1413 750 1086 880 1357 869 1747 1479 1180 
Employment annual average 
('000) 80 81 80 80 78 74 75 78 74 70 
Source: Verband der Deutscher Schiffbauindustrie. 
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Table 6.6 
LABOUR COSTS IN SHIPBUILDING 1977 (OM PER HOUR) 
West Germany 
USA 
18.92 
11.76 ($ = OM 2.32) 
12.23 (100F = OM 47.26) 
11.83 (LlOOO = OM 2.632) 
10.57 (100 Yen = OM 0.867) 
Fraflce 
Italy 
Japan 
UK 8.09 (£1 = OM 4.051) 
Source: Verband der Deutschen Schiffbau Industrle 
The competitive position of the shipbuilding companies of the BRD has also been handicapped by the rising 
international value of the mark and the lack of a large maritime fleet. The ability of the German shipbuilding 
industry to expand despite the difficulties it has faced reflects primarily the ability of the industry to usc 
its commercial and technological expertise. to build sophisticated and technologically advanced ships for 
specialised use, such as container ships, roll-on-foll-off ships, gas carriers, ferries, refrigerated ships and 
factory ships. The German yards have been in the forefront of technological advance in production methods 
and have maintained a high rate of investment which has allowed the introduction of more productive 
working methods (such as the series production of larger ships), Innovation, investment and diversification 
of the German shipbuilding industry has been assisted by the fact that the shipbuilding companies tend to 
have extensive interests outside the shipbuilding industry. Of the six largest shipbuilders, four are general 
engineering companies. Yet, despite the successful development of the shipbuilding industry over the pmt· 
war period, Germany is one of the countries most heavily hit by the current world shipbuilding crisis, 
Table 6.7 shows the principal shipbuilders of the BRD. 
Table 6.7 
MAJOR GERMAN SHIPBUILDING COMPANIES 
Employment 
7976 Location of yards 
Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft 
AG Weser 
14,700 
8,290 
6,700 
5,606 
4,750 
1,988 
1,807 
1,568 
1,544 
Kiel and Hamburg 
Bremen and Bremerhilven 
Hamburg Blohm and Voss AG . ' 
Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau und Maschmenfabnk Bremen 
Thyssen Nordseewerke GmbH 
Flender Werft Atkiengesellschaft 
Emden 
Lubeck 
Flensburger Schiffbau - Gesellschaft Flensburg 
Hamburg J J Sietas Schiffswerft 
Schiffbau Unterweser AG Bremerhaven 
Source: German Shipyards for Ocean Going Vessels - Verband der Deutschen Schiffbauindustric 
6.9 
c. 
6,10 
In shipping the relative superiority of German over British industrial performance that ch.uacterises ship-
building (and many other manufacturing industries) is not apparent, Britain, despite its falling share of 
world trade, has rapidly expanded its merchant fleet and has remained the world's second largest ship-
owning nation. Indeed, during the 1970s the growth of the UK fleet did not lag far behind that of the 
Japanese fleet, even without the enormous par!ial~y-captive cargo market available to Japanese operators. 
Between 1970 and 1975 the West German shlppmg fleet expanded at only one third of the rate of the 
British fleet, Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the two countries' share of the world fleet and their tonnage growth. 
Nevertheless, the replacement rate of the merchant fleet of the BRD has been extremely high with the 
result that the German fleet is among the youngest of the world - A concentration on modern labour. 
saving ships offering a highly efficient service has been the principal strategy of German shipo~ners to 
overcome their cost disadvantages vis-a-vis other shipping nations. 
The shipping and shipbuilding industries in crisis 
The most important factor influencing the development of maritime policies of the British and West German 
governments since ~97.5 has bee~ the, sl~mp in ",,:"orld demand for shipping and ships combined with rapid 
growth in world shiPPing and shlpbUlldmg capacity. In Germany the threat to the existence of its shipping 
and shipbuild!ng posed by the ~970s crisis has resul,ted in th.e i~trodu~tion of support measures the ju~tifi. 
catio~ of whl~~ stretc.h ,the phllosop~y of,th~ non-lnterve~tIOn!st, soc!al market economy to the limit. In 
Britain the CrISIS precIpitated the n.atlonah~tlon of,the shlpb,Ulldlng mdustry. To understand the current 
support policies of the two countries requires a brief analysIs of the major factors responsible for this 
situation. 
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Table 6.8 
UK AND BRD SHARES OF WORLD MERCHANT FLEET (DEADWEIGHT TONNAGE) AND AVERAGE AGE OF FLEET 
1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1975 
National deadweight registration 
as per cent of world fleet 
Total UK 11.5 11.0 11.3 10.9 10.5 9.9 
W. Germany 3.3 3.4 3.6 2.9 2.7 2.4 
'w 
Tankers UK 12.0 12.4 13.6 12.7 12.0 10.9 \.0 
0"- W. Germany 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.9 
..... 
l\.) 
Bu I k carriers UK 9.9 8.9 8.6 9.9 9.9 9.7 
W. Germany 3.9 35 3.7 3.0 2.8 2.7 
Freighters UK 11.2 10.2 9,7 8.4 7.6 7.2 
W. Germany 5.0 5.4 6.3 5.4 4.2 3.8 
A verage age of fleet (years) 
UK 12 11 11 10 10 10 
W. Germany II 10 9 6 7 7 
World 17 13 13 12 12 12 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report, 1977. 
Table 6.9 
GROWTH OF NATIONAL FLAG FLEETS 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1978 
Total ships UK 1772 1713 1627 1596 1609 1576 
{no.} West Germany 993 958 797 702 668 611 
DWT UK 37.1 40.7 43.5 47.8 53.0 54.9 
{million} West Germany 11.7 12.5 11.5 11.4 13.6 135 9.7 
\..t.> GRT UK 24.1 25.8 27.2 29.4 32.2 33.2 30.9 
'" 
{million} West Germany 17.8 8.2 7.6 75 85 8.3 9.7 \..t.> 
\0 
DELIVERIES TO THE FLEET (GRT) N 
Total UK 2.8 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.0 1.6 
West Germany 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.3 0.4 0.02 
Tankers UK 1.9 1.7 0.7 1.8 2.7 2.3 
West Germany 0.4 0.1 0.05 0.1 1.1 0.3 
Bu I k carriers UK 0.6 0.8 1.8 1.4 0.8 0.6 
West Germany 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 
Freighters UK 0.4 0.4 0.8 05 0.1 0.1 
West Germany 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.03 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report, 1977. 
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Demand Factors: Three influences have combined to promote a substantial and prolonged fall in the demand 
for freight carrying services. First, 50 per cent of all bulk freight is in the transportation of iron ore and coal 
for the steel industry. Hence any decline in the demand for steel, as witnessed during the world depression 
commencing in 1974, exerts an immediate impact upon freight rates. Second, in the dry bulk freight trade 
much depends upon Soviet grain harvests. A shortfall in agricultural output and the necessity for sub: 
stantial wheat imports has given a considerable fillip to transportation rates in the past but over the recent 
years of depression such a s timu Ius has not been forthcoming. The most significan t demand factor, however 
has been the OPEC·induced rise in the price of oil which has drastically curtailed the demand for oil tanke; 
services. More and more countries have attempted to economise on oil imports by turning to alternative 
sources of fuel or by exploiting domestic energy sources. The impact upon freight rates was not just confined 
to oil as ship owners reacted by using tankers to carry alternative cargoes. To these influences on the demand 
for freight transport one has to add the decline in passenger transportation services which have not helped 
the shipowners' plight. The rapid technological and cost·reducing innovations in air-passenger services 
have virtually eliminated demand for sea travel whilst at the same time improving air freight services. Sig-
nificantly, Hapag·L!oyd one of Germany's leading shipping lines, found it necessary to diversify into plane 
chartering activities in the attempt to 'reclaim back passenger traffic'. 
Supply Factors: Independently of demand conditions, supply influences conspired during the mid-1970s to 
promote a world-wide fall in freight shipping rates, to such an extent that it became uneconomic to put 
newly-built ships on ocean-going voyages. One factor has been the tendency for the industry to over-react 
to favourable demand conditions and buoyant prices. This arises from the inelastic nature of short·term 
supply conditions for obviously tonnage cannot be increased substantially overnight. Consequently, any 
increase in demand tends to have a disproportionate impact upon freight prices causing freight profits to 
spiral. Excess profits promote new entry and new orders for ships which ultimately depress freight rates, 
but the countervailing adjustment does not come into play until considerable excess capacity has been 
generated owing to the time lag in the supply response. This is precisely the situation which prevailed in the 
creation of the surplus in tankers. The 1960s witnessed a steady growth in the consumption of oil and 
oil-related products. There was consequently a steady rise in the demand for shipping to transport oil and by 
1973 tanker freight charges had risen to 420 (1947=100). The closure of the Suez Canal in 1973 encouraged 
shippers to order tankers of a size which took full advantage of scale economies in tanker transport. Tankers 
of 250,000 dwt, were ordered and built. During 1973-74 the world tanker tonnage more than doubled. 
Such were the economies of scale and so buoyant were oil freight charges that it was possihle to recoup 
the outlay of a super tanker in a comparatively few voyages. 
Such conditions would inevitably have produced an eventual surplus of tankers even without the OPEC. 
induced fall in demand for oil. The resulting drastic fall in oil freight rates has led to tankers being com-
pleted and laid up without ever seeing se~ic~. For ex~mple, ~n 1975.six tankers were c~mpleted in West 
German yards at a total cost of DM600 million to be Immediately laid up, the reason given being that it 
would be more expensive to put them out to sea. Since 1975 such lay·ups have become common in UK and 
West Germany. I n addition, other freight rates have been adversely affected as disillusioned tanker owners 
have abandoned oil transportation and switched to carrying bulk dry good traffic, in particular, iron ore, 
coal and corn. The rapid generation of the tanker surplus on the scale observed would not have been 
possible without the creation of new shipyards. The new yards, specially designed to accommodate the 
super breed of tanker, were built quickly particularly in Japan where the government provided considerable 
financial backing. Indeed, shipbuilding became looked upon as a growth centre for the economy as a whole 
as well as a source of rapidly expanding export orders. Between 1960 and 1970 Japan's output increased 
from 1.7 million to 10.09 million GRT and by 1975 it totalled 16.9 [see EIU (1977)1. By 1975 Japan 
was producing more than 50 per cent of world output and this apparent success stimulated other far 
Eastern competitors, especially in Taiwan and South Korea. Excess capacity in bulk carriage now exceeds 
some 12 million tons or approximately 10 per cent of total world transportation. Nor will surplus capacity 
be readily eliminated. The current world fleet is relatively young; whilst there is doubtless room for scrap· 
ping, the fact remains that 80 per cent of all vessels over 18,000 dwt are less than ten years old. 
Two other influences played their part in generating excess capacity. One was the rise in competition from 
the Eastern bloc countries; Comecon is now responsible for. some 12 per cent of world freight tonnage and 
handles 20 per cent of the world's seaborne cargo. As these figures suggest, the Comecon countries are price 
competitive in their quotation of freight cha~es, partly, it is alleged.' because their need for foreign currency 
earnings over-rides cost fac~ors. The oth.er I~fl~ence. was the rapid ~ace of technological change in ship-
ping, notably the introductIOn ?f contal~ensatlon, IIght~r-abroad ShiPS, roll-on-roll-off ships and various 
types of specialised carriers. ~hlle the ra?~d obsolescence Induced by technology has been to the benefit of 
shipyards, the increases in ship p~od~ctlvlty exacerbated the problem ~f e~cess carrying capacity. Other 
innovations have included the apphc~tlon o~ ~uclear powe~ t~ merchant shiPPing. The Otto Hahn, Germany's 
first nuclear ship produced an operating defiCit of DM7 million, 90 per cent of which has been borne by the 
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Federal government. The unwillingness of the government to continue support means that the vessel is now 
destined for scrapping. 
German shipowners, who have shown themselves remarkably willing to adapt and diversify their activities in 
the wake of increased structural change, also face additional difficulties. Crewing regulations on German ships 
are such as to render her operation and labour costs nearly as high as the United States and virtually double 
that on Greek and British ships. Indeed, it was recognition of these higher costs associated with operating 
under the German flag which justified the initial assistance granted to shipowners. In addition, the upward 
pressure upon the DM has increased the difficulties of selling ships built in West German yards (not least 
to West German shipowners). The decline of the US dollar has also caused a fall in shipowners' profits. This 
is because 80 per cent of all freight charges are quoted in US dollars and thus the net revenue of German 
shipping lines falls in proportion with the comparative decline of the US dollar against the D. M.trk. More-
over, it is has long been the convention to quote insurance cover in US dollars, and hence implicitly the 
replacement value of the vessel. The continued decline of the US dollar thus implies a rising percenWgo of 
indebtedness against the insured asset which is unwelcome and indeed unacceptable to those providing 
mortgage cover. 
In addition to the problems of oceangoing and coastal shipping, inland waterways are of considerable 
importance in the BRD_ Inland shipping employs close on 30,000 people and it is a source of concern that 
future prospects for such traffic are decidedly bleak. The current recession, beginning in 1974, seriously 
reduced demand it is now estimated that at least 20 per cent of domestic inland tonnage is surplus to require-
ments. By far the greatest fear, however springs from the threat of competition from the Eastern European 
fleets following the completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal scheduled for 1982. The Eastern ship-
ping barges are mainly laid-up during the severe winter months but will now have the incentive to tramfer 
to the Danube and other Western Europe waterways during the winter if they can cover only average 
variable costs. The inc~ease~ competition in condition~ of excess cap~city will i~evitably lead to a lowering 
of freight rates, espeCially If the Eastern bloc countries follow their oceangoing precedent and set rates 
primarily with a view to foreign exchange earnings and witho~t regard to covering operating costs. At the 
present time, there appears to be no concerted government policy to cope with the difficulties of the inl.lI1d 
shipping lines, despite the fact that the position of the inland boat owners is also threatened by the highly 
efficient but heavily subsidised German rail network. In contrast, the inland waterways of the UK are of 
comparatively minor importance. 
The future prospects for shipping and shipbuilding in the two countries are far from encouraging. While the 
setting of conference rates for general cargoes provides a protection to shipowners from the full forces of 
competition, in the market for new ships a scarcity of new orders appears likely for a considerable period. 
In neither country has the shipbuilding industry adjusted to the new world situation. Even prior to the 
current crisis, the UK shipbuilding industry was maintained only by government subsidies and the nJtional· 
isation of the industry appeared to be as much a device for channelling greater public aid to the industry as 
a means of achieving 'orderly' contraction and regeneration. During its first year of operation, British 
Shipbuilders has made a loss of nearly £150 million. German yards have been even harder hit by the fJmine 
of orders as Table 6.10 shows. Forecasts by the Chairman of the German Shipbuilding Industry, Herr 
Bartels, that a 30 per cent reduction in capacity would now be necessary appears almost optimistic. Present 
orders suggest that the industry may be operating at around one third of capacity in 1979 with virtually no 
work at all available in 1980. 
Table 6.10 
WORLD SHIPBUILDING ORDERS, 1975-1977 
West Germany 
UK 
Japan 
Sweden 
France 
Brazil 
USA 
Spain 
World 
31.12.1975 
4.2 
4.9 
31.4 
6.5 
4.9 
3.6 
5.0 
4.3 
82.3 
Source: Verband der Deutschen Schiffbau industrie e.v. 
31.12.1976 
2.4 
2.9 
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18.2 
4.0 
3.0 
3.2 
4.7 
3.8 
55.4 
(G P.T, millions) 
31.12.1977 
1.1 
2.2 
9.9 
2.1 
2.0 
2.9 
3.6 
1.9 
36.7 
D. 
6.18 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
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The objectives of government support policies towards shipping and shipbuilding 
The rationale for maritime support policies have been similar in the UK and West Germany. The differences 
are pri~ari.ly those of emphasis reflec,ting the d!ff~r~nt conditions aff~cti~g the shipping and shipbuilding 
industries In each country and the dIfferent pnorltles accorded to ob/ectlves. In the case of shipping the 
purposes of the support policies can be listed as follows: 
To maintain and increase the contribution of the industry to the balance of payments. As the revenue from 
overseas business is in foreign currency earnings and the business of domestic importers and exporters would 
fall to foreign fleets ~f not carried by .domesti~ shi~ping companies, almost the entire earnings of shipping 
companies may be VIewed as a posItIve contnbutlon to the balance of payments. For the UK it is con-
sidered vital to preserve the international position of its shipping fleet in order to maintain the contri-
bution of the industry to the invisible account of balance of payments. In West Germany support for the 
domestic fleet is directed towards limiting and reducing the adverse foreign exchange balance represented 
by shipping. Because of the heavy dependence of UK shipowners on third country trade, UK support of its 
shipping fleet must be cautious because of vulnerability of the fleet to any retaliation from other countries 
in the form of cargo preference. West Germany, on the other hand, because of its large share of world trade 
might be expected to derive substantial benefit from a protectionist shipping policy. The fact that th~ 
German government and German shipping industry have consistently supported the maintenance of free-
dom of entry to international shipping is an indication of commitment to the concept of workable compe-
tition. At the same time the German government has sought to pursue the interests of its domestic fleet 
through the negotiation of bilateral shipping agreements with certain other countries. 
To offer security to foreign trade. The economies of both UK and West Germany are heavily dependent on 
foreign trade - for imports of food and raw materials and export earnings from manufactured goods. For 
Germany a large proportion of exports and imports travel by sea, and for the UK almost all foreign trade is 
by sea. For foreign trade to be wholly dependent for transportation on foreign registered vessels makes the 
national economy liable to disruption from political crises or commercial and labour relations problems 
entirely outside the control of that country. The claimed need for a national merchant fleet to provide 
security for foreign trade has been a particularly important objective of Germany's shipping policy. The 
desire to provide security for vital segments of Germany's foreign trade is reflected in the special assistance 
given to certain types of ship, notably large oil tankers. 
To enhance the competitiveness of export industries. In the case of West Germany, the ability to deliver 
export goods quickly and efficiently is seen as essential to its export effort. Because of the high wage costs 
of German industry and rising international value of the mark, the competitiveness of German exports have 
become increasingly dependent upon quality, reliability and speed of delivery. Thus efficient shipping 
services are viewed as complementary to efficient export industries. For this reason government policy has 
been orientated towards making Germany's shipping fleet the most up-to-<late and technically advanced in 
the world. For the UK on the other hand, the quality of shipping services is not a constraint on export 
performance. The UK's poor record in the prompt. delivery of e~port orders stems from inefficiencies at the 
manufacturing level and, to a lesser extent, delays In dock handling. 
The achievement of the goals of foreign exchange earnings from shipping and the maintenance of a national 
fleet to provide security to foreign trade require that national fleets are able to compete in a world freight 
market against 'flag of convenience' fleets with low wage crews and the subsidised fleets of the Comecon 
countries. For this reason both the UK and West Germany have felt it necessary to subsidise their national 
fleets, partly by concessions on indir~ct taxe~ to lower operati~g costs, but primarily by grants, tax relief 
and loans for the purchase of new shIps. ASSIStance for new ship purchases lowers capital costs, may boost 
efficiency by having a modern fleet and can also be directed to benefit domestic shipbuilders. Support 
policies have also sough.t to maintai~ shipping. comp~nies against t~e stro.ng flu~tu.ations in profitability 
which result from the hIgh level of fIxed costs In the Industry combIned With vanatlons in world trade. In 
West Germany the capital gains reserve and a carry-forward provision for losses are designed to counter the 
effects of the cyclical nature of shipping demand. 
In terms of the percentage contribution of shipbuilding to GNP or in terms of the percentage of total labour 
force employed in the industry, shipbuilding is a minor industry. However, for a number of reasons, ship-
building has been of considerable importance in the structural policies of both West Germany and Britain, 
and the reasons advanced for support are as follows: 
Employment considerations. In both UK .and West Germany, shipbuilding is geographically concentrated. 
In UK the major locations are the estuanes of the Clyde, Tyne, Tees and Mersey and at Belfast. I n West 
Germany the main centres are Hamburg, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Emden, Kiel and Lubeck. Changes in the 
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employment in the industry have concentrated effects which are amplified by the importance of shipbuild-
ing as a customer for steel, marine engines, cables and ships' fittings. The employment objective would appear 
to be the dominant motive behind UK support for its domestic shipbuilding industry and reflects the high 
levels of unemployment in the shipbuilding areas of the UK. The strength of the employment motive has 
led the government to continue to support certain shipyards even where the possibilities of reaching profit-
ability in the long run have appeared to be extremely slim. Thus the Harland and Wolff and Govan (for-
merly UCS) companies have been heavily subsidised because of high local unemployment and consequentidl 
political backlash in the West of Scotland and Northern Ireland. By mid-1976 total loans and grants to 
Harland and Wolff amounted to £137 million - about £25,000 per employee. In West Germany employ-
ment considerations have not been paramount in influencing policy towards shipbuilding for unlike 
British shipbuilding, the industry has been expanding and the major shipbuilding areas do not suffer 
from high unemployment. However, in the current world shipbuilding crisis the likelihood of large scale 
bankruptcy and closures have resulted in the government's introduction of short-term support to prevent 
a sudden rise in unemployment\and to allow an orderly adjustment of the industry to the new market 
conditions. 
ii. Export earnings. In UK and West Germany shipbuilding is a significant export industry. Between 1975 
and 1977 exports as a proportion of the value of completed ships were 57 per cent for West Germany and 
40 per cent for UK. Where government believes its currency to be overvalued in relation to foreign trade 
in manufactured goods, as has been the view both in UK and West Ger~any, there is an incentive for 
government to subsidise export-{)rientated manufacturing industries, particularly since direct subsidisation 
of exports would contravene GAIT and the Treaty of Rome. . 
iii. The encouragement of growth Industries. Although in the UK the trend of shipbuilding output and" -'-'''---
employment has been slightly downward over the past two decades, world trade has steadily expanded 
over the period and the demand for ships has shown a strongly upward trend. Thus for most countries 
iv. 
v. 
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including West Germany, shipbuilding has been regarded as a growth industry. Even in the UK modes~ 
growth in shipbuilding might take place if the yards could be modernised and reorganised and I,thour 
relations improve. The Geddes Report of 1966 suggested that a doubling of UK shipbuilding output 
would be possible if the necessary gains in efficiency could be attained. The idea that government fin.mcc 
for British shipyards was aimed at the investment and modernisation necessary to create long run pros-
perity has been a common justification for heavy public expenditure on the industry. 
The safeguarding of the industry against periodic recessions. As a capital goods industry the ~hipbuilding 
industry is subject to volatile fluctuations in demand. Because profit margins are normally narrow due to 
international competition, production does not normally have to fall far below capacity operation before 
fixed costs cannot be covered. To maintain industry capacity, therefore, governments have accepted the 
need to provide finance to the yards to assist them during periods of recession. 
Subsidisation of domestic shipbUilding in order to match the assistance given by olhercounlrles to their 
shipbuilding industries. The growing competition of low-cost shipbuilding countries to the long-established 
shipbuilding countries and the general excess-capacity in shipyards during the current recession has en-
couraged an international subsidy race aimed at safeguarding national shipbuilding industries from the full 
brunt of the recession. 
This 'subsidy race' displays the characteristics of the 'prisoners' dilemma '. For the shipbuilding nations as 
a whole, competitive subsidisation has resulted in a failure to reduce shipbuilding capacity and has added 
to the long-term adjustment problem of the industry while intensifying the problem of over-capacity in the 
shipping industry. Yet for national reasons each country is unwilling to limit subsidisation for fear that its 
domestic shipbuilding industry will be forced to bear a disproportionate share of the necessary reduction 
in world yard capacity. It is difficult to divide the shipbuilding nations into 'leaders' and 'followers' 
with regard to their subsidisation policies. On the basis of US estimates (see Table 6.11) the UK appears 
to offer particularly generous assistance to its shipbuilding industry, while Germany's support is com-
paratively small. 
Limited subsidies to the shipbuilding industries which do not involve a distortion of competition between 
particular West German yards are _t~us ~iewed ~s entir~ly consistent with the BRD government's principles 
of maintaining workable competItIon In the IndustrIal sector. Where West German firms compete in an 
international mar~et then the maintenance of work.able competition means that the BRD government 
must, at least partIally, match the generous support gIven by other countries to their national shipbuilding 
industries. While the ~ederal governmen~ h~s ~een keen .to limit its su~port to the shipbuilding industry 
and to ensure that assIstance does not dISCrImInate unfaIrly between dIfferent yards, financial assisLmce 
at state level has been of an ad hoc nature and has not followed any consistent principles. 
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Table 6.11 
ESTIMATED GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SHIPPING AND 
SHIPBUILDING,1970-75 
SHIPPING SHIPBUILDING 
Amount % of revenue Amount % of revenue 
($ millions) ($ millions) 
Japan 208 4_3 88 0_9 - 2.0 
9.2 69 14.6 UK 320 
Norway 269 9.8 40 6.5 
Sweden 128 8.4 33 3.8 
Germany 99 4.3 61 2.6 
France 121 9.0 179 24_1 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report (1977), pp.I-2. 
E. 
6.22 
UK government policy towards the shipbuilding industry 
Prior to nationalisation in July 1977, the shipbuilding industry was subject to more government inter. 
vention and received more government financial support than any other private sector industry. Calcu. 
lating the total amount of public subsidy to the industry involves considerable difficulty, for assistance 
has been provided through numerous departments and agencies in a variety of forms (including grants, loans, 
equity, tax relief, credit guarantees) the aggregation of which involves considerable difficulties. In the case 
of shipbuilding, however, the fact that most loans were never repaid and most equity finance went to 
yards whose commercial value was low, has meant that it has been possible to aggregate these forms of 
finance and treat them as grants_ Table 6.12 shows the US Department of Commerce's estimate of govern. 
ment finance to the industry between 1965 and mid-1976. An alternative breakdown of government assis. 
tance to the industry for recent years is given in Table 6.13. 
Table 6.12 
PUBLIC GRANTS, LOANS, AND EQUITY PURCHASES UNDER THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY ACT AND 1972 INDUST 
INDUSTRY ACT (1965-JUNE 1976) 
Unexpended 
Equity Grants Loons Provisions Total 
Private companies 6.3 16.9 23.2 
Partly or wholl~ 
26.9 17.3 46.4 29.0 119.6 owned companies 
3.6 23.1 44.9 23.3 34.9 Harland and Wolff 
TOTAL 30.5 46.7 108.2 52.3 297.7 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report (1977), pp.III-32. 
6.23 
The principal forms of assistance by government to the shipbuilding industry are described below. 
General regional assistance: Throughout the post·war period shipbuilding has been a major beneficiary of 
UK regional support measures. Over 90 per cent of the industry has been eligible for investment grants, 
tax allowances and the regional employment premium. Between 1972/73 and 1977/78 regional develop. 
ment grants paid to shipbuilding amounted to £56.1m. 
6.24 Relief of indirect taxefs: Pdriofr. tO
d
.1963 the only sel~ctive 2support for fthhe shipbuilding industry was 'Ship, 
builders' Relief' - a re un 0 In Irect taxes amountmg to per cent 0 t e gross value of ships completed. 
6.25 
(a) 
Financial support by the Shipbuilding Industry Board 1967-1972: Government intervention into the 
industry backed by heavy financial support followed the pUblication of the report of the Gedde!o Com. 
mittee on the shipbuilding industry (1966). The report identified poor management, poor labour relations 
inadequacies in marketing, purchasing, design and planning as the major problems of the industry and It~ 
principal recommendations were: 
a re-organisation of the industry into larger companies accompanied by greater specialisation by indio 
vidual yards; 
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(b) a comprehensive government policy involving greater financial assistance. 
The 1967 Shipbuilding Industry Act established the Shipbuilding Industry Board (SIB) to encourage and 
finance re~rganisation and modernisation in the industry along the lines recommended in the Geddes 
Report. The establishment of the Board marks the inauguration of a comprehensive structural policy 
towards the industry. 
6.26 The loans and grants offered by the SIB were on a selective basis, the purpose being to encourage modern-
isation of shipyards and assist re~rganisation. Some finance did encourage large-scale re-cquipment, but 
in the main the finance was concentrated on the biggest loss makers, [Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS). 
Harland and Wolff and Cammell Laird) for the purposes of providing working capital and covering losses. 
The Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report (p.88) estimated that only one third of SIB assistance was used for 
capital investment. Table 6.13 shows financial assistance to the industry from the SI B and government 
departments between 1967 and 1972. The table also indicates the remarkably high rate of subsidy to 
Cammell Laird, UCS and Harland and Wolff. 
6.27 Support under the 1972 Industry Act: With the 1972 Industry Act the SIB was wound-up and since 1972 
virtually all assistance to the industry has been within the framework of this Act (excepting payments to 
Harland and Wolff by the Northern Ireland Ministry). The principal schemes are as follows: 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
6.28 
Constructions Grant Scheme (1972.74) \provided grants for the construction of new ships and mobile 
offshore installations at the rate of 10 per cent for 1972, 4 per cent for 1973 and 3 per cent for 1974. 
The final payments under the schemes were made in 1978. 
Selective regional assistance: section 7 of the Act provides for selective financial assistance for projects 
which create or maintain employment in the assisted regions. Under this section £3m was supplied in 
loans and £3.3m in gran ts in the period up to 31 March, 1978. 
Special assistance under Section 7. In addition to the measures described above, selective payments have 
been made since 1972 to the following yards. 
Govan Shipbuilders - between June 1972 and March 1978 £63.5 million was advanced to the company, 
although much of this sum was in loans, these loans were converted to equity or grants. 
Cammell Laird -loans of £19.4 million were advanced. 
Sunderland Shipbuilders - after the acquisition of the company, together with the other shipbuilding 
interests of Court Line in 1974 for £16 million, further loans of £ 15 million were made to Sunderland 
Shipbuilders. 
Austin and Pickersgill -loan of £9 million in 1975/76. 
Special assistance to Harland and Wolff was provided by the Northern Ireland Ministry. By mid·1976 aid 
to the company had totalled £137 million. 
Cost escalation insurance: In 1976 the government introduced a cost escalation insurance to cover ship. 
builders against increases in costs on ship contracts. 
Shipbuilding intervention fund, 1977: In February 1977 a £65 million intervention fund was announced 
for the industry under the Industry Act. The scheme was to provide selective assistance to individual yards 
to enable them to quote competitive prices for particular orders (the principal objective is to be com. 
petitive with Japanese tenders). The major application of the scheme so far is the £28 million from the 
fund to gain the £115 million Polish ships order (this was in addition to the normal ECGD finance). 
Credit assistance for the buyers of ships: In addition to direct assistance to shipbuilders, government 
schemes to assist the buyers of UK produced ships are aimed primarily at making British yards more com-
petitive with those of other countries. ~nder the Export Credit Guarantee Scheme the government guaran. 
tees and subsidises loans ~ade to fore.lgn buyers for t~e p~r~ose of buying ships from UK yards. The 
Home Credit Scheme. was Introduced In ~ 963 t? p~ovlde slmil~r fi~a~cial terms to UK shipowners pur. 
chasing from domestic yards. The enabling legislation, the S.hlpbulldlng Credit Act, was passed in the 
following year. Under the scheme loans are made by the clearing banks but lending above a certain limit 
is refinanced by the government and the difference between the rate of interest on the loans and com. 
mercial rates is covered by the government. Table 6.14 shows the growth of lending under the scheme. 
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Table 6.13 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO UK SHIPBUILDERS, 1967-1972 
SIB SIB 
Grants total payments 
(Em) (Em) 
Payments from 
Government 
departments 
(Em) 
Total assIstance 1 
as per cent 
of sales 
(J6) 
Appledore 0_35 0.35 1.10 2.2 
2.0 
23.8 
2.0 
23.0 
21.8 
2.4 
Austin and Pickersgill 
21.50 
52.30 
26.64 
Cammell Laird 
0.1 Doxford 
12.79 Gavan/UCS 6.25 
7.04 15_04 Harland and Wolff 
0.51 Robb Caledon 0.10 
1.71 5.25 Scott Lithgow 
5_82 5.84 
3.6 
5.9 Swann Hunter 
0_09 0.10 Vosper 
0.35 1.57 4.50 
1.90 
n.a. 
n.a. Yarrow 0_71 Others 0.05 n.a. 
TOTAL 21.16 42_93 116.84 n.a_ 
Note: 
From G. Denton, Financial Assistance to British Industry in Corden and Fels (1976). This column relates to the years 
1967 to 1971 and the assistance includes SIB payments, ad hoc assistance and shipbuilders' relief. 
Source: Report by Booz-Allen and Hamilton (1973) - except for final column (see note 1). 
6.29 Since 1975 the terms of export credit have been governed by the OECD Export Credit Understanding for 
Ships. 
6.30 
6.31 
Re-organisation and the extension of public ownership: 
A principal objective of the SIB was the re-organisation of the industry into fewer companies. In its Report 
for 1968/9 the Board announced that of twenty-seven of the shipbuilding companies covered by the 
Geddes Report, twenty-one had merged into seven groups and two had left shipbuilding. Table 6.15 shows 
the re-organisation over the period. But when, after re-organisation and SIB financed yards still faced 
bankruptcy, government often responded by offering further finance in the form of equity participation. 
The main reason for part or entire public ownership was the avoidance of unemployment. A popular view 
was that the introduction of public ownership would provide a better atmosphere for the resolution of 
disputes between management and labour over pay and working methods. In view of the poor managerial 
quality of some companies it was considered that government ownership would provide an opportunity for 
introducing more dynamic and up-to-date management methods. Public ownership was also seen as a way 
of improving co-operation between shipbuilding companies over Rand D, design and purchasing. 
The rescl!e of failing shipbuilding companies by equity purchases resulted in forms of public ownership 
that contrasted sharply with traditional approaches to nationalisation: public ownership was often partial 
with arms-length arrangements between government and management. The majority holding which govern-
ment took in Fairfields Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd in 1965 was followed by the company adopting 
radical methods of management and industrial relations. During the early 1970s as other shipbuilding com-
panies ran into serious financial difficulties so government ownership expanded. Between 1970 and 1975 
the government acquired:-
50 per cent ownership in Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd. 
100 per cent of Govan Shipbuilding Ltd. 
47.6 per cent ownership of Harland and Wolff Ltd. 
100 per cent ownership of Scotstown Marine Ltd. 
100 per cent ownership of Appledore Shipbuilders Ltd. 
100 per cent ownership of Sunderland Shipbuilders Ltd. 
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Table 6.14 
UK HOME CREDIT SCHEME 
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 
Proportion of vessel cost 
covered by guaranteed 
'-" 
loan 80% 80% 70%1 70% 70% 70% 
-J 
I-' Maximum repayment 
7 1 
..... 
period (years) 8 8 7 7 7 0 
0 
Maximum interest rate (%) 7.0 7.0 7.5 1 7.5 7.5 7.5 
. Guarantees, outstanding at 
year-end (fm) 601.9 642.4 795.9 895.5 932.4 884.4 
Estimated annual benefit 
to borrowers2 16.3 28.2 71.2 76.5 71.6 51.9 
Note: 1. From 1 July. 1974 
2. Based on average difference between the rate of interest on guaranteed loans and the industrial bond yield. 
Source: Industry Act, 1972. Annual Reports 
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Table 6.15 
RATIONALISATION IN THE UK SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY FROM 1965 
EAST SCOTLAND 
Henry Robb Shipbuilders 
Caledonian Shipbuilding & 
Engineering Co. 
Burntisland Shipping Co* 
LOWER CLYDE 
Scott's Shipbuilding & 
Engineering Co. 
Uthgows Ltd. 
Greenock Dockyard Co. 
UPPER CL YDE 
John Brown & Co. 
Yarrow & Co. 
Connell & Co. 
A. Stephen & Co.* 
Fairfields 
Barclay Curle & Co.* 
ULSTER 
Harland & Wolff 
TYNE& TEES 
WEAK 
Vickers Ltd. 
Swan Hunter & Wigham 
Richardson 
Hawthorn Leslie 
J. Readhead & Sons 
Furness Shipbuilding 
Smith's Dock Co. 
Austin & Pickersgill 
Bartram & Sons 
Wm. Doxford & Sons 
/. Laing & Sons 
J.L. Thompson & Sons 
MERSEY 
Cammell Laird & Co. 
SOUTHAMPTON 
).1. Thorneycroft & Co. Ltd 
BARROW 
Vickers Ltd. (Shipbuilding Group) 
OTHERS 
Blyth Dry Docks & Shipbuilding* 
Appledore Shipbuilders Ltd. 
Robb Caldeon 
Shipbuilders 
Scott Lithgow 
Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders 
Swann Hunter 
Shipbuilders 
Austin & Pickersgill 
Doxford & Sunderland Ltd. 
Vosper Thornycroft 
* finished shipbuilding between 1965 and 1972 
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Yarrow Shipbuilders 
Govan Shipbuilders 
British Shipbuilding 
Ltd. 
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lOOper cent ownership of North East Coast Ship repairers Ltd. 
6.32 In July 1974 the government announced in Parliament its intention of taking the whole of the shipbuilding 
industry into public ownership under a single national shipbuilding company. The Aircraft and Shipbuilding 
Bill was introduced in 1975 and passed in 1977. The purposes of nationalisation were: 
(a) to finance the industry so as to maintain employment and allow the industry to survive the shipbuilding 
recession; 
(b) 
(c) 
F. 
6.33 
6.34 
to provide the investment funds required for the necessary modernisation of British yards; 
to enable re-<>rganisation in order to exploit scale economies in certain activities and improve management. 
UK government policy towards the shipping industry 
While some of the financial aids paid to UK shipowners are unambiguously subsidies to the shipping industry, 
in the case of certain aids it is difficult to apportion the benefit between the shipowner and the shipbuilder. 
In the case of subsidies for ship purchases restricted to purchases from UK yards, the principal beneficiary 
will be the shipbuilder, since the effect of such subsidies is to bring down UK prices to those charged by 
lower-cost shipbuilding nations, thus shifting orders from foreign to domestic yards. 
Subsidies for ship purchases: Under the 1966 I ndustrial Development Act, investment grants were intro-
duced for expenditure on fixed assets by manufacturing industry. Section 5 of the Act introduced 20 per 
cent grants towards purchases of ships by UK owners which was increased to 25 per cent between 1967 and 
1968. The programme was cancelled in 1971 as a result of the unexpectedly high cost of the grants and the 
general shift in government policy from investment grants to investment tax allowances. However, payments 
under the scheme continued after 1971 because of ships already on order. The grants were available to UK 
shipowners and UK subsidiaries of foreign shipowners for new vessels registered under the British flag. The 
objectives were the expansion of the UK fleet, the encouragement of modernisation and efficiency of the 
British fleet and increased orders for UK shipyards. The programme was remarkably successful in encour· 
aging the expansion of the UK fleet, but a large part of new orders still went to foreign shipyards. Table 
6.16 shows expenditure on investment grants for ships. 
Table 6.16 
INVESTMENT GRANTS ON UK SHIP PURCHASES 
Financial Years Expenditure (£ million) 
1967-1968 
1968-1969 
1969-1970 
1970-1971 
1971-1972 
1972-1973 
1973-1974 
1974-1975 
1975-1976 
1976-1977 
1977·1978 
Source: Industry Act 1972, Annual Reports. 
22.7 
48.1 
75.7 
66.1 
115.6 
97.5 
105.0 
59.5 
46.4 
21.0 
4.9 
6.35 Depreciation Allowances: Free depreciation became available to UK shipowners in 1965, the benefits being 
codified under the 1968 Capital Allowances Act and then revised in October 1970. As capital investment 
by shipping companies increased during the late 19605 and early 19705 so the write-off provisions have 
become increasingly valuable. One effect of the generous depreciation allowances has been to encourage 
non-shipping companies to become shipowners. Thus the Clearing Banks have formed subsidiaries to pur-
chase ships and lease them to shipping companies. The subsidy element in free depreciation schedules is 
difficult to calculate but if the shipping company's total tax liability does not alter, the benefit occurs 
from the shifting forward of allowances. Table 6.17 estimates the subsidy element in the depreciation scheme. 
6.36 Home credit scheme: The scheme is described in paragraph 6.28 above where it is noted that the intended 
beneficiary of the favourable credit terms is the UK shipbuilding industry. However, to the extent that the 
subsidised credit terms are greater than the minimum financial inducement necessary for the ship buyer to 
switch his order from an overseas to a UK yard, then he also benefits. 
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Table 6.17 
ESTIMATED BENEFIT FROM FREE DEPRECIATION ON SHIPS 
1971-1972 
1972·1973 
1973·1974 
1974-1975 
1975-1976 
1976·1977 
Net fixed capital 
expenditure 
286.5 
298.0 
428.5 
496.5 
428.5 
418.4 
Estimated 
benefit l 
31.5 
32.8 
47.1 
54.6 
47.1 
46.0 
(£ million) 
Note: 1.11 per cent of capital investment - assumes 8 per cent cost of capital, g·year 
straight-line depreciation com pared with depreciation taken at end of first 
year. 
Source: US Department of Commerce (1977) page 111·25. 
G. West German Government policy towards the shipbuilding industry 
6.37 In comparison with other European countries, the level of financial assistance by government to the mari-
time sector has been low in the BRD (see Table 6.11). Also in contrast to the UK, German financial sup-
port has been concentrated upon shipping with relatively little support for shipbuilding. Since 1976, how-
ever, the seriousness of the fall in shipyard orders has resulted in much heavier financial support of the 
West German shipyards. Table 6.18 shows the US government's estimate of total financial assistance to 
shipbuilding between 1971 and 1975. 
Table 6.18 
TOTAL WEST GERMAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
(DM million) 
Modernisation funds, border 
loans, interest subsidies, KW & 
E RP loans, investory loss 
reserveS, tax credits, Rand 0 
support 
7971 
95.7 
7972 1973 
104.6 173.7 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report (1977),pp.VI-18. 
1974 1975 
180.1 192.9 
6.38 As with UK ma~itime aid, allocating the benefits of financial support measures between shipping and 
shipbuilding is not straightforward. In general, assistance to the shipbuilding industry is administered by 
the Federal Ministry of Economics, while assistance to shipping is by the Ministry of Transport. However, 
subsidies for new ship purchases which are limited to purchases from German yards will principally benefit 
the shipbuilding companies. 
6.39 The Subsidy Reports list financial and tax allowances according to whom they are paid. The support for 
shipbuilding shown in the Reports is modest, but to it should be added subsidised credit available to pur-
chasers from German yards, relief of indirect taxes to shipbuilders, and those aids paid to shipping com-
panies which are to the benefit of shipbuilders (notably construction grants). 
Table 6.19 
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL AIDS BENEFITING SHIPBUILDING IN THE BRD 
(DM millIons) 
1970 7971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Grants for 
shipbuilders l 27.6 29.5 37.1 66.9 98.9 99.6 83.7 83.1 106.9 
Construction 
87.3 81.9 56.3 60.0 60.0 118.3 grantsl 150.1 155.0 255.0 
Subsidy element 
in credit assis- 1 
tanCe for buyers 156.5 156.5 156.5 303.5 303.5 303.5 329.4 329.4 329.4 
Note: 1 = From Subsidies Reports 
2 = From US Department of Commerce (1977) p.VI.43. 
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6.40 The general and selective schemes benefiting the shipbuilding industry of the BRD are described below. It 
should be noted that the conventions of the BRD government have been followed in distinguishing between 
aids to shipping and shipbuilding, and some of the major assistance to German shipyards (notably construc-
tion grants) are described in the section on shipping. 
6.41 Regional assistance measures: The principal beneficiaries of regional assistance measures have been those 
shipyards located in the Eastern Border region. The Lubeck-based companies Flender Werft A.G., D & K 
Orenstein and Koppel A.G. and Schlichting Werft GmbH have received low interest loans (6 per cent) of 
about DM497.8 million. These were special ERP investment loans offered during the period 1966 to 1971. 
No further loans have been made since 1971. The subsidy element in these loans was calculated by the US 
Department of Commerce at DM15.2 million. (For a calculation oftotal shipbuilding aid, see Table 6.19). 
6.42 Credit assistance at favourable rates of interest: The credit for foreign buyers has been supplied through 
9 successive shipbuilding assistance programmes. Export credit is supplied through a special government 
credit institution, the Kreditanstalt fUr Wiederaufbau (KW). The financing is from the ERP programme and 
from the Federal Government. By estimating the difference in the a verage rate of interest on these loans 
and the market rate of interest, it is possible to estimate the subsidy element in these loans. The US Depart-
ment of Commerce has calculated the subsidy element on budgeted funds as follows:-
6.43 
(DM million) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
156.5 156.5 156.5 303.5 303.5 303.5 329.4 329.4 329.4 
The acceptance of the OECD agreement on export credits for ships has limited assistance to shipbuilding 
more in West Germany than in most other OECD countries because of the lower rates of interest prevailing 
in West Germany than in countries with higher rates of inflation. The minimum rates of interest specified 
by OECD have not been far below actual market rates of interest in Germany. 
Special assistance has been available to less developed countries for purchases from German yards. The 
programme is administered by the Ministry for Economic Co-operation which in 1976 and 1977 made 
available DM300 million for purchases from German industry. Loans to German shipowners from the ERP 
for ship purchases have been small. The loans are not limited to purchases from German yards although in 
practice most have been used for purchases from German yards. The amount of loan is shown in Table 
5.21. Because the greater part of the German merchant fleet's ship purchases are from German yards, a 
large proportion of the aid schemes for German shipping companies provides an indirect benefit to German 
shipyards. This is particularly true of the construction subsidies and tax arrangements. The increase in the 
construction subsidy on new ships from 12.5 per cent to 17.5 per cent in 1977 was aimed primarily at 
protecting West German shipyards rather than assisting German shipping companies. 
6.44 Tax allowances: These have taken the form of: 
i. 
ii. 
6.45 
Customs Duty exemption - imports of materials for the building of oceangoing ships are exempt from 
customs duty. Since most of the inputs for Germany's shipbuilding industry are domestically produced, the 
benefit is trivial. 
Reserve funds against inventory losses - special reserve funds against inventory losses provide a tax benefit 
for shipyards. Between 1970 and 1974 the 9 largest West German shipbuilding companies increased their 
reserve funds by DM68.7 million of which (HOW) was responsible for DM39 million (US Department of 
Commerce, 1977 page VI-40). 
Rand D support: The Ministry of Science and Technology provides grants of up to 25 per cent towards 
selected Rand D projects in the shipbuilding industry. Among the projects supported have been gas trans-
porters, ice breaking ships and cargo carrying catamarans. The US Department of Commerce Report (1977) 
pp. vi-43) estimates that between 1970·1975 Rand D support amounted to about DM4.5 million per year. 
The Federal Government's finance for Rand D into shipbuilding would appear to be a little less than that 
of the UK Government. 
6.46 Yard modernisation assistancle: Low ,interest loans to shipbuilders have been available from (E RP) funds. 
These loans are available to al industries, but allocation to shipbuilding has been particularly important. 
6.47 Public ownership: The Largest German shipyard, HOW, is 75 per cent owned by Salzgitter, the steel con-
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glomerate owned by the Federal Government, and 25 per cent owned by the State Government of Schles-
wig-Holstein. The arrangement does not appear to have resulted in any preferential treatment of HDW by 
Federal or State gove~n.ments, al.though HD~'s balance sheet has benefited from Salzgitter's exemption 
from having to pay a dividend on Its shareholdmg. 
6.48 Aid through State Naval Contracts: Military contracts have been used to assist individual yards during the 
present crisis. Thus the Ministry of Defence brought forward orders for five ships to assist the industry -
notably the Blohm and Voss yard which was facing bankruptcy in 1977 prior to the government order. In 
1976-1977 HDW took DM 1260m of Defence Ministry orders, equivalent to 18 per cent of its sales. 
6.49 Assistance from State Governments: In addition to Federal support for the shipbuilding industry there has 
been substantial support by state governments in the shipbuilding areas for their local industries. The 
principal shipbuilding states are shown in Table 6.20 following. 
Table 6.20 
DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY BY STATE 
(by production IIOlue 1977) 
Schleswig-Holstein 
Hamburg 
29.7 per cent 
17.8 per cent 
15.8 per cent 
32.7 per cent 
Lower Saxony 
Bremen 2.0 per cent North Rhine-Westphalia 
Source: Deutscher Schiffbou 1977. Verband der Deutschen Schiffbauindustrie e.v. 
H. 
6.50 
State government support was increased through a joint project which linked Lander support of the ship-
building companies to the larger Federal programme. The 1977 Federal government budget DM450 million 
was earmarked for construction grants. To supplement this sum the coastal states (Hamburg, Bremen, 
Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein) agreed to supplement this fund with state grants for projects not 
backed or insufficiently backed by the Federal government. (Verband Deutscher Reeder, Seeschiffahrt 
1977 p.18). In addition selective assistance to local shipbuilding companies has been given by all five 
of the main shipbuilding states. This assistance has taken a variety of forms. Hamburg shipyards have bene-
fited from state ownership of the shipyard land and heavy public investment in infrastructure at the free-
port (interview at Economics Ministry, Bonn. September 1978). 
West German Government Policy towards the Shipping Industry 
As has been explained above, West German policy towards its shipping industry has been to make the West 
German fleet competitive in international trade with the fleets of lower-cost nations, to make the German 
merchant marine the most modern and the most efficient in the world, to increase the proportion of 
Germany's trade carried in German ships for strategic reasons, to increase Germany's control over her own 
foreign trade and to assist the balance of payments. It is notable that German shipping assistance has been 
more selective than that of Britain. Aid has been restricted to particular types of ships and different rates of 
assistance have been paid according to types of ship. Financial assistance has been designed to encourage 
modernisation of the fleet through a more rapid scrapping and replacement of vessels. The principal aids 
are listed below. 
6.51 ERP loans to German shipping companies: These have been much less significant than the finance given to 
foreign buyers. The loans have had a maximum of DM5.9 million per loan which covers only purchases of 
small ships. Table 6.21 shows the terms of the loans. 
Table 6.21 
ERP FINANCING ASSISTANCE TO GERMAN SHIPOWNERS 
(OM millions) 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Authorised loans 23.1 23.1 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 
Per cent financing 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 70.0% 
I nterest rate 6.0% 6.0% 6.5% 7.5% 7.5% 7.5% 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report (1977, pp.VI-8). 
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6.52 Special Depreciation of Ships: Additional depreciation against tax is allowable on new ships to the amount 
of 30 per cent of the purchase cost over 5 years in addition to the normal depreciation by a straight line 
method. The 30 per cent additional depreciation for 1971 to 1974 was increased 40 per cent for 1975 to 
1978. The effect on depreciation of a ship is shown in Table 6.22 following. 
Table 6.22 
DEPRECIATION UNDER THE SPECIAL DEPRECIATION PROGRAMME 
(per cent) 
Total after 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 years 
Straight line 
8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33 66.64 depreciation 8.33 
With special 
14.33 1433 14.33 1433 14.33 4.05 4.05 4.05 83.80 depreciation 
(1971·1974) 
With special 
16.33 16.33 16.33 16.33 2.62 2.62 2.62 89.51 depreciation 16.33 
(1975-1978) 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report, 1971,pp.VI-l0 
\ , 
6.53 The tax advantages of shipowning have encouraged other firms and individual investors to become ship-
owners, leasing the ships to operating companies. The average annual value of the depreciation provisions 
have been estimated by the US Department of Commerce at DM7S.7 million for 1973 to 1975. 
6.54 Other tax benefits: Some additional tax benefits have been:-
i. 
ii. 
6.55 
Taxes on gains from ship sales may be deferred for two years and are not levied at all if the capital gains 
are used for the purchase of a new ship during the two year period (Table 6.22). 
Preferential tax rate on foreign earnings. Up to the end of 1973, 50 per cent of foreign earnings from 
shipping were taxed at half the normal rate (i.e. 37.5 per cent instead of 50 per cent). From 1974 SO 
per cent of foreign earnings were taxed at half the normal rate (30 per cent instead of 50 per cent). 
Construction subsidies: Construction subsidies are grants paid to German shipowners to cover a proportion 
of the costs of new vessels whether ordered from German or foreign shipyards. From 1965 to 1974 the sub-
sidy amounted to 10 per cent of new ship costs. In 1975 it was increased to 12.5 per cent. From 1976 the 
subsidies could be combined with other aid measures, e.g. interest relief, to a maximum total subsidy of 17 
per cent. In 1977 a special subsidy of 5 per cent was added to the base subsidy of 12.5 per cent and the 
new subsidy of 17.5 per cent was continued in 1978. The procedure under successive programmes has been 
for the government to establish the total budget and the percentage rate of the subsidy, to invite appli-
cations for assistance, then to decide the proportion of planned tonnage acquisitions which can be covered 
by the subsidy. I n addition to the standard subsidies on ship purchases, in 1974 a special subsidy of 15 per 
cent was introduced for very large tankers. The purpose was to expand the proportion of Germany's 
petroleum imports carried in German ships. The total value of grants to the shipping companies is shown in 
Table 6.23. 
Table 6.23 
GRANTS TO BRD SHIPPING COMPANIES FOR NEW SHIP PURCHASES 
1970 
87.3 
1971 
81.9 
1972 1973 
56.3 60 
Source: Subsidies Report, for 1978 German Tribune 15.5.71 
1974 
60 
1975 
118.3 
1976 
150.1 
(OM million) 
1977 1978 
155 255 
6.56 Preference in Trade: In coastal trade between German ports, foreign flag ships are not permitted if German 
flag vessels are available. at competitive ra~es .. Also the B.RD government's permission is required for cargo 
pooling arrangements with non-German shlppmg companies. 
6.57 Short term assistance to mee~ financial crisis: The severity of the late 70s depression in the world ship-
building industry and the particular problems of the German-owned shipping companies, e.g. their relative-
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Iy high costs, has led the BRO government to provide special short-term assistance to avert the threat to the 
long-term existence of the fleet. The most noticeable factor in the shipping market in 1976 and 1977 was 
the extension of the highly depressed conditions in the tanker industry to the bulk-<;arrier sector. To avoid 
liquidity crises and mass sell-offs by German bulk carrier owners, the government provided Federal guaran-
tees for loans against bulk carriers. 
Comparison and assessment of the structural policies towards shipping and shipbuilding 
The comparison of the policy measures of the two countries is of interest not just in relation to the indus-
tries considered here, but also because the differences in policy are representative of the different approaches 
to structural policy in the two countries. In the case of shipbuilding policies the heavier subsidisation and 
the more interventionist stance of UK policies is a reflection of the political differences of governments 
in the two countries towards economic policy, notably the priority attached to employment maintenance 
by the UK government. The shipping industries of the two countries provides an interesting contrast. Not 
only is the level of financial support similar between the two countries, but it is the government of the 
BRO which had been more interventionist and selective in its policies than that of the UK. This difference 
reflects to some extent the importance attached in the BRO to the strategic role of the German merchant 
fleet, particularly in relation to the country's export trade, whereas the primary consideration for UK 
industrial policy - regional unemployment - is absent in the case of shipping. The comparative lack of 
selective intervention by the UK government in its shipping industry can also be attributed to the COn-
centration of UK industrial policies on the manufacturing sector of the economy. 
In assessing the effectiveness of the structural policies towards the maritime industries several difficulties 
present themselves. The objectives of policy measures are not always apparent from policy statements. In 
particular, both in the BRD and the UK, governments have been reluctant to admit that shipbuilding aids 
have been primarily for t~e purpose o~ protecting dom~stic shipbuilding capacity and maintaining employ-
ment. The most substantial offers of finance for UK shipyards have supposedly been for the modernisation 
and re-equipping of shipyards to enable them to raise their productivity towards international levels. Yet 
it is clear that subsidies have been used primarily to cover current losses and provide working capital for the 
purpose of maintaining employment in the medium-term. In the BRO, grants for purchases of new ships are 
classified as subsidies to the shipping industry, although the intended beneficiaries are domestic shipyards. 
The allocation of the benefits of maritime aids between the shipping and shipbuilding industries presents 
some difficult problems. Subsidies to foreign owners on purchases from domestic yards are intended for the 
benefit of domestic shipbuilders. Subsidies to domestic shipowners on purchases of ships whether from 
domestic or foreign yards benefit domestic shipowners. Subsidies to domestic shipowners which are tied to 
purchases from domestic yards will t~nd. to benefit both owner and.bui.lder.ln all three case.s the division of 
benefit between purchaser and supplier IS dependent upon the relative Importance of the price and quantity 
effects of the subsidy. 
As with all policy interventions, the problem of assessing the influence of policy is in identifying how indus-
try performance would have differed had the policy not operated (Cf Chapter VII paragraph 7.13below). 
Special difficulties arise in assessing the influence of structural policies because of the two-way relationship 
between performance and policy: it is the sub-optimal performance of the industry which creates the need 
for structural intervention and moulds the form of polic~ instruments, while the operation of the policies 
themselves will impinge upon industry performance. A view which merits particular attention in relation to 
shipbuilding policies is that the reaction of industry to policy intervention is such as to counteract the effects 
of the policy instruments with the result that government policies have had very little long-term impact on 
the industry. 
Shipbuilding policies: At first glance, the predominant feature of a comparison between structural policies 
towards shipbuilding in the BRO and UK is the similarity of the policy instruments employed. In both 
countries a major form of aid has been credit assistance in the form of interest subsidies and credit guaran-
tees for domestic and foreign ship buyers. Construction grants and relief of indirect taxes to shipbuilders 
are paid in both countries. The principal differences in shipbuilding policies lie in the relative importance of 
different instruments, ,the higher level of subsidisation in the UK and selectivity in the application of the 
policy instruments. 
The far heavier degree of financial support for the UK shipbuilding industry is primarily a reflection of the 
greater 'needs' of ~he ~K i~d~stry, assuming that neither government would be willing to allow the major 
part of its domestic shlpbUlldln.g In~u~try .to close completely. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate the great differ-
ences in the performance of shipbUilding In the UK and BRO. Between the five year periods 1955-59 and 
1973-77, the tonnage output of UK yards fell at an average rate of around 1 per cent. This compares with 
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an average annual rate of growth of about 6 per cent for German yards and 10 per cent for world output. 
Of the world's leading shipbuilding nations, Britain was the only one to fail to achieve significant output 
growth before the current crisis. In both UK and BRD shipbuilding has been subject to strong cyclical 
movements and even the UK has had periods of output growth - notably 1969-71 and 1973-76. This 
great discrepancy in performance took place despite the large size and steady growth of the UK merchant 
fleet as compared with the reliance of German yards on overseas orders. 
Decline resulting from lack of international competitiveness does not alone justify maintenance by means 
of government subsidies. Explanation of government's willingness to prevent the contracting of the UK 
shipbuilding must take into account the location of the major shipyards in areas of high unemployment 
(see paragraph 6.19), yet even this factor does not fully explain the remarkably high level of financial 
support for UK shipbuilding as compared with other industries in similar situations (e.g. textiles). An 
important factor is likely to be the strong influence which the industry was able to exert as a result of the 
concentration of the industry into a single company in each shipbuilding area (e.g. UCS - Clyde, Cammell 
Laird - Merseyside, Harland and Wolff - Belfast)," together with the traditional importance of the industry 
as a major exporter and symbol of British industrial prowess, and the militancy of shipyard workers. 
The concentration of UK shipbuilding aids on selective grants, loans and equity funding for individual yards, 
as compared with the concentration of BRD aids on general support for the industry, partly reflects the 
importance of the employment objective in the UK. The least-cost means of achieving short-run employ-
ment targets is not to distribute aid generally to the industry, but to concentrate support on those yards 
facing closure. UK policy has followed this approach with the heaviest proportional support going to the 
financially weakest and commercially least·successful yards - notably Harland and Wolff, UCS and Cammell 
Laird. Whether such policies are the most economical means of maintaining employment over the longer 
term is questionable. To investigate the effectiveness of UK as compared with West German policy measures, 
it is necessary to investigate more closely performance in the two countries. 
The success of the German shipbuilding industry, at least up until the current crisis, has been in spite of the 
handicaps of very high labour costs and a rising international value of the mark. The competitive strength 
of the German shipyards appears to be more the result of managerial competence rather than of govern-
ment policy. The high labour costs of the German companies has been offset by specialisation on particu-
lar vessel types where quality construction, technical expertise and high levels of capital per worker could 
be exploited to their fullest advantage. Government subsidies have assisted the shipyards in meeting world 
competition but have been insufficient to shield the industry from price competition from low-cost pro-
ducers. Nor hav.e they had the. effect of concentrating resources i~ particular sectors of the shipbuilding 
industry or in different compaOles. Where the Federal government did move from general support measures 
to more selective assistance, for instance in encouraging the construction of very large tankers, the induce-
ment to participate in this highly competitive sector of the market which was experiencing a short-lived 
boom, was undoubtedly detrimental to the industry. 
The effectiveness of the heavy and selective supp~rt of ship~uilding by the UK government must be judged 
not solely in terms of the success of government In preventing the closure of any major shipyard between 
1967 and 1978, but also in the effectiveness of UK policy in solving the basic structural problems of the 
UK shipbuilding industry and providing a secure basis for future existence and development. The sources of 
poor performance of the UK industry have been the subject of a number of detailed studies (e.g. Geddes 
Report 1966, Booz-Allen and Hamilton Report, 1973). Three principal factors have been identified: 
Low labour productivity. UK ,employment in the industry since 1972 has e~ceeded that of Germany, 
despite the fact that Germany s output has been about 60 per cent greater In tonnage terms, and even 
greater in value terms. Comparisons have shown German labour productivity in terms of production tonnage 
and value per employee to be about three times the UK level. Nor has UK labour productivity increased 
significantly over time. An analysis of productivity during the period 1967-1971 showed that the increase 
in average output per employee in UK yards was entirely the result of increased vessel size. (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 1973, p.154). 
poor delivery performance. The major reasons for the poor international reputation of UK shipbuilding and 
the preference of UK shipowners for purchases from foreign yards is the unreliable delivery record of UK 
yards. Between 1967 and 1971 of total UK ship completions: 
48 per cent were delivered on or before the contracted date; 
13 per cent were up to one month late; 
18 per cent were 2-3 months late; 
12 per cent were 3-6 months late; and 
9 per cent were over 6 months late. 
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(Department of Trade and Industry 1973, pp.1 02-1 03) _ The principal causes of this poor delivery record 
have been identified as poor production planning and industrial relations disputes. 
Low level of capital investment. Despite heavy (government financed) investment at certain yards, the level 
of investment in fixed capital has been low in UK yards relative to West Germany and to other shipbuilding 
nations. 
Government policies since the 1960's have done little to solve these aspects of the poor productive per-
formance of UK shipyards. Although the inadequacies of management, work practices, industrial relations 
and capital equipment were highlighted by the Geddes Report, subsequent government policies have 
frequently provided an environment for the continuation rather than the elimination of these inadequacies. 
While major injections of public funds into ailing shipyards have frequently been conditional upon the 
abandonment of restrictive working practices and the adherence to established procedures for resolving 
industrial relations disputes, such conditions have not been effective_ Where the offer of government rescue 
did encourage trade unions to abandon restrictive labour practices and accept flexible working arrangements, 
such concessions were often purchased with special bonus or productivity payments to workers, as occurred 
at Fairfields Ltd_ [Broadway (1976), pp.21-22]. Where the greater part of government finance for the 
industry is used for keeping unprofitable yards in business, then the incentives for management and workers 
to increase efficiency and profitability are blunted and, as the theory of X-inefficiency would suggest, the 
tendency is for average costs to rise above their minimal point. The failure of government policies to resolve 
the deep-seated problem of UK shipbuilding is clearly identified in the 1979 corporate plan for British 
Shipbuilders Ltd. The report notes that the yards are 'among the least productive in the world' with output 
per employee 50 per cent below typical Western European ratios and delivery performance has deteriorated 
sharply over the period 1973-1978. 
This lack of impact of government policy on efficiency and productivity may seem surprising in view of 
the extent of structural re-organisation stimulated by government intervention. Since the Geddes Com-
mittee's formation in 1966 the UK shipbuilding industry was reduced from 28 to 6 companies, which were 
amalgamated into a single corporation with the establishment of British Shipbuilders in 1977. Despite the 
amalgamations and managerial re-organisations at the highest level, there have been few yard closures and 
little attempt to exploit benefits of specialisation, for example, by the re-Iocation of orders. The history 
of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders provides a clear example of how sweeping organisational and managerial 
changes can have only limited effect at production level [see Broadway, (1976)]. 
Measured against the objective of maintaining employment in the industry, structural policy has been fairly 
effective. In the absence of government assistance the shipyards of the Upper Clyde, Belfast and the Mersey 
would almost certainly have faced closure by the early 1970's, while in the current crisis it is doubtful 
whether more than a few yards could survive. At the same time, however, there is a clear conflict between 
the maintenance of employment in the short and medium-term and providing the foundation for self-
sustaining viability which can secure employment in the long-term. It would appear that by providing 
selective support to unprofitable shipyards, the government has maintained almost intact the size, structure 
and distribution of the UK shipbuilding industry, but in doing so it has only delayed the necessary ration-
alisation of the industry. It might also be argued that structural policy in discriminating in favour of the 
least profitable yards (and therefore impeding the progress of certain more profitable and progressively-
managed yards) has conflicted with the objective of securing employment in the industry in the long-term. 
Shipping policies: The effectiveness of the policies towards the shipping industries of the BRO and UK are 
more similar than in the case of shipbuilding. The differences that exist are the reverse of the differences in 
the shipbuilding industries of the two countries. Thus it is the UK that has had the larger and more inter-
nationally successful shipping industry while the German fleet has been concerned mainly with the foreign 
trade of the BRO. Comparing policies, it is the Federal government which has adopted more interventionist 
policy instruments aimed at inducing structural changes within the industry. 
The growth of the German fleet has been modest during the 1970s. The BRO's share of the world merchant 
fleet has fallen, and only a small proportion of foreign trade of the BRO is carried by the home fleet. The 
competitive disadvantages faced by the German fleet must be borne in mind, namely high wages costs, 
rising value of the OM and competition from COMECON fleets. While the performance of the German 
merchant marine must be considered reasonably satisfactory in such a competitive international market, 
the ability of the UK fleet to maintain its international position over the post-war period and to expand 
rapidly over the decade 1966-1976 is more impressive. This is particularly so in view of the fact that the UK 
fleet has achieved its growth largely through expanding its share of trade between countries, as growth of 
UK trade provided no basis for expansion of business. In 1974, 63 per cent of the receipts of the UK 
shipping industry were provided by cross-trading. 
380 
6.73 
6.74 
110 
Aid to shipping has involved similar measures in both countries, tax concessions and subsidies for the 
purchase of new ships being the principal instruments. In both countries aid has been more limited than 
that to shipbuilding, particularly in the UK. Indeed it could be argued that the support given to shipbuilding 
has increased the difficulties of the shippers by encouraging the growth of excess shipping capacity. Subsi· 
aies to foreign shipping companies for the purchase of new ships have been particularly damaging to the 
domestic shipping industries. The shipping industry of the BRD has complained that 'as yet, shipyards are 
in effect the sole beneficiaries since the grants reduce their internationally uncompetitive prices' (Verband 
Deutscher Reeder, Annual Report for 1977). 
Financial aid by both governments has been mainly in the form of general measures available to the indus· 
try as a whole with a comparative absence of selective assistance. In contrast with shipbuilding, and indeed 
most other industries, the support measures of the BRD have been more selective than those of the UK. 
The Federal government has identified particular structural objectives in relation to shipping which have 
been implemented by means of financial incentives. Incentives for new ship purchases and scrapping aids 
have encouraged modernisation of the fleet and incentives have been provided for the maintenance and 
expansion of particular types of shipping, for example, special inducements for tankers and the guarantees 
made available in September 1977 to maintain bulk carriers in the merchant fleet. The success of replace· 
ment in the BRD shipping industry is indicated by the low average age of the fleet (see Table 6.24). 
Table 6.24 
AVERAGE FLEET AGE IN YEARS 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Japan 9 7 7 6 7 7 
UK 12 11 11 10 10 10 
Norway 10 8 8 8 8 8 
11 10 9 6 7 7 Germany 
12 11 11 10 10 10 France 
13 13 12 12 12 World 17 
Source: US Department of Commerce Report, 1977 pp.1·13 
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The chief characteristics of UK aid to shipping are the relatively low level of support and the absence of 
selective intervention that is discriminatory between companies. The level of aid as a percentage of revenue 
has been on a comparable level to that received by the fleets of other nations but has been far below the 
level of support for shipbuilding. The absence of direct intervention by government with policies which are 
selective by companies is unusual for the UK industry faces intense international competition and strongly 
cyclical demand. Where shipping companies have run into financial difficulties there has been little effort 
by government to provide emergency support. Thus when the Court Line became insolvent, the British 
government allowed the sale of its shipping interests while nationalising its shipbuilding subsidiaries. The 
contrast between UK policy towards shipping and towards shipbuilding reflects in part the greater prosperity 
of the shipping industry but also the relatively weaker political pressures on government for support to the 
shipping industry. It has frequently been observed that UK economic policy has been heavily influenced 
by the electoral ambitions of government and by pressures from sectional interest groups. One result has 
been for industrial policy to be strongly affected by unemployment. Because the UK shipping fleet is 
widely distributed (unlike shipbuilding which is highly geographically concentrated), the constituency system 
of Parliamentary representation means that political pressures for financial assistance are weaker for shipping 
than for shipbuilding. Similarly, the geographical dispersion of the shipping industry means that an increase 
in unemployment in the industry tends to have a smaller electoral impact than an increase in unemployment 
in shipbuilding. The international character and environment of the UK shipping industry also means that it 
is less likely to appeal to the national government for a solution to problems than will the shipbuilding 
industry. This is particularly true of British shipping companies whose dependence on cross-country trade 
encourages a vigorously independent attitude towards national governments. 
Conclusions 
Study of policies in the UK and BRD towards the shipping and shipbuilding industries provides some 
interesting comparisons, not just between the two countries, but in the case of the UK between the two 
industries as well. Given the difficulties of identifying the relative importance of the different objectives of 
the governments in supporting their maritime industries and the difficulties of evaluating the precise effects 
of the policy interventions, it is not possible to draw clear conclusions on the effectiveness of different 
policy tools. Nevertheless, inferences may tentatively be drawn, some of which may be applicable to 
industries other than shipping and shipbuilding. 
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First, the examination of the impact of the policy measures of the two governments on the shipping and 
shipbuilding industries invites caution as to the ability of structural policies to achieve the long-term policy 
goals of employment maintenance, growth and balance of payments contribution. The history of UK policy 
towards the shipbuilding industry is particularly relevant in this context. Despite heavy and increasing 
financial support for the industry between 1967 and 1978, measurable economic benefits appear small. The 
inferior performance of UK shipbuilding in relation to the BRD and other shipbuilding nations would seem 
to be the result of inadequate investment, inadequate research, poor financial and cost controls, inadequate 
production planning, poor marketing and chaotic labour relations. These same problems appear to be as 
prevalent in 1978 as in 1966 despite over a decade of intense government interventions accompanied by 
structural reorganisation and to enormous injections of public funds. 
So far as short-term policy objectives are concerned, government intervention and heavy financial support 
have achieved one important goal. As a result of government policy the company structure of UK ship-
building has been re-organised and the heavy support has achieved its objective of maintaining industry 
employment, though only in the short-term. As far as long-term performance is concerned the objective of 
increasing international competitiveness by new investment and greater efficiency has been a remarkable 
failure. The greater part of grants and loans for investment have been used to finance losses and provide 
working capital and where substantial new investment has taken place, e.g. Harland and Wolff, Sunderland 
Shipbuilders, and the results have been disappointing. It could be argued that the short-term maintenance 
of employment in inefficient firms has inhibited progress in the industry which has only increased the size 
of the long-term performance improvements in industry but structural policy may be counter-productive. 
An assumption behind UK shipbuilding policy has been that publicly financed re-equipment of yards and 
support for losses in the short-run can enable more efficient production methods to be introduced which 
will enable the companies to move towards being self-supporting in the longer term. The experience of UK 
shipbuilding hils to support this assumption and evidence from the most heavily assisted yards lends sup-
port to the contrary hypothesis that short-term inhibits managerial change and encourages the maintenance 
of inefficient work practices at all levels in the employment hierarchy. 
Secondly, the experiences of the industries allows a comparison between the relative effectiveness of 
general support measures available to the industry as a whole and more interventionist policies which aim to 
support particular activities or particular companies. Both countries have directed financial support at both 
the industry generally and at particular firms and activities. While the former should not affect resource 
allocation within the industry, the latter is designed to reallocate resources between products or between 
firms. Although selective support policies have the ability of achieving government objectives more directly 
and possibly with less waste of expenditure, an essential requirement of such policies is that the govern-
ment can correctly identify the sectors of the market or the companies where increased resources are 
required in order to achieve the policy objectives. If the policy objective is the maintenance of employment 
in the short-term, then a selective policy of providing emergency support to companies in danger of insol-
vency is likely to be a less costly means of achieving any employment objective than a general support for 
the whole industry. If, on the other hand, the objective is to encourage growth and profitability in the 
industry by taking full advantage of market opportunities, there is no a priori reasons why the govern-
ment's decisions on the allocation of resources should be more efficient than those of the market and com-
pany managers. Indeed, attempts by both the British and West German governments to direct resources 
into particular areas of the shipping market seem in retrospect to have been misguided. Both British and 
German governments encouraged the domestic shipbuilding industries to expand their production of large 
tankers just before the world slump in this sector of the market. 
Thirdly, the comparison of the maritime aids and interventions by the governments of the UK and BRD 
reflects the different political structures and constraints existing in the two countries. The propensity of 
British governments to intervene selectively to support particular industries and enterprises arises in part 
from the electoral sensitivity of governments which is the product of a finely-balanced two-party system 
where changes in government can arise from changes in the majority party in a relatively small number of 
parliamentary constituencies. The influence exerted on government by a few particularly large trade unions 
may also increase sensitivity to unemployment. The contrasting government structure in the BRD means 
that the political forces impinging on the policy process are different and it is possible that economic policy 
is less subject to short-term political pressures. First, the Federal structure of government may result in 
weaker direct pressure on the Bund for selective interventions. Second, the greater formalisation and 
openness in the process of economic policy formulation (as indicated by the role of the Export Council, the 
influence of the independent economic research institutes and the more formal tripartite arrangements 
with industry and unions through the 'concerted action' programme) may tend to shield government 
from sectional interests. Finally, the adherence by the post-war governments of the BRD to a set of prin-
ciples embodied in the philosophy of the social market economy and formally established in policy guide-
lines (the 1966 and 1968 Principles of Sectoral PoliCY) provides a sharp contrast to the virtually unlimited 
powers of industrial intervention which the UK government conferred upon itself in the 1972 Industry Act. 
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APPRAISING SELECTIVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO INDUSTRY: 
LESSONS FROM THE RECENT EXPERIENCES OF THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, SWEDEN AND WEST GERMANY. 
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Abstract 
The ability to forecast and evaluate the impact of 
selective financial assistance is crucial to the 
formulation of effective policies of selective 
industrial intervention. A survey of institutions 
and methodology across the three countries reveals 
inadequaciEs in the quality and the extent of 
governments' appraisal of industrial assistance 
measures. The principal problems of quantitative 
appraisal are identifi~d and discussed and 
suggestions are made for improvements in the pro-
cedures and methods of appraisal, with the purpose 
of improving the formulation and the implementation 
of policies of selective industrial assistance. 
*Lecturer in Business Economics, 
The City University Business School, London. 
Introduction: the growth of selective assistance to industry and the 
importance of policy appraisal 
Selective subsidies to industry have played an increasingly important role 
over the past decade in the economic policies of all the mature Western 
economies. The growth of these subsidies is a major feature of the resort 
by the older industrialised countries to more direct instruments of 
industrial intervention in grappling with the post-1973 problems of stagna-
tion and structural adjustment in the face of growing ineffectiveness of the 
traditional tools of macroeconomic management in achieving the basic goals 
of economic policy (OECD 1979, pp.71-7S). 
Prior to the 1970s, subsidies to industry were primarily general investment 
incentives and incentives to regional development ~/hich were available on 
a universal basis. The diversity and widespread impact of the economic 
problems facing the industrial sectors of the developed countries during 
the 1970s has encouraged a more flexible approach to industrial Intervention, 
while the desire to control the growth of public expenditure has encouraged 
the replacement of general by selective subsidy measures. 
In the UK, for instance, the proportion of government industrial support 
in the form of general subsidies fell from 68.5 per cent In 1970/71 (chiefly 
investment grants and the regional employment premium) to 32.9 per cent 
in 1980/81 (chiefly regional development grants). A similar change has 
taken place in Sweden where regional development subsidies and general 
employment subsidies have been supplemented, and to some degree suppl~nted, 
by sectoral 'assistance schemes to shipbuilding, iron and steel, tectlles 
and clothing, the wood products industry, manual glass manufacture, as 
well as by support measures for individual enterprises. By 1979 sectoral 
and flrm~specific subsidies amounted to 56.7% of total Industrial subsidies 
(Carlsson 1981). In Germany direct subsidies and tax allowances to a small 
number of industries (notably electronic data processina, cool mining, mineral 
oil production, shipbuilding and steel) have been substantial. 
The large sums of money disbursed by the national governments of Britain, 
Sweden and Germany on selective support to industry and the important 
consequences of these policies for industrial structure and performance 
has given rise to increasing concern over the quality of decision making 
in allocating financial support, and, indeed, over the policies themselves. 
A growing body of evidence, mainly British and Swedish, is pointing to the 
ineffectiveness, if not the undesirabil ity, of many past programmes of 
industrial support. In both countries the major part of selective financial 
assistance has been to declining industries and fail ing firms, where the 
support has served only to delay and complicate eventual contraction and 
restructuring (OECD 1979, pp.71-75, Peacock et al 1980, Hagner 1982, pp.58-59). 
The concentration of selective support on sectors and firms with poor 
commercial prospects reflects the primacy accorded by governments to short-
term employment objectives arising from the party political interests of 
government and the influence of producer pressure groups (both employer 
and trade union). Indeed the history of selective industrial assistance 
in Europe provides and illuminating case study' in the economic theory of 
politics (Rowley 1980). Frequently selective subsidy decisions are in 
conflict with the overall economic strategy of the government. For example, 
the rescues of Rolls Royce and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in 1971/2 and ICl 
in 1981 by avowedly non-interventionist British Conservative governments, 
and the support by German governments to shipbuilding in the late 1970s, 
steel in 1981 and AEG-Telefunken in 1982 . 
. The haphazard development of selective support poliCies, their apparent 
conflict with other instruments of economic policy, and the political 
controversy which accompanies them, all point to the need for greater 
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efforts to be devoted towards their objective appraisal. Such appraisal 
should involve an indentification of the effects of the assistance measures 
and an evaluation of these effects in relation to the government's policy 
objectives •. 
A vital distinction here is between ex ante appraisal, assessment of the 
desirability of a policy option on the basis of a forecast of its likely 
effects, and ex post appraisal, the assessment of a past policy decision 
on the basis of the identification and evaluation of Its actual effects. 
For improving the efficiency of policy making, ex ante appraisal is of 
primary importance. Such appraisal may take place at any stage in the 
policy maki~g process where decision making occurs. In the formulation 
of a subsidy programme, choices have to be made con~erning the type of 
financial assistance, the sector toward~ which assistance is to be directed, 
and the criteria governing the offer of assistance. In the implementation 
of selective assistance by government departments and agencies, it is 
vital that selection of entrerprises and projects for supPQrt and the 
amount of subsidy granted should be based upon an objective forecast of 
the effects of such support. Hence appraisal forms an integral part of 
the process of formulating and implementing policy concerning selective 
assistance to industry. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that unless 
it is possible to forecast and evaluate with some accuracy the effects 
of government support to enterprises, then there is no sound foundation 
for a policy of selective intervention in industry. 
Emphasis on the importance of ex ante appraisal is not to imply that 
ex post appraisal of selective assistance is of subsidiary interest. The 
forecasting of the effects of proposed grants of selective assistance can 
only be undertaken on the basis of the detailed observation and assessment 
of the i~pact of past policies. The German Federal Fianance Ministry has 
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emphasised the important role of ex post appraisal in providing Information 
feedback and has recommended that subs i dy prog rammes shou ld be subject 
to "conti~uous appraisal ••• to investigate whether results are keeping 
pace with the plan" and "concluding appraisal ••• to Investigate whether 
results achieved correspond to the original or adopted pla~' 
(Deutscher Bundestag 1977. pp.33-3S). 
In all three countries concern over the growth of financial support to 
industry and doubts about its effectiveness have encouraged strong pressures 
for improvements in the appraisal of the policies. In Britain. parlia-
mentary COrT'olnittees have been particularly critical of the inadequate 
evaluation of industrial c'lnd regional subsidies: "clarity of purpose has 
frequently been absent .•. there should be more rigorous analysis ••• The 
government must consider whether an industry needs to be sustained and if 
so what should be its size and location and the length of time and total 
cost of such support". (Expenditure Committee 1972. para.262). A SwedIsh 
Commission of Enquiry on Indus.trial Assistance has similarly pointed to 
the need for improved policy formulation and the more realistic appraisal 
of the effects of selective support to "problem industries" and "crlsts 
enterprises" (OECD 1982. pp.184-18S). In Germany great emphasis has been 
placed upon the comprehensive reporting of federal subsidy measures through 
the biannual Subsidy Reports, but comparatively little attention has been 
devoted to appraising the effects and the effectiveness of the subsidies. 
Pressure for more \~i despread and thorough eva I uat ion of subs I dy measures 
has come from the Federal Finance Ministry. To the Sixth Subsidy Report 
was annexed "Possibilities and limitations of policy appraisal" (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1977 pp.32-3S) in which the Finance Ministry stated the need for 
government departments and agencies to introduce methods of policy appraisal 
("Erfolgskontrolle") :ind guidelines for appraisal were proposed which 
further elaborated in the subsequent Subsidy Report (Deutscher Bundestag 1979, 
pp.39:' 40 ). 
(9 388 
The general impression that is conveyed by these introductory remarks is 
that despite the importance of selective financial assistance to industry 
as an instrument of economic policy and despite the enormous sums of 
publ ic expenditure devoted to these programmes, little is known about the 
results of the policies, whether the policies are achieving their aims 
or whether the same aims could be better attained using alternative policies. 
The picture is undoubtedly complex. Since industrial subsidies are 
frequently indirect instruments of trade protection which offend the spirit, 
and frequently the lette~ of international trading agreements such as GATT, 
EFTA and the Treaty of Rome, governments may have a vested interest in the 
opacity of their subsidy measures, thus discouraging their objective 
appraisal. 
This article sheds new I ight upon the inStitutional procedures and methodo-
log for appraising selective financial assistance to industry through a 
comparative review of the exeriences of three countries: the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and West Germany. Conclusions are drawn as to the kinds of Instl-
tutional arrangements conducive to efficient and effective appraisal of 
selective industrial assistance and the scope for improving techniques 
of appra i sa I. 
Establishing objectives for selective industrial assistance: the relevance 
of the "pol icy model" 
Policy appraisal involves evaluating the effects of a policy measure in 
relation to some objectives. Before the objectives of selective industrial 
assistance can be specified it is necessary that the governmeht is clear 
as to the role of these subsidy measures within the government's overall 
~~~nomic strategy. 
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At the most general level, industrial policy is directed towards improvIng the 
performance of the industrial sector in relation to the m~croeconom'c goals 
of output growth, full employment, price stability and a satisfactory balance 
of international payments. The essential consideratIon is how government sees 
these goals being achieved:- whether by the IndivIdual choices of households 
and firms coordinated by the market economy, or by government choIces formu-
lated through a democratic political system and implemented through planned 
InterventIon in the economy.l 
In both of these "views of the economy" or "policy models" selectIve assis~ 
tance to industry may play an important rol~, although the ObjectIves assIgned 
to them differ' and dIfferent forms of policy appraisal may be approprIate. 
The "market model" of economic policy is most closely associated wIth the 
policies of post-war German governments and also with those of BrItIsh Con-
servative governments during the years 1970-72 and 1979-83. The "market 
model ll is founded on a bel ief in the efficiency and politIcal desl rabi 11 ty of 
decentralised economic decision makIng coordinated through competItIve markets. 
The principal role for government Is to establish the basIc condItIons of com-
petItion and stability necessary for the market economy to maximise the eco-
nomic welfare of society. Within this framework. industrial subsIdies should 
not be assigned the duty of attaining specific quantitative goals 
but should be introduced where distortions or imperfections of the 
market mechanism prevent industry from optimising its performance. 
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The clearest statement of the role of industrial subsidies in a com-
petitive market economy is found in the German government1s published 
criteri3 governing the offer of different types of Industrial assistance: 
the "Principles of Regional and Sectoral Structural Pol icy" (Deutscher 
Bundestag 1909a) and the "Principles of Structural Policy for Small 
and Medium-Sized Companies". (Deutscher Bundestag 1970a) These 
criteria were elaborated further in the "Structure Reports" of 1969 
and 1970. (Deutscher Bundestag 1969b, 1970b). The basic consideration 
is that subsidies should not distort the competitive mechanism thereby 
impeding the adjustment process or causing mis-Investment. Hence 
selective subsidisation is justified to correct or off-set distortions 
to competition which already exist. Assistance to particular sectors to 
retard the rate of adjustment is permissible where the prcblems are so 
severe that serious economic and social consequences would arise. It 
is important to r.ct~ that while these principles can be used to Justify 
subsidies to particular industries, subsidies to particular enterprises 
are generally excluded because of the distortion to competition which 
would result. 
Ex-ante appraisal of subsidies within a market-orientated industrial 
pol icy is based upon the identification of the sources of market failure 
responsible for deficiencies in economic performance. These include 
externalities, monopoly and impediments to flows of resources and 
information. Ap~raisal is chiefly concerned with the extent to which 
selective subsidies achieve a correction to these distortions through 
eliminating divergencies between market prices and social opportunity 
cost. Hence the cQ~petitive market approach to industrial policy does 
not, in principle, require the d~tailed forecasting of the Impact of· 
selective assistance. So long as the subsidy represents a correction 
to a prop~rly diag~osed market imperfection, then the market mechanism 
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can· be relied upon to effect the increase in economic welfare. 
The second type of policy model may be termed the "planning model". 
This has formed the basis of Swedish industrial policy and that of 
British Labour goverrnnents of 1964-70 and 1974-79, but has been most 
closely identified with the economic policies of France. While the 
market model envisages the government as creating the necessary frame-
work for private industry to optimise economic performance, the planning 
model sees government as playing an integral and permanent role In the 
direction of industry and the achievement of desired levels of economic 
performance. The model is based on the rejection of the belief In the 
efficiency of the market system in optimising national economic perfor-
mance. The deficiencies of the market mechanism are too serious to 
permit government policy to intervene merely by corrections to the price 
mechanism. The tendency of capitalist industry towards monopoly 
(nationally and internationally), the unreliability of the responses of 
firms and households to price signals, and the failure of risk-averse 
and poorly-informed managers and investors to exploit new productive 
opportunities, imply a central role for government in the direction of 
economic activity. Even where a market orientation is deemed appropri-
ate in relation to purely domestic economic policies, the emergence of 
international, oligopolistically competitive markets for many industrial 
products requires that government and tndustry act cooperatively in 
adopting a national strategy in relation to world markets based upon the 
identification of comparative advantages, a forecasting of international 
economic trends and the choice of appropriate policies for competing 
internationally.This dichotomised approach to industrial policy - a 
competitive market approach to internal policies combined with national 
planning in relation to the external enviornment - is most closely 
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associated with Japan (Allen 1981, Hosomi and Okumura 1982), although 
recently some similar tendencies are apparent in British and Swedish 
industrial policy. 
The role of selective financial assistance implied by the planning model 
is quite different that in a market model. In a market model selective 
assistance represents an adjustment to price incentives to which firms 
respond by changes in their market behaviour. In the planning model 
selective assistance is I ikely to be one of several policy Instruments 
through which government seeks to influence an enterprise or Industry 
towards some specified goals. Within the framework of Industrial 
planning, cooperation between government and industry is close with the 
result that the two parties are not viewed as pursuing distinct and 
separate roles. As a result, financial' assistance may operate, less as 
a market incentive, than a side-payment to the firm to gain compliance 
with government policy. For example the British government's financial 
assistance to Chrysler UK was less a subsidy to maintain the commercial 
viability of Chrysler UK, as a payment ot the Chrysler Corporation In 
return for its maintaining its UK operation, continuing production at 
its Scottish plant, and pursuing the interests of the British government 
in respect of employment policy, regional policY and the balance of 
payments. 
These characteristics of the planning approach: complementarlly of 
pol icy ,instruments and consensus pol icy formulation by government, business 
and trade unions (litripartism") is illustrated by the British labour 
Government's Industrial Strategy of 1975-79. Sectoral Intervention 
policies were based upon recommendations and appraisals by the National 
Economic Development Office and its Sector Working Parties, and they com-
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prised a combination of selective financial assitance, planning agreements 
between government of major firms and the provision of entrepreneurship 
and venture c~pital by the National Enterprise Board (Grant 1982 pp62-71). 
In Sweden, selectiveassistance to firms and Industries has occupied a similar 
role: it has been one instrument of industrial intervention along with 
government-industry cooperative planning, direct government restructuring 
(e.g. shipbuilding and steel) and informal government Influence over the 
investment decisions of major enterprises. The implications of the planning 
model for the appraisal of selective industrial assistance are, first, that 
financial assistance cannot be evaluated as a policy instrument in isolation 
from the other aspects of government policy; Second, the tri-partlte 
formulation of industrial and corporate strategies means that appraisal must 
relate to the plan as a whole and cannot isolate the contribution of 
government alone. 
Despite the difficulties, the adoption by governments of a strongly inter-
ventior.ist approach to industrial policy, involving extensive government 
inolvement in industrial structure and corporate decisions means that 
objective appraisal (both ex ante and ex post is even more important than 
is the case with market-orientated industrial Intervention. This point 
has been clearly made by the Deputy Chief Economist to the British Treasury:-
The general econcmic policy conclusion I draw is that 
there is an urgent need to consider what constitutes 
a par or baseline situation. Should we take the 
situation where industry operates according to its own 
rules - maximising what entrepreneurs are alleged to 
maximise - as the baseline from which we are to consider 
government intervention designed to remedy specific 
shortcomings in the market economy, e.g. tendency to 
monopoly. failure to take account of externalities, 
market imperfe~tions. etc? Or is the baseline position 
one where the Government is constantly involved in the 
affairs of i~dustry - as is said to be the case in 
France - and is Itself operating as an entrepreneur? 
The UK seems to be shifting from the first to the second. 
This given the growth in the content of what are thought 
to be the apprcpriate objectives of the State, may be 
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the right thing to do. But if so, the need to 
develop appropriate general criteria for government 
assistance to industry, and in particular to develop 
them in a way which ensures that success and failure 
can be monitored, becomes more important than ever. 
Unless objectives can be reasonably clearly set out 
and policies monitored so that their effectiveness 
known, policy is at the mercy of whatever plausible 
arguments hold the scene. (Byatt, 1975, p75). 
The institutional arrangements for policy appraisal 
While the potential for policy appraisal depends upon the state of development 
of appraisal methodology, the application of such appraisal and its influ-
ence on policy decisions depends substantially upon the institutional 
arrangements within which appraisal takes place. Appraisal of selective 
industrial assistance takes place at different stages in the policy 
places: the establ ishment of subsidy programmes is generally through the 
legislative process, or at minimum requires parliamentary approval, Indlvi-
dual offers of assistance to specific enterprise are normally within the 
scope of ministerial discretion, finally, spending by government departments 
is subject to scrutiny by parliament and the public auditor. Hence In all 
three ~ountries appraisal of industrial subsidies is spread across several 
different bodies. The focus of the following survey Is on the principal 
differences in the institutional arrangements for appraisal between the 
three countries and different extent of formal recognition given 
to the appraisal function. 
Ministerial discretion in the offer of selective assistance is greater in 
the United Kingdom than in Sweden or Germany. Under the Industry Act 
1972 the Secretary of State for Industry is empowered to offer assistance 
in almost any form to virtually any enterprise so long as it can be justified 
in terms of regional employment (Section 7 of the Act) or the national economic 
interest (Section 8 of the Act). In consequence a heavy burden is placed 
. (II) 
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upon the Department of Industry to ensure that decisions on industrial 
support are based upon an adequate appraisal of their likely consequences. 
In practice ihe burden of decision making and the necessary Input of 
appraisal is reduced by administrative limits on the discretionary powers 
of the Secretary of State. Thus assistance under Section 8 in normally 
I imited to specific subsidy programmes established in relation to particular 
industrial sectors or to particular types of project. Criteria for the 
selective assistance under Sections 7 and 8 relate to the commercial 
viability of the project, the need for government assistance for the fulfIl-
ment of the project, the creation of additional employment (for Section 7 
support) including maximum limits of cost per job, and (for Section 8 
support) a minimum project size and the requirement that the project furthers. 
certain specified national economic objeetives. (Dept. of Industry, 1982). 
The application of these criteria to requests for financial assistance is 
undertaken by the Industrial Development Unit with decisions on the granting 
of support by the Industrial Development Advisory Board (and its regional 
bodies for Scotland, Wales and the English development areas). These are 
independent agencies within the Department of Industry the senior staff of 
which are principally on secondment from private firms of accountants. 
Broader scale appraisal of major applications for assistance within the 
wider framework of national economic policy objectives is undertaken by 
economists within the Department of Industry. In certain instances such 
advice may be supplemented by independent forecasts of commercial prospects 
and advice on corporate and industrial strategies commissioned from consul-
tancy firms or from the Central Policy Review Staff, a senior research unit 
attached to the Cabinet Office (see for example, Ryder 1975; Central Policy 
Review Staff 1975). A further independent input into the ex ante appraisal 
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of new schemes of selective assistance is the National Economic Development 
Office and the secter Working Parties of the National Economic Development 
Council. The analyses and recommendations of these bodies were partIcu-
larly influential in guiding the establishment of sectoral support schemes 
under Section 8 during the period 1975-79. 
While ex-ante appraisal occupies a fairly formal role within the process 
of decision making over the granting of selective industrial assistance, 
no legislative or administrative requir~lents exist for ex post appraisal 
and such appraisal has been undertaken on an ad hoc basis. The principal 
bodies engaged in appraising the effectiveness of government spending on 
industrial support are two House of Commons Select Committees - the Industry 
and Trade Committee (formerly a sub-committee of the Expenditure Committee) 
and the Public Accounts Committee. The time and resources of these 
Committees is severely limited and for the most part they have concerned 
thems~lves with the detailed questioning of senior civil servants, commentary 
upon t~e. results of appraisal exercises undertaken by the Department of 
Industry and recommendations for more comprehensive evaluations of subsidy 
measures. (see fer example 
The Department of Industry's own ex post "appraisal includes the annual 
reporting of grcss figures for the amount of investment and employment 
associated with subsidy projects (Department of Industry 1982) and more 
detailed studies on ~articular schemes (Department of Industry 1978). 
The institutional arrangements in Sweden for the appraisal of selective 
industrial a5sistance bear many similarities to those in the United Kingdom, 
the chief differences being that ex ante appraisal generally occurs In a 
more forlT,ali5ed process of policy planning and greater emphasis Is given to 
ex pos..!, appra i sa 1. 
Until recently, most selective assistance was for the purpose of regional 
economic development. The form and levels of financial assistance, the 
criteria and the budget allocation were determined as a part of the four-
yearly and annual regional planning procedure undertaken jointly by the 
Ministries and the National Boards for Industry and the Labour Market, 
the counties and the municipalities. (Engelorecht et al 1979). None of 
the forms of regional support (including development aid, write-off loans, 
location loans, employment grants and special aid) are automatic, although 
the degree of selectivity varies between the different measures. Decisions 
on the granting of support lie chiefly with the County Administrative Boards 
or, in special cases, the government as a whole. The 1979 Act of Parliament 
on Regional; Policy establishes criteria for the granting of regional support 
which are similar to the British criteria governing offers of selective 
regional assistance: projects must be sh9wn to be commercially viable over 
the long-term, the aid offered is not to exceed the sum needed to initiate 
the investment and maximum levels of subsidy per job created are laid 
down (Industriedepartementet, 1978). 
In the case of sectoral support measures, no formal system of ex ante 
appraisal exists. Support programmes for individual Industries require 
legialative approval, so that appraisal, generally of a non-quantitative 
kind, takes place in the formulation of policy proposals and the debate 
over them in the Riksdag. In some cases Commissions of Inquiry are appointed 
by government to make policy recommendations. In addition independent 
assessments have been commissioned by government to examine the prospects 
and recommend strategies for certain problem industries and enterprlses. 2 
The most notable feature of the Swedish procedure for appraising industrial 
assistance is the heavy emphasis which has been given to the ex post 
appraisal of regional support measures and employment measures. Attached to 
the Ministry for labour and the Ministry of Industry are Group for Labour 
Market Resear~h and the Expert Group on Regional Studies. These are 
effectively permanent boides whose function Is to analyse policy problems 
and examine the effects of government policies. Their reports are usually 
highly detailed analyses of policy programmes and are generally published 
(e.g. Expert Group for labour Market Research 197~, 1978: Expert Group on 
Regional Studies 197~, 1978). At the same time, these Instltutior.s for the 
evaluation of industrial intervention by government have failed to keep 
pace with the development of policies in this field. While the Export Groups 
are concerned with regional and employment policies, much recent selective 
assistance to enterprises and sectors has been outside the framework of 
these policies. For this purpose the detailed and wide-ranging Investiga-
tion by the Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Assistance was of 
particular importance. 
In Germany there are few formal requirements for the appraisal of subsidies 
and despite the emphasis given by the Federal Finance Ministry to the need 
for the quantitative appraisal of subsidy measures, the response of the 
spending ministries has been limited. This may partly reflect the limited 
discretion exercised by Ministries in the offer of industrial assistance and 
partly the government1s adherence to the "social market economy" model which 
views subsidies as a response to market imperfections. 
Ex ante appraisal of proposed support programmes is not carried out as a 
separate act~vity but forms part of the process of policy formulation and 
development at the ministerial and parliamentary level. In the case of 
regional policy and some sectoral subsidy programmes (notably the developm~nt 
plans for electronic data processing) the plans involve a detailed considera-
tion of financial assistance measures. 
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Very little work on ex post appraisal appears to have been undertaken within the 
German government. This may partly reflect the important role played by the five 
economic research Institutes in the evaluation of economic policies. In the 
case of financial.asslstance to industry however very little work has been 
undertaken by the institutes. In a summary of published and commissioned 
research on the subject of subsidies during the period 1977 to 1980 annexed 
to the Seventh Subsidy Report, the majority of investigations were concerned 
with agriculture, construction and housing, with very little work which was 
directly relevant to industrial assistance. A major· project has recently been 
completed on the structural adjustment of the German economy which has Involved all 
five of the research institutes. Even here however, the appraisal of Industrial 
subsidies has not been a major focus of the study. , 
The major issue concerning the optimal organisation for appraising selective indus-
trial support which arises from this survey is whether appraisal is best under-
taken within the government departments and agencies which formulate and im-
plement industrial policy, or whether it should be undertaken by some inde-
pendent body. The advantages of appraisal taking place within the government 
department responsible for industrial support is the access to information 
and the close coordination between appraisal and policy making which results. 
The principal advantage of independent appraisal is its Objectivity. 
In appraising applications for selective support from individual enterprises 
there is no real alternative to appraisal taking place within the departments 
alloc~ting the assistance. However the system employed by the British govern-
ment of an independent advisory unit within the government department permits 
the assessment of financial viability and the objective application of established 
criteria by expert. staff without the danger of direct polttlcal Interference. 
The principal area of debate concerns the appropriate institutions for ex post 
appraisal of subsidy measures. Here the danger of internal appraisal by the 
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government department responsible for industrial policy Is that appraisal will 
tend to justify the policies pursued - (there is some evidence of this In the 
British Department of Industry). In all three countries, the legislature's 
budgetary control occupies a critical role in evaluating exp~nditure on 
industrial subsidies, but here insufficient information and pressures on time 
and res'ources have meant that parI iamentary bodies have been unable to undertake 
detailed, quantitative appraisals. Some of the most imaginative and thorough 
ex post appraisals of industrial and employment subisidies have been those under-
taken by the Swedish Expert Groups. The attachment of special appraisal units 
to the pol icy making departments also ensures feedback from appraisal into the 
policy making process (see Gutzland, 1979). 
The usefulness of universities and research institutes in the ex post appraisal of 
selective support is difficult to assess. In Sweden some useful cost-benefit analysis 
and a more extensive analysis of the impact of subsidies have been undertaken, but 
in Germany which has relied heavily on independent research into economic policy 
the studies so far completed do not appear to have been directed towards the 
principal iss.ues of sectoral industrial support. However, in the development 
of methodology for policy appraisal the universities and research institutes possess 
a largely untapped potential. For example, in developing methodology 
for the appraisal of regional support measures, academic economists have played 
a leading role (e.g. Moore and Rhodes 1973). 
Methodology for appraising selective financial support 
The principal decisions which have to be made in formulating and implementing 
pol icies of selective financial assistance to industry concern which sectors 
and enterprises to support, the optimal level of subsidisation and the form 
which such assistance should take. In common with all other decisions involving 
the disbursement of public money, the guiding criterion for decision making is 
(17) 
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is that of maximising over time the surplus of social benefit over social 
cost. For such decisions cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has been developed 
to a highly sophisticated level as a practical, quantitative technique 
for determining the desirability of Individual projects and ranking 
alternatives. 
While the principle of measuring and comparing social costs and benefits 
is as valid for decisions concerning industrial assistance as for any 
other public expenditure decisions, the technique of CBA has been 
developed primarily for the appraisal of individual investment projects 
within the public sector. The application of CSA to appraising selective 
industrial assistance involves a large number of thorny issues which 
relate partly to the inappropriate theoretical basis of CBA when appl ied 
to industrial subsidy decisions and, eyen more importantly, to the 
practical difficulties of identifying and measuring the full range of 
effects of industrial assistance measures. 
Because of the complexities and heavy resource demands associated with 
full-blown cost-benefit appraisal of proposals for selective financial 
assistance, the authorities have turned to more restricted methods of 
ex ante appraisal - particularly for the purposes of standardised vetting 
procedures of applications for assistance. 
To avoid the problem of CSA of combining in a number of policy objectives 
into a single objective function quantified in monetary units, 
cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) has been employed for the ranking of 
support applications and determining eleigibility cut-off points. CEA 
measures for individual projects the financial cost of achieving single 
objectives. Thus, in Sweden and the UK estimates of the subsidy cost ~ 
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job created and subsidy cost per unit of investment are used both in 
ex ante appraisal of the eligibility of applications for support and In 
the ex post reporting of the effectiveness of programmes of selective 
assistance. The use of CEA in assisting decision making in the granting 
of industrial subsidies has been advocated by the German Federal Finance 
Ministry (Deutscher Bundestag 1979, p.40). 
A further method of appraisal used for the initial vetting of the 
eligibility of individual support applications is the analysis of commercial 
viaiblity. In both the UK and Sweden the offer of selective assistance 
is dependent upon the commercial viability of the project or enterprise. 
For projects seeking investment support DCF analysis is used to evaluate 
the project. Fur rescue aid to floundering firms, aid is normally 
dependent upon the prospect of a future return to profitability. The 
intention is that government support should not be extended to enter-
prises which are likely to fail once support is withdrawn. Nevertheless, 
the ~alidity of the commer~ial viability criterion is questionable on 
two grounds: first, where external benefits are substantial a financial 
loss is compatible with net social benefits, second, the viability 
criterion is not readily compatible with the additionality requirement 
employed by the British Department of Industry. The additonality require-
ment for selec~ive support of new investment is that the offer of 
government support is essential for the project to be undertaken. 
Both CEA ~nd commercial viability analysis are of limited value In the 
appraisal of selectivp. in~ustrial a~sistance. The former is a useful 
indicator but only allows one pol icy objec.tive to the considered at a 
time. The latter is crucial in establishing the longer term effective-
ness of assistance measures, but doesn't provide guidance In determining 
whether policy measures are opprating in the national interest. Hence 
Q~ 
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the remainder of this discussion focuses upon the overall appraisal of 
selective financial support, and in particular on cost-benefit approaches. 
Experience in the application of CBA to selective financial assistance 
Both in Sweden and the United Kingdom considerable experience has been 
accumulated in the application of CSA to selective industrial assistance, 
largely in relation to the rescue of failing enterprises. In Sweden 
studies have been undertaken by the Expert Groups and have been commi-
ssioned from independent economists; for the most part these studies have 
been published. In the UK studies have been made within government and 
with the exception of the Chrysler study (Expenditure Committee 1976) the 
studies have not been published. 
The Swedish studies have, for the most part, been limited in scope and 
have concentrated upon the support of loss-making enterprises in areas 
of high unemployment for the purposes of maintaining employment. For 
example, in a study of a bankrupt clothing manufacturer, Algots Nord, 
estimates of the unemployment consequences of closure were made, and 
on the basis of the discrepancy between wage costs and the social 
opportunity cost of labour in the region, the maximum level of govern-
ment subsidy for the continued operation of the enterprise was establ ished 
(Expert Group for Labour Market Research 1978, pp45-50). 
A rather more sophisticated approach to the cost-benefit appraisal of 
major applications for selective assistance has been employed by the 
British Depa:tment of Industry since 1976. Though unpublished, the 
principal features of the method are outl ined in a recent OECD report 
(OECD 1982 ppI97-199). 
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Starting from a DCF analysis of the project where all costs and revenues 
are valued at market prices ,net of all taxes, adjustment to social 
costs and benefits is made by replacing market prices with social 
opportunity costs - the most important of which is a shadow price for 
labour in the regional development areas. All shadow prices are set 
to converge to market prices over a variable time period. 
The net effects of the project on output and employment are calculated 
by subtracting the displacement effects of the project. These are the 
reductions in output and employment in enterprises which compete in 
product and factor markets with the subsidised enterprises. The net 
present value of the benefits associated with the project are then 
red W'lth the r_ost of the selective assistance. compa .. Subsidy expenditure 
is treated as a real cost in recognition of the opportunity cost of 
publ ic expenditure. 
Problem in identifying the impact of selective financial assistance 
While the methodology employed by the British Department of Industry shows 
considerable improvement to some of the rather simplistic CBAs performed 
in some Swedish examples of industrial assistance, the above brief sketch 
fails to illuminate the near-insurmountable difficulties encountered 
in the comprehensive appraisal of selective assistance measures. 
Nor have these difficulties been resolved by some of the theoretical 
and practical advances which have taken place in CBA methodology. Most 
of these advances relate to the evaluation of known effects, notably 
the calculation of shadow prices, the choice of discount rate and the 
appropriate decision criterion. However, the major problem facing the 
appraisal of selective industrial assistance is not the evaluation of 
the effects of subsidies, but the identification of the effects of 
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subsidies. The problem of estimating the impact of financial assistance 
is greater for ex ante than for ex post appraisal: ex post appraisal 
involves a comparison of the actual (subsidised) situation with an 
hypothesised nil-subsidy situation, ex ante appraisal requires a 
comparison of the forecast subsidised situation with a forecast nil-
subsidy situation. A~ong the problems of estimation the following are 
of particular prominance: 
(1) Forecasting the incentive effects of subsidisation on the recipient 
enterpri5e or industry 
The first stage in the forecasting of the effect of financial assistance 
on a firm or industry, is to calculate the rate of subsldlsatlon of the 
subsidised variable (generally investment or employment). Then with 
some knowledge of the price elasticity of response by the firm or 
industry, a forecast can be made of the change in output, employment, 
investment, etc. Such a calculation Is particularly important were 
selective assistance takes the form of an incentive to the firm within 
the "market model" of industrial pol icy. 
The calculation of rates of subsidisatlon is likely to be useful In: 
showing the differential effects of a subsidy measure between 
projects and enterprises which differ with regard to capital 
structure, profitability etc. 
comparing the subsidy implied by different types of financial 
assistance' (~.g. gr~nts, soft loans and tax allowances). 
aogregating different types of assistance to an enterprise or 
industry to give a tota 1 level of subsidisation enterpri se of 
industry to grve a total level of subsldlsation (on an ex eos t 
or ex ante bas i s) . 
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The calculation of a measures of subsidisation is no easy matter and a 
number of alternatives are feasible. Among the measures of subsldlsa-
tion employed in the three countries are: 
(i) DCF measures of investment incentives as a proportion of the 
amount of investment expenditure. (Mellis and Richardson 
1976). 
(ii) Overall rates of subsidy. Particular attention has been given 
in Germany to the calculation of overall government assistance 
to each industry expressed as a proportion of output or value 
added. (Fels 1976, Juttemeier and Lammers 1979). 
(iii) Effective rates of trade protection and overall assistance. 
In their effects on international trade, subsidies are similar 
to tariff and other trade barriers in offering protection to 
domestic industries. The calculation of effective rates of 
tariff protection proposed by Corden (1971) can be extended. 
first. to include various non-tariff trade barriers and. second. 
to include subsidies so as to give "effective rates of total 
protection". Some estimates of these latter ratios have been 
produced for Britain and Germany. (Corden and Fels. 1976). 
It is notable that. apart from one study commissioned by the Germany 
government (Juttemeier and Lammers 1979). little interest has been shown 
by governments in the overall allocation of selective assistance and other 
forms of industrial subsidy across industrial sectors .. 
(2) The indirect effects of selective financial assistance upon the 
recipient enterprise or industry. 
Appraisal of the selective industrial assistance tends to consider only 
a small number of target variables. For example, in some of the Swedish 
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appraisals only the impact on ~lployment in the subsidised firm was 
considered, and even in the more sophisticated studies only the direct 
effects on investment, output and employment were taken into account. 
It is certain however, that the impact of financial assistance upon 
recipient firms and industries is far more general than this, and some 
of the indirect effects may have feedback effects on the target variables. 
Observation suggests that the indirect effects of selective assistance 
may, in the long term, be as important as the more immediate impdct on 
jobs and investment. The offer of state assistance can generate 
expectations of continuing government support which encourages X-ineffi-
ciency in the form of managerial complacency and the adherence of shop 
floor workers to restrictive work practices. Evidence from the UK 
.. 
shipbuilding industry shows the tendency for continued state assistance 
to induce wage inflation at industry and company level which can 
effectively negate the employment protecting effects of subsididsatlon. 
(Broadway 1976, Peacock et al 1980, ppl07-111). 
In practice the effects of financial assistance are likely to spread Over a 
wide variety of behaviour and performance variables including productivity, 
labour relations, product development and innovation, levels of inventory, 
marketing practices and so on. Only by undertaking a substantial number 
detailed ex post examinations at the level of the firm of selective 
subsidisation will it be possible to make valid generalisations about 
such effects. 
(3) The effects of selective financial assistance outside the recipient 
firms.The ultimate concern of policy appraisal is with the net effects of 
assistance upon macroeconomic variables. This requires estimates of the 
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various effects of assistance outside the supported enterprise or Industry. 
These wider effects comprise: 
(a) ~la~ement eFfects occur principally among competitors 
of the subsidised enterprise at product market level and 
also among ~ompetitors in input markets (primarily In the 
labour market) through a process of "crowding out". 
Ex post appraisals in the UK of employment subsidies and 
selecti'/e aid to the wool textile industry have discussed 
displacement effects (Department of Employment 1977, 1978, 
Department of Industry i978), but only In the field of 
regional policy does there appp.ar to be quantitative estimates 
of displacement in the form of distinctions between the 
creation of investment and employme;t in the assisted areas, 
and its diversion from other areas (Marguand 1980). 
(b) Offsetting displacement effects are linkage effects - Increases, 
in economic activity among the suppliers and customers of the 
assisted enterprise or industry. Linkage effects may be 
estimated through input-output coefficients. However the 
size of any linkage effects will be reduced by the extent of 
any displacement of economic activity in non-subsidised firms 
by supported firms. 
(c) Multiplier effects have be~n strongly emphasised in appraising 
the impact of regional assistance measures both generally 
and in rel~tion to specific projects (see, for example, Greig 
1972) At the national level, however, the estimation of 
multiplier effects is more prOblematic because of the ques-
tionable validity of Keynesian demand multipliers In terms 
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of real economic variables and the dependence of any 
multiplier effect upon the government's macroeconomic 
policy stance. In the past the assumption employed by 
the British Department of Industry in evaluating industrial 
assistance was that the Treasury aimed at a constant level 
of damnd - hence an increase in expenditure would 
necessitate policy adjustments necessary to maintain a 
constant pressure of aggregate demand. An assumption 
more consistent with recent UK policy would be a 'Ibalanced 
budget approach", where any sub~idy expenditure requires 
an off-setting increase in taxation to maintain a constant 
PSBR. More generally it would be possible to evaluate 
the macro effects of subsidies according to a range of 
alternatives for financing the necessary expenditure -
taxes, the money supply or public borrowing. Whichever 
alternative is chosen, it is necessary Is that the net 
Exchequer cost of the financial assistance Is calculated. 
This take~ into account the gross cost of the subsidy 
together with returns to the Exchequer In taxes and 
savings in social security payments arising from the 
problems of industrial adjustment: to regulate adjustment 
where rapid industrial contraction imposed unacceptable 
sound costs, and to accelerate adjustment through the 
founding new industries and accelerating technical change 
in establis~d industries. Hence for appraising government 
intervention the relevant comparison in many cases of 
selective assistanc~ is between alternative time paths of 
adj~Stment rather than alternative equilibria. In these 
cases comparative dynamic rather than comparative static 
appr~isal would seem appropriate. 
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The rate at which resources are reallocated has been taken into account 
in cost-benefit appraisal both in the UK, where shadow prices for inputs 
are adjusted at differential rates towards market prices, and in Sweden 
where average durations of unemployment have been calculated both regionally' 
and occupationally. Little progress has been made, ~owever, in placing 
the cost-benefit appraisal of industrial support measures within a fully 
dynamic framework. The only example of such an approach in the three 
countries was in relation to price support policies for German agricultrue 
(Koester and Tangermann 1977). 
(5) The range of pOlicy alternatives considered in appraisal exercise. 
One of principal limitations of the ex ante appraisals of selective 
assistance to insolvent enterprises and declining industries has been the 
limited number of policy options considered by government. In most cases 
appraisal only considered the preferred policy measure as compared with 
non-intervention (in the Chrysler UK appraisal, subsldisation of the company 
to continue at its current level of activity was compared only with closure). 
In practice the number of policy options is wide. For example, In Germany 
governments have resisted selectively supporting individual enterprises 
but have introduced employment subsidies and investment Incentives In 
localities affected by the closure or 'decline of major enterprises (e.g • 
. 
following major redundancies by Volkswagen in 1975 the government offered 
incentives to encourage the re-employment of displaced workers). The 
Swedish Commission of Enquiry on Industrial Assistance has pointed to 
the adverse dynamic effects that selective assistance to insolvent 
enterprises may have through inhibiting the adjustments necessary for 
long-run v}ability. Such evidence suggests that governments should 
consider a wider range of policy options when considering applications for 
selective assistance, including the possibility of allowing the bankruptcy 
of the problem enterprise and using financial assistance to encourage 
subsequent reconstruction through acquisition. 
Conclusions 
The survey of the experiences of three countries in appraising their 
policies of selective industrial assistance is, in most respects, 
disappointing in its findings. The need for the objective evaluation 
of selective assistance programmes and decisions Is clear: selective 
industrial intervention has lacked a clear theoretical foundation to 
guide it (unlike other areas of microeconomlc policy such as monopoly 
policy and environmental protection), decisions have been highly suscepti-
ble to political interference, and selective industrial assistance has 
accounted for a large and growing proportion of public expenditure In the 
three co~ntries. Nevertheless, progress in the development and application 
of improved methods of policy appraisal have been slow. Consequently 
the paper has concerned itself more with the problems of appraisal than 
with the achievements. By examining the common difficulties experienced 
in the analysis of selective assistance decisions ar.d revealing the 
deFiciencies of past procedures and methodologies, some recommendations 
can be made for future progress in the field. 
The first stage in the establishment of more effective analysis of 
selective financial assistance to industry must be the formulation of 
clear objectives for such policies. Clarifying the objectives of selective 
assistance necessitates a well-defined policy model which Identifies the 
appropriate reles of government and the private sector and specifies how 
decisions are made in the industrial sector. If industrial intervention 
takes place within a mi'lrket model, then the focus of appraisal must be 
on the sources of market failure and the appropriate subsidy or other 
policy instruments to correct these failures. Forecasting the effects 
of assistance measures within the approach ~ecessitates an analysis of 
the incentive effects of the measures and an understanding of the quantitative 
responses to the incentives. In the planning model a more direct relation-
ship between selective industrial assistance and the target policy variables 
exists, but here the principal problem is the complementary of the various 
instruments of industrial intervention giving rise to intractable 
identification problems. 
The emphasis given in the paper to the institutional framework for policy 
appraisal is justified by the importance of this factor in determining the 
amount and quality of appraisal work and the impact of appraisal on policy 
decisions. Our survey suggests that ex ante appraisal should be closely 
coordinated with the formulation and implementation of policy, not least 
because 6f the superior access to information of the government department 
responsible for industrial policy. Independent analysIs, by management 
consultants and economists for instance, may provide a vital input, 
particularly in examining the causes of unsatisfactory performance in the 
past and in appraising commercial prospects for the future, but the final 
appraisal of the national interest, must ultimately be carried out within 
the policy making department if it is to be influential. 
At the ex post level there appears considerable scope for greater 
diversity in the organisations undertaking appraisal. Appraisal by 
government departments alone is inadequate because of the tendency to 
concentrate upon current policy problems and the lack of a sufficiently 
critical stance. However the creation of specialised internal appraisal 
units of highly qualified personnel has been notably successful in Sweden. 
An obvious need is for improved communication and cooperation between 
government and independent bodies such as universities and research 
.~~ 
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organisations in policy appraisal. While In Germany there has probably 
been too great a reliance upon independent bodies for the appraisal of 
structural economic policies and a lack of adequate cooperation between the 
research institutes and government departments, In the UK their has been 
very little utilisation of the expertise available in universities and 
research organisations. This is partly due to the failure of the BrItish 
government to make available information on its appraisal methods and 
their applications. The high level of communication and cooperation In 
the policy evaluation achieved in Sweden is based partly upon the readiness 
(and the obligation) of government to make Information available to the 
public. 
The greatest scope for improving the apprlasal of selective financial 
assistance to industry lies in the development of better methods for policy 
evaluation. The principal technique for appraising public expenditure 
decisions, cost-benefit analysis, encounters serious problems when applied 
to the disbursement of industrial aid. 
CBA is based upon static, partial equilibrium welfare analysis, while 
selective industrial intervention is in response to dynamic problems and 
is aimed at macroeconomic objectives. Important progress has been made 
In the evaluatory aspects of CBA, notably in the calculation of shadow 
prices and discount rates, however, by for the greatest problems are In 
identifying and measuring the impact of selective assistance upon economic 
variables. The major priorities therefore in improving appraisal methods 
are: 
(I) to consider the effect of Industrial support on a wider range of 
economic variables than the direct impact on Investment, employment 
and output - the effects on productivity wages and managerial 
performance are likely to be especially significant In the longer 
term; 
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(ii) to examine more carefully the effects of selective assistance outside 
the supported enterprises or industry - displacement, linkage and 
macro-level effects are likely to be crucial in determining the 
net effects of industrial assistance; progress In this direction 
is likely to necessitate more detailed econometric modelling of 
individual industries and the construction of disaggregated 
macroeconomic models; 
(iii) to place policy appraisal on a dynamic rather than a static footing, 
In particular to examine the effects of selective assistance on the 
rate of change of impact variables; 
(iv) to consider a wider range of policy options than a simple support 
versus not support alternative., 
In view of the difficulties encountered in the comprehensive appraisal of 
selective industrial intervention and the enormous Information requirements 
which would be imposed, it is unlikely that a full and thorough ex ante 
appraisal of support decisions will ever be either practical or desirable. 
What is of concern, however, is the new programmes for selective subsidies 
are being drawn up and new criteria for the offer of financial assistance 
. 
introduced in the absence of detailed knowledge of the effects or the 
degree of success of past policies of industrial support. If past mistakes 
are not to be repeated and new ones not to be made, then It is essential 
that governments devote substantially more attention and resources to the 
careful appraisal of past policies. 
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FOOTNOTES-
I. The simple distinction between market and planned approaches is 
the most illuminating and useful classification of approaches to 
industrial intervention. Similar but more refined categorisations 
are found in Grant (1982 ppI2-23) and Levacic (1980 pp9-17). 
2. For example, a study by the Boston Consulting Group of Industrial 
development policies (Finlay 1980), pp55-59) and cost benefit 
studies of individual cases of selective support by Professor 
Peter Bohm. 
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